Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics

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Transcription:

Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics By T. Adrian and H. Shin Based on a series of papers by Adrian, Shin, and coauthors and forthcoming in Handbook of Monetary Economics

Motivation This paper reconsiders the role of financial intermediaries in monetary economics. Questions to be answered:

Motivation This paper reconsiders the role of financial intermediaries in monetary economics. Questions to be answered: 1. What are the channels through which financial intermediaries influence the real economy (if at all) 2. What implications for monetary policy?

Motivation This paper reconsiders the role of financial intermediaries in monetary economics. Questions to be answered: 1. What are the channels through which financial intermediaries influence the real economy (if at all) 2. What implications for monetary policy? Focus is on the financial intermediary sector itself rather than borrowers agency problem ( financial friction ).

Sketch of Ideas end-user borrowers Intermediated Credit Banks (Active Investors) Directly granted credit Debt Claims Households (Passive Investors)

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) Longer maturity Shorter maturity end-user borrowers Intermediated Credit Banks (Active Investors) Directly granted credit Debt Claims Households (Passive Investors)

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) Longer maturity Shorter maturity end-user borrowers Intermediated Credit Banks (Active Investors) Directly granted credit Debt Claims Households (Passive Investors) The yield curve affects the risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) Annually from 1987Q1 to 2008Q3

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) A near perfect negative 1-to-1 relationship... Thus, shifts in the Fed Funds rate translate into the slope of the yield curve.

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads)

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector

Sketch of Ideas (Ctd.) The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector The size of lending and risk premium GDP growth

Results The Fed Funds rate 1. Build a model of a part of the entire mechanism below. The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector The size of lending and risk premium GDP growth

Results 1. Build a model of a part of the entire mechanism. 2. Provides empirical results that jointly suggest 2-a. The entire mechanism works in reality

Results 1. Build a model of a part of the entire mechanism. 2. Provides empirical results that jointly suggest 2-a. The entire mechanism works in reality 2-b. Commercial banks and market-based financial intermediaries (shadow banks and broker-dealers) have different roles in the mechanism.

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Focus on lender s BS

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Focus on lender s BS Bernanke-Gertler (89) Kiyotaki-Moore (97, 05) Bernanke-Blinder (88) Bernanke-Blinder (92) Holmstrom-Tirole (97) Brunnermeier-Sannikov (10) Adrian, Shin, and others Gertler-Kiyotaki (10)

Literature Focus on lender s BS Bernanke-Blinder (88) Bernanke-Blinder (92) Adrian, Shin, and others

Literature Bernanke-Blinder Adrian-Shin Focus on Commercial banks Shadow banks Broker-dealers Drived by Binding nature of the reserve constraint Binding nature of VaR constraint

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Bernanke-Gertler (89) Kiyotaki-Moore (97, 05) Holmstrom-Tirole (97) Brunnermeier-Sannikov (10) Gertler-Kiyotaki (10)

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Bernanke-Gertler (89) Kiyotaki-Moore (97, 05) introduce an agency problem b/w non-financial borrowers & financial intermediaries into business cycle analysis.

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Holmstrom-Tirole (97) pay attention to the role of financial intermediary sector as a borrower.

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Brunnermeier-Sannikov (10) provide a dynamic model with Two types of constraint: Capital ratio requirement and VaR constraint Two types of equity: With and w/o control right

Literature Focus on borrower s BS Gertler-Kiyotaki (10) overview this literature

Roadmap Model (Section 2.1 in the paper) Empirical Hypotheses (Sections 2.2 and 2.3) Empirical Results (Sections 4 and 6.0) Skipped: 1. Changing Nature of Financial Intermediaries (in the US) (Section 3) 2. Central Banks as Lender of Last Resort and Non-traditional Monetary Policy (Section 5)

Model The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector Model s (only) focus The size of lending and risk premium GDP growth

Model (Ctd.) We begin (and end) with a static partial equilibrium model Assumption 1: No default. The debt is risk-free. Assumption 2: No lending & borrowing (b/w financial intermediaries)

Model (Ctd.) We begin (and end) with a static partial equilibrium model Assumption 1: No default. The debt is risk-free. Assumption 2: No lending & borrowing (b/w financial intermediaries) We will show that aggregate capital and size of the financial intermediaries stands in 1-to-1 negative relationship with risk premium

Model: Investors 2 types of investors: 1. Active and leveraged (e.g. Banks, securities firms) 2. Passive and non-leveraged (e.g. Households, pension funds) end-user borrowers Intermediated Credit Banks (Active Investors) Directly granted credit Debt Claims Households (Passive Investors)

Model: Assets 2 types of assets: 1. Risk-free cash with net interest rate of i 2. Risky security whose price is p and whose payoff is a r.v. w U[q-z, q+z] (q>z)

Model: The Problem of Investors Given endowed equity e, an investor decides how many units of the securities to buy.

Model: The Problem of Investors Given endowed equity e, an investor decides how many units of the securities to buy. If she buys y units, the payoff of her portfolio is represented by a r.v. W:. F3GF 43 4 3HAG4 5 3. 3G F 4 4 F 3GF 4! "# $! "# $ "#$%& '()'$$ "'*+", "#$%-."'' /01 3HAH4

Model: The Problem of Passive Investors Objective function: B C D ) '!

Model: The Problem of Passive Investors! "# $! "# $ Objective function: B C D ) '! FOC: Demand: C C) O D D ) B E C C) O D D! G E! BG "> C) O D <-9&%F"8& C'(RD

Model: The Problem of Passive Investors! "# $! "# $ Objective function: B C D ) '! FOC: Demand: C C) O D D ) B E C C) O D D! G E! BG "> C) O D <-9&%F"8& Let τi be the risk tolerance of the ith investor and C'(RD 7! 8 Then (2.5) gives the aggregate demand of the Passive investor sector as a whole.

Model: The Problem of Active Investors Problem: +(F 9 < $.-M#,/ /0 A(B Demand: : AB C D A D AG+KD

Model: The Problem of Active Investors Problem: +(F 9 < $.-M#,/ /0 A(B Demand: : AB C D A D AG+KD As in the case of Passive investor, (2.8) gives the aggregate demand of the Active investor sector as a whole.

Model: Equilibrium Market clearing condition: 2 = (S: Total endowment of the security)

Model: Equilibrium Market clearing condition: 2 = (S: Total endowment of the security) q 1 i 1 i p demand of VaR-constrained investors demand of passive investors q 0 S

Model: A Comparative Static Suppose the expected payoff of the security rise from q to q (>q). q' / 1 i p' p q / 1 i 0 S

Model: A Comparative Static Suppose the expected payoff of the security rise from q to q (>q ). q' / 1 i p' p q / 1 i 0 S The direction of the change is important

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) increase in value of securities increase in equity Final balance sheet assets equity debt assets equity debt assets equity debt Initial balance sheet After q shock new purchase of securities new borrowing

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) increase in value of securities increase in equity Final balance sheet assets equity debt assets equity debt assets equity debt Initial balance sheet After q shock new purchase of securities! F<! <G H > < >> new borrowing

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) increase in value of securities increase in equity Final balance sheet assets equity debt assets equity debt assets equity debt Initial balance sheet After q shock new purchase of securities! F<! <G H > < >> new borrowing! <=! =>? @ =! @@!

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) increase in value of securities increase in equity Final balance sheet assets equity debt assets equity debt assets equity debt Initial balance sheet After q shock new purchase of securities! F<! <G H > < >> new borrowing! <! >? "!! =>? @!?! <=! =>? @ =! @@!

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) The equilibrium price of the security is higher than its worst possible discounted payoff and thus p (1+i)-q +z>0! <! >? "!! =>? @!?

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) The equilibrium price of the security is higher than its worst possible discounted payoff and thus p (1+i)-q +z>0! <! >? "!! =>? @!? y -y has the same sign as q -q

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) 1. The active investors sector amplifies booms and busts! < p (1+i)-q +z>0! >? "!! =>? @!? y -y has the same sign as q -q

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) 1. The active investors sector amplifies booms and busts 2. The volatility z The size of amplification! < p (1+i)-q +z>0! >? "!! =>? @!? y -y has the same sign as q -q

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) 1. The active investors sector amplifies booms and busts 2. The volatility z The size of amplification 3. Risk tolerance τ The size of amplification! < p (1+i)-q +z>0! >? "!! =>? @!? y -y has the same sign as q -q

Model: A Comparative Static (Ctd.) 1. The active investors sector amplifies booms and busts 2. The volatility z The size of amplification 3. Risk tolerance τ The size of amplification 4. The size of Active investor sector y The size of amplification! < p (1+i)-q +z>0! >? "!! =>? @!? y -y has the same sign as q -q

Roadmap Model Empirical Hypotheses Empirical Results

Empirical Hypotheses C)$> '/"&)<& L 6 M8: 8

Empirical Hypotheses C)$> '/"&)<& L 6 M8: 8 Hypothesis 1: The equity of the financial intermediary sector e Risk premium Proof: q and i are exogenous and e p

Empirical Hypotheses C)$> '/"&)<& L 6 M8: 8

Empirical Hypotheses C)$> '/"&)<& L 6 M8: 8 Hypothesis 2: The size of the financial intermediary sector y Risk premium Proof: q and i are exogenous and y p

Roadmap Model Empirical Hypotheses Empirical Results

The Macro Risk Premium & GDP Growth The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector The size of lending and risk premium GDP growth

The Macro Risk Premium & GDP Growth (Ctd.) Macro Risk Premium 1 1.5 2 2.5 3-10 -5 0 5 10 Quarterly GDP growth 1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 Macro Risk Premium Quarterly GDP growth The strong negative relationship b/w the macro risk premium & GDP growth

Macro Risk Premium & GDP Growth (Ctd.) The macro risk premium is estimated as a linear combination of Treasury and corporate bond spreads that best predict GDP growth:

Macro Risk Premium & GDP Growth (Ctd.) The macro risk premium is estimated as a linear combination of Treasury and corporate bond spreads that best predict GDP growth: 1. The 7 constant maturity yields published in the H.15 release of the FRB 2. Corporate bond spreads of credit rating AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, & B from S&P in excess of the 10-year constant maturity Treasury yield.

The Macro RP & Risk Appetite The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector Risk premium and the size of lending GDP growth

The Macro RP & Risk Appetite (Ctd.) Risk appetite The looseness of BS constraints The shadow value of capital of leveraged active investors sector in the model

The Macro RP & Risk Appetite (Ctd.) Macro Risk Premium 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0.2 Intermediary Risk Appetite 1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 Macro Risk Premium Intermediary Risk Appetite The strong negative relationship b/w the macro risk premium & risk appetite

The Macro RP & Risk Appetite (Ctd.) As is similar in the previous analysis, a measure of risk appetite is estimated as a linear combination of 1-year lagged BS variables of the broker-dealers, the shadow & commercial banks that best predict 1-year change of the macro risk premium.

The Macro RP & Risk Appetite (Ctd.) Macro Risk Premium 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 -.8 -.6 -.4 -.2 0.2 Intermediary Risk Appetite 1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 Macro Risk Premium Intermediary Risk Appetite The strong negative relationship b/w the macro risk premium & risk appetite

The Macro RP & Risk Appetite (Ctd.) Hypotheses 1 and 2 (The equity or size of the financial intermediary sector Risk premium ) The strong negative relationship b/w the macro risk premium & risk appetite?

GDP & BSs The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector Risk premium and the size of lending GDP growth

GDP & BSs (Ctd.) Add lags of additional financial variables (equity market volatility, term and credit spreads) Offset BS movements due to a price effect

GDP & BSs (Ctd.) Add lags of additional financial variables (equity market volatility, term and credit spreads) Offset BS movements due to a price effect Add lags of macroeconomic variables Control for BS movements due to past macroeconomic condition

GDP & BSs (Ctd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uarterly from 1986Q1 to 2009Q2

GDP & BSs (Ctd.),' L(M!"#$%&$'( )*+ )$,-%. /$,0&$1*&#'&$ 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 7879: /$,0&$1*&#'&$ ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 78>? @.#A,- /#B03 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 @.#A,- /#B03 ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 E,FF&$G=#' /#B0 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 E,FF&$G=#' /#B0 ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 )*+ )$,-%. 4'#56 7879 +E; IB!#%=,B 4'#56 1>87>:: KIL 4'#56 787> E$&A=% @M$&#A 4'#56 1>89D: N&$F 3M$&#A 4'#56 78DO:: P&A P"BA3 4'#56 78Q7 E,B3%#B% Q8JD::: Broker-dealer asset growth has weak significance for GDP growth. RS3&$T#%=,B3! H9 78C??

GDP & BSs (Ctd.),' /$,0&$1*&#'&$ 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 /$,0&$1*&#'&$ ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 @.#A,- /#B03 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 @.#A,- /#B03 ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 E,FF&$G=#' /#B0 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 E,FF&$G=#' /#B0 ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 )*+ )$,-%. 4'#56 +E; IB!#%=,B 4'#56 KIL 4'#56 E$&A=% @M$&#A 4'#56 N&$F 3M$&#A 4'#56 P&A P"BA3 4'#56 E,B3%#B% RS3&$T#%=,B3! LEM!"#$%&$'( )*+ )$,-%. 78C>::: 78D>:: 178>? 1>877:: 17879 1>8?>:: >8>?::: 78>H Q8HQ::: H9 78Q7H Shadow bank asset growth has strong significance for GDP growth.

GDP & BSs (Ctd.),' /$,0&$1*&#'&$ 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 /$,0&$1*&#'&$ ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 @.#A,- /#B03 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 @.#A,- /#B03 ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 E,FF&$G=#' /#B0 233&% )$,-%. 4'#56 E,FF&$G=#' /#B0 ;<"=%( )$,-%. 4'#56 )*+ )$,-%. 4'#56 +E; IB!#%=,B 4'#56 KIL 4'#56 E$&A=% @M$&#A 4'#56 N&$F 3M$&#A 4'#56 P&A P"BA3 4'#56 E,B3%#B% RS3&$T#%=,B3! LNM!"#$%&$'( )*+ )$,-%. 787C 178>C 787H 1>8>J::: 1787C 1>87> 78DO: 78QH: Q8QQ:: H9 78CJ9 Commercial bank asset growth has no significance for GDP growth.

GDP & BSs (Ctd.) Our interpretation Commercial bank BSs are less informative since they did not mark their BSs to market over the time span in our regressions

BSs & The Fed Funds Rate The Fed Funds rate The yield curve (term spreads) The risk-taking capacity of the financial intermediary sector Risk premium and the size of lending GDP growth

BSs & The Fed Funds Rate (Ctd.) 4.09.0#?,-,-"3:".: %..0.,' Broker-dealers Shadow banks Commercial banks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eekly from October 1990 to February 2010

BSs & The Fed Funds Rate (Ctd.) 4.09.0#?,-,-"3:".: %..0.,' Broker-dealers Shadow banks Commercial banks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he Fed Funds rate All types of short-term liability growth

BSs & The Fed Funds Rate (Ctd.) 4.09.0#?,-,-"3:".: %..0.,' Broker-dealers Shadow banks Commercial banks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olatility (VIX) Repo and Repo+CP growth

BSs & The Fed Funds Rate (Ctd.) 4.09.0#?,-,-"3:".: %..0.,' Broker-dealers Shadow banks Commercial banks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olatility (VIX) M2 growth (Flight to quality?)

BSs & The Fed Funds Rate (Ctd.) 4.09.0#?,-,-"3:".: %..0.,' Broker-dealers Shadow banks Commercial banks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erm and credit spreads Short-term liability growth

Summary 1. Build a model of a part of the entire mechanism. 2. Provides empirical results that jointly suggest 2-a. The entire mechanism works in reality 2-b. Commercial banks and market-based financial intermediaries (shadow banks and broker-dealers) have different roles in the mechanism.