Appendix. Table S1: Construct Validity Tests for StateHist

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Transcription:

Appendix Table S1: Construct Validity Tests for StateHist (5) (6) Roads Water Hospitals Doctors Mort5 LifeExp GDP/cap 60 4.24 6.72** 0.53* 0.67** 24.37** 6.97** (2.73) (1.59) (0.22) (0.09) (4.72) (0.85) Democracy 19.33 16.24** 2.18** 0.32 46.67** 7.02* (10.26) (5.96) (0.82) (0.33) (17.72) (3.19) TaxRev 1.39** 0.08 0.05* 0.03* 0.04 0.14 (0.32) (0.18) (0.03) (0.01) (0.54) (0.10) StateHist 55.13** 11.92* 2.12** 1.14** 45.66** 14.12** (8.08) (4.69) (0.65) (0.26) (13.95) (2.51) Constant 49.12** 16.38 4.71** 5.04** 287.01** 5.63 (16.69) (9.69) (1.35) (0.53) (28.81) (5.19) N 98 98 96 98 98 98 R 2 0.61 0.54 0.50 0.73 0.59 0.72 Cross-sectional OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are Roads (% of roads that are paved), Water (% of population with access to an improved water source), Hospitals (number of hospital beds per 1,000 people), Doctors (number of physicians per 1,000 people), Mort5 (under-5 mortality rate), and LifeExp (level of life expectancy). The independent variables are GDP/cap 60 (log level of GDP per capita in 1960), Democracy (mean level during the period 1960-2007), TaxRev (mean level of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP over the period 1960-2007), and StateHist. These tests indicate that StateHist has a strong effect on several indicators of public service delivery even after controlling for initial country wealth, the level of democracy over a long period, and the level of tax revenue.

Table S2: Construct Validity Tests for StateHist (5) (6) Roads Water Hospitals Doctors Mort5 LifeExp GDP/cap 60 3.06 1.44 0.10 0.30 0.27 2.41 (4.56) (2.25) (0.41) (0.15) (5.26) (1.22) Democracy 1.43 2.09 1.72 0.19 7.50 1.15 (13.25) (6.53) (1.19) (0.45) (15.30) (3.56) TaxRev 1.93** 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.31 0.15 (0.47) (0.23) (0.04) (0.02) (0.54) (0.13) SocDev 16.02** 10.51** 0.16 0.55** 36.51** 6.18** (5.73) (2.82) (0.51) (0.19) (6.62) (1.54) Comms 0.28 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.25 0.05 (0.21) (0.10) (0.02) (0.01) (0.24) (0.06) StateHist 53.79** 9.19 2.65** 0.42 35.83** 13.64** (10.82) (5.33) (0.97) (0.37) (12.49) (2.90) Constant 17.67 64.02** 1.29 1.70 81.93* 41.61** (33.46) (16.49) (2.99) (1.13) (38.62) (8.98) N 57 57 57 57 57 57 R 2 0.55 0.66 0.40 0.64 0.80 0.78 Cross-sectional OLS regression with standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variables are Roads (% of roads that are paved), Water (% of population with access to an improved water source), Hospitals (number of hospital beds per 1,000 people), Doctors (number of physicians per 1,000 people), Mort5 (under-5 mortality rate), and LifeExp (level of life expectancy). The independent variables are GDP/cap 60 (log level of GDP per capita in 1960), Democracy (mean level during the period 1960-2007), TaxRev (mean level of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP over the period 1960-2007), SocDev (a measure of socioeconomic development from the 1998 article from Temple and Johnson), Comms (the extent of mass communications from Temple and Johnson), and StateHist. These tests indicate that StateHist still has a strong effect on indicators of public service delivery even with the addition of controls for proxies of social capabilities. The loss of statistical significance in Model 4, as well as the decreased magnitude of the coefficient, is due largely to the reduction in sample size compared with Table S1. 2

Table S3: Robustness Tests for Growth in Capital Stock Using Annual Data kixwkrgrowth t 1 0.63** 0.62** 0.52** 0.52** (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) EthnicFrac 1.11** 1.15** 1.39** 1.41** (0.30) (0.30) (0.46) (0.45) Landlock 0.60** 0.60** 0.74** 0.72* (0.22) (0.22) (0.28) (0.28) TropicArea 0.10 0.09 0.17 0.14 (0.21) (0.21) (0.30) (0.30) Gap 0.21** 0.11 0.23* 0.08 (0.07) (0.12) (0.10) (0.18) StateHist 1.38** 0.05 1.77** 0.19 (0.28) (0.40) (0.44) (0.76) StateHist Gap 0.60** 0.71* (0.16) (0.28) Checks 0.03 0.42* 0.10 0.36 (0.11) (0.21) (0.14) (0.31) Checks Gap 0.19* 0.19 (0.09) (0.11) Constant 0.11 0.31 0.26 0.57 (0.26) (0.36) (0.39) (0.57) N 2435 2435 2435 2435 Countries 84 84 84 84 R 2 0.45 0.46 0.49 0.49 Table S3. The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital stock per worker ( k). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses.

Table S4: Robustness Tests for Productivity Growth Using Annual Data TFPgrowth t 1 0.14** 0.14** 0.10** 0.10** (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) EthnicFrac 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.54 (0.47) (0.47) (0.61) (0.61) Landlock 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.08 (0.34) (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) TropicArea 1.09** 1.08** 1.13** 1.11** (0.29) (0.30) (0.41) (0.41) Gap 0.41** 0.45* 0.42** 0.45 (0.11) (0.21) (0.14) (0.25) StateHist 0.37 0.74 0.40 0.77 (0.43) (0.62) (0.59) (1.04) StateHist Gap 0.50 0.52 (0.28) (0.38) Checks 0.62** 1.32** 0.64** 1.36** (0.18) (0.34) (0.20) (0.43) Checks Gap 0.30* 0.30 (0.15) (0.16) Constant 0.88* 1.09* 0.92 1.11 (0.40) (0.54) (0.54) (0.78) N 2397 2397 2397 2397 Countries 84 84 84 84 R 2 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 Table S4. The dependent variable is the growth rate of productivity (Ȧ). Standard errors in parentheses. 4

Table S5: Robustness Tests for Growth in Capital Stock Using 10-Year Time-Periods kixwkrgrowth t 1 0.44** 0.44** 0.15 0.17 (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) EthnicFrac 3.48* 3.54** 4.43** 4.44** (1.35) (1.31) (1.68) (1.64) Landlock 2.07** 1.95* 2.33* 2.12* (0.78) (0.80) (1.04) (1.04) TropicArea 0.20 0.14 0.71 0.57 (0.74) (0.74) (1.12) (1.09) Gap 0.83** 0.28 0.58 0.15 (0.28) (0.54) (0.43) (0.75) StateHist 3.53** 1.60 5.99** 0.35 (1.12) (1.78) (1.76) (2.99) StateHist Gap 2.18** 2.31* (0.71) (1.04) Checks 0.55 1.82 0.10 0.84 (0.58) (1.21) (0.74) (1.48) Checks Gap 0.52 0.36 (0.42) (0.50) Constant 0.89 2.05 0.43 4.53 (1.24) (1.83) (1.71) (2.51) N 251 251 251 251 Countries 84 84 84 84 R 2 0.47 0.49 0.67 0.68 Table S5. The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital stock per worker ( k). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 5

Table S6: Robustness Tests for Productivity Growth Using 10-Year Time-Periods TFPgrowth t 1 0.08 0.08 0.35** 0.36** (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) EthnicFrac 1.26 1.30 1.57 1.60 (1.14) (1.11) (1.60) (1.57) Landlock 0.34 0.31 0.52 0.50 (0.71) (0.71) (1.02) (1.03) TropicArea 2.65** 2.67** 2.96** 2.97** (0.69) (0.68) (1.08) (1.07) Gap 1.25** 0.99 1.33** 1.10 (0.31) (0.57) (0.40) (0.70) StateHist 0.87 2.90* 1.30 2.50 (0.89) (1.38) (1.55) (2.82) StateHist Gap 1.60* 1.61 (0.66) (0.98) Checks 2.12** 3.46** 2.39** 3.83** (0.53) (1.04) (0.65) (1.34) Checks Gap 0.55 0.59 (0.38) (0.45) Constant 2.16 1.62 2.53 3.77 (1.10) (1.66) (1.56) (2.25) N 248 248 248 248 Countries 83 83 83 83 R 2 0.22 0.24 0.64 0.64 Table S6. The dependent variable is the growth rate of productivity (Ȧ). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 6

Table S7: Robustness Tests for Growth in Capital Stock using AgEmp for Gap kixwkrgrowth t 1 0.48** 0.46** 0.22** 0.23** (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) EthnicFrac 1.70** 1.87** 2.24** 2.40** (0.53) (0.51) (0.74) (0.72) Landlock 0.66 0.59 1.00* 0.86 (0.35) (0.37) (0.49) (0.48) TropicArea 0.23 0.36 0.50 0.60 (0.33) (0.33) (0.48) (0.47) AgEmp 0.03** 0.00 0.03** 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) StateHist 1.15* 0.33 2.29** 0.25 (0.51) (0.62) (0.74) (0.98) StateHist AgEmp 0.07** 0.09** (0.03) (0.03) Checks 0.15 0.59 0.12 0.58 (0.24) (0.31) (0.32) (0.44) Checks AgEmp 0.02 0.02 (0.01) (0.01) Constant 1.03 0.72 0.96 0.48 (0.57) (0.59) (0.72) (0.83) N 386 386 386 386 Countries 83 83 83 83 R 2 0.46 0.48 0.63 0.63 Table S7. The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital stock per worker k. All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 7

Table S8: Robustness Tests for Productivity Growth using AgEmp for Gap TFPgrowth t 1 0.00 0.02 0.21** 0.21** (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) EthnicFrac 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.36 (0.49) (0.48) (0.70) (0.69) Landlock 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.13 (0.32) (0.33) (0.47) (0.46) TropicArea 0.88** 0.78* 1.00* 0.86 (0.32) (0.32) (0.45) (0.44) AgEmp 0.02** 0.01 0.02* 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) StateHist 0.46 0.42 0.60 0.63 (0.47) (0.61) (0.67) (0.95) StateHist AgEmp 0.04 0.06* (0.02) (0.03) Checks 0.69** 1.17** 0.78** 1.34** (0.23) (0.34) (0.30) (0.42) Checks AgEmp 0.02 0.02* (0.01) (0.01) Constant 0.79 0.90 1.19 1.18 (0.55) (0.62) (0.69) (0.80) N 379 379 379 379 Countries 82 82 82 82 R 2 0.14 0.16 0.40 0.40 Table S8. The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital stock per worker k. All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 8

Table S9: Robustness Tests for Growth in Capital Stock using PolCon for Checks kixwkrgrowth t 1 0.59** 0.59** 0.45** 0.45** (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) EthnicFrac 1.27** 1.27** 1.54* 1.53** (0.47) (0.47) (0.60) (0.59) Landlock 0.67* 0.68* 0.73 0.74 (0.30) (0.30) (0.38) (0.38) TropicArea 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.14 (0.28) (0.29) (0.40) (0.40) Gap 0.41** 0.26 0.38* 0.24 (0.14) (0.23) (0.19) (0.32) StateHist 1.09** 0.02 1.65** 0.54 (0.41) (0.63) (0.60) (1.04) StateHist Gap 0.56* 0.56 (0.28) (0.43) PolCon 0.38 0.91 0.16 0.76 (0.40) (0.67) (0.52) (0.87) PolCon Gap 0.29 0.32 (0.31) (0.37) Constant 1.28* 1.03 1.05 0.83 (0.53) (0.63) (0.67) (0.86) N 654 654 654 654 Countries 84 84 84 84 R 2 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.59 Table S9. The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital stock per worker ( k). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 9

Table S10: Robustness Tests for Productivity Growth using PolCon for Checks TFPgrowth t 1 0.06 0.06 0.08* 0.08* (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) EthnicFrac 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.73 (0.44) (0.44) (0.59) (0.59) Landlock 0.19 0.19 0.21 0.22 (0.25) (0.25) (0.38) (0.39) TropicArea 0.72** 0.71* 0.80* 0.78 (0.28) (0.28) (0.40) (0.40) Gap 0.53** 0.41 0.53** 0.41 (0.14) (0.23) (0.19) (0.32) StateHist 0.51 0.33 0.59 0.29 (0.37) (0.60) (0.58) (1.03) StateHist Gap 0.43 0.46 (0.28) (0.44) PolCon 1.40** 1.78** 1.46** 1.89* (0.40) (0.68) (0.50) (0.88) PolCon Gap 0.21 0.24 (0.30) (0.36) Constant 0.90 0.70 1.12 0.92 (0.51) (0.65) (0.65) (0.87) N 645 645 645 645 Countries 83 83 83 83 R 2 0.15 0.16 0.32 0.32 Table S10. The dependent variable is the growth rate of productivity (Ȧ). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 10

Table S11: Robustness Tests for Growth in Capital Stock using PolCon and AgEmp kixwkrgrowth t 1 0.48** 0.46** 0.21** 0.21** (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) EthnicFrac 1.77** 1.94** 2.33** 2.50** (0.51) (0.50) (0.74) (0.72) Landlock 0.65 0.58 1.00* 0.85 (0.35) (0.37) (0.50) (0.49) TropicArea 0.22 0.37 0.50 0.63 (0.34) (0.34) (0.48) (0.48) AgEmp 0.02** 0.00 0.02* 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) StateHist 1.18* 0.23 2.36** 0.42 (0.51) (0.62) (0.75) (0.99) StateHist AgEmp 0.06** 0.08** (0.02) (0.03) PolCon 0.15 0.79 0.46 0.53 (0.51) (0.69) (0.67) (0.90) PolCon AgEmp 0.03 0.03 (0.02) (0.02) Constant 0.75 0.57 0.51 0.16 (0.58) (0.62) (0.77) (0.88) N 387 387 387 387 Countries 83 83 83 83 R 2 0.47 0.49 0.63 0.64 Table S11. The dependent variable is the growth rate of capital stock per worker ( k). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 11

Table S12: Robustness Tests for Productivity Growth using PolCon and AgEmp TFPgrowth t 1 0.02 0.00 0.21** 0.20** (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) EthnicFrac 0.46 0.56 0.56 0.67 (0.49) (0.49) (0.71) (0.70) Landlock 0.12 0.09 0.19 0.13 (0.32) (0.33) (0.48) (0.48) TropicArea 0.68* 0.57 0.80 0.66 (0.33) (0.33) (0.46) (0.46) AgEmp 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) StateHist 0.58 0.28 0.75 0.48 (0.47) (0.61) (0.68) (0.96) StateHist AgEmp 0.04 0.05* (0.02) (0.03) PolCon 0.68 1.51* 0.62 1.59 (0.52) (0.74) (0.63) (0.86) PolCon AgEmp 0.03 0.03 (0.02) (0.02) Constant 0.36 0.45 0.60 0.61 (0.59) (0.68) (0.72) (0.84) N 380 380 380 380 Countries 82 82 82 82 R 2 0.12 0.14 0.39 0.40 Table S12. The dependent variable is the growth rate of productivity (Ȧ). All models include time-period dummy variables to capture worldwide trends (coefficients not reported). Standard errors in parentheses. 12

Table S13: Country Coverage Country Years Country Years Algeria 1961-2005 Korea, South 1961-2005 Argentina 1961-2005 Madagascar 1961-2005 Australia 1961-2005 Malawi 1966-2005 Austria 1961-2005 Malaysia 1961-2005 Bangladesh 1966-2005 Mali 1961-2005 Belgium 1961-2005 Mauritius 1971-2005 Bolivia 1961-2005 Mexico 1961-2005 Brazil 1961-2005 Morocco 1961-2005 Cameroon 1961-2005 Mozambique 1976-2005 Canada 1961-2005 Netherlands 1961-2005 Chile 1961-2005 New Zealand 1961-2005 China 1961-2005 Nicaragua 1961-2005 Colombia 1961-2000 Nigeria 1961-2000 Costa Rica 1961-2005 Norway 1961-2005 Cote d Ivoire 1961-2005 Pakistan 1961-2005 Cyprus 1961-2005 Panama 1961-2005 Denmark 1961-2005 Paraguay 1961-2005 Dominican Rep. 1961-2005 Peru 1961-2005 Ecuador 1961-2005 Philippines 1961-2005 Egypt 1961-2005 Portugal 1961-2005 El Salvador 1961-2005 Rwanda 1961-2000 Ethiopia 1961-2005 Senegal 1961-2005 Finland 1961-2005 Sierra Leone 1961-2000 France 1961-2005 Singapore 1961-2005 Germany 1980-2005 South Africa 1961-2005 Ghana 1961-2005 Spain 1961-2005 Greece 1961-2005 Sri Lanka 1961-2005 Guatemala 1961-2005 Sweden 1961-2005 Guyana 1966-2000 Switzerland 1961-2005 Haiti 1961-2000 Taiwan 1961-2000 Honduras 1961-2005 Tanzania 1961-2005 Iceland 1966-2005 Thailand 1961-2005 India 1961-2005 Trinidad-Tobago 1966-2005 Indonesia 1961-2005 Tunisia 1961-2005 Iran 1961-2005 Turkey 1961-2005 Ireland 1961-2005 Uganda 1966-2005 Israel 1961-2005 United Kingdom 1961-2005 Italy 1961-2005 United States 1961-2005 Jamaica 1961-2000 Uruguay 1961-2005 Japan 1961-2005 Venezuela 1961-2005 Jordan 1961-2005 Zambia 1966-2005 Kenya 1966-2005 Zimbabwe 1971-2005 13

Figure S1: Productivity Growth Rate Productivity Growth Rate -2 0 2 4 China Thailand IndonesiaUganda Ghana Morocco Tanzania Sierra Leone Rwanda Cameroon Mali Pakistan Mozambique Egypt Malawi Senegal Bangladesh Kenya Zambia Ethiopia Philippines Cote d'ivoire Madagascar Sri Lanka Zimbabwe India Productivity Growth Rate 0.2.4.6.8 1 Switzerland Norway United Kingdom United States Australia Belgium Italy Sweden Japan Iceland Austria Canada Netherlands Denmark France 0.5 1 1.5 2 Constraints on Rulers (Checks) 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 Constraints on Rulers (Checks) (a) Low-Income Countries (b) Leading-Edge Countries Productivity Growth Rate -1 0 1 2 3 China Mali Thailand Mauritius South Korea Pakistan Tunisia Mozambique India Sri Lanka Tanzania Colombia Indonesia Kenya Malaysia Morocco Egypt Sierra Leone Dominican Rep. Panama Senegal Bangladesh Zimbabwe Philippines Cote d'ivoire Malawi Zambia Paraguay Ethiopia Uganda Cameroon Guyana Honduras Rwanda Ghana Madagascar Productivity Growth Rate.2.4.6.8 1 1.2 Australia United States Canada Finland Iceland Norway Italy Sweden Netherlands Belgium Denmark Austria United Kingdom France Switzerland Japan 0.2.4.6.8 1 State Authority (StateHist).2.4.6.8 1 State Authority (StateHist) (c) Low-Income Countries (d) Leading-Edge Countries 14

Figure S2: Marginal Effect Plots of RationalLegal and Checks on Growth Factors Effect of RationalLegal2 on Capital Stock Growth -1 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 (a) This figure shows the effect on the capital stock growth rate from a one-unit change in RationalLegal at different levels of Gap according to the estimates in Table 1, Model 5. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Gap Effect of RationalLegal2 on TFP Growth -1 0 1 2 0 1 2 3 4 5 (b) This figure shows the effect on the productivity growth rate from a one-unit change in RationalLegal at different levels of Gap according to the estimates in Table 2, Model 5. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Gap 15

Figure S3: Marginal Effect Plots of RationalLegal original and Checks on Growth Factors Effect of RationalLegal_orig on k Growth -2 0 2 4 6 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 (a) This figure shows the effect on the capital stock growth rate from a one-unit change in Rational- Legal original at different levels of Gap according to the estimates in Table??, Model 2. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Gap Effect of RationalLegal_orig on TFP Growth -2 0 2 4 6 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 (b) This figure shows the effect on the productivity growth rate from a one-unit change in Rational- Legal original at different levels of Gap according to the estimates in??, Model 2. The dotted lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Gap 16