Labor Supply and Taxation in Europe
|
|
- Coleen Jennings
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Labor Supply and Taxation in Europe Fabrizio Colonna - Banca d Italia Stefania Marcassa - Paris School of Economics November 16, 2010
2 Motivation Observe differences in Female Labor Force Participation (FLFP) across countries
3 Motivation Observe differences in Female Labor Force Participation (FLFP) across countries What are the effects of the tax system on FLFP?
4 Motivation Observe differences in Female Labor Force Participation (FLFP) across countries What are the effects of the tax system on FLFP? How different is the marginal tax rate of the second earner?
5 Why we care In most countries, the unit of taxation is the couple or the individual. France is an exception
6 Why we care In most countries, the unit of taxation is the couple or the individual. France is an exception Family tax splitting means that income is divided between all family members
7 Why we care In most countries, the unit of taxation is the couple or the individual. France is an exception Family tax splitting means that income is divided between all family members Common view is that male LFP is relatively inelastic, but FLFP is not
8 Why we care In most countries, the unit of taxation is the couple or the individual. France is an exception Family tax splitting means that income is divided between all family members Common view is that male LFP is relatively inelastic, but FLFP is not Gender wage gap and who married whom may matter for labor supply
9 What we do for France and Italy Use EU-SILC 2007
10 What we do for France and Italy Use EU-SILC 2007 Compute the marginal tax of the second earner
11 What we do for France and Italy Use EU-SILC 2007 Compute the marginal tax of the second earner Simulate using different tax systems
12 What we do for France and Italy Use EU-SILC 2007 Compute the marginal tax of the second earner Simulate using different tax systems Compare marginal taxes, labor force participation in simulated economies
13 OVERVIEW OF DATA
14 Female Labor Force Participation by Age Female Labor Force Partecipation cla France Germany United Kingdom Italy Spain
15 Male Labor Force Participation by Age Male Labor Force Partecipation cla France Germany United Kingdom Italy Spain
16 Female Labor Force Participation by Husband's Wage Female Labor Force Partecipation by husband s hourly wage Percentile husband s hourly wage France Germany United Kingdom Italy Spain
17 Labor Force Participation Country Men Women France Italy Spain Germany UK Data: EU-SILC, 2007
18 Female Labor Force Participation Without children With Children Country Single Living Married Divorced Single Living Married Divorced with partner Separated with partner Separated Widow Widow France Italy Spain Germany UK Data: EU-SILC, 2007
19 Female Incidence of Part-Time (Women 25-55) Country Single Living Married Divorced with partner Separated Widow France Italy Spain Germany UK Data: EU-SILC, 2007
20 Hourly Wage Country Men Women Gender gap France % Italy % Spain % Germany % UK % Data: EU-SILC, 2007
21 To Summarize No differences for men
22 To Summarize No differences for men Female labor force participation is the lowest in Italy
23 To Summarize No differences for men Female labor force participation is the lowest in Italy Female labor force participation is the highest in France
24 To Summarize No differences for men Female labor force participation is the lowest in Italy Female labor force participation is the highest in France In Italy, wife s participation rate increases with husband s income
25 TAX SYSTEMS
26 Tax System - France vs Italy
27 Tax System - France vs Italy In France, the unit of taxation is the family
28 Tax System - France vs Italy In France, the unit of taxation is the family In Italy, the unit of taxation is the individual
29 French Tax System - Quotient Familial Number of Parts Children Single Single in Couples Married Widowed
30 French Tax System - Quotient Familial Number of Parts Children Single Single in Couples Married Widowed Divide total household income by number of parts
31 French Tax System - Quotient Familial Number of Parts Children Single Single in Couples Married Widowed Divide total household income by number of parts Apply tax rate
32 French Tax System - Quotient Familial Number of Parts Children Single Single in Couples Married Widowed Divide total household income by number of parts Apply tax rate Multiply tax by number of parts to get total tax
33 French Tax System - Tax Schedule Fraction of Taxable Income Rate 1st bracket Up to nd bracket From to rd bracket From to th bracket From to th bracket Above
34 Italian Tax System - Tax Schedule Fraction of Taxable Income Rate 1st bracket Up to nd bracket From to rd bracket From to th bracket From to th bracket Above
35 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit Taxable Income Tax Credit Up to From to MaxTaxCredit + 502*( taxable income)/7 000 From to MaxTaxCredit*( taxable income)/ More than Where Max Tax Credit depends on level of taxable income
36 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit for Family Dependents Taxable Income Tax Credit Up to *taxable income/ From to From 690 to 720 From to *( taxable income)/ More than If wife s earnings are lower than 2840, then she depends on the husband
37 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit for Dependent Children For families with one child: 800 (95000 taxable income)/95000
38 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit for Dependent Children For families with one child: 800 (95000 taxable income)/95000 For families with more than one child: 800 (( (15000 nchild)) taxable income)/( (15000 nchild))
39 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit for Dependent Children For families with one child: 800 (95000 taxable income)/95000 For families with more than one child: 800 (( (15000 nchild)) taxable income)/( (15000 nchild)) Single parents receive maximum spouse tax credit and child tax credit
40 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit for Dependent Children For families with one child: 800 (95000 taxable income)/95000 For families with more than one child: 800 (( (15000 nchild)) taxable income)/( (15000 nchild)) Single parents receive maximum spouse tax credit and child tax credit Tax credits for children are equally shared between parents
41 Italian Tax System - Tax Credit for Dependent Children For families with one child: 800 (95000 taxable income)/95000 For families with more than one child: 800 (( (15000 nchild)) taxable income)/( (15000 nchild)) Single parents receive maximum spouse tax credit and child tax credit Tax credits for children are equally shared between parents If spouse s taxes net of tax credit is less than her share in child credit, the entire child credit is provided to first earner
42 Next Steps (1) Predict hourly wage and yearly hours worked, as in Heckman (1976)
43 Next Steps (1) Predict hourly wage and yearly hours worked, as in Heckman (1976) (2) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does not work
44 Next Steps (1) Predict hourly wage and yearly hours worked, as in Heckman (1976) (2) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does not work (3) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does work
45 Next Steps (1) Predict hourly wage and yearly hours worked, as in Heckman (1976) (2) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does not work (3) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does work (4) Estimate FLFP as a function of the expected net income
46 Next Steps (1) Predict hourly wage and yearly hours worked, as in Heckman (1976) (2) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does not work (3) Compute Taxes and Net HH Income assuming that wife does work (4) Estimate FLFP as a function of the expected net income (5) Redo (2) and (3) changing tax system
47 FRANCE
48 Summary Statistics - France, Women Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Age Years in school Children Married Gross HH Income Hourly wage
49 Experiments - Two Tax Reforms in France Individual Income based with: (1) Italian tax system (tax schedule + tax credits)
50 Experiments - Two Tax Reforms in France Individual Income based with: (1) Italian tax system (tax schedule + tax credits) (2) French tax schedule and no splitting
51 Some Definitions Marginal Income = Change in HH Net Income
52 Some Definitions Marginal Income = Change in HH Net Income Tax Rate 1 = Tot. Income Tax (Wife Not Working) Net Income (Wife Not Working)
53 Some Definitions Marginal Income = Change in HH Net Income Tax Rate 1 = Tax Rate 2 = Tot. Income Tax (Wife Not Working) Net Income (Wife Not Working) Tot. Income Tax (Wife Working) Net Income (Wife Working)
54 Some Definitions Marginal Income = Change in HH Net Income Tax Rate 1 = Tax Rate 2 = Tot. Income Tax (Wife Not Working) Net Income (Wife Not Working) Tot. Income Tax (Wife Working) Net Income (Wife Working) Marginal Tax = Change in Tot. Income Taxes Change in HH Net Income
55 Ratio to Benchmark (France) Tot. Tax (Working) Tot. Tax (Not Working) MI Reform (1) Reform (2)
56 Tax Rate of Married and Pacsed Tax Rate Benchmark France Tax Rate 2 Tax Rate 1 (Reform 1) Reform (1) Tax Rate 2 (Reform 1) Tax Rate 1 (Reform 2) Reform (2) Tax Rate 2 (Reform 2)
57 Tax Rate of Married and Pacsed Benchmark vs Reform (1) Benchmark vs Reform (1) Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 1 (Reform 1) Tax Rate 2 (Reform 1) Benchmark vs Reform (2) Benchmark vs Reform (2) Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 1 (Reform 2) Tax Rate 2 (Reform 2)
58 Tax Rates - Married and Pacsed Tax Rate 1 Tax Rate 2 Benchmark Reform (1) Reform (2) Higher increase with Italian system
59 Tax Rates - Singles Tax Rate 1 Tax Rate 2 Benchmark Reform (1) Reform (2) No change for those who work
60 Marginal Income - Married and Pacsed Marginal Income Reform (1) Benchmark vs Reform (1) Marginal Income
61 Marginal Income - Married and Pacsed Marginal Income Reform (2) Benchmark vs Reform (2) Marginal Income
62 Reform (1) - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women Quartiles of Wife's Income Quartiles of Husband's Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd France (benchmark) France with Italian tax schedule and tax credits
63 Reform (1) - Marginal Tax Single and Divorced Women Quartiles of Own Income Quartiles of Other Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd France (benchmark) France with Italian tax schedule and tax credits
64 Reform (1) - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women vs Singles in France Quartiles of Own Income Quartiles of Other Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd Not too much difference between Married and Singles
65 Reform (1) - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women vs Singles in Italy Quartiles of Own Income Quartiles of Other Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd Higher marginal tax for Married than Singles
66 Reform (2) - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women Quartiles of Wife's Income Quartiles of Husband's Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd France (benchmark) France with French tax schedule and no splitting
67 Reform (2) - Marginal Tax Single and Divorced Women Quartiles of Own Income Quartiles of Other Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd France (benchmark) France with French tax schedule and no splitting
68 Reform (1) and (2) - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women With Children Quartiles of Wife's Income Quartiles of Husband's Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd France (benchmark) France with Italian tax schedule and tax credits France with no splitting
69 Multinomial Logit - Marginal Effects, Married Unemployed Part-Time Full-Time Marginal Income -4.66e e (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** Net Income 1.77e e e-06 (0.0000) (0.0000)* (0.0000)** Age (0.0056) (0.0076)** (0.0128)** Age (0.0007) (0.0001)** (0.0002)** Children (0.0043) (0.0052)*** (0.0099)*** Base outcome is Out of Labor Force
70 Change in Employment Status of Married vs Singles Out of LF Unemployed Part-Time Full-Time Benchmark Reform (1) Reform (2)
71 Change in Employment Status of Married with/without Children Out of LF Unemployed Part-Time Full-Time Benchmark Reform (1) Reform (2)
72 To Summarize Reform (1) does not affect FLFP
73 To Summarize Reform (1) does not affect FLFP Reform (2) increases total taxes but decreases marginal tax, and affects positively LFP of married
74 ITALY
75 Summary Statistics - Italy, Women Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Age Years in school Children Married Gross HH Income Hourly wage
76 Experiment - Tax Reform in Italy French tax schedule with splitting
77 Ratio to Benchmark (Italy) Tot. Tax (Working) Tot. Tax (Not Working) MI Reform
78 Tax Rate Benchmark Italy Tax Rate 2.4 Tax Rate 1 (Reform) Tax Rate of Married and Pacsed Tax Rate 2 (Reform).4 Benchmark vs Reform Tax Rate Tax Rate Benchmark vs Reform Reform Tax Rate 1 (Reform) Tax Rate 2 (Reform).4
79 Tax Rates - Married and Pacsed Tax Rate 1 Tax Rate 2 Benchmark Reform
80 Tax Rates - Singles Tax Rate 1 Tax Rate 2 Benchmark Reform
81 Marginal Income - Married and Pacsed Marginal Income Reform Benchmark vs Reform Marginal Income
82 Reform - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women Quartiles of Wife's Income Quartiles of Husband's Income 1st 2nd 3rd 1st nd rd Italy (benchmark) Italy with French tax schedule and splitting
83 Reform - Marginal Tax Single and Divorced Women Quartiles of Own Income Quartiles of Other Income 1st 2nd 3rd Italy (benchmark) Italy with French tax schedule and splitting 1st nd rd
84 Reform - Marginal Tax of Second Earner Married and Pacsed Women With Children Quartiles of Wife's Income Quartiles of Husband's Income 1st 2nd 3rd Italy (benchmark) Italy with French tax schedule and splitting 1st nd rd
85 Multinomial Logit - Marginal Effects, Married Unemployed Part-Time Full-Time Marginal Income -8.57e e (0.0000)* (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** Net Income 4.62e e e-06 (0.0000) (0.0000)*** (0.0000)** Age (0.0056) (0.0077)*** (0.0148)*** Age (0.0007) (0.0001)*** (0.0002)** Children (0.0057) (0.0063) (0.0134)*** Base outcome is Out of Labor Force
86 Change in Employment Status of Married vs Singles Out of LF Unemployed Part-Time Full-Time Benchmark Reform
87 To Summarize The Italian system discourages LFP of low income second earners, but less than French system
88 To Summarize The Italian system discourages LFP of low income second earners, but less than French system The French system would not affect FLFP
Introducing Family Tax Splitting in Germany: How Would It Affect the Income Distribution, Work Incentives and Household Welfare?
Introducing Family Tax Splitting in Germany: How Would It Affect the Income Distribution, Work Incentives and Household Welfare? Viktor Steiner and Katharina Wrohlich DIW Berlin Motivation In Germany,
More informationTaxation and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Italy
Taxation and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Italy Fabrizio Colonna Stefania Marcassa November 15, 2011 Abstract Italy has the lowest labor force participation of women among OECD countries. Moreover,
More informationLecture 4: Income Taxes Over Time & Across Countries
Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year 2014-2015 Lecture 4: Income Taxes Over Time & Across Countries (January 27 th 2015)
More informationIndebted households in the euro area: a micro perspective using the EU-SILC
Indebted households in the euro area: a micro perspective using the EU-SILC 2 nd European User Conference for EU-LFS and EU-SILC Mannheim 31 March-1 April 211 Ramon Gomez-Salvador, Adriana Lojschova and
More informationJOINT EMPLOYMENT REPORT STATISTICAL ANNEX
,--~- -._, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 6.9.2000 COM(2000) 551 final Volume II JOINT EMPLOYMENT REPORT STATISTICAL ANNEX Definitions, tables and charts (presented by the Commission)
More informationTaxation and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Italy
Taxation and Labor Force Participation: The Case of Italy Fabrizio Colonna (Bank of Italy) Stefania Marcassa (THEMA Université de Cergy-Pontoise) Abstract Italy has the lowest labor force participation
More informationOnline Appendix. Long-term Changes in Married Couples Labor Supply and Taxes: Evidence from the US and Europe Since the 1980s
Online Appendix Long-term Changes in Married Couples Labor Supply and Taxes: Evidence from the US and Europe Since the 1980s Alexander Bick Arizona State University Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln Goethe University
More informationGender Pay Gap Report 2017
Gender Pay Gap Report 2017 Pay And The Bonus Gap Pay difference between men and women HOURLY PAY BONUS PAID Mean * 14.1% 29.1% Median * 5.3% 48.8% Fig. 1. The table above shows our overall mean and median
More informationIncome Inequality in France, : Evidence from Distributional National Accounts (DINA)
Income Inequality in France, 1900-2014: Evidence from Distributional National Accounts (DINA) Bertrand Garbinti 1, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret 2 and Thomas Piketty 2 1 Paris School of Economics, Crest, and
More informationOnline Appendix. Long-term Changes in Married Couples Labor Supply and Taxes: Evidence from the US and Europe Since the 1980s
Online Appendix Long-term Changes in Married Couples Labor Supply and Taxes: Evidence from the US and Europe Since the 1980s Alexander Bick Arizona State University Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln Goethe University
More informationFinancing long-term care through housing in Europe
Financing long-term care through housing in Europe C. Bonnet 1, S. Juin 2, A. Laferrère 3 1 Ined 2 Ined, labex ipops, Univ. Paris-Est, Erudite 3 Insee, Crest, Univ. Paris-Dauphine Contact: sandrine.juin@ined.fr
More informationThe Local Government Pension Scheme (England and Wales) Trivial Commutation. Lump sums paid on or after 1 April 2008
The Local Government Pension Scheme (England and Wales) Trivial Commutation Lump sums paid on or after 1 April 2008 Date: 21 February 2008 Author: Ian Boonin Table of Contents 1 Introduction and Legislative
More informationWhat accounts for the increase in female labor force participation in Spain
Discussion Paper No. 2018-6 January 18, 2018 http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2018-6 Please cite the corresponding Journal Article at http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/journalarticles/2018-16
More informationLecture 3: Income & Wage Taxation Over Time & Across Countries (check on line for updated versions)
Public Economics: Tax & Transfer Policies (Master PPD & APE, Paris School of Economics) Thomas Piketty Academic year 2015-2016 Lecture 3: Income & Wage Taxation Over Time & Across Countries (check on line
More informationHusband s Unemployment and Wife s Labor Supply The Added Worker Effect across Europe
Husband s Unemployment and Wife s Labor Supply The Added Worker Effect across Europe Julia Bredtmann a,b Sebastian Otten a,b Christian Rulff a a Ruhr-University Bochum b RWI Essen 3 rd European User Conference
More informationInvalidity: Benefits (I), 2002 a)
Austria Belgium Denmark 2% of "E" per period of 12 insurance months. "E" =. If a person becomes an invalid before completing 56½ years of age, the months preceding the age of 56½ are credited as insurance
More informationInvalidity: Benefits a)
Austria 1.83% of E per year for the first 30 insurance years; 1.675% of "E" per year for the further insurance years (max. 80% of "E"). If a person becomes an invalid before completing the 56th year of
More informationPortability of pension rights and taxation of pension schemes in the EU
Task Force on Portability of pension rights and taxation of pension schemes in the EU DRAFT REPORT ANNEX I : PUBLIC PENSION SCHEMES IN THE EU (MISSOC) 16/05/2002 Rapporteur: J rgen Mortensen, Associate
More informationGREECE Overview of the system
GREECE 2001 1. Overview of the system The national currency is the Drachmae (GRD). The 2001 Average Worker earnings is GRD 3318905. All information in this chapter applies to 1 January, 2001. 2. Unemployment
More informationANTICIPATE Social Security and Your Retirement SAVING : INVESTING : PLANNING
ANTICIPATE Social Security and Your Retirement SAVING : INVESTING : PLANNING About this seminar Presentation > Provides comprehensive education > Includes action steps > Provides opportunity to develop
More informationInvalidity: Benefits a) (II), 2010
Austria Belgium Partner: No supplement. Children: EUR 29.07 for each child up to the completion of age 18 or up to the completion of age 27 for children engaged in vocational training or university education,
More informationLow-wage employment and the reform of the Austrian welfare system
Low-wage employment and the reform of the Austrian welfare system EUROMOD Workshop, Vienna, 17-18 September 2018 www.gaw-mbh.at Viktor Steiner, Florian Wakolbinger Gesellschaft für Angewandte Wirtschaftsforschung
More informationRomero Catholic Academy Gender Pay Reporting Findings
Romero Catholic Academy Gender Pay Reporting Findings March 2018 Introduction In light of the recent Government Regulations regarding Mandatory Gender Pay Gap Reporting, Total Reward Group have been tasked
More informationAnswer Key Midterm Exam Winter 2002
The University of British Columbia Department of Economics Economics 351: Women in the Economy Answer Key Midterm Exam Winter 2002 I. For each of the following questions, circle the letter corresponding
More informationS U M M A R Y B R I E F. The Nordic countries are leaders on gender equality
S U M M A R Y B R I E F May 2018 http://oe.cd/last-mile-gender-nordic The Nordic countries are leaders on gender equality Key measures of gender gaps in employment, Nordic and selected other OECD countries,
More informationWomen in the Labor Force: A Databook
Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 9-2007 Women in the Labor Force: A Databook Bureau of Labor Statistics Follow this and additional works at:
More informationEffective Tax Rates on Employee Stock Options in the European Union and the USA
Brussels, May 23 Ref. Ares(214)75853-15/1/214 Effective Tax Rates on Employee Stock Options in the European Union and the USA Table of Contents INTRODUCTION...2 RESULTS...3 Normal taxation (no special
More informationGender Inequality in Taxation: The case of Argentina
GEM-IWG Knowledge Networking Program on Engendering Macroeconomics and International Economics Gender Inequality in Taxation: The case of Argentina Corina Rodríguez Enríquez Natalia Gherardi Dario Rossignolo
More informationGREECE. 1. Overview of the system
GREECE 1. Overview of the system The national currency is the Drachmae (Dr). The 1997 Average Production Worker s earnings level is Dr. 3 061 145. All information in this chapter applies to 1 January,
More informationSecuring Your Retirement. Transforming Social Security Into a Winning Retirement Strategy
Securing Your Retirement Transforming Social Security Into a Winning Retirement Strategy Living Longer Life Expectancy Upon Retirement at Age 65 Male Age 65 50% chance of living to 87 25% chance of living
More informationThe Canadian Pension System
The Canadian Pension System Edward Tamagno Policy Associate Caledon Institute of Social Policy Ottawa, Canada General Assembly of the Japan Pension Research Council Tokyo, 8-98 9 September 2005 Outline
More informationSocial Security: Is a Key Foundation of Economic Security Working for Women?
Committee on Finance United States Senate Hearing on Social Security: Is a Key Foundation of Economic Security Working for Women? Statement of Janet Barr, MAAA, ASA, EA on behalf of the American Academy
More informationToday s agenda. Social Security the choice of a lifetime. Social Security basics. Managing the discussion
Today s agenda Social Security the choice of a lifetime Social Security basics Managing the discussion 2 Social Security The choice of a lifetime 3 Most file at the earliest possible time New Social Security
More informationInequality Dynamics in France, : Evidence from Distributional National Accounts (DINA)
Inequality Dynamics in France, 1900-2014: Evidence from Distributional National Accounts (DINA) Bertrand Garbinti 1, Jonathan Goupille-Lebret 2 and Thomas Piketty 2 1 Paris School of Economics, Crest,
More informationRULE C8 Limitation where spouses or civil partners living apart
Rule C8 explains a limitation on death benefits if husband and wife, or civil partners were living apart at the date of death. Part V of Schedule 3 shows how a minimum level of pension should be calculated.
More informationWomen in the Labor Force: A Databook
Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 2-2013 Women in the Labor Force: A Databook Bureau of Labor Statistics Follow this and additional works at:
More informationExplaining the gender gap in sickness absence: the EU-LFS ad hoc
Explaining the gender gap in sickness absence: the EU-LFS ad hoc module 2005 Erling Solheim Norwegian University of Science and Technology 2nd European User Conference EU-LFS & EU-SILC Mannheim 31.03.2011
More informationNORWAY Overview of the system
NORWAY 1997 1. Overview of the system In Norway, the unemployment insurance scheme is part of the National Insurance Scheme (NIS). Unemployment benefits are calculated as a percentage of previous earnings,
More informationIncome Splitting in Retirement
Income Splitting in Retirement INCOME SPLITTING IN RETIREMENT [Please note that any reference to the term spouse in this article includes a reference to the term commonlaw partner.] Couples planning for
More information3. Work. Number of Employees by Industry and Sex
3. Work Number of Employees by Industry and Sex Labour Force Survey, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Note: Attention should be paid to the time-line of the data, as, with revision of
More informationWomen in the Labor Force: A Databook
Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 12-2011 Women in the Labor Force: A Databook Bureau of Labor Statistics Follow this and additional works at:
More informationEICT Microsimulations for New Public Policy Initiatives for Mexico to tackle poverty
EICT Microsimulations for New Public Policy Initiatives for Mexico to tackle poverty Araceli Ortega Díaz Tecnológico de Monterrey Sabbatical Researcher at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid 12 June 2017 This
More informationStatistical annex. Sources and definitions
Statistical annex Sources and definitions Most of the statistics shown in these tables can be found as well in several other (paper or electronic) publications or references, as follows: the annual edition
More informationIMPACT OF RETIREMENT RISKS ON WOMEN. Report: Society of Actuaries & WISER Presented by: Linda Stone, WISER Senior Fellow
IMPACT OF RETIREMENT RISKS ON WOMEN Report: Society of Actuaries & WISER Presented by: Linda Stone, WISER Senior Fellow SOA RESEARCH 2013 Survey on Process of Retirement and Retirement Risks Covers retirees
More informationWomen in the Labor Force: A Databook
Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR Federal Publications Key Workplace Documents 12-2010 Women in the Labor Force: A Databook Bureau of Labor Statistics Follow this and additional works at:
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE GROWTH IN SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AMONG THE RETIREMENT AGE POPULATION FROM INCREASES IN THE CAP ON COVERED EARNINGS
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE GROWTH IN SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS AMONG THE RETIREMENT AGE POPULATION FROM INCREASES IN THE CAP ON COVERED EARNINGS Alan L. Gustman Thomas Steinmeier Nahid Tabatabai Working
More informationYouGov Survey Results
YouGov Survey Results Sample Size: 1944 Chinese Adults Fieldwork: 2013/12/16-2013/12/30 Total Age Gender City Total 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45+ Male Female Beijing Guangzh ou Shanghai Shenzhen And which
More informationSPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WOMEN FACE IN RETIREMENT SECURITY
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WOMEN FACE IN RETIREMENT SECURITY 2019 EBRIEFING SERIES FEBRUARY 6, 2019 SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WOMEN FACE IN RETIREMENT SECURITY Jack VanDerhei Research Director, EBRI The Cost
More informationNon-employed contributions to Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI) and Income Compensation Insurance (IC)
2.03 Contributions Non-employed contributions to Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), Disability Insurance (DI) and Income Compensation Insurance (IC) Position as of 1 st January 2018 The facts at a
More informationTrying the Impossible - Financing 30-Year Retirements with 40-Year Careers: A Discussion of Social Security and Retirement Policy
John B. Shoven Charles R. Schwab Professor of Economics Stanford University Trying the Impossible - Financing 30-Year Retirements with 40-Year Careers: A Discussion of Social Security and Retirement Policy
More informationThe Local Government Pension Scheme. Liability for combined benefits - Regulations 29, 48 and 126
The Local Government Pension Scheme Liability for combined benefits - Regulations 29, 48 and 126 1. Regulation 29 of the Local Government Pension Scheme Regulations 1997 (the LGPS Regulations ) provides
More informationA Comparison of the Tax Burden on Labor in the OECD, 2017
FISCAL FACT No. 557 Aug. 2017 A Comparison of the Tax Burden on Labor in the OECD, 2017 Jose Trejos Research Assistant Kyle Pomerleau Economist, Director of Federal Projects Key Findings: Average wage
More informationPublic-private sector pay differential in UK: A recent update
Public-private sector pay differential in UK: A recent update by D H Blackaby P D Murphy N C O Leary A V Staneva No. 2013-01 Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series Public-private sector pay differential
More informationThe Effect of NZ Superannuation eligibility age on the labour force participation of older people
The Effect of NZ Superannuation eligibility age on the labour force participation of older people Roger Hurnard Workshop on Labour Force Participation and Economic Growth, Wellington 14 April 2005 Outline
More informationMarried Women s Labor Supply Decision and Husband s Work Status: The Experience of Taiwan
Married Women s Labor Supply Decision and Husband s Work Status: The Experience of Taiwan Hwei-Lin Chuang* Professor Department of Economics National Tsing Hua University Hsin Chu, Taiwan 300 Tel: 886-3-5742892
More informationYour State Pension Choice Pension now or extra pension later: A guide to State Pension Deferral
Your State Pension Choice Pension now or extra pension later: A guide to State Pension Deferral Introduction About this guide When you are coming up to State Pension age, you need to decide when you want
More informationAppendix for Incidence, Salience and Spillovers: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Tax Credits on Wages
Appendix for Incidence, Salience and Spillovers: The Direct and Indirect Effects of Tax Credits on Wages Table A.1. Parameters of Family Credit and WFTC ( per week) April 1999 (FC) October 1999 (WFTC)
More informationFinancial Aid Application
Financial Aid Application Families that wish to apply for financial aid must complete the attached forms after enrolling students in the DAPCEP online system. The available financial awards are as follows:
More informationReview questions for Multinomial Logit/Probit, Tobit, Heckit, Quantile Regressions
1. I estimated a multinomial logit model of employment behavior using data from the 2006 Current Population Survey. The three possible outcomes for a person are employed (outcome=1), unemployed (outcome=2)
More informationTax Treatment of Married, Separated and Divorced Persons
Tax and Duty Manual Part 44-01-01 Tax Treatment of Married, Separated and Divorced Persons Part 44-01-01 This document should be read in conjunction with Part 44 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 and
More informationThe Local Government Pension Scheme (England & Wales) Trivial Commutation. Lump sums paid on or after 1 April 2009
The Local Government Pension Scheme (England & Wales) Trivial Commutation Lump sums paid on or after 1 April 2009 Date: 26 March 2010 Author: Ian Boonin Table of Contents 1 Introduction and Legislative
More informationJoint Retirement Decision of Couples in Europe
Joint Retirement Decision of Couples in Europe The Effect of Partial and Full Retirement Decision of Husbands and Wives on Their Partners Partial and Full Retirement Decision Gülin Öylü MSc Thesis 07/2017-006
More informationSocial Security and Your Retirement
Social Security and Your Retirement January 2013 ACI-1111-3702 American Century Investment Services, Inc. Distributor 2013 American Century Investments Proprietary Holdings, Inc. All rights reserved. Social
More informationWomen, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity
Women, Work, and the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity Kalpana Kochhar Deputy Director Strategy, Policy, and Review Department, IMF June 12, 2014 The views expressed in this presentation
More informationTHE NETHERLANDS 2005
THE NETHERLANDS 2005 1. Overview of the tax-benefit system Dutch social security provides several incomes replacement schemes under the employee s insurance act (e.g. unemployment insurances), the national
More informationDoes Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development? Matthias Doepke (Northwestern) Michèle Tertilt (Mannheim)
Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development? Matthias Doepke (Northwestern) Michèle Tertilt (Mannheim) Evidence Evidence : Evidence : Evidence : Evidence : : Evidence : : Evidence : : Evidence
More informationPROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL 63
SB -1 (LC 1) //1 (CMT/ps) PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO SENATE BILL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 On page 1 of the printed bill, line, after amending delete the rest of the line and delete lines through and insert ORS
More information77th OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY Regular Session. House Bill 2491
th OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY-- Regular Session House Bill Introduced and printed pursuant to House Rule.00. Presession filed (at the request of House Interim Committee on Revenue) SUMMARY The following
More informationGender Pay Gap and Quantile Regression in European Families
Gender Pay Gap and Quantile Regression in European Families Catia Nicodemo Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona 13th of December EUROPEAN MARRIED WOMEN: WHY DO(N T) THEY WORK? "To the woman he said, Great
More informationHousehold debt inequalities
Article: Household debt inequalities Contact: Elaine Chamberlain Release date: 4 April 2016 Table of contents 1. Main points 2. Introduction 3. Household characteristics 4. Individual characteristics 5.
More informationPanel Data Research Center at Keio University DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES
Panel Data Research Center at Keio University DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES DP2017-003 May, 2017 Changes in Household Income Inequality over the Business Cycle: Husbands Earnings and Wives Labor Supply in Japan
More informationThe Chilean Pension System: Favorable Results in International Comparison
ISSN 0717-1528 The an Pension System: Favorable Results in International Comparison The pension system has been questioned Recently, the an pension system has shown an increasing dissatisfaction level,
More informationThe minimum wage debate: whatever happened to pay equity?
The minimum wage debate: whatever happened to pay equity? Jill Rubery and Damian Grimshaw EWERC University of Manchester Labour markets and the law of one price Law of one price still a central organising
More informationThe Effects of Income Support Settings on Incentives to Work. Nicolas Hérault, Guyonne Kalb and Justin van de Ven
The Effects of Income Support Settings on Incentives to Work Nicolas Hérault, Guyonne Kalb and Justin van de Ven Objectives of research Key research question: What relationships are described by survey
More informationTHE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AUXILIARY SPOUSE AND SURVIVOR BENEFITS ON THE HOUSEHOLD RETIREMENT DECISION
THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AUXILIARY SPOUSE AND SURVIVOR BENEFITS ON THE HOUSEHOLD RETIREMENT DECISION DAVID M. K. KNAPP DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AUGUST 7, 2014 KNAPP (2014) 1/12
More informationTHE ABOLITION OF THE EARNINGS RULE
THE ABOLITION OF THE EARNINGS RULE FOR UK PENSIONERS Richard Disney Sarah Tanner THE INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES WP 00/13 THE ABOLITION OF THE EARNINGS RULE FOR UK PENSIONERS 1 Richard Disney Sarah Tanner
More information2016 Census of Canada
216 Census of Canada Incomes Results from the latest Census release show that Alberta had the highest median income among the provinces. Alberta s strong economic expansion in recent years, particularly
More informationHELPING YOU PLAN A BETTER RETIREMENT
HELPING YOU PLAN A BETTER RETIREMENT HELPING YOU PLAN A BETTER RETIREMENT The small but steady progress in the number of women saving enough for later life in recent years shows that, to some extent, the
More informationWays to increase employment
Ways to increase employment Iceland Luxembourg Spain Canada Italy Norway Denmark Germany Portugal Ireland Japan Belgium Switzerland Austria Slovenia United States New Zealand Finland France Netherlands
More informationLabor supply responses to health shocks in Senegal
Labor supply responses to health shocks in Senegal Virginie Comblon (PSL, Université Paris-Dauphine, LEDa, UMR DIAL) and Karine Marazyan (Université Paris 1, IEDES, UMR D&S) UNU WIDER Conference - Human
More informationCHAPTER 11 CONCLUDING COMMENTS
CHAPTER 11 CONCLUDING COMMENTS I. PROJECTIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS MINT3 produces a micro dataset suitable for projecting the distributional consequences of current population and economic trends and for
More informationMedicaid Insurance and Redistribution in Old Age
Medicaid Insurance and Redistribution in Old Age Mariacristina De Nardi Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and NBER, Eric French Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and John Bailey Jones University at Albany,
More informationSocial Security and Medicare: A Survey of Benefits
Social Security and Medicare: A Survey of Benefits #5485L COURSE MATERIAL TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview 1 I. Social Security: The Numbers Game 1 II. Social Security: A Snapshot
More informationFamily and Work. 1. Labor force participation of married women
Family and Work 1. Labor force participation of married women - why has it increased so much since WW II? - how is increased market work related to changes in the gender wage gap? 2. Is there a time crunch?
More informationTax Progressivity in Australia:
Tax Progressivity in Australia: Facts, Measurements and Estimates (In Progress) Chung Tran Australian National University Nabeeh Zakariyya Australian National University Australian-Korean Tax and Welfare
More informationMind the Gap! HR Factory April 2 nd, 2015
Mind the Gap! HR Factory April 2 nd, 2015 Introduction to the Luxembourg State Pension System 2 PENSION SYSTEM IN THE GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBOURG RETIREMENT: STATE PENSION State Pension Company Pension Personal
More informationIOPS COUNTRY PROFILE: BELGIUM
IOPS COUNTRY PROFILE: BELGIUM DEMOGRAPHICS AND MACROECONOMICS GDP per capita (USD) 43580 Population (000s) 11 322 Labour force (000s) 4 976 Employment rate 62.3 Population over 65 (%) 18.5 Dependency ratio
More informationNETHERLANDS the earnings related benefit (half a year up till 5 years depending on employment record),
NETHERLANDS 2004 1. Overview of the tax-benefit system Dutch social security provides several incomes replacement schemes under the employee s insurance act (e.g. unemployment insurances), the national
More informationLABOUR FORCE SURVEY 2017 MAIN RESULTS
LABOUR FORCE SURVEY 2017 MAIN RESULTS In 2017 the number of economically active population aged 15-64 was 3 277.5 thousand and represented 71.3% of population in the same age group. The activity rate (15-64
More informationThe Decision to Delay Social Security Benefits: Theory and Evidence
The Decision to Delay Social Security Benefits: Theory and Evidence John B. Shoven Stanford University and NBER and Sita Nataraj Slavov American Enterprise Institute and NBER 14 th Annual Joint Conference
More informationHousehold Taxation, Income Splitting and Labor Supply Incentives - A Microsimulation Study for Germany
Household Taxation, Income Splitting and Labor Supply Incentives - A Microsimulation Study for Germany Viktor Steiner Katharina Wrohlich Free University Berlin German Institute of Economic Research (DIW
More informationSocial Determinants of Health: employment and working conditions
Social Determinants of Health: employment and working conditions Michael Marmot UCL Institute of Health Equity 3 rd Nordic Conference in Work Rehabilitation 7 th May 2014 Fairness at the heart of all policies.
More informationabacus planning group
abacus planning group smart financial decisions Social Security Claiming Strategies Kirkland Watson Financial Summit Tuesday, November 15, 2011 X. Alexandra Chastain, CFP, Susan Amick McCants, CFP and
More informationExiting Poverty: Does Sex Matter?
Exiting Poverty: Does Sex Matter? LORI CURTIS AND KATE RYBCZYNSKI DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO CRDCN WEBINAR MARCH 8, 2016 Motivation Women face higher risk of long term poverty.(finnie
More informationLabor-Force Participation Rate for Men and Women, Age 25 to 54, and Mothers, 1948 to 2005
FIGURE 1.1 Labor-Force Participation Rate for Men and Women, Age 25 to 54, and Mothers, 1948 to 25 Percentage 1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 1948 1955 1965 1975 Year 1985 1995 25 Men 25 to 54 Women 25 to 54 Women
More informationGender Pay Gap Report. April
Gender Pay Gap Report April 2018 Introduction We are passionate about ensuring that everyone, regardless of their background, race, ethnicity or gender has equality. We have reported on our gender pay
More informationFertility Decline and Work-Life Balance: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications
Fertility Decline and Work-Life Balance: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications Kazuo Yamaguchi Hanna Holborn Gray Professor and Chair Department of Sociology The University of Chicago October, 2009
More informationCountry profile Remuneration Italy
Support for continued data collection and analysis concerning mobility patterns and career paths of researchers Country profile Remuneration Italy 1 RESEARCHER REMUNERATION IN ACADEMIA 2 1.0 Introduction
More informationIncome and Longevity: Implications for Retirement and Disability Programs
Income and Longevity: Implications for Retirement and Disability Programs David Cutler, Harvard and NBER The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect
More informationDiane Owens, Speaker & Consultant Step Up Your Social Security
Diane Owens, Speaker & Consultant Step Up Your Social Security Benefit rate depends on your age when you start your benefits: Early Retirement reduced based on # of months before your Full Retirement Age
More information