Discussion of "Risk Premium Shocks and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest"

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Discussion of "Risk Premium Shocks and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest" by Robert Amano and Malik Shukayev Andrea Tambalotti Federal Reserve Bank of New York Bank of Italy Conference on Macro Modeling in the Policy Environment Rome, 30 June 2009 The views expressed in this paper solely re ect those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Banks of New York or San Francisco, or those of the Federal Reserve System as a whole Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 1 / 9

The Issue Nominal interest rates are at zero, but what got us here? Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 2 / 9

The Issue Nominal interest rates are at zero, but what got us here? Can we make zero bind in a quantitative DSGE model? Literature largely qualitative, liquidity trap "assumed" Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 2 / 9

The Issue Nominal interest rates are at zero, but what got us here? Can we make zero bind in a quantitative DSGE model? Literature largely qualitative, liquidity trap "assumed" Useful to learn about Model: new shocks, new frictions World: locate source of problems Desirable policy response Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 2 / 9

The Strategy Calibrate a New Neoclassical Synthesis model to the U.S. RBC + nominal and real frictions + shocks Careful calibration of shock distributions Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 3 / 9

The Strategy Calibrate a New Neoclassical Synthesis model to the U.S. RBC + nominal and real frictions + shocks Careful calibration of shock distributions Simulate imposing the zero bound (hard!) How often does it bind? 1.7% of the quarters (every 15 years) Never without risk premium shocks Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 3 / 9

The Strategy Calibrate a New Neoclassical Synthesis model to the U.S. RBC + nominal and real frictions + shocks Careful calibration of shock distributions Simulate imposing the zero bound (hard!) How often does it bind? 1.7% of the quarters (every 15 years) Never without risk premium shocks But how often is often enough? Over last 60 years, FedFunds lower than 0.5% only "once" Rare event problem Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 3 / 9

The Strategy Calibrate a New Neoclassical Synthesis model to the U.S. RBC + nominal and real frictions + shocks Careful calibration of shock distributions Simulate imposing the zero bound (hard!) How often does it bind? 1.7% of the quarters (every 15 years) Never without risk premium shocks But how often is often enough? Over last 60 years, FedFunds lower than 0.5% only "once" Rare event problem How long are the episodes? Perhaps should look at left tail more generally Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 3 / 9

The Strategy Calibrate a New Neoclassical Synthesis model to the U.S. RBC + nominal and real frictions + shocks Careful calibration of shock distributions Simulate imposing the zero bound (hard!) How often does it bind? 1.7% of the quarters (every 15 years) Never without risk premium shocks But how often is often enough? Over last 60 years, FedFunds lower than 0.5% only "once" Rare event problem How long are the episodes? Perhaps should look at left tail more generally How about the other variables? Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 3 / 9

The Strategy Calibrate a New Neoclassical Synthesis model to the U.S. RBC + nominal and real frictions + shocks Careful calibration of shock distributions Simulate imposing the zero bound (hard!) How often does it bind? 1.7% of the quarters (every 15 years) Never without risk premium shocks But how often is often enough? Over last 60 years, FedFunds lower than 0.5% only "once" Rare event problem How long are the episodes? Perhaps should look at left tail more generally How about the other variables? Unconditional analysis must also account for dynamics at zero Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 3 / 9

Some Intuition i = r MPK S(r) i* = r* = 2.5% i = 0 I(MPK f ) Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 4 / 9

Some Intuition i = r MPK S(r) i* = r* = 2.5% i = 0 τ I(MPK f ) Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 5 / 9

An Alternative Strategy Focus on causes of current situation, rather than on unconditional frequency Estimate model in normal times If Bayesian, careful calibration of shocks useful for prior Conditional on estimates, smooth shocks through end of 08 Procedure picks shocks to reproduce observables exactly Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 6 / 9

An Alternative Strategy Focus on causes of current situation, rather than on unconditional frequency Estimate model in normal times If Bayesian, careful calibration of shocks useful for prior Conditional on estimates, smooth shocks through end of 08 Procedure picks shocks to reproduce observables exactly What shocks are crucial for what variables? 5.5% GDP might be harder than FedFunds at 0.18% How large are the shocks? Compared to independent evidence (prior) posterior distribution in "normal" times Measures of t excluding selected shocks Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 6 / 9

Alternative Strategy: Implementation (JPT) Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 7 / 9

When Does the Zero Bound Matter? Alternative strategy computationally impossible with zero bound Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 8 / 9

When Does the Zero Bound Matter? Alternative strategy computationally impossible with zero bound But what is the role of the zero bound in the paper? Expected de ation is key ampli cation mechanism. At zero recession ) de ation ) higher real rates ) more recession Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 8 / 9

When Does the Zero Bound Matter? Alternative strategy computationally impossible with zero bound But what is the role of the zero bound in the paper? Expected de ation is key ampli cation mechanism. At zero recession ) de ation ) higher real rates ) more recession Here π t = 0, so no expected de ation Is this always feasible with zero bound binding? Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 8 / 9

When Does the Zero Bound Matter? Alternative strategy computationally impossible with zero bound But what is the role of the zero bound in the paper? Expected de ation is key ampli cation mechanism. At zero recession ) de ation ) higher real rates ) more recession Here π t = 0, so no expected de ation Is this always feasible with zero bound binding? Zero bound a bizarro world, policies matter a lot With appropriate policies, zero bound no big deal Ignore the non linearity and use alternative strategy Zero bound can become a nightmare with "wrong" policies Policies at least as important as non linearity, need careful modelling Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 8 / 9

Conclusion Positive analysis of the zero bound is hard! Policies are crucial, but little historical evidence If question is: how did we get to 2008Q4 (when FedFunds rst 0)? Ignoring non linearity might be OK, follow alternative strategy If question is: what happens from here? Non-linearity important, but so are policies Two questions better addressed separetly Tambalotti (FRBNY) Discussion of Risk Premium Shocks Bank of Italy, 30 June 09 9 / 9