Banking crises and investments in innovation

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Banking crises and investments in innovation Oana Peia University College Dublin, School of Economics 6 th European Conference on Corporate R&D and innovation Seville, 27-29 September 2017 Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 1 / 25

Motivation Real effects of banking crises Large output losses (Laeven & Valencia, 2012) and longer recessions (Boissay et al., 2015) Slow recoveries: it takes on average 8 years to reach pre-crisis levels of real GDP/capita (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014) Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 2 / 25

Motivation Real effects of banking crises Large output losses (Laeven & Valencia, 2012) and longer recessions (Boissay et al., 2015) Slow recoveries: it takes on average 8 years to reach pre-crisis levels of real GDP/capita (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014) Link between short- and long-run dynamics: innovation Main driver of productivity growth (Aghion & Howitt, 1999) Highly pro-cyclical (Barlevy, 2007; Ouyang, 2011; Aghion et al., 2010; Aghion et al., 2014): balance-sheet effects? Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 2 / 25

Motivation Real effects of banking crises Large output losses (Laeven & Valencia, 2012) and longer recessions (Boissay et al., 2015) Slow recoveries: it takes on average 8 years to reach pre-crisis levels of real GDP/capita (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2014) Link between short- and long-run dynamics: innovation Main driver of productivity growth (Aghion & Howitt, 1999) Highly pro-cyclical (Barlevy, 2007; Ouyang, 2011; Aghion et al., 2010; Aghion et al., 2014): balance-sheet effects? New insight in this paper Evidence of a supply-side channel: worsening credit supply conditions after banking crises will disproportionally affect investments in innovation Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 2 / 25

Outline of the model and empirical results Theoretical Framework Growth model with a banking sector subject to crises Channel to explain longer-term effect of banking crises composition of investment Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 3 / 25

Outline of the model and empirical results Theoretical Framework Growth model with a banking sector subject to crises Channel to explain longer-term effect of banking crises composition of investment Model dynamics: Pre-crisis period: credit boom in innovative technology high growth Post-crisis: less investment in innovative technology slow recovery Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 3 / 25

Outline of the model and empirical results Theoretical Framework Growth model with a banking sector subject to crises Channel to explain longer-term effect of banking crises composition of investment Model dynamics: Pre-crisis period: credit boom in innovative technology high growth Post-crisis: less investment in innovative technology slow recovery Empirics Industry-level data on R&D around 13 recent banking crises episodes Diff-in-diff estimations: industries that depend more on bank credit reduce their share of R&D in total investment disproportionately more following episodes of banking crises. Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 3 / 25

Relation to literature Banking crises Real effects of banking crises (Dell Ariccia et al., 2008; Kroszner et al., 2007; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014; Ball, 2014; Garicano and Steinwender, 2015) Macro models with a financial sector (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014; Boissay et al. 2015) Global games (Carlsson and Van Damme, 1993; Morris and Shin 1998, 2001, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005) Research and development R&D and finance (Brown et al. 2009; Ouyang, 2011; Nanda and Nicholas, 2014, Artuç & Pourpourides, 2014, Hsu et al., 2014) R&D as a link between short and long-term dynamics (Aghion et al., 2010; Schmitz, 2015) Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 4 / 25

Set-up Figure: The economy Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 5 / 25

Real sector Aghion et al. (2010) Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 Borrow to cover C Investors place funds in the bank Bank decides on optimal loanto-assets ratio Entrepreneurs borrow I and decide on the share to invest in long-term technology Short-term production (Y 1 ) Liquidity shock (C) Investors decide whether to withdraw funds If crisis occurs, long-term investments fail Long-term production (Y 2 ) Figure: Timing of the real sector Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 6 / 25

Financial sector and bank runs Assets I (loans to real sector) Liabilities D (deposits) M (cash reserves) E (equity) Figure: Balance Sheet of the Bank Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 7 / 25

Financial sector and bank runs Assets I (loans to real sector) Liabilities D (deposits) M (cash reserves) E (equity) Figure: Balance Sheet of the Bank Period 1 demand for liquidity coming from both sides of the balance sheet: }{{} ld + C Y }{{} 1 > M Depositors Entrepreneurs C is noisy (global games equilibrium selection argument) Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 7 / 25

Equilibrium Proposition 1 There exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which a bank run occurs whenever C > C : C = M + Y 1 D r Lemma 1: The share of investment in the long-term technology is monotonically increasing in the credit supply. Proposition 2: The loans-to-assets ratio in the banking sector increases monotonically with bank leverage. Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 8 / 25

OLG model Figure: Timing of the real sector Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 9 / 25

Model dynamics The economy experiences the following investment and growth dynamics: Proposition 3 (i) As long as a bank run does not occur: increase in savings more leveraged banking sector higher loan-to-assets ratio higher share of high-productivity investment (ii) A bank run decreases the aggregate income in the next period lower deposits-to-equity ratio banks tighten credit supply by decreasing their loans-to-assets ratio (iii) Tighter credit conditions after the banking crisis lower share of investment in the high productivity technology, which slows down the recovery. Simulation of the economy Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 10 / 25

Empirics Testable implication Tightening credit supply that follows banking crises causes the share of R&D investment in total investment to drop Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 11 / 25

Empirics Testable implication Tightening credit supply that follows banking crises causes the share of R&D investment in total investment to drop Supply-side or demand-side? Banking crises occur at the onset or are followed by recessions (Demirguc-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998) Shocks to supply of credit (Iyer et al., 2014; Chava & Purnanandam, 2011) Differential impact on financially-dependent borrowers (Dell Ariccia, et al., 2008; Kroszner et al., 2007; Hsu et al. 2014; Nanda & Nicholas, 2014) Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 11 / 25

Identification strategy Rajan & Zingales s (1998) difference-in-difference estimations: exogenous way of differentiating between industries that depend more on external finance R&D ic = α i + µ c + β 1 ExtDep i Bank c + β 2 Size ic + ɛ ic, R&D ic = R&D post crisis R&D pre crisis ExtDep i : industry-level measure of dependence on external finance Bank c : country-level measure of dependence on the banking sector Size ic : share of sector i R&D in total country c s R&D α i, µ c : industry and country fixed effects Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 12 / 25

Data Industry level data on R&D and Total investment: 29 two- and three-digits manufacturing industries (OECD ANBERD, STAN) Industry-level measure of dependence on external finance: Rajan & Zingales (1998) (Compustat- firm level data) Country-level measure of bank dependence: Private Credit/ Stock Market Capitalization (Levine, 2002) 13 systemic banking crises episodes over 1994-2012 (Laeven & Valencia, 2012) Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 13 / 25

Banking crises and investment in innovation R&D ic = α i + µ c + β 1 ExtDep i Bank c + β 2 Size ic + ɛ ic R&D= (R&D postcrisis - R&D precrisis ) Panel estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank -0.0187*** -0.0152*** (0.0058) (0.0053) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.0104*** -0.0115*** (0.0028) (0.0034) Size t 3 0.274-0.346-0.368*** -0.658*** (0.600) (0.389) (0.101) (0.230) Observations 244 248 4,387 4,387 R-squared 0.289 0.279 0.045 0.082 Country FE YES YES YES Industry FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES Country-industry FE YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 14 / 25

Banking crises and investment in innovation R&D ic = α i + µ c + β 1 ExtDep i Bank c + β 2 Size ic + ɛ ic R&D= (R&D postcrisis - R&D precrisis ) Panel estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank -0.0187*** -0.0152*** (0.0058) (0.0053) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.0104*** -0.0115*** (0.0028) (0.0034) Size t 3 0.274-0.346-0.368*** -0.658*** (0.600) (0.389) (0.101) (0.230) Observations 244 248 4,387 4,387 R-squared 0.289 0.279 0.045 0.082 Country FE YES YES YES Industry FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES Country-industry FE YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 14 / 25

Banking crises and investment in innovation R&D ict = α i + µ c + λ t + β 1 ExtDep i Bank c Crisis ct + Size ic + ɛ ict, R&D= (R&D postcrisis - R&D precrisis ) Panel estimations (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank -0.0187*** -0.0152*** (0.0058) (0.0053) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.0104*** -0.0115*** (0.0028) (0.0034) Size t 3 0.274-0.346-0.368*** -0.658*** (0.600) (0.389) (0.101) (0.230) Observations 244 248 4,387 4,387 R-squared 0.289 0.279 0.045 0.082 Country FE YES YES YES Industry FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES Country-industry FE YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 15 / 25

Share of R&D in Total Investment (R&D/TI)= (R&D/TI) post - (R&D/TI) pre Panel regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank -0.0104*** -0.0278*** (0.0033) (0.0082) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.0056** -0.0047* (0.0025) (0.0024) Size t 3-0.0962 0.0916 0.263** 0.0243 (0.153) (0.510) (0.105) (0.0243) Observations 234 234 4,415 4,415 R-squared 0.333 0.320 0.712 0.888 Country FE YES YES YES Industry FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES Country-industry FE YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 16 / 25

Share of R&D in Total Investment (R&D/TI)= (R&D/TI) post - (R&D/TI) pre Panel regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank -0.0104*** -0.0278*** (0.0033) (0.0082) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.0056** -0.0047* (0.0025) (0.0024) Size t 3-0.0962 0.0916 0.263** 0.0243 (0.153) (0.510) (0.105) (0.0243) Observations 234 234 4,415 4,415 R-squared 0.333 0.320 0.712 0.888 Country FE YES YES YES Industry FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES Country-industry FE YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 16 / 25

Share of R&D in Total Investment (R&D/TI)= (R&D/TI) post - (R&D/TI) pre Panel regressions (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank -0.0104*** -0.0278*** (0.0033) (0.0082) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.0056** -0.0047* (0.0025) (0.0024) Size t 3-0.0962 0.0916 0.263** 0.0243 (0.153) (0.510) (0.105) (0.0243) Observations 234 234 4,415 4,415 R-squared 0.333 0.320 0.712 0.888 Country FE YES YES YES Industry FE YES YES YES Year FE YES YES Country-industry FE YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 16 / 25

Banking crises vs balance sheet effects R&D R&D/TI (1) (2) (3) (4) ExtDep*Bank*Crisis -0.00943*** -0.0112*** -0.00617** -0.00441** (0.00264) (0.00330) (0.00285) (0.00209) ExtDep*Bank*Recession -0.00246 0.00181-0.0242*** -0.00414 (0.00626) (0.00737) (0.00765) (0.00585) Observations 4,080 4,080 4,103 4,103 R-squared 0.049 0.089 0.730 0.881 Country FE YES YES Industry FE YES YES Year FE YES YES YES YES Country-industry FE YES YES Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 17 / 25

Alternative industry characteristics R&D growth R&D/TI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) ExtDep -0.014*** -0.0096*** -0.0088*** -0.0044-0.0064** -0.0096*** -0.011*** -0.0096** (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0039) Tangible -0.0001-0.0000 (0.0005) (0.0002) Small -0.00907** 0.0047 (0.00364) (0.003) Durable -0.0103* 0.0002 (0.0059) (0.0055) Intensity -0.0113* 0.0078 (0.0066) (0.0057) Observations 3082 3545 2354 2247 3103 3558 2368 2262 R-squared 0.028 0.020 0.041 0.055 0.706 0.748 0.433 0.709 Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 18 / 25

Robustness tests Different time pre/post crisis time frames Split sample analysis: banking crisis vs non banking crisis periods Inclusion of only countries that have experienced the 2008 GFC Model saturated with two-way fixed effects Include also countries that have not experienced systemic banking crises Alternative measures of financial dependence: Bank dependence: Carlin & Mayer (2003) (Orbis firm level data) Country measure of bank dependence to include bond market funding Falsification strategies: random crisis date; hypothetical crisis date in 2008 all countries Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 19 / 25

Conclusions Theoretical model: Identify a new channel through which banking crises can impact long-run growth Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 20 / 25

Conclusions Theoretical model: Identify a new channel through which banking crises can impact long-run growth Build a growth model in which financial sector distress impacts the composition of investment over the financial cycle Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 20 / 25

Conclusions Theoretical model: Identify a new channel through which banking crises can impact long-run growth Build a growth model in which financial sector distress impacts the composition of investment over the financial cycle Empirical findings: Show that industries that depend more on the banking sector reduce their R&D investments, as well as the share of R&D in total investment, disproportionately more following episodes of banking crises. Policy implications: Policies that encourage R&D investment during periods of tight credit supply and in more financially constrained industries Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 20 / 25

Thank you! Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 21 / 25

Motivating evidence Impact of investments in R&D investment on productivity growth: Standard growth accounting framework: the elasticity of output to investments in R&D between 0.05 to 0.12 (larger than regular investment) (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; Hall et al., 2010) Impact of R&D is not only strongly positive, but also relatively fast: two periods in cross-country studies; 1-4 years in firm-level studies. Volatility of R&D: Source: Schmitz (2014): R&D and GDP fluctuations in the United States Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 22 / 25

Proof of investors equilibrium 2 equations determine the threshold equilibrium. 1. The number of investors who run on the bank: l = Prob(x i > x C 1 ) = Prob(C 1 + ɛ i > x C 1 ) = 1 1 2ɛ (x C 1 + ɛ), since x i is uniformly distributed over [C 1 ɛ, C 1 + ɛ]. Define C the threshold cost at which the bank is illiquid: ld + C = M + Y 1 Then: x = C ɛ 2ɛ rd (M + Y 1 C ) Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 23 / 25

Proof of equilibrium 2. At the threshold a depositor is indifferent between withdrawing and leaving his funds in the bank: Prob(C < C x )rd = D, given that C is uniform over [x ɛ, x + ɛ]. which is equivalent to: C x = 2ɛ r ɛ Plunging this into the first equation gives: QED C = M + Y 1 D r. Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 24 / 25

Simulation of the economy Output(deviation from trend).1.05 0.05.1 Financial cycle Other Business cycle 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 time Figure: Dynamics of GDP around recessions Oana Peia Banking crises and innovation 25 / 25