TALLINN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND SOCIETY JUNCKER S EU ARMY MILITARISATION OF THE EU: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY UNION

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1 TALLINN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF GOVERNANCE, LAW, AND SOCIETY JUNCKER S EU ARMY MILITARISATION OF THE EU: TOWARDS A EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY UNION PREPARED BY: TALLINN, ESTONIA MAY 2017

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION... 3 NOT A NEW IDEA: HISTOGRAPHY... 3 THE REVIVAL OF THE IDEA: JUNCKER S PLAN... 5 A NEW BALANCE OF POWER... 5 IT IS REALISM AND POWER POLITICS... 6 THE ROAD MAP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMON ARMY... 7 CONCLUSION... 8 REFERENCES... i

3 INTRODUCTION On the evening of the 27th anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, Jean-Claude Juncker President of the European Commission - delivered a speech in Berlin at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation premises presenting his long-term plan to establish a European Common Army (ECA). This occasion was not the first-time Juncker expressed this idea. In the previous year and on several occasions Juncker said that Europe although indeed owes an enormous debt of thanks to the U.S., they will not safeguard the European Union s (EU) security forever (Juncker, 2016). He further stressed that Europe should carry this task for itself. Juncker concluded that this is why Europe needs, now more than ever, to take a new approach to the European Security and Defence Union, including the long-term plan to establish a European Common Army. The viability of Juncker s proposal comes as concerns grow over the security situation in the member states of the European Union. The threats that originate from the rising aggression from the Russian regime along the eastern borders of the EU, as well as the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). A future that could be at stake due to the current political turbulence in the U.S. with Donald Trump coming into power and him questioning the U.S. commitment to NATO and the worrying signs he will pivot towards Russia (MacAskill, 2017). The United Kingdom has been for so long opposing any initiative promoting a European Defence and Security Union. Now, with its impending exit from the EU, the remaining 27 EU member states are looking towards developing a stronger common security and defence policy (Brady, 2016). In this article, I will look through a structural realist lens on Juncker s plan to create the European Common Army, by shedding light on the histography and causality of the European Defence Cooperation. The article will move forward to reflect on how the establishment of the European Common Army (ECA) would affect the existing of the NATO and the current world balance of military power. NOT A NEW IDEA: HISTOGRAPHY Juncker s plan to create a European Common Army is not a brand-new idea. It is as old as the proposal of the European Unity that surfaced after the end of World War II. The French Prime Minister, René Pleven, in 1950 proposed an idea for a common army for Western Europe to oppose 3

4 the Soviet power. Branded as the Pleven Plan, it called for a joint European army, under the control of institutions similar to those of the ECSC, in which all countries, except Western Germany, would contribute their national forces (Glencross, 2014, p. 43). The U.S. immediately rejected the plan outright, labelling it as a diversionary tactic that would never raise the number of German troops necessary for defending Western Europe. France then presented a modified plan, drafted by Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of European Integrity, which allowed for the creation of entire West German divisions, with the multinational army coming under supranational control and be funded by a common budget. The then new proposal was labelled as the European Defence Community (EDC) and was formalised as a treaty in May The Treaty, however, received a devastating blow in August 1954 when the French National Assembly rejected it, refusing even to discuss the matter (European Defence Agency, 2016). Over the following decades, European cooperation in defence has taken place primarily in the framework of NATO. Until the ratification of the Treating of the European Union, known as the Treaty of Lisbon, which introduced Article 42.7 which introduced the Mutual Defence Claus that allows for a joint European military action in times of distress. The clause states that if a member of the European Union is under armed attack on its territory, other member states of the EU have an obligation of assistance and aid by all the means in their power (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). Article 42.7 was included in the Lisbon Treaty on the request of Greece, which demanded to have some collective defence protection outside of the realm of NATO since Turkey, its biggest adversary, is also covered by NATO but is not an EU member (POLITICO, 2015). The Lisbon Treaty also established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) that lies under the umbrella of the CFSP. The CSDP, although it does not mean the full integration of EU military powers, it aims at providing the EU with an operational and functional capacity based on civilian and military assets. The EU may use them on missions outside Europe for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security by the principles of the United Nations Charter (Glencross, 2014, p. 188). 4

5 THE REVIVAL OF THE IDEA: JUNCKER S PLAN JUNCKER S EU ARMY Juncker s proposal revives the old idea of creating a European Common Army. It comes amid rising fears over the security of Europe both on internal and external levels. The plan aims at consolidating peace in Europe, reacting to security threats both within the continent and in its neighbourhood, defending European values vis-à-vis aggressive powers, notably Russia, and creating economies of scale by consolidating demand for military machinery (Frontini, 2015). To conclude, Juncker s argument on the important of having an ECA is based on three pillars: a) Common Threat: the Russian aggression on the eastern EU borders, migrant crisis, and the change in the world balance of power. b) Common Army: reacting more credibly to any threat to peace in a member state or a neighbouring country. The ECA would be complementary to NATO. More defence in Europe doesn t necessarily mean less transatlantic solidarity. The reduction of the U.S. security footprint in Europe and Europeans dramatic loss of army capability since the 1990s have resulted in a security vacuum in Europe. c) Common Budge: facing the challenges created by shrinking national defence budgets and the unnecessary duplication of organisations, capabilities, and expenditures. A European Defence Fund would allow military research and development. Juncker refutes the claims that having an ECA means a step towards the establishment of the United States of Europe (Juncker, 2016). Keohane scrutinised Juncker s claim and plan by stating that a European army cannot exist without a supranational European state. And since a federal superstate is not in the cards, those who propose a European army may think that they are advancing their federalist fantasies, but it is not a credible solution to today s EU security challenges (Keohane, 2016). A NEW BALANCE OF POWER The establishment of the European Common Army would present a new form of the world s order. Combining the various military capabilities of the EU member states together under one EU authority would alleviate EU s role in world politics. With the growing uncertainty of the 5

6 U.S. commitment to Europe security and NATO, Europe finds itself forced to fill in the power vacuum that could occur if the new U.S. President Trump decides to withdraw from the Alliance (Rettman, 2016). Trump on various occasions expressed his willingness to work with Russia and shift the U.S. policy towards embracing it as an alley. At the beginning of his presidency, he declared NATO as obsolete. Later, he reversed his position by saying that NATO is no longer obsolete due to its importance to fight terrorism (Liptak & Merica, 2017). For Trump, the importance of NATO is only to fight Islamic terrorism and not the Russian aggression. The instability and uncertainty of the position of the U.S. foreign policy don't present a solid prove of U.S. continuous support to NATO. Trump would aim to undermine NATO. He recently proposed, during his first visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as the U.S. President, a new regional security architecture labelled as Arab NATO, to push back against the threats coming from Iran and guide the fight against terrorism (Rogin, 2017). With Trump s efforts to undermine the role of NATO, and with the UK s decision to leave the EU, Brussels believes it is in the best interest of Europe to have a European Security and Defence Union and eventually an ECA taking care of its security and defence matters. IT IS REALISM AND POWER POLITICS Mearsheimer in his explanation of Structural Realism states that in Realism, sovereign states are the key players in the international system, whereas individuals, international institutions, non-governmental organisations, multinational corporations, other sub-state or transstate actors are depicted as having little to zero influence (Mearsheimer, 2013). Mearsheimer further explains that in realism, states are inherently aggressive (labelled as offensive realism) or obsessed with security (labelled as defensive realism). In structural realism, a security dilemma is created whereby the increase of one's security may bring along greater instability as an opposing power builds up its arms in response, resulting in arms race. Mearsheimer concludes by saying that security becomes a zero-sum game in that environment where only relative gains can be obtained. 6

7 Contrary to liberal accounts of the EU, Rosato challenges these conventional explanations, arguing that the European Community (EC) came into existence as a consequence of balance of power concerns (Rosato, 2011). Rosato claims that the Federal Republic of Germany and France, the two key founding members, established the European Community at the peak of the Cold War as a means to balance against the Soviet Union and one another. That same argument is also valid to apply to the establishment of the European Common Army. Rosato s core argument is that the balance of power determines whether and how states cooperate with each other. States decide to come together aiming at balancing against a common adversary. They choose among different arrangements based on an evaluation of their power position relative to that common adversary and their coalition partners (Rosato, 2013). Thus, Rosato concludes, the occurrence and form of international cooperation is best understood as a reflection of the distribution of power. Moravcsik refuted Rosato s argument about the establishment of the European Community, and the claim that European Integration was a result of power politics (Moravcsik, 2013). Moravcsik argues that Rosato s claim is based on monocausal interpretation based on anti- Soviet and Franco-German balancing. He further explains that European integration is based on economic interdependence mainly, and geopolitics comes second. THE ROAD MAP TO THE EUROPEAN COMMON ARMY The possibility of a common defence policy is enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty's Article 42 which stipulates that 'the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. Following the announcement of Juncker s plan, Federica Mogherini 1, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, announced the road map to the establishment of the European Common Army labelled A New Level of Ambition (Mogherini, 2016). The proposed new Level of Ambition implementation plan aims to develop a stronger Union in defence and security, which is capable of tackling today s challenges and threats 1 Federica Mogherini also holds the role of Vice-President of the European Commission, and Head of the European Defence Agency 7

8 more effectively, with the right tools, capabilities and structures to deliver greater safety for EU citizens. The key areas of the plan are: CONCLUSION a) to increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of CSDP b) to enhance the development of EU Member State capabilities c) to strengthen the European defence industry Juncker s plan to establish the European Defence Union (EDU) is becoming a reality, backed by the European Council, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. The establishment of the European Defence Union and consequently the European Common Army is indeed bringing a new power dynamics in world politics. The question still arises of whether this will mean the end of NATO as we know it nowadays or present a new way to define the relationship between the EU and NATO, where EDU works within the realm on NATO, complementing it. The ECA intends to show that EU has advanced and strong joint military power that can deter any offence and help protect international security and stability. 8

9 REFERENCES Brady, K. (2016). UK will oppose any idea of EU army despite impending Brexit. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from European Defence Agency. (2016). The European Defence Community failure. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from Frontini, A. (2015). Federalist rhetoric or political tactics? The what, where, who, when and why of Juncker s call for a common European army. EPC Commentary, 12 March Retrieved from Glencross, A. (2014). The Politics of European Integration: Political Union or a House Divided? Juncker, J.-C. (2016). The Europe Speech given by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from Keohane, D. (2016). Samuel Beckett s European Army. Retrieved May 18, 2017, from Liptak, K., & Merica, D. (2017). Trump reverses position, says NATO is no longer obsolete. Retrieved May 18, 2017, from MacAskill, E. (2017). Pence s speech on Nato leaves European leaders troubled over alliance s future. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from Mearsheimer, J. J. (2013). International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith (Eds.), International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity (Third Edition, pp ). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mogherini, F. (2016). Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. Brussels. Retrieved from i

10 Moravcsik, A. (2013). Did Power Politics Cause European Integration? Realist Theory Meets Qualitative Methods. POLITICO. (2015). What is article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty? Retrieved May 17, 2017, from Rettman, A. (2016). Germany: Trump victory to spur EU military union. Retrieved May 18, 2017, from Rogin, J. (2017). Trump to unveil plans for an Arab NATO in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved May 18, 2017, from Rosato, S. (2011). Europe United: Power Politics and the Making of the European Community. Cornell University Press. Rosato, S. (2013). Theory and Evidence in Europe United: A Response to My Critics. Security Studies, 22(4), Treaty of Lisbon. (2009). Mutual Defence Clause. Retrieved May 17, 2017, from ii