Oil Shocks and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

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Oil Shocks and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates Martin Bodenstein, Luca Guerrieri, Christopher Gust Federal Reserve Board "Advances in International Macroeconomics - Lessons from the Crisis," Brussels, 23-24 July 21

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.

Introduction Shock Properties at the ZLB Academic work has emphasized how demand shocks are amplified in a liquidity trap: amplification applies to shocks that move output and inflation in the same direction, e.g., government spending usually implies an increase in resource utilization and a burst of inflation (Eggertsson (26), Christiano, Eichenbaum, Rebelo (21), Uhlig (21), Erceg and Lindé (21)), normally, monetary policy leans against inflation (crowding out of private investment), in a deep recession at ZLB, policy rates remain unvaried, leading to a decrease in real rates (crowding in of private investment).

Introduction Oil Shocks at the ZLB Transmission of oil shocks is also quite different at the zero lower bound. However, oil shocks tend to move output and inflation in opposite directions, at ZLB, the burst of inflation lowers real rates and stimulates the interest-sensitive component of GDP, mitigating the usual contractionary effects of the oil shock, if oil prices rise gradually, persistent rise in inflation might causes GDP to expand temporarily.

Brief Model Description Two-country DSGE model that builds on Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995): home and foreign goods produced under monopolistic competition, oil use in production and consumption as in Bodenstein et al (21), real and nominal rigidities (investment adj. costs, consumption habits, sticky prices and wages) as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (25), incomplete international financial markets (one-bond-economy, net positions only), one country imports oil in steady state.

Monetary Policy Monetary Policy follows a standard Taylor Rule, but needs to respect the zero bound constraint on the nominal interest rate: and i not t = ī +γ i(i not t 1 ī)+(1 γ i)(π t +γ π (π t π)+ γ y 4 y gap t ), i t = max(, i not t ).

Solution Method Laséen and Svensson (29) suggest a method for obtaining simulations with arbitrary restrictions on the path of the nominal interest rate in a linear model with perfect foresight through a sequence of anticipated monetary policy shocks in the interest rate reaction function of the policymaker. We repurpose their method to implement the zero lower bound constraint and solve for the endogenous duration of the zero bound constraint. Code can be easily applied to any linearized model of any size (number of equations, number of country blocs). The codes will be available online soon.

Calibration Calibration follows Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust (25) and Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (21). Oil substitution elasticity is set to.4. Trade substitution elasticity is set to 1.1. Home country is calibrated to be the U.S. and accounts for 1/3 of world GDP. In steady state the home country produces 3% of its oil use. The parameters in the in interest rate reaction function imply a total weight on inflation of 2, on the output gap of 1/4. The smoothing coefficient is set to.8. Rule assures that the outcome to an oil shock under sticky prices are reasonably close to the outcome under flexible price.

Persistent Oil Demand Shock at the ZLB Our analysis focuses on the effects of oil shocks against the backdrop of an initial severe recession in the home country: monetary policy attempts to stimulate the economy by lowering rates to zero, at the point in which the additional oil shock strikes ZLB is expected to bind for 1 quarters, in the following, all the responses will be shown in deviation from this initial recession.

Persistent Oil Demand Shock at the ZLB Consider an oil demand (intensity) shock with a persistent growth component and a level error correction component in three cases: flexible price economy, sticky price economy without ZLB, sticky price economy with ZLB: in all three cases, home oil demand falls, long-term responses resemble those of a negative home technology shock, external sector different from technology shock: real exchange rate has to depreciate for an improvement of nonoil balance.

Persistent Oil Demand Shock at the ZLB Under ZLB, shock generates persistent qualitative differences in the response of real GDP: GDP temporarily rises, persistently cushioned beyond the liquidity trap, policy rates constrained and oil shocks being inflationary, the real interest rate falls more, cushioning fall in investment, props up capital stock, leads to persistent wedge between real (nonoil) gross output (across cases), gross output falls gradually due to real rigidities and phasing in of shock, difference between gross output and GDP is a wedge implied by the presence of imported oil inputs in production, initial fall is gross output small enough so that the contraction in oil imports due to oil price rise translates into a boost to GDP.

Figure 1: An Oil Demand Shock at the Zero Lower Bound Oil Price Policy Interest Rate (AR) 2 18 16 14 12.3.2.1.1 Real Gross Output.5 Real Interest Rate (AR).2.3.5.4 Real GDP Headline Inflation (AR) 1.5.1 1.5.2 Real Investment Core Inflation (AR).8.5.6 1 1.5.4.2 Home, ZLB Binds Home, ZLB Does Not Bind Home, Flexible Prices/Wages 28

Figure 2: An Oil Demand Shock at the Zero Lower Bound: Trade Flows Real Exports Foreign GDP.5.1.2.5.3 1.4 Real Nonoil Imports.12 Oil Balance (GDP share) 1.14.16 1.5.18.2 2.22.24 Real Exchange Rate (consumption based) Trade Balance (GDP share) 1.8 1.6.14.16.18 1.4.2 1.2.22 1.24 Home, ZLB Binds Home, ZLB Does Not Bind Home, Flexible Prices/Wages 29

Sensitivity to Monetary Policy Rules Rule without smoothing: away from ZLB less persistent rise in real rates for same oil shock, at ZLB, enhances the inflation response and further cushions the effects, initial rise in GDP more than doubled and wedge between GDP and gross output larger.

Figure 3: An Oil Demand Shock at the Zero Lower Bound: Monetary Policy Rule with No Smoothing Real Gross Output, No Smoothing Real Gross Output, Benchmark.1.1.2.2.3.3.4.4.2 Real GDP, No Smoothing.2 Real GDP, Benchmark.1.1.1.1.2.2 Real Interest Rate (5 year, AR), No Smoothing Real Interest Rate (5 year, AR), Benchmark.1.5.1.5.5.5 Headline Inflation (AR), No Smoothing 2 1.5 1.5 2 1.5 1.5 Headline Inflation (AR), Benchmark Home, ZLB binds Home, ZLB does not bind 3

Sensitivity to Monetary Policy Rules Rule using forecast of headline inflation: looks past the peak inflation response and lowers rates in anticipation of the expected decline in oil prices, implies larger inflation response (Bodenstein et al (27)), bigger fall in the real interest rate, investment and consumption still fall, but are propped up relative to other rules, fall in net real rates enhances the exchange rate depreciation, boost to net exports leads to a temporary expansion in gross output.

Figure 4: An Oil Demand Shock at the Zero Lower Bound: Monetary Policy Rule Responds to a Forecast of Headline Inflation Real Gross Output, Headline Infl. Forecast.1.1.2.3 Real GDP, Headline Infl. Forecast Real Gross Output, Current Core Infl..1.1.2.3 Real GDP, Current Core Infl..2.1.1.2.1.1.2.2 Real Int. Rate (5 year, AR), Headline Infl. Forecast.1.5.5.1 Headline Inflation (AR), Headline Infl. Forecast 2 1.5 1.5 Real Int. Rate (5 year, AR), Current Core Infl..1.5.5.1 Headline Inflation (AR), Current Core Infl. 2 1.5 1.5 Home, ZLB Binds Home, ZLB Does Not Bind 31

Sensitivity Policy Model Add in two features that may diminish the expansionary effects of oil shock at ZLB: Financial accelerator: real interest rate affecting investment demand is no longer the risk-free rate, but takes into account information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, asymmetric problem worsens in response to higher oil prices, a more severe contraction in investment could induce deflationary pressure, real policy rates may not fall as much, reducing the stimulative effects of higher oil prices at ZLB. Lower exchange rate pass-through: may reduce the inflationary effects when the home currency depreciates in response to the rise in oil prices.

Figure 6: An Oil Demand Shock at the Zero Lower Bound: Comparison with a Policy Model Real GDP, Policy Model Real GDP, Benchmark.1.1.1.2.1.2 Real Exports, Policy Model Real Exports, Benchmark.5.5.5.5 1 1 Real Interest Rate (5 year, AR), Policy Model Real Interest Rate (5 year, AR), Benchmark.1.1.5.5 Headline Inflation (AR), Policy Model Headline Inflation (AR), Benchmark 1.5 1.5 1 1.5.5 Home, ZLB Binds Home, ZLB Does Not Bind 33

Oil Supply Shock Near-unit root oil supply shock: Large real exchange rate depreciation required to generate necessary and highly persistent improvement in trade balance. Only short-lived rise in inflation. Thus, similar behavior at and away from ZLB. If the oil supply shock lead to a period of increasing oil prices similar to the oil demand shock and protracted inflation, the oil supply shock would be compressed in the same manner. However, as argued in Bodenstein (21) oil supply and demand shocks differ along exactly this dimension: oil supply shocks are near unit-root processes, but oil demand shocks are best described as AR(2) processes.

Figure 7: An Oil Supply Shock at the Zero Lower Bound Oil Price Policy Interest Rate (AR) 2.3 18.2 16 14 12.1.1 Real Gross Output Real Interest Rate (5 year, AR).1.5.2.3.4.5.5 Real GDP Headline Inflation (AR) 2.1 1.2 Real Exchange Rate (consumption based) Trade Balance (GDP share) 2.2 2 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2.1.15.2.25 Home, ZLB Binds Home, ZLB Does Not Bind Home, ZLB Binds, Oil Demand Shock 34

Technology Shock 1% temporary decline in the level of the home country s productivity: oil price response not large enough to substantially affect the transmission of technology shocks, rise in inflation made persistent by the real rigidities, effects cushioned at ZLB relative to normal times, as technology shock primarily affects output rather than inflation, no sign reversal of GDP or gross output response.

2 15 1 5 Figure 8: A Technology Shock at the Zero Lower Bound Oil Price Policy Interest Rate (AR).4.3.2.1 Real Gross Output Real Interest Rate (5 year, AR).2.1.4.5.6 Real GDP Headline Inflation (AR) 1.5.2 1.4.5.6 1.5 1.5.5 Real Exchange Rate (consumption based).1.1.2 Home, ZLB Binds Home, ZLB Does Not Bind Home, ZLB Binds, Oil Demand Shock Trade Balance (GDP share) 35