THE GREAT RECESSION: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES
|
|
- Philip Thomas
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 THE GREAT RECESSION: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND STRUCTURAL ISSUES Jesse Rothstein CLSRN Summer School June 2013 Unemployment Rate Percent of labor force, seasonally adjusted Oct. 2009: 10.0% 8 6 Oct. 2012: 7.9% 4 2 Oct. 2007: 4.7% Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 1
2 Long- term Unemployment Rate Percent of labor force unemployed 27 weeks or more, seasonally adjusted Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment- PopulaCon Rate by Sex Percent, seasonally adjusted Female Male Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2
3 Unemployment Insurance claims Source: Henry S. Farber and Robert Valletta, Extended Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Duration in the Great Recession: The U.S. Experience. Working paper, June Maximum duration of Unemployment Insurance benefits Source: Henry S. Farber and Robert Valletta, Extended Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Duration in the Great Recession: The U.S. Experience. Working paper, June
4 The effect of UI on unemployment UI subsidizes unemployment in two ways: Reduces incentive to search for work. Creates incentive to remain in labor force. Optimal UI policy trades off consumption smoothing benefit with moral hazard cost. Might expect benefits to be larger, costs lower in recessions à extend/increase benefits when UE is high. Exits from unemployment, by UI eligibility Source: Henry S. Farber and Robert Valletta, Extended Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Duration in the Great Recession: The U.S. Experience. Working paper, June
5 Meyer (1990); Katz-Meyer (1990a, b) Early 1990s estimates for 1980s Look for spike in UI exit hazard as benefit expiration approaches. Mortensen (1977) search model Search intensity s determines offer arrival rate. All offers arrive from stationary wage distribution F(). Accepted if exceed reservation wage w. UI benefits reduce urgency of job-finding, so reduce s & raise w. Exit hazard s(1-f(w)) as benefit exhaustion approaches. Data from administrative records exit hazard = 100% at benefit exhaustion. Important role of temporary layoffs. Predicted unemployment exit hazard, by time until UI exhaustion Source: Bruce Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, Econometrica 58(4), July
6 Empirical unemployment exit hazard, by time in unemployment Source: Bruce Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, Econometrica 58(4), July Empirical unemployment exit hazard, by time until UI exhaustion Source: Bruce Meyer, Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells, Econometrica 58(4), July
7 Card-Levine Examine temporary New Jersey extended benefits program. Argue that extension was exogenous to labor market conditions. Focus on probability of exhausting regular benefits, weekly exit hazards. Look at onset and exit of program. Can examine individuals already drawing UI when new program was announced. Regular UI benefits exhaustion rate, by month Source: David Card & Phillip B. Levine, Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: Evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program, Journal of Public Economics 78 (2000). 7
8 Empirical unemployment exit hazards Source: David Card & Phillip B. Levine, Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: Evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program, Journal of Public Economics 78 (2000). UI survival curves Source: David Card & Phillip B. Levine, Extended benefits and the duration of UI spells: Evidence from the New Jersey extended benefit program, Journal of Public Economics 78 (2000). 8
9 Card-Chetty-Weber Two effects of UI on search effort, with different implications: Moral hazard (substitution deadweight loss). Liquidity (wealth welfare improving). A lump sum severance payment has a liquidity but not a moral hazard effect. No effect if workers can smooth consumption. Regression discontinuity design in Austrian data: At 3 years of service, entitled to 2 months severance payment. UI benefits: 20 weeks if < 36 months of employment in previous 5 years; 30 weeks otherwise. Tenure distribution on pre-displacement job Source: David Card, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, Cash-in-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, QJE November
10 Mean wage on pre-displacement job Source: David Card, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, Cash-in-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, QJE November Predicted UI exit propensity given predetermined characteristics Source: David Card, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, Cash-in-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, QJE November
11 Average nonemployment duration around the severance qualification threshold Source: David Card, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, Cash-in-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, QJE November Average nonemployment duration around the extended benefit qualification threshold Source: David Card, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, Cash-in-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, QJE November
12 Average wage change, pre- to post-displacement, around the severance pay qualification threshold Source: David Card, Raj Chetty, and Andrea Weber, Cash-in-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market, QJE November von Wachter-Bender-Schmieder Q: How do effects of UI vary over the business cycle? Effective UI replacement rate à larger effects. Lower job arrival rate may make workers less confident in their ability to choose their exit timing; congestion may reduce attenuate aggregate effects of individual decisions à smaller effects. Note: Consumption smoothing effects almost certainly larger in recessions, b.c. time to reemployment rises. Strategy: Regression discontinuity in Germany. Benefits depend on age: 12 months if < 42, 18 months if 42-43, 22 months if 44-48, 26 months if 49-53, Mapping doesn t change over a fairly long time period. Estimate effect separately by year and correlate with business cycle. 12
13 Source: Johannes Schmieder, Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years, working paper, July Source: Johannes Schmieder, Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years, working paper, July
14 Source: Johannes Schmieder, Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years, working paper, July Source: Johannes Schmieder, Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years, working paper, July
15 Source: Johannes Schmieder, Till von Wachter, and Stefan Bender, The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years, working paper, July Three ways to estimate the effect of recent UI extensions Extrapolate from 1980s estimates of UI effects. Mazumder (2010): UI extensions raised UE rate by percentage points. Extrapolate from pre-recession trends, attributing any discrepancy to UI. Fujita (2011) 1.2 p.p.; Barro (2010) 2.7 p.p. Use haphazard roll-out of UI extensions to identify UI effect in current data. Rothstein (2011), Farber & Valetta (2011). 15
16 Rothstein (2011) Four identification strategies for effects of changes 1. Control flexibly for labor market conditions 2. Job-leavers as control group 3. Focus on variation coming from state decisions about optional triggers in Extended Benefits (EB) program 4. Focus on time-to-exhaustion (with state x month FEs) identify UI effect from changes in duration profile over time & space. à Each isolates a different component of variation. à Assume workers myopic about future legislative extensions (but Farber & Valetta make opposite assumption w/ similar results). Source: Jesse Rothstein, Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall The roll-out of extended benefits EB triggered EUC triggered EUC automatic Regular benefits EUC authorizations, scheduled expiration, and (retroactive) reauthorizations 16
17 Variation in EB benefits due to adoption of optional triggers Data Matched monthly CPS, April 2004-March ,000 unemployed job-losers, with duration of unemployment and 2 follow-up interviews. Match to state UI rules. Advantages: Current, large samples. Can follow beyond expiration of UI benefits, and have UIineligibles. Can distinguish reemployment from labor force exit. Disadvantages UI receipt / eligibility not measured. Noise in labor force status & duration. Many U-U-U spells are coded as U-N-U (Poterba & Summers, Abowd & Zellner). 17
18 35 Empirical specification (strategy1) where: λist ln = D ist θ + P n (n ist ; γ)+p Z (Z st ; δ)+α s + η t. 1 λ ist λist is the log odds of monthly unemployment exit for ln 1 λ ist job loser i from state s at time t D ist is the number of weeks of benefits (including those already used) n ist is the unemployment duration, with P n (n ist; γ) =n istγ 1 + n 2 istγ 2 + n 1 ist γ 3 +1(n ist 1) γ 4 α s, η t are state and time effects P Z (Z st ; δ) is a flexible function of observable measures of economic conditions Also: (1) allow θ to vary with n ist < 26 vs. n ist 26 (2) multinomial logit models for reemployment vs. LF exit Strategies 2 and 3 Strategy 2: Use job-leavers as a control group. Allows state-by-month FEs Separate P n (n; γ) functions for UI-eligible, ineligible. Control for simulated D (common to both groups), individual Xs. Allow economic conditions measures to affect relative hazards. Strategy 3: Zero in on variation coming from state take-up of EB program. 3 optional triggers for states to adopt; not all states do. Add controls for: EUC weeks available EB benefits if don t adopt any optional triggers EB benefits if adopt all optional triggers Status of each of the triggers Remaining variation in D comes only from state take-up decisions (interacted with trigger status); none from legislative forecasts. 18
19 Strategy 4: Time-to-exhaustion Strategies 1-3 focus on effect of number of weeks of available benefits. Alternatively, can model effect of time-to-exhaustion, d=max(0, D-n): λist 99 ln = f (d ist ; θ)+ 1(n ist = v) γ v + α st 1 λ ist v=0 Allows state-by-month FEs plus unrestricted n controls. f() can be arbitrarily flexible; effects of d are identified from: d/ D = 1 if n D, 0 otherwise. D varies across n within s-t cells due to anticipated EUC expiration. Logit models for unemployment exit Strategy 1 Strategy 2 Strategy 3 Sample is job-losers Sample is Sample is joblosers all unemp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Weeks of benefits (/100) X unemployed < 26 weeks (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) Weeks of benefits (/100) X unemployed 26+ weeks (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.19) (0.27) Controls Unemp duration controls Y Y Y Y Y Y State unemployment rate linear cubic cubic cubic*elig cubic cubic State insured unemp rate State new UI claims rate State empl. growth rate State-by-month FEs Job loser indicator, alone & in interactions Weeks * sensitivity to expectations EUC weeks EB control function cubic cubic cubic Effect of UI extensions on avg. exit hazard in 2010:Q4-1.0 pp -1.3 pp -1.4 pp -1.3 p.p pp -3.1 pp Y Y Y Y Y 19
20 Multinomial logit models for reemployment vs. labor force exit Sample is job-losers (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Reemployment Weeks of benefits (*100) X unemployed < 26 weeks (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.24) (0.33) Weeks of benefits (*100) X unemployed 26+ weeks (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.37) Labor force exit Weeks of benefits (*100) X unemployed < 26 weeks (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.45) (0.26) Weeks of benefits (*100) X unemployed 26+ weeks (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.37) (0.34) Effect of extensions on average hazards in 2010:Q4 Reemployment Labor force exit -0.6 p.p p.p p.p p.p p.p p.p p.p p.p p.p p.p. Effects of time until exhaustion on log odds of unemployment exit (strategy 4) Reemployment Labor force exit Parametric Relative log odds Nonparametric Relative log odds Weeks until exhaustion of benefits Weeks until exhaustion of benefits 0 20
21 Simulated unemployment without UI extensions So what is going on? (Rothstein, 2012) Insufficient aggregate demand? Something else ( structural )? Demand is there, but it isn t getting to the workers. Several mechanisms proposed High implicit taxes discourage work or job search real shortage is on the supply side Mismatch there are jobs and there are workers, but they aren t searching in the same markets Declines in search efficiency of unspecified origin One definition: Unemployment that wouldn t be reduced by balanced increases in demand (without inflation). Source: Jesse Rothstein, The Labor Market Four Years Into the Crisis: Evaluating Structural Explanations, Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 21
22 Claims A substantial part of the increase in unemployment since the beginning of the recession reflected factors other than a shortfall in aggregate demand. (FOMC, 1/12) Labor supply reductions (due in large part to expansions of safety net) explain decline in employment (Mulligan 2009, 2011a, b). Firms have jobs, but can t find appropriate workers. The workers want to work, but can t find appropriate jobs. There are many possible sources of mismatch geography, skills, demography and they are probably all at work (Kocherlakota 2010). Structural UE due to supply shift w D S S w w L L L 22
23 Structural UE due to supply shift w w S S w D w D L L L Structural UE due to demand shifts LABOR MARKET A LABOR MARKET B S A w A S B w A D A w B w B D A D B D B L A L A L B L B 23
24 How to distinguish? Structural explanations w/ sufficient aggregate demand imply that employers have jobs but are having trouble finding workers. I.e., that there is a supply shortage (in the markets where the jobs are). à Should expect rising wages (in some markets). Estimating wage changes Current Population Survey monthly measures of hourly wages. Construct 12-month changes. Wage changes over business cycle are confounded by compositional changes, stickiness. Strategy 1: Use repeated observations on individuals employed in both periods. Strategy 2: Use wages on new jobs, reweighted for changes in observables 24
25 Figure 11. Twelve-month changes in mean wages, various subsamples 12-month growth in average wages (percent) All workers Composition-adjusted New jobs Date Change in log real wage at percentile Figure 12. Change in distribution of starting wages, to All industries Industries with large job openings increases Percentile of residual log real wage distribution 25
Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great. Recession
Unemployment Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession Jesse Rothstein University of California, Berkeley and NBER July 13, 2011 Abstract Nearly two years after the official end of the "Great Recession,"
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND JOB SEARCH IN THE GREAT RECESSION. Jesse Rothstein
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND JOB SEARCH IN THE GREAT RECESSION Jesse Rothstein Working Paper 17534 http://www.nber.org/papers/w17534 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts
More informationApril 2015 Forthcoming, American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings. Abstract
The Effect of Extended Unemployment Insurance Benefits: Evidence from the 2012-2013 Phase-Out Henry S. Farber Jesse Rothstein Robert G. Valletta Princeton University U.C. Berkeley FRB San Francisco April
More informationDoes Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality?
Does Extending Unemployment Benefits Improve Job Quality? Arash Nekoei IIES Stockholm Andrea Weber CEU Question Unemployment insurance (UI) increases unemployment duration Does UI also affect job quality?
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES DO EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS LENGTHEN UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS? EVIDENCE FROM RECENT CYCLES IN THE U.S.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES DO EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS LENGTHEN UNEMPLOYMENT SPELLS? EVIDENCE FROM RECENT CYCLES IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET Henry S. Farber Robert G. Valletta Working Paper 19048 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19048
More informationLECTURE: UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE:
LECTURE: UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION HILARY HOYNES UC DAVIS EC230 OUTLINE OF LECTURE: 1. Consumption smoothing 2. Moral hazard in unemployment spell length 3. Cash in hand models 1 Baily/Chetty papers show
More informationRecent Extensions of U.S. Unemployment Benefits: Search Responses in Alternative Labor Market States
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 8247 Recent Extensions of U.S. Unemployment Benefits: Search Responses in Alternative Labor Market States Robert G. Valletta June 2014 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft
More informationECONOMIC COMMENTARY. Reassessing the Effects of Extending Unemployment Insurance Benefits Pedro Amaral and Jessica Ice
ECONOMIC COMMENTARY Number 2014-23 November 14, 2014 Reassessing the Effects of Extending Unemployment Insurance Benefits Pedro Amaral and Jessica Ice To deal with the high level of unemployment during
More informationTopic 2-3: Policy Design: Unemployment Insurance and Moral Hazard
Introduction Trade-off Optimal UI Empirical Topic 2-3: Policy Design: Unemployment Insurance and Moral Hazard Johannes Spinnewijn London School of Economics Lecture Notes for Ec426 1 / 27 Introduction
More informationEFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXTENSIONS ON JOB SEARCH OUTCOMES
Clemson University TigerPrints All Theses Theses 5-2013 EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXTENSIONS ON JOB SEARCH OUTCOMES Ailin He Clemson University, ahe@g.clemson.edu Follow this and additional works
More informationScraping By: Responses to Unemployment Insurance Exhaustion in the Aftermath of the Great Recession
Highly preliminary and incomplete draft. Do not cite without authors permission. Scraping By: Responses to Unemployment Insurance Exhaustion in the Aftermath of the Great Recession Jesse Rothstein Goldman
More informationPOLICY BRIEF: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WORKER MOBILITY Ryan Nunn, Laura Kawano, and Ben Klemens February 8, 2018
POLICY BRIEF: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WORKER MOBILITY Ryan Nunn, Laura Kawano, and Ben Klemens February 8, 2018 Unemployment insurance (UI) helps workers smooth their consumption after employment loss,
More informationDoes Reducing Unemployment Benefits During a Recession Reduce Youth Unemployment? Evidence from a 50 Percent Cut in Unemployment Assistance
ONLINE APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSES AND ADDITIONAL ESTIMATES FOR Does Reducing Unemployment Benefits During a Recession Reduce Youth Unemployment? Evidence from a 50 Percent Cut in Unemployment Assistance
More informationUnemployment Benefits, Unemployment Duration, and Post-Unemployment Jobs: A Regression Discontinuity Approach
Unemployment Benefits, Unemployment Duration, and Post-Unemployment Jobs: A Regression Discontinuity Approach By Rafael Lalive* Structural unemployment appears to be strongly correlated with the potential
More informationEC426-Public Economics. Class 2, Question1
EC426-Public Economics Class 2, Question1 In the US, the time that people can receive unemployment benefits is extended during recessions. Use the Baily formula to shed light on this particular design
More informationThe Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance
The Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance Benefits Nynke de Groot Bas van der Klaauw July 14, 2014 Abstract This paper exploits a substantial reform of the Dutch UI law to
More informationThe Welfare Effects of Welfare and Tax Reform during the Great Recession
The Welfare Effects of Welfare and Tax Reform during the Great Recession PROJECT DESCRIPTION - PRELIMINARY Kavan Kucko Johannes F. Schmieder Boston University Boston University, NBER, and IZA October 2012
More informationThe Effects of Extended Unemployment Benefits: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design (Latest version available here )
The Effects of Extended Unemployment Benefits: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design (Latest version available here ) Po-Chun Huang Tzu-Ting Yang October 10, 2016 Abstract This paper uses administrative
More informationEquitable Growth. Extended Unemployment Insurance Remains Critical. Washington Center for
Washington Center for Equitable Growth Extended Unemployment Insurance Remains Critical Recent data indicates that extended benefits would support displaced workers and keep them in the job market with
More informationScraping By: Income and Program Participation After the Loss of Extended Unemployment Benefits
Scraping By: Income and Program Participation After the Loss of Extended Unemployment Benefits Jesse Rothstein Goldman School of Public Policy & Department of Economics University of California, Berkeley
More informationDo Unemployment Insurance Extensions Reduce Employment?
Do Unemployment Insurance Extensions Reduce Employment? John Coglianese November 30, 2015 Abstract Unemployment insurance (UI) extensions can have broad effects on labor markets by changing search effort,
More informationTopic 1: Policy Design: Unemployment Insurance and Moral Hazard
Introduction Trade-off Optimal UI Empirical Topic 1: Policy Design: Unemployment Insurance and Moral Hazard Johannes Spinnewijn London School of Economics Lecture Notes for Ec426 1 / 39 Introduction Trade-off
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS: NEW EVIDENCE AND INTERPRETATION. Johannes F. Schmieder Till von Wachter
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS: NEW EVIDENCE AND INTERPRETATION Johannes F. Schmieder Till von Wachter Working Paper 22564 http://www.nber.org/papers/w22564 NATIONAL
More informationDo Unemployment Insurance Extensions Reduce Employment?
Do Unemployment Insurance Extensions Reduce Employment? John Coglianese October 31, 2015 Abstract Unemployment insurance (UI) extensions can have broad effects on labor markets by changing search effort,
More informationUnemployment Insurance and Worker Mobility
Unemployment Insurance and Worker Mobility Laura Kawano, Office of Tax Analysis, U. S. Department of Treasury Ryan Nunn, Office of Economic Policy, U.S. Department of Treasury Abstract After an involuntary
More informationIRLE. Scraping By: Income and Program Participation After the Loss of Extended Unemployment Benefits. IRLE WORKING PAPER # February 2014
IRLE IRLE WORKING PAPER #101-14 February 2014 Scraping By: Income and Program Participation After the Loss of Extended Unemployment Benefits Jesse Rothstein and Robert G. Valletta Cite as: Jesse Rothstein
More informationA Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions
A Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions Makoto Nakajima February 8, 211 First draft: January 19, 21 Abstract This paper measures the effect of extensions of unemployment insurance (UI)
More informationHOW LONG DO UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS SEARCH FOR A JOB?
February 2014, Number 14-3 RETIREMENT RESEARCH HOW LONG DO UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS SEARCH FOR A JOB? By Matthew S. Rutledge* Introduction The labor force participation of older workers has been rising
More informationJob Search and Unemployment Insurance: New Evidence from Time Use Data. Alan B. Krueger Princeton University and NBER. and
Job Search and Unemployment Insurance: New Evidence from Time Use Data Alan B. Krueger Princeton University and NBER and Andreas Mueller Stockholm University and Princeton University First Draft: July
More informationWorking Paper Do Extended Unemployment Benefits Lengthen Unemployment Spells? Evidence from Recent Cycles in the U.S. Labor Market
econstor www.econstor.eu Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Farber,
More informationDisincentive Effects of Unemployment Benefits and the Role of Caseworkers
Disincentive Effects of Unemployment Benefits and the Role of Caseworkers Johannes F Schmieder Simon Trenkle Boston University, Institute for Employment NBER, IZA Research (IAB) October 2015 Abstract A
More informationThe Value of Unemployment Insurance
The Value of Unemployment Insurance Camille Landais (LSE) and Johannes Spinnewijn (LSE) September, 2018 Landais & Spinnewijn (LSE) Value of UI September, 2018 1 / 27 Motivation: Value of Insurance Key
More informationThe Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of. Unemployment Insurance Receipt: New Evidence from a
WORKING PAPER #585 PRINCETON UNIVERSITY INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SECTION JANUARY 2015 http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01f4752j974 The Effect of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment
More informationComments on Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Unemployment Insurance from New York State by Bruce Meyer and Wallace Mok Manuel Arellano
Comments on Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Unemployment Insurance from New York State by Bruce Meyer and Wallace Mok Manuel Arellano Quinta do Lago, June 10, 2007 Introduction A nice paper
More informationThe Outlook for Employment and Unemployment
The Outlook for Employment and Unemployment Rob Valletta* Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco *The views expressed are solely my own and are in no way attributable to the Federal Reserve Bank of San
More informationHow Tight is the Labor Market?
How Tight is the Labor Market? Alan B. Krueger November 19, 2015 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Outline U.S. unemployment rate is down from 10% in October 2009 to 5.0% in October 2015 that represents
More informationA SHORT REVIEW OF RECENT EVIDENCE ON THE DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND NEW EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK STATE
National Tax Journal, March 2014, 67 (1), 219 252 A SHORT REVIEW OF RECENT EVIDENCE ON THE DISINCENTIVE EFFECTS OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND NEW EVIDENCE FROM NEW YORK STATE Bruce D. Meyer and Wallace
More informationUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAXES AND LABOR-MARKET RECOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM FLORIDA AND MISSOURI
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAXES AND LABOR-MARKET RECOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM FLORIDA AND MISSOURI Andrew C. Johnston* January 2015 JOB MARKET PAPER Abstract Unemployment insurance (UI) taxes impose penalties
More informationUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAXES AND LABOR-MARKET RECOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM FLORIDA AND MISSOURI
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TAXES AND LABOR-MARKET RECOVERY: EVIDENCE FROM FLORIDA AND MISSOURI Andrew C. Johnston* December 2015 JOB MARKET PAPER Abstract Unemployment insurance (UI) taxes impose penalties
More informationEstimating the Effect of Extended and Emergency Unemployment Benefits on the Long-term Unemployed
Clemson University TigerPrints All Dissertations Dissertations 12-2015 Estimating the Effect of Extended and Emergency Unemployment Benefits on the Long-term Unemployed James Jones Clemson University,
More informationThe Costs of Job Displacement over the Business Cycle and Its Sources: Evidence from Germany
The Costs of Job Displacement over the Business Cycle and Its Sources: Evidence from Germany Johannes F. Schmieder Till von Wachter Stefan Bender Boston University University of California, Los Angeles,
More informationColumbia University. Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Columbia University Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series The Effects of Unemployment Insurance on Labor Supply and Search Outcomes: Regression Discontinuity Estimates from Germany Johannes F.
More informationApril Andrew C. Johnston University of California, Merced. Alexandre Mas Princeton University and NBER ABSTRACT
POTENTIAL UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DURATION AND LABOR SUPPLY: THE INDIVIDUAL AND MARKET-LEVEL RESPONSE TO A BENEFIT CUT * April 2017 Andrew C. Johnston University of California, Merced Alexandre Mas Princeton
More informationTuning unemployment insurance to the business cycle Unemployment insurance generosity should be greater when unemployment is high and vice versa
Torben M. Andersen Aarhus University, Denmark, and IZA, Germany Tuning unemployment insurance to the business cycle Unemployment insurance generosity should be greater when unemployment is high and vice
More informationFRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER
FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 2009-28 September 8, 2009 New Highs in Unemployment Insurance Claims BY AISLING CLEARY, JOYCE KWOK, AND ROB VALLETTA Unemployment insurance benefits have been on an upward trend over
More informationThe Effects of Increasing the Early Retirement Age on Social Security Claims and Job Exits
The Effects of Increasing the Early Retirement Age on Social Security Claims and Job Exits Day Manoli UCLA Andrea Weber University of Mannheim February 29, 2012 Abstract This paper presents empirical evidence
More informationA Contribution to the Empirics of Reservation Wages
A Contribution to the Empirics of Reservation Wages Alan B. Krueger, Princeton University Andreas I. Mueller, Columbia University and IZA November 11, 2013 Abstract: This paper provides evidence on the
More informationWORKING PAPER NO EFFECTS OF THE UI BENEFIT EXTENSIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE MONTHLY CPS. Shigeru Fujita Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
WORKING PAPER NO. 10-35 EFFECTS OF THE UI BENEFIT EXTENSIONS: EVIDENCE FROM THE MONTHLY CPS Shigeru Fujita Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia November 2010 Effects of the UI Benefit Extensions: Evidence
More informationThe Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment Duration and the Subsequent Employment Stability
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 1163 The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Unemployment Duration and the Subsequent Employment Stability Konstantinos Tatsiramos May 2004 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft
More informationThe Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance
The Effects of Reducing the Entitlement Period to Unemployment Insurance Benefits Nynke de Groot Bas van der Klaauw February 6, 2019 Abstract This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach exploiting
More informationThe Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years
The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates over Twenty Years Johannes F. Schmieder Till von Wachter Stefan Bender Boston University
More informationUnemployment Insurance and the Unemployment Rate: Evidence Across U.S. Counties. Ariel Goldszmidt. 1! of! 16
Goldszmidt: Unemployment Insurance and the Unemployment Rate: Evidence Across Unemployment Insurance and the Unemployment Rate: Evidence Across U.S. Counties Ariel Goldszmidt 1! of! 16 Published by Dartmouth
More informationNew Ideas about the Long-Lasting Collapse of Employment after the Financial Crisis
New Ideas about the Long-Lasting Collapse of Employment after the Financial Crisis Robert E. Hall Hoover Institution and Department of Economics Stanford University Woytinsky Lecture, University of Michigan
More information********************************************************
Unemployment*Insurance*and*Disability*Insurance*in*the*Great*Recession* * * Andreas*I.*Mueller * * Columbia*University,*NBER*and*IZA* * Jesse*Rothstein* University*of*California,*Berkeley*and*NBER* * Till*M.*von*Wachter*
More informationJob Search and Job Finding in a Period of Mass Unemployment: Evidence from High-Frequency Longitudinal Data. Alan B. Krueger Princeton University.
Job Search and Job Finding in a Period of Mass Unemployment: Evidence from High-Frequency Longitudinal Data Alan B. Krueger Princeton University and Andreas Mueller* Stockholm University January 16, 2011
More informationUnemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment, and Firm-Worker Collusion
Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment, and Firm-Worker Collusion Bernardus Van Doornik David Schoenherr Janis Skrastins October 18, 2017 The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors
More informationA Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions
A Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions Makoto Nakajima June 11, 2012 First draft: January 19, 2010 Abstract Extensions of unemployment insurance (UI) benefits have been implemented
More informationOn the Design of an European Unemployment Insurance Mechanism
On the Design of an European Unemployment Insurance Mechanism Árpád Ábrahám João Brogueira de Sousa Ramon Marimon Lukas Mayr European University Institute Lisbon Conference on Structural Reforms, 6 July
More informationReemployment Bonuses, Unemployment Duration, and Job Match Quality
Reemployment Bonuses, Unemployment Duration, and Job Match Quality Taehyun Ahn School of Economics, Sogang University Seoul 121-742, Korea ahn83@sogang.ac.kr, tahn.83@gmail.com July 2016 ABSTRACT This
More informationBenefit Duration, Unemployment Duration and Job Match Quality: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 4670 Benefit Duration, Unemployment Duration and Job Match Quality: A Regression-Discontinuity Approach Marco Caliendo Konstantinos Tatsiramos Arne Uhlendorff December
More informationThe Effects of Unemployment Insurance Under High Informality: Evidence from Argentina
The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Under High Informality: Evidence from Argentina Martín González-Rozada UTDT Hernán Ruffo UTDT October 2, 2014 Abstract We evaluate the effects of unemployment insurance
More informationChapter II: Labour Market Policy
Chapter II: Labour Market Policy Section 2: Unemployment insurance Literature: Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund (2001), Optimal unemployment insurance in search equilibrium, Journal of Labor Economics
More informationCASH-ON-HAND AND COMPETING MODELS OF INTERTEMPORAL BEHAVIOR: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE LABOR MARKET* DAVID CARD RAJ CHETTY ANDREA WEBER
CASH-ON-HAND AND COMPETING MODELS OF INTERTEMPORAL BEHAVIOR: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE LABOR MARKET* DAVID CARD RAJ CHETTY ANDREA WEBER This paper presents new tests of the permanent income hypothesis and
More informationUnemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession. Andreas I. Mueller * Columbia University and IZA
Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance in the Great Recession Andreas I. Mueller * Columbia University and IZA Jesse Rothstein University of California, Berkeley and NBER Till M. von Wachter University
More informationUNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WORKER MOBILITY
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND WORKER MOBILITY Ryan Nunn, Laura Kawano and Ben Klemens February 8, 2018 ABSTRACT Unemployment insurance (UI) helps workers to smooth their consumption after employment loss,
More informationThe Role of Unemployment in the Rise in Alternative Work Arrangements. Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger* 1 December 31, 2016
The Role of Unemployment in the Rise in Alternative Work Arrangements Lawrence F. Katz and Alan B. Krueger* 1 December 31, 2016 Much evidence indicates that the traditional 9-to-5 employee-employer relationship
More informationAntipoverty Effects of Unemployment Insurance
Antipoverty Effects of Unemployment Insurance Thomas Gabe Specialist in Social Policy Julie M. Whittaker Specialist in Income Security October 16, 2012 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and
More informationStrengthening Enforcement in Unemployment Insurance: A Natural Experiment
Strengthening Enforcement in Unemployment Insurance: A Natural Experiment Patrick Arni Amelie Schiprowski April 2017 Abstract Enforcing the compliance with rules through the threat of financial penalties
More informationShould Unemployment Insurance Vary With the Local Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence
Should Unemployment Insurance Vary With the Local Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence Kory Kroft Yale School of Management Matthew J. Notowidigdo University of Chicago Booth School of Business October
More informationCash-on-hand in Developing Countries and the Value of Social Insurance: Evidence from Brazil
Cash-on-hand in Developing Countries and the Value of Social Insurance: Evidence from Brazil Diogo G. C. Britto October 30, 2016 Abstract This paper first exploits a bonus policy providing low-income workers
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE CAUSAL EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION ON WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXTENSIONS
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE CAUSAL EFFECT OF UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION ON WAGES: EVIDENCE FROM UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXTENSIONS Johannes F. Schmieder Till von Wachter Stefan Bender Working Paper 19772 http://www.nber.org/papers/w19772
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CONSUMER CREDIT
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES OF SOCIAL INSURANCE: UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CONSUMER CREDIT Joanne W. Hsu David A. Matsa Brian T. Melzer Working Paper 20353 http://www.nber.org/papers/w20353
More informationLessons from research on unemployment policies
Econ 4715 Lecture 5 Lessons from research on unemployment policies Simen Markussen Insurance vs. incentives Policy makers face difficult trade-offs when designing unemployment insurance Insurance vs. incentives
More informationWhen the Going Gets Tough... Financial Incentives, Duration of Unemployment and. Job-Match Quality
When the Going Gets Tough... Financial Incentives, Duration of Unemployment and Job-Match Quality Yolanda F. Rebollo-Sanz, Universidad Pablo Olavide Núria Rodríguez-Planas, City University of New York
More informationThe earned income tax credit (EITC) has grown to be an important part of the
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2013, 5(2): 190 223 http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.2.190 The EITC, Tax Refunds, and Unemployment Spells By Sara LaLumia* The earned income tax credit generates
More informationLabor Market Update. Where we are today. December 3, 2010
Labor Market Update December 3, 1 Daniel Aaronson Vice President and Director of Microeconomic Research Research Department daaronson@frbchi.org 1 Where we are today Chicago Fed National Activity Index
More informationFederal Subsidization and Optimal State Provision of Unemployment Insurance in the United States
Federal Subsidization and Optimal State Provision of Unemployment Insurance in the United States Jorge A. Barro University of Texas at Austin Job Market Paper June 18, 2012 Abstract This paper studies
More informationCREATIVE DESTRUCTION & JOB MOBILITY: FLEXICURITY IN THE LAND OF SCHUMPETER
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION & JOB MOBILITY: FLEXICURITY IN THE LAND OF SCHUMPETER Andreas Kettemann, University of Zurich Francis Kramarz, CREST-ENSAE Josef Zweimüller, University of Zurich OECD, Paris February
More informationUnemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment, and Firm-Worker Collusion
Unemployment Insurance, Strategic Unemployment, and Firm-Worker Collusion Bernardus Van Doornik David Schoenherr Janis Skrastins July 31, 2017 The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors
More informationPotential Causes and Implications of the Rise in Long-Term Unemployment 1
Economic Brief September 2011, EB11-09 Potential Causes and Implications of the Rise in Long-Term Unemployment 1 By Andreas Hornstein, Thomas A. Lubik, and Jessie Romero Long-term unemployment rose dramatically
More informationThe Aggregate Implications of Regional Business Cycles
The Aggregate Implications of Regional Business Cycles Martin Beraja Erik Hurst Juan Ospina University of Chicago University of Chicago University of Chicago Fall 2017 This Paper Can we use cross-sectional
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES WHY DO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS RAISE UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS? MORAL HAZARD VS. LIQUIDITY. Raj Chetty
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES WHY DO UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS RAISE UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS? MORAL HAZARD VS. LIQUIDITY Raj Chetty Working Paper 11760 http://www.nber.org/papers/w11760 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC
More informationLabor Market Shocks and Retirement: Do Government Programs Matter?
Labor Market Shocks and Retirement: Do Government Programs Matter? Courtney C. Coile Department of Economics Wellesley College and NBER ccoile@wellesley.edu Phillip B. Levine Department of Economics Wellesley
More information(a) Is it possible for the rate of exit from OLF into E tobethesameastherateof exit from U into E? Why or why not?
Final (Take-Home) Exam The Formulation and Estimation of Equilibrium Models of Household and Labor Market Behavior Department of Economics, TAU Professor C. Flinn Please answer five (5) of the following
More informationTopic 11: Disability Insurance
Topic 11: Disability Insurance Nathaniel Hendren Harvard Spring, 2018 Nathaniel Hendren (Harvard) Disability Insurance Spring, 2018 1 / 63 Disability Insurance Disability insurance in the US is one of
More informationLecture 11: Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers Compensation
53 Lecture 11: Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers Compensation Stefanie Stantcheva Fall 2017 53 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES Unemployment insurance, workers compensation, and disability
More informationWhy do Unemployment Benefits Raise Unemployment Durations? The Role of Borrowing Constraints and Income Effects
Why do Unemployment Benefits Raise Unemployment Durations? The Role of Borrowing Constraints and Income Effects Raj Chetty UC-Berkeley and NBER November 2005 Abstract It is well known that unemployment
More informationLabor Market Shocks and Retirement: Do Government Programs Matter?
Wellesley College Wellesley College Digital Scholarship and Archive Economics Faculty Scholarship Economics 10-2006 Labor Market Shocks and Retirement: Do Government Programs Matter? Courtney C. Coile
More informationShould UI Eligibility Be Expanded to Low-Earning Workers? Evidence on Employment, Transfer Receipt, and Income from Administrative Data
Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 2015 Should UI Eligibility Be Expanded to Low-Earning Workers? Evidence on Employment, Transfer Receipt, and Income from Administrative Data Pauline
More informationA Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions
A Quantitative Analysis of Unemployment Benefit Extensions Makoto Nakajima November 8, 2011 First draft: January 19, 2010 Abstract This paper measures the effect of the ongoing extensions of unemployment
More informationCostly Commuting and the Job Ladder
Costly Commuting and the Job Ladder [preliminary and incomplete] Jean Flemming University of Oxford ESEM Lisbon August 23, 2017 Motivating Facts Job-to-job (J2J) transitions are important for wage growth
More informationCamille Landais Assessing the welfare effects of unemployment benefits using the regression kink design
Camille Landais Assessing the welfare effects of unemployment benefits using the regression kink design Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Landais, Camille (2015) Assessing the welfare
More informationUnemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers Compensation. 131 Undergraduate Public Economics Emmanuel Saez UC Berkeley
Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers Compensation 131 Undergraduate Public Economics Emmanuel Saez UC Berkeley 1 INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES Unemployment insurance, workers compensation,
More informationThe spike at benefit exhaustion in the Finnish labor market
VATT Working Papers 86 The spike at benefit exhaustion in the Finnish labor market Tomi Kyyrä Hanna Pesola Jouko Verho VATT INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH VATT WORKING PAPERS 86 The spike at benefit exhaustion
More informationFind a Job Now, Start Working Later Does Unemployment Insurance Subsidize Leisure?
Find a Job Now, Start Working Later Does Unemployment Insurance Subsidize Leisure? (Job market paper) Marjolaine Gauthier-Loiselle Princeton University September 2011 Abstract Distorting incentives is
More informationHow Changes in Unemployment Benefit Duration Affect the Inflow into Unemployment
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES IZA DP No. 4691 How Changes in Unemployment Benefit Duration Affect the Inflow into Unemployment Jan C. van Ours Sander Tuit January 2010 Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit
More informationFRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER
FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 1- January, 1 Why Is Unemployment Duration So Long? BY ROB VALLETTA AND KATHERINE KUANG During the recent recession, unemployment duration reached levels well above those of past
More informationAn Empirical Note on the Relationship between Unemployment and Risk- Aversion
An Empirical Note on the Relationship between Unemployment and Risk- Aversion Luis Diaz-Serrano and Donal O Neill National University of Ireland Maynooth, Department of Economics Abstract In this paper
More informationUnemployment, Consumption Smoothing and the Value of UI
Unemployment, Consumption Smoothing and the Value of UI Camille Landais (LSE) and Johannes Spinnewijn (LSE) December 15, 2016 Landais & Spinnewijn (LSE) Value of UI December 15, 2016 1 / 33 Motivation
More informationEarnings Inequality and the Minimum Wage: Evidence from Brazil
Earnings Inequality and the Minimum Wage: Evidence from Brazil Niklas Engbom June 16, 2016 Christian Moser World Bank-Bank of Spain Conference This project Shed light on drivers of earnings inequality
More information