How Extending the Maximum Benefit Duration Affects the Duration of Unemployment

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How Extending the Maximum Benefit Duration Affects the Duration of Unemployment A Regression Discontinuity Approach Rainer Eppel, Marian Fink, Helmut Mahringer Workshop Arbeitsmarktökonomie 2017 IHS Vienna, Nov 2017

Motivation Evidence from empirical studies longer periods of entitlement for UB cause longer benefit receipt e.g. Card et al., 2007 in line with theoretical considerations e.g. Mortensen (1977), Chetty (2008) Effects of longer entitlement may depend on Institutional settings of labor market policies Outcome variables considered e.g. Card Chetty Weber (2007) Labor market policy has to deal with the trade-off between social transfer and incentive to return to work Holmlund (2014), Tatsiramos van Ours (2014) 1 10 Nov 2017

First glance on the data Exits from unemployment react to the maximum entitlement for UB 2 10 Nov 2017

Research question What is the effect of an extended maximum UB-entitlement... on the duration of benefit claims exit rate from unemployment to employment to labor market inactivity on non-employment duration (time to next job) on re-employment wage within the institutional setting of Austrian labor market policy 3 10 Nov 2017

Austrian Unemployment Insurance System Public Employment Service (AMS) Administration of UB and (means-tested ) UA Counselling and placement service Active measures Policy objectives Reduction of unemployment duration Sustained reintegration into employment UI system provides two types of benefits UB ~55% net replacement rate UA ~92% of UB 4 10 Nov 2017

UB elegibility rules: sharp discontinuities in maximum entitelment period Unemployment benefit (UB) Claimant must meet eligibility requirements Maximum entitlement period depends on age and work experience (insurance time) Magnitude of financial drop after exhaustion of UB depends on partners income and the number of dependent children. Age at claim # Claim Time preceding claim Insurance time Max. UB duration < 25 years 1 year 26 weeks 20 weeks first 2 years 1 year 20 weeks consecutive 1 year 28 weeks 20 weeks 5 years 3 years 30 weeks 5 10 Nov 2017

Identification Strategy Graphical representation of discontinuity: Unemployed who worked at least 9 out of 15 years preceding the claim 6 10 Nov 2017

Identification Strategy Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) yy ii = ττdd ii + ff xx ii + gg xx ii DD ii + εε ii, where DD ii = 11 aaaaaa ii 5555 xx ii = aaaaaa ii 5555 and ff, gg assumed to be smooth Identifying assumption: all other unobserved determinants of Y are continuously related to age: ε continuous at x = 0 then treatment is locally randomized Sharp Age strictly determines UB duration 7 10 Nov 2017

Databasis Administrative individual data (full population) Austrian social security records: an administrative matched employeremployee data set regularly processed at WIFO Employment relationships (duration on daily basis, wages on yearly basis) Employee characteristics (age, gender, full labor market career back to 1972,...) Employer caracteristics (industry, number of employees,...) Administrative PES-data: Unemployment episodes on daily basis, including information on participation in active measures and other temporary reasons for interruption of UB recipt Individual characteristics (age, gender, level of education, existence of health restrictions, care responsibilities...) Interventions by PES (monitoring appointments, placement suggestions, assignment to training,...) 8 10 Nov 2017

Data Sample: Inflow into unemployment in years 2010 to 2013, age-group 42-57 years old unemployed who worked at least 9 out of 15 years preceding their UB claim with (new) UB entitlement no recall (promis) by former employer Outcome variables: Outflow from unemployment in employment and out-of-labor-force, respectively Wage in new job (standardized to monthly wage) Contribution base to social insurance (top-coded) Duration of unemployment episodes Duration of UB receipt Net of short interruptions Time to next job Hazard rates for leaving unemployment and finding a job 9 10 Nov 2017

Descriptives: duration of benefit receipt Distribution of actual duration of benefit receipt 39 Weeks 52 Weeks Density 0.01.02.03.04.05 Density 0.01.02.03.04.05 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Week Week Median = 114.0 days / 16.3 weeks Median = 149.0 days / 21.3 weeks N = 65,401 N = 46,796 10 10 Nov 2017

Descriptives: overview 47.1% women 37.4% single household 35.5% unemployed with kids Distribution of exit types Exit to 39 weeks 52 weeks Employment (dependent unsubsidized) 55.82 29.25 Subsidised employment 10.18 17.77 Self employment 5.78 3.53 OLF 23.58 42.19 Censored 4.65 7.27 11 10 Nov 2017

Descriptives: hazard to leave benefit receipt, by transition into employment or inactivity Hazard rate by week, max. UB duration and exit type Hazard rate 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 39 weeks / empl 39 weeks / olf 52 weeks / empl 52 weeks / olf 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Week 12 10 Nov 2017

Descriptives: Hazard rate leaving benefit receipt, by gender and household type Hazard rate by week, max. UB duration, gender / partner in household Hazard rate 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 39 weeks / men 39 weeks / women 52 weeks / men 52 weeks / women Gender Hazard rate 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 39 weeks / no 39 weeks / yes 52 weeks / no 52 weeks / yes Partner 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Week Week 13 10 Nov 2017

Estimation of RD-effects Nonparametric local polynomial estimator without/with additional explanatory variables (following Calonico et al., 2014) Results shown for bandwidth 5 (to both sides: 45 to 54 years) and polynomial degree 2 robust (bias corrected with robust standard errors) estimators Sensitivity analysis OLS for bandwidth (3-7years) and degree of polynomial (1-3) with optimal bandwidth (following Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2011, Calonico et al., 2014) Definition of outcome variables: Durations are censored at the last observable day (June 30 2015) Time to job can become maximum 104 weeks for all observations: otherwise transitions to retirement might influence results Sensitivity checks done, similar results if censored cases are dropped 14 10 Nov 2017

RD results: duration of benefit receipt Effect of extending max. UB duration from 39 to 52 weeks on net actual duration of benefit receipt 150 200 250 300 UB duration in days Total 40 45 50 55 60 Age Sample average Polynomial fit of order 2 15 10 Nov 2017

RD-results: duration of benefit receipt exit to employment vs. exit to inactivity Effect of extending max. UB duration from 39 to 52 weeks on net actual benefit receipt UB duration in days Direct exit to employment UB duration in days Direct exit to inactivity 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 40 45 50 55 60 Age 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 40 45 50 55 60 Age Sample average Polynomial fit of order 2 Sample average Polynomial fit of order 2 16 10 Nov 2017

RD-Results: time to next job Effect of extending max. UB duration from 39 to 52 weeks on time to next job 400 600 800 1000 1200 Time to job in days, cens. 30 Jun 2015 Total 40 45 50 55 60 Age Sample average Polynomial fit of order 2 17 10 Nov 2017

RD-results: overview Sample Cov Case Benefit receipt Time to job Wage Duration Duration, Hazard Hazard Compl. Duration cens. at rate rate Duration 104 weeks Total N Con 14.43** -0.0029*** 15.08*** 0.0006-1,33 6,46 23,78 N Rob 15.51* -0.0031*** 15.46** 0.0012-5,04 2,82 22,77 Y Con 14.29** -0.0035*** 13.74** 0.0007-1,52 8,90 30.38* Y Rob 15.26* -0.0038*** 13.50* 0.0014-5,36 6,43 13,99 Obs. 72.236 69.494 72.236 71.051 53.429 72.236 36.854 Exit to employment N Con 2,91-0.002 3.2101 - - - 23,78 N Rob 1,48-0.0011 0.482 - - - 22,77 Obs. 46.575 46.575 46.575 - - - 36.854 Exit to inactiv ity N Con 23.68** -0.0065 22.13** - - - - N Rob 16,49-0.0027 16,97 - - - - Obs. 21.325 21.325 21.325 - - - - 18 10 Nov 2017

Summary Contribution of the study Discontinuity 39/52 weeks UB not yet analyzed Exact calculation of benefit duration Exit to employment vs. exit to OLF Benefit duration vs. unemployment duration vs. time to next job Differences in household constellation (which determine income drop after UB exhaustion) Effect of extended potential UB duration (52 instead of 39 weeks): Moderate extension of actual UB duration and duration UB is claimed (~15 days) Consistent with lower exit hazard rate Caused mainly by a significant drop in exits to inactivity Women with partners are particularly affected: Means-testing of UA most likely reason for leaving the labor market No significant effect on exits to employment No significant effect on time to next job Insignificant (slightly positive) effect on re-employment wages 19 10 Nov 2017

Thank you 20 10 Nov 2017