Macau Gaming More downgrades to come, but some positives should emerge by year-end

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1 Global Research 2 September 2014 Macau Gaming More downgrades to come, but some positives should emerge by year-end Equities Hong Kong Casinos Weak VIP demand, labour costs higher: trim EBITDA by 5% on average Macau revenue trends continue to disappoint: we think mass-market growth is largely in line with our estimates (we now expect about 19% in H214E, from about 20% before, but still expect 18% in E), but VIP has not shown the seasonal strength in summer that we had expected. We revise our FY14E VIP YoY growth forecast from up 2% to down 8%, implying down 19% YoY for August-December 2014, and expect it to stay subdued at 3% in 2015E: we think the market may under-estimate regional competition that could take 4-5ppt off Macau's junket VIP growth. Our overall gross gaming revenue (GGR) forecast is now 3% for 2014E (ie, down 6% on average for August-December), and 9% for 2015E. Combined with higher labour costs and massmarket non-gaming comps, we lower our 2014/15/16E EBITDA estimates 5-6% on average. Accordingly, we have lowered our price targets about 5% on average. Anthony Wong Analyst anthony-y.wong@ubs.com Angus Chan Analyst angus.chan@ubs.com Amid a downgrade cycle, some stocks offer great medium-term value For the past two months we have been concerned about consensus downgrades, especially in the mass-market, capping sector sentiment. We believe more downgrades will come (our estimates are 5% lower than consensus, itself 7% lower since May), and a tougher base effect in Q4 means near-term headline growth will remain difficult, but we think some stocks offer attractive medium-term value. For example MGM's/MPEL's existing businesses trade at 7-8x 15E EBITDA, below low-growth casinos in the US & Asia at 8-9x (above 9-10x if ex-tax, which Macau multiples are). Two openings within nine months; headline growth to stabilise by year-end We believe that near the end of 2014 the market will start to see casino openings (Melco Philippines in Q414, Galaxy in Q215) as positives. Macau room inventory should rise 9% in 2015E after a supply lull in By late 2014/early 2015 we also expect headline GGR growth to stop deteriorating. In the near term, downside/upside risks lie in a larger-than-expected impact from Macau's smoking ban, from 6 October, on the mass-market segment, and any positive flows from Southbound MMA from October. Prefer MGM/MPEL; Wynn most fully valued MGM is at a discount to sector averages but has the best E EPS growth, driven by MGM Cotai. The market has largely ignored MPEL's Philippines contribution, but we think it could add a differentiated 8-9% EBITDA growth in 2015E. Figure 1: Macau sector valuation Price (LC) PT P/E (x) EV/EBITDA (x) Div. yield (%) Company name Rating 1-Sep E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E 2014E 2015E Melco Crown Buy MGM China Buy Sands China Buy SJM Holdings Buy Galaxy Neutral Wynn Macau Neutral Simple average This report has been prepared by UBS Securities Asia Limited. ANALYST CERTIFICATION AND REQUIRED DISCLOSURES BEGIN ON PAGE 33. UBS does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.

2 Figure 2: Revised EBITDA on average 5% below consensus average in 2014/15E Group consolidated EBITDA (US$m) % growth Melco Crown 1,288 1,316 1,595 2,180 2,426 41% 2% 21% 37% 11% MGM China Holdings ,009 1,204 1,936 20% 10% 12% 19% 61% Sands China 2,827 3,497 4,098 4,431 5,120 48% 24% 17% 8% 16% SJM Holdings 1,106 1,128 1,268 1,242 1,166 12% 2% 12% -2% -6% Galaxy Entertainment 1,603 1,847 2,286 2,585 2,503 28% 15% 24% 13% -3% Wynn Macau 1,143 1,184 1,306 1,654 2,349 15% 4% 10% 27% 42% Sector aggregate 8,787 9,873 11,561 13,296 15,500 30% 12% 17% 15% 17% Bloomberg consensus average (US$m) UBS % difference to consensus Melco Crown 1,355 1,710 2,328-3% -7% -6% MGM China Holdings 946 1,034 1,281-5% -2% -6% Sands China 3,624 4,236 5,096-4% -3% -13% SJM Holdings 1,195 1,318 1,409-6% -4% -12% Galaxy Entertainment 1,926 2,397 2,945-4% -5% -12% Wynn Macau 1,243 1,346 1,832-5% -3% -10% Source: Bloomberg, UBS estimates Figure 3: Sector 12-month forward EV/EBITDA based on consensus estimates Feb-10 Apr-10 Jun-10 Aug-10 Oct-10 Dec-10 Feb-11 Apr-11 Jun-11 Aug-11 Oct-11 Dec-11 Feb-12 Apr-12 Jun-12 Aug-12 Oct-12 Dec-12 Feb-13 Apr-13 Jun-13 Aug-13 Oct-13 Dec-13 Feb-14 Apr-14 Jun-14 Aug fwd EV/EBITDA avg. +1 s.d. -1 s.d. Source: DataStream, UBS Double-digit sequential drop in VIP volumes in Q3 likely Junket VIP volumes corrected sharply in April-June this year, with volumes dropping 14% QoQ in Q2. We previously believed VIP volumes would stabilise and start rebounding in Q3 from a low Q2 base, but in fact Q3 volumes will likely again be down from Q2 levels, with end-player demand much weaker than we had expected. In June, junket volumes dropped to around US$66bn. In July MoM there was no sequential improvement, which is weaker than normal seasonality. We believe August volumes will be quite similar to July levels, indicating little MoM growth, again weaker than normal seasonality in this sense, it could be argued that VIP volumes have continued to weaken. We believe end demand has continued to deteriorate in Q3 due to shifting player behaviour in the context of some unprecedented changes in China's political climate, with many high-end gamblers choosing to "lie lower" as a result. These Macau Gaming 2 September

3 changes have intensified over the last few months, and there is now little indication of whether these would ease in the rest of the year or into 2015, in our view. Figure 4: Junket volumes have continued to drop in Q3 QoQ % Q413 Q114 Q214 Q314E Total 14% -3% -14% -13% Sands 14% -7% -24% -2% Wynn 14% 5% -27% -5% MPEL 9% -4% -13% -12% SJM 13% -4% -13% -23% MGM 17% -13% -16% -5% Galaxy 16% 4% -1% -13% Source: Company data, UBS estimates June-August VIP revenue annualising at US$26bn Taking a step back and look at the June-August period overall, we estimate junket VIP volumes have averaged around US$66bn per month, around 25% below that the peak of around US$87bn per month in Q413. This volume run rate annualises to industry junket VIP revenue of around US$23bn. Adding to that around US$7bn of direct VIP rolling per month (US$2.5bn of revenue), then total VIP revenue annualises to around US$26bn. Figure 5: Junket rolling volume has dropped 25% from peak levels Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10 Source: Company data Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 Jul-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Apr-12 Jul-12 Oct-12 Jan-13 Apr-13 Jul-13 Oct-13 3mma monthly junket rolling volume (US$bn) Jan-14 Apr-14 Jul-14 We believe this total VIP revenue run rate of US$26bn was achieved under the impact of several factors, some of which we do not expect to last through Firstly, in April a junket incident impacted the incentive for junkets to use their capital in the ensuing months. Secondly, there was the World Cup in June-July which diverted the attention of some gamblers. These two factors we see as temporary in nature. Against this context, we forecast 2015E VIP revenue will reach US$28.4bn, around 3% growth from FY14E. Our FY15E revenues implied run rate will be 10% above that of the June-August 2014 run rate. In our downside scenarios (please see the respective company pages), we assume VIP revenue to be down 10% YoY in 2015E, reaching absolute revenues of US$25bn; this will be 4% below the run rate of the June-August 2014 period. Macau Gaming 2 September

4 For the rest of 2014, we assume VIP revenues will be down 19% YoY on average in August-December, leading to our downgrade of full-year VIP growth for this year from up 2% to down 8%. This forecast assumes no further deterioration in volumes sequentially (which has been the case since June), and that Q4 shows some seasonal strength compared with Q3. Regional competition could drag junket VIP segment by 4-5% in 2015E We believe Macau's junket VIP segment is subject to the most intensive regional competition (refer to our 29 July report, Macau Gaming: will regional supply increases add to competition), amongst all gaming segments in Macau. Customers in this segment are introduced to casino resorts via junket agents, who in turn are motivated to bring customers to where they can earn the most commissions, and where they can have the most abundance availability of credit. In other gaming jurisdictions, gaming tax rates are lower than that of Macau's 39%, and operators can offer substantially higher commissions to junkets. In , we believe competition will intensify, coming mostly from jurisdictions including the Philippines through City of Dreams Manila (MCP.PS) and Solaire (BLOOM.PS), in Vladivostok through Summit Ascent's (102.HK) casino, and in Phnom Penh, Cambodia through Naga Corp (3918.HK). For example in Cambodia, Naga Corp plans to offer commission rates higher than 70% of gross gaming revenue to Macau junkets under the revenue-share model, according to the company - a clear strategy to sacrifice margins in order to gain any incremental business in the junket VIP pie in Macau. This strategy will likely start operation in H2 this year and ramp out through Figure 6: Commission rates offered to Macau junkets across regions Junket commission rates Rolling chip model Revenue share model as % rolling chip as % revenue Macau 1.25% 40%-45% Philippines 1.50% 52%-55% Vladivostok / Summit Ascent 1.70% 58%-62% Cambodia / Naga Corp 2.05% 70%-75% Source: Company data, UBS estimates In the Philippines at Solaire Resort, we believe the operator is offering around 1.5% of rolling chip commissions to junkets under the rolling chip commission model. These are again much higher than in Macau, where commissions are typically 40-45% of revenue on average, or around % of rolling volumes. In our recent visit to Solaire Resort in the Philippines, we noticed that most of their fixed room junkets are now occupied by well-known Macau junket operators. Solaire also mentioned that over 50% of their Chinese VIP customers are repeat customers. By end of this year, MPEL's City of Dreams Manila will open, likely adding another junket VIP tables. Of course, there is a wide difference between the quality of the gaming products in Macau compared with those in other jurisdictions, and junket agents could have limited ability to sway decisions made by customers. Still we expect junkets will be able to bring some Macau junket VIP businesses to other jurisdictions, especially in the Philippines, where we see the quality of product itself as quite high. If we assume various rolling volume per table per day that ranges from US$0.2m to US$0.4m (compared with Macau at around US$ m), we estimate these jurisdictions can achieve US$1.1bn of revenue in 2015E. We think this could be Macau Gaming 2 September

5 directly cannibalising Macau VIP business, especially as in two of these jurisdictions, there will be Melco-backed operations (CoD Manila, and Summit Ascent). US$1.1bn equals around 4-5% of 2014E Macau junket VIP revenue of around US$25bn. Figure 7: Four regional resorts might achieve over US$1bn of junket revenues in 2015E 2015E Illustrative no. of tables dedicated to Macau junkets Illustrative US$m roll per table per day US$bn roll per month Annualised US$m revenue Solaire / Bloomberry* , City of Dreams Manila / MCP , Summit Ascent Naga Corp Note: Solaire numbers include Phase 1a, where we assume around 65 additional junket tables; not all of Solaire's revenue run rates illustrated here are incremental in 2015, given they started some junket operations already in Q313. Mass segment: no change in medium term forecasts There is no change to our medium term mass segment growth forecasts of 17-18% for E. As noted previously, we saw risks in consensus 22-25% forecasts as medium term mass growth, which we believed have been coming down sharply since July's disappointing growth of 17%.We have marginally trimmed mass growth for August-December 2014E from ~20% to ~19%. We believe structural growth in the mass segment will continue to be supported by: 1) income growth among China s middle class; 2) the build-out of hotel rooms in Cotai, which adds capacity to serve the "middle" mass segment, who are currently priced out of Macau; 3) infrastructure improvements, including the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge, which should be completed in 2016; and 4) construction on Hengqin Island. We expect hotel rooms inventory to grow 9%/13% in 2015/16E, after close to zero supply growth in Figure 8: Casino hotel rooms growth % YoY by quarter: now in a trough of capacity growth. To pick up in % 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408 Q109 Q209 Q309 Q409 Q110 Q210 Q310 Q410 Q111 Q211 Q311 Q411 Q112 Q212 Q312 Q412 Q113 Q213 Q313 Q413 Q114 Q214 Q314 Q414 Q115 Q215 Q315 Q415 Q116 Q216 Q316 Q416 Q117 Q217 Q317 Q417 Source: DSEC, Company data, UBS estimates From a top down perspective, our forecasts assume single digit growth in spending per visitor in E, compared to an around 20% increase for the industry in E. We believe price points in Macau are already very high, and growth Macau Gaming 2 September

6 from the mass segment will be driven more by the middle mass segment, rather than the very high end premium mass segment. We assume the explosive growth in premium mass over the last few years will slowdown, and incremental capacity will have to be filled by middle to lower mass customers. Figure 9: UBS mass growth forecast: slower spend per visit growth expected 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% E 2015E 2016E 2017E Overall mass growth Spend per visit (mass) Source: DICJ, UBS estimates From a bottom up perspective, mass table yield (win per table per day) for the sector grew +28% on average through We forecast 9% growth in 2015E and 6% growth in E. We believe the main factors that drive table yields are utilization rate (opened tables as a percentage of total tables, active tables as a percentage of opened tables), average bet (linked to minimum bet), and other operational factors like length at the table, and game speed. For the sector we think growth will be driven more by utilization rate (which in turn will be driven by more hotel room capacity) than average bet sizes. On the other hand, we expect average number of mass tables to grow faster in E, as operators continue to move VIP tables to mass, and as new Cotai properties open through E. Figure 10: Mass table yield growth expected to slow as avg. bet growth slows 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E Table yield growth Source: DICJ, Company data, UBS estimates Avg no. of tables growth Macau Gaming 2 September

7 Figure 11: Visitation remained strong in July, but mass/slot growth was lower 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% Q210 Q310 Q410 Q111 Q211 Q311 Q411 Q112 Q212 Q312 Q412 Q113 Q213 Q313 Q413 Q114 Q214 Jul-14 Chinese visitation growth Chinese IVS visitation growth Mass/slot revenue growth* Source: DSEC, DICJ, we have adjusted mass/slot growth to account for SJM's definition of premium mass into VIP from Q112 to Q313 Margin outlook not as straight forward as before Business mix shift continues to be the main positive driver For the sector, we believe that there will be some drags on margins going forward that was not apparent in the last few years. We believe higher labour costs inflation, a lowering threshold for mass comps, and a slower ramp of new projects will all be drag to margins. Despite all of above, we estimate sector margins will still edge up slightly in E, albeit at a slower pace than experienced in By far the most important determinant to margins remains the business mix between VIP (at 8-12% EBITDA margins) and mass (at 35-45% EBITDA margins). With our expectations for the mass market to growth at about 18% in E compared with VIP growth at 3-4%, the business-mix shift continues to be hugely beneficial to margins. Labouring issues Firstly, we expect staff costs to rise at a higher rate of 9-10% in E (after a large step increase of 15-20% in 2014E, due to various summer bonus schemes or the similar, i.e. we are assuming around 30% increase in pay per head in 2015E vs. 2013), compared with the 5-6% increase in This is as we factor in a tighter labour market, especially in jobs of dealers and dealer supervisors, when several large scale Cotai properties open up. The government has recently commented that there will be no relaxation in the "local only" policy for dealers and dealer supervisors in the next five years. This begs the questions about whether there will be enough labour to operate the new resorts, and whether there are enough locals to operate the tables. If we look simply at overall labour force, there were around 150,000 workers in the hotel, leisure, gaming & related industry as of end-june according to the DSEC. This accounts for around 38% of total labour force of 390,000 in Macau. If we assume each major Cotai property will require around 8,000 workers, there will be a need Macau Gaming 2 September

8 of around 48,000 workers over a three year period from 2015 to end Optically this is should be sufficiently met by current labour force plus some influx of foreign labour: although in reality this involves some disruptions to other local industries, whilst the influx of foreign labour could create additional social issues. Figure 12: Macau labour force 500, , , , ,000 0 Source: DSEC Mar-03 Sep-03 Mar-04 Sep-04 Mar-05 Sep-05 Mar-06 Sep-06 Mar-07 Sep-07 Mar-08 Sep-08 Mar-09 Sep-09 Mar-10 Sep-10 Mar-11 Sep-11 Mar-12 Sep-12 Mar-13 Sep-13 Mar-14 Labour force Construction Hotels, restaurants and similar activities Recreational, cultural, gaming and other services Other industries If we look specifically at the role of dealers, currently there are around 25.7k dealers in Macau according to the DSEC, equating around 4.5 dealers per gaming table. If we assume there will be another 1800 tables allocated to the next 6 big projects (from Galaxy Macau phase 2 in mid-2015, to SJM's Lisboa Palace in mid- 17), then theoretically there is a need for incrementally 8.1k dealers hired over a three year period. This translates to average annual growth in no. of dealers of around 10% in the three year period. Looking back into history, there has been a period between end-2010 to end-2012 where dealers' growth averaged over 12% per year, with associated wage costs averaging up 8-9% per year. So the upcoming demand for local dealers is by no means totally "unprecedented", although the absolute size required is now larger whilst local labour force has not grown. Macau Gaming 2 September

9 Figure 13: No. of dealers grew average of 12% YoY in % 15% 10% 5% 0% -5% -10% Jun-08 Dec-08 Jun-09 Dec-09 Jun-10 Dec-10 Jun-11 no. of dealers YoY growth Dec-11 Jun-12 Dec-12 Jun-13 Dec-13 Jun-14 dealer wages YoY growth Source: DSEC If we take into account roles including dealer supervisors and pit bosses, we estimate there are closer to 34,500 locals already employed in these roles. Again if there are additional 1800 tables over a three year period, it translates to a need for an additional 10,800 local people for these roles combined. Macau has a resident work force of close to 230,000 out of the total labour force of 390,000 as of end- June again we think there are enough local people to be hired into these specific positions, although the government would likely wish to spread out the hiring to minimise the social impact. We now factor in a 15-20% increase in labour costs in 2014E (including various guaranteed bonuses), and ~9-10% increases in wages over 15-17E. That is, we are assuming around a 30% increase in pay per head in 2015E compared with that in 2013), compared with the 5-6% increase in Lower threshold for mass non-gaming comps Secondly, we believe operators will be more liberal in mass rebates (in the form of free non-gaming benefits, or membership points) when they have more sufficient room inventories from new Cotai projects e.g. we see the threshold of "comping" a free room to a customer being lowered. This has the effect of lowering the gross margin of the mass business. Strategically this could be a sound strategy if it incrementally adds to absolute EBITDA dollars. We believe there are signs of this happening at the largest room inventory owner now: Sands. We believe Sands have been trying more aggressively in this since middle of last year: at Cotai Central, we estimate non-gaming promotional allowance as a percentage of mass/slot revenue has increased from below 6% in Q213 to over 8% in Q214; a similar and more pronounced trend can also be seen at Four Seasons, matching the company's stated aim in bring more aggressive in premium mass in that property. We see other operators following a similar strategy when they acquire more room inventory as their Cotai projects open in E. We estimate higher mass comps will drag sector mass gross margins by 1-2 percentage points over E. Macau Gaming 2 September

10 Figure 14: Estimated non-gaming allowance as a percentage of mass/slot revenues at Sands 12.0% 11.0% 10.0% 9.0% 8.0% 7.0% 6.0% 5.0% 4.0% 3.0% 2.0% Q112 Q212 Q312 Q412 Q113 Q213 Q313 Q413 Q114 Q214 Venetian Cotai Central Sands Four Seasons Source: Company data, UBS estimates. We assume ~0.08%-0.09% of VIP rolling chip each quarter as VIP-related non-gaming promotional allowance, with the balance as mass/slot related non-gaming promotional allowance New projects takes time to ramp Thirdly, we expect major new openings to take months to ramp close to their full revenue potential, while operating costs are fully loaded from day of opening hence new openings' initial years of operations will likely be of lower margins than existing properties, assuming all else equal. All six operators will have a major property opening in E, and we expect this to be net negative to margins. We believe consensus might be too optimistic in margins of some new projects, which might explain some our much lower than consensus EBITDA in 2016E. Bringing forward some project opening dates We have adjusted our assumed project opening dates based on latest construction progress: we have shifted Wynn Palace opening from Q416E to Q216E (company target is January-February 2016), MPEL's Studio City from end-2015e to late Q415E (company target is mid-2015). We have also pushed MGM Cotai later from Q216E to Q316E (company target is mid-2016). We continue to expect Galaxy Macau phase 2 to open in mid-2015 (company target mid-2015), and Sands' Parisian to open in late 2016 (company targets end-2015). We do not think availability of construction worker is an issue that hampers the construction progress of the projects, as we believe there are physically enough mainland Chinese workers that could be imported. Even as there is a soft rule that every foreign construction labour should be matched with a local labour, we believe it has not been strictly enforced in recent times. However we think administratively, the government has a preference to space out each opening in order to reduce any disruptive impacts especially to local labour force- this is the basis of our forecast which has at least a three-month gap between each opening. Macau Gaming 2 September

11 Figure 15: Importing foreign construction workers not an issue 60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 Mar-03 Jun-03 Sep-03 Dec-03 Mar-04 Jun-04 Sep-04 Dec-04 Mar-05 Jun-05 Sep-05 Dec-05 Mar-06 Jun-06 Sep-06 Dec-06 Mar-07 Jun-07 Sep-07 Dec-07 Mar-08 Jun-08 Sep-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 Jun-09 Sep-09 Dec-09 Mar-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13 Jun-13 Sep-13 Dec-13 Mar-14 Jun-14 Total construction workers Non-resident construction workers Source: DSEC Figure 16: Delay in openings was our base case; pushing forward two opening dates Project Building GFA (sqm) Total Target opening UBS est. opening All in costs Hotel rooms US$m First full year First full year EBITDA Implied RoIC Galaxy Macau phase 2 450,000 mid-2015 Q ,511 1, % Macao Studio City phase 1 471,385 mid-2015 late 2015 (from end-15) 3,078 1, % Cotai Central St. Regis tower 120,000 late-2015 Q NM NM NM Wynn Palace 636,737 Q MGM Cotai 401,497 mid-2016 Q (from Q416) Q (from Q216) 4,000 1, % 3,321 1, % Sands Parisian 419,755 late-2015 end ,804 3, % SJM Cotai North 635, end ,109 2, % City of Dreams hotel tower 145,000 Q Q , NM NM NM Source: Company data, UBS estimates Revisions to forecasts We revise our 2014/15E VIP forecasts from up 2%/up 3% to down 8%/up 3% to factor in a continued deteriorating volumes trend. Our forecast implies a 19% YoY decline in VIP revenue for August-December 2014E. We have left our mass forecasts largely unchanged at 26-27%/18% in 2014/15E. Our forecasts imply 19% YoY mass growth in August-December 2014E. In terms of headline revenue, our forecasts are now at up 3%/up 9% in 2014/15E, from up 10%/up 9% before, and imply a decline of 6% YoY in August-December 2014E. Macau Gaming 2 September

12 Figure 17: Market sector revenue forecast Revenues (MOPm) E 2015E 2016E 2017E VIP 135, , , , , , , ,310 Mass Market 44,074 60,316 80, , , , , ,054 Slot 8,619 11,425 13,244 14,384 15,163 15,750 16,801 18,750 Total revenues 188, , , , , , , ,114 VIP 70% 45% 8% 13% -8% 3% 6% 8% Mass Market 33% 37% 33% 35% 27% 18% 19% 18% Slot 33% 33% 16% 9% 5% 4% 7% 12% Total revenues 58% 42% 14% 19% 3% 9% 11% 12% Source: We revised down our 2014E EBITDA forecast by an average of 5%, of which approximately 2 points were driven by higher staff costs, and the balance driven by lower VIP estimates. Similarly, we reduced 2015E EBITDA by an average of 5%, approximately half of which driven by lower VIP estimates and half of which driven by higher staff costs. Our revised EBITDA forecasts are around 5% below Bloomberg consensus average in 2014E, around 5% below in 2015E and around 9% below in 2016E. We believe our lower than consensus forecast in 2016E are driven by our expectations our delays in project openings, and lower than consensus margins forecasts for new openings. Figure 18: Revisions to EBITDA forecasts Wynn Macau 2014E 2015E 2016E Galaxy Entertainment 2014E 2015E 2016E EBITDA (HK$m) EBITDA (HK$m) Revised 9,178 10,120 12,820 Revised 14,317 17,718 20,031 Original 9,560 10,647 12,740 Original 15,107 18,627 21,374 % changes -4.0% -5.0% 0.6% % changes -5.2% -4.9% -6.3% Sands China 2014E 2015E 2016E Melco Crown 2014E 2015E 2016E EBITDA (US$m) EBITDA (US$m) Revised 3,497 4,098 4,431 Revised 1,316 1,595 2,180 Original 3,764 4,380 4,688 Original 1,363 1,642 2,327 % changes -7.1% -6.5% -5.5% % changes -3.5% -2.9% -6.3% SJM Holdings 2014E 2015E 2016E MGM China 2014E 2015E 2016E EBITDA (HK$m) EBITDA (HK$m) Revised 8,744 9,827 9,625 Revised 6,996 7,817 9,334 Original 9,366 10,424 10,364 Original 7,342 8,128 10,099 % changes -6.6% -5.7% -7.1% % changes -4.7% -3.8% -7.6% Macau Gaming 2 September

13 Figure 19: Revised market share forecast E E 2015E 2016E 2017E 2018E Market share % Total Overall market Sands China 15.6% 19.0% 21.7% 23.2% 23.5% 22.2% 23.7% 21.7% Galaxy (StarWorld & Galaxy Macau) 14.5% 17.7% 17.4% 19.1% 20.4% 20.0% 17.6% 19.2% Galaxy (CityClubs) 1.5% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% Wynn 14.0% 11.8% 11.0% 10.6% 10.5% 12.2% 14.6% 14.0% MPEL 14.7% 13.5% 14.0% 12.8% 12.7% 15.3% 14.4% 13.9% SJM (self-owned) 13.4% 13.7% 12.8% 11.8% 11.5% 10.1% 8.5% 12.4% SJM (3rd party) 15.7% 13.1% 12.1% 11.9% 11.0% 9.4% 7.7% 6.6% MGM 10.5% 9.9% 9.9% 9.7% 9.5% 10.1% 12.9% 11.8% VIP Sands China 12.1% 15.8% 17.0% 17.3% 17.0% 15.7% 16.6% 15.1% Galaxy (StarWorld & Galaxy Macau) 17.0% 20.2% 19.5% 23.0% 24.4% 24.3% 22.3% 22.8% Galaxy (CityClubs) 1.3% 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% Wynn 14.8% 12.8% 12.5% 12.1% 12.3% 14.2% 17.1% 16.6% MPEL 15.6% 13.8% 14.1% 12.2% 12.0% 13.9% 12.9% 12.4% SJM (self-owned) 12.8% 14.1% 14.3% 13.3% 13.1% 11.8% 10.2% 14.8% SJM (3rd party) 15.0% 11.9% 11.0% 11.0% 10.2% 8.6% 6.8% 5.4% MGM 11.2% 10.5% 11.0% 10.5% 10.5% 11.1% 13.9% 12.6% Mass & slots Sands China 25.1% 26.3% 30.7% 31.7% 31.8% 29.7% 31.1% 28.2% Galaxy (StarWorld & Galaxy Macau) 7.6% 12.3% 13.4% 13.3% 15.2% 14.9% 12.6% 15.6% Galaxy (City Clubs) 2.0% 2.3% 2.1% 1.8% 1.6% 1.2% 0.9% 0.7% Wynn 11.8% 9.4% 8.2% 8.4% 8.2% 9.9% 12.1% 11.4% MPEL 12.3% 12.8% 13.8% 13.7% 13.7% 16.9% 15.9% 15.4% SJM (self-owned) 14.9% 12.7% 9.8% 9.6% 9.4% 8.2% 6.8% 10.1% SJM (3rd party) 17.5% 15.6% 14.2% 13.3% 12.0% 10.2% 8.7% 7.7% MGM 8.8% 8.6% 7.9% 8.4% 8.1% 8.9% 11.9% 11.0% Source: DICJ, Company data, UBS estimates Macau Gaming 2 September

14 Global Research 2 September 2014 Melco Crown Entertainment Core Macau business at below 8x 2015E EBITDA Equities Hong Kong Casinos 12-month rating Buy Pricing in an ex-growth environment for existing business We estimate MPEL's existing Macau business is trading below 8x 2015E EBITDA (assuming stake in MSC at US$3.1bn, and MCP stake at market value), which we find attractive even if the properties go ex-growth: eg, US regional casino names are trading at an average 8-9x 15E EBITDA pre-tax. Granted growth in 2014 has been disappointing: we now estimate EBITDA will grow only 2% YoY, driven by lower VIP market share in addition to the weak industry environment, and a step increase in staff costs. We believe there have been market worries that the mass segment at City of Dreams (CoD) cannot grow given its high yield, but we argue that mass growth at CoD will be driven more by table re-allocation from Alitra and CoD's VIP segments than by any further yield improvements. We think the company has delivered this 2014 (2014E CoD mass revenue, up 26%, is higher than our beginning-of-the-year forecast, mass table count up 22%, mass win per day up 4%). We have assumed around 10% mass growth at CoD in E, with 2% improvement in mass table yields. CoDM provides differentiated growth in 2015 We expect City of Dreams Manila to open later this year, and to deliver US$100-$120m of consolidated EBITDA in 2015, which would in itself drive 7-9% group EBITDA growth in 2015E. We think this is a differentiated driver in an environment where existing Macau properties face severe competitive pressure in ; it would also ensure MPEL can capture a piece of the regional China junket market. Revisions to estimates; push forward MSC opening to Q415E We are revising our 14/15/16E EBITDA by -2%/-2%/-6% respectively. The downward revisions in 14/15/16E were mostly due to lower industry VIP estimates and higher staff costs, balanced by slightly higher mass market share estimates. We have also shifted contribution of Studio City from in 2016 only (no contribution in 2015), to having one month of contribution in Our opening target continues to be more conservative than company's target of opening in mid m price target Price RIC: MPEL.O BBG: MPEL US US$38.90 Prior: US$42.10 US$28.36 Trading data and key metrics 52-wk range US$ Market cap. US$15.7bn Shares o/s 554m (ORD) Free float 33% Avg. daily volume ('000) 3,660 Avg. daily value (m) US$117.4 Common s/h equity (12/14E) US$4.87bn P/BV (12/14E) 3.2x Net debt / EBITDA (12/14E) 0.0x EPS (UBS, diluted) (US$) From To % ch Cons. 12/14E /15E /16E Anthony Wong Analyst anthony-y.wong@ubs.com Robin M. Farley Analyst robin.farley@ubs.com Valuation: We lower our PT from $42.1 to $38.9. Our SOTP-derived PT is based on target 11.0x 2015E EBITDA for existing Macau business; we also value Studio City at US$5.7/ADS, stake in MCP at US$1.6/ADS, and value of CoD expansion at US$0.9/ADS. Our PT implies 19.0x 2015E PE, and 2.6% 2015E dividend yield. Maintain Buy. Highlights (US$m) 12/11 12/12 12/13 12/14E 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E 12/18E Revenues 3,831 4,078 5,087 5,044 6,017 8,044 8,629 9,197 EBIT (UBS) ,126 1,549 1,729 1,954 Net earnings (UBS) ,115 1,436 1,506 1,711 EPS (UBS, diluted) (US$) DPS (US$) Net (debt) / cash (803) (71) 619 (37) (390) 78 1,332 3,001 Profitability/valuation 12/11 12/12 12/13 12/14E 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E 12/18E EBIT margin % ROIC (EBIT) % EV/EBITDA (core) x P/E (UBS, diluted) x Equity FCF (UBS) yield % (2.7) Net dividend yield % Source: Company accounts, Thomson Reuters, UBS estimates. Metrics marked as (UBS) have had analyst adjustments applied. Valuations: based on an average share price that year, (E): based on a share price of US$28.36 on 29 Aug :37 HKT Macau Gaming 2 September

15 Investment Thesis 12-month rating Buy Melco Crown Investment case We estimate MPEL will deliver strong EPS growth in E. The company is scheduled to have new project openings each year between 2014 and 2016: the Philippines project in 2014; Studio City in 2015; and the City of Dreams (CoD) new hotel tower in early Coupled with continued good execution at existing properties, especially at CoD, we estimate MPEL will deliver EPS growth of around 19% in E. We think consensus and the market might have under-estimated the contribution from Melco Crown Philippines, but on the other hand we think there could be slippage in the opening time of Macao Studio City vs. consensus estimates. Our SOTP-derived PT is based on target 11.0x 2015E EBITDA for existing Macau business; we also value Studio City at US$5.7/ADS, stake in MCP at US$1.6/ADS, and value of CoD expansion at US$0.9/ADS. Our PT implies 19.0x 2015E PE, and 2.6% 2015E dividend yield. Upside scenario In this scenario, we assume higher industry growth in 2015 with mass at 22%, and VIP at 5% versus our base case of 18% and 2%, respectively. This raises Macau business 2015E EBITDA by 4%. We also assume stronger growth leads to a re-rating of existing Macau business to 12.0x 2015E EBITDA (from 11.0x). Our upside valuation is US$42.90/ADS and implies 19.8x 2015E PE and a 2.5% 2015E dividend yield. Downside scenario In this scenario, we assume lower industry growth in 2015 with mass at 13%, and VIP at -10% versus our base case of 18% and 2%, respectively. This reduces existing Macau business 2015E EBITDA by 8%. We also assume weaker growth leads to a derating of existing Macau business to 8.0x 2015E EBITDA (from 11.0x). Our downside valuation is US$29.2/ADS and implies 15.9x 2015E PE and a 3.1% 2015E dividend yield. Upcoming catalysts Monthly Macau gross gaming revenue growth and market share gain / loss, especially in the mass market segment would drive the stock; the roll out of Hong Kong Shanghai Mutual Market Access in Oct could add additional inflow into the sector from domestic investors; the upcoming opening of City of Dreams Manila in Q414 could add to positive sentiment in the stock. 12m price target US$38.90 Business description Melco Crown Entertainment (MPEL) was formed in December 2004 as a joint venture between Melco International (0200.HK) and Crown Limited (CWN.AX). It owns one of the six gaming concessions in Macau, and is the exclusive vehicle for Melco International and Crown's gaming/hotel businesses in Macau. Its main properties in Macau are the City of Dreams and Altira Macau. MPEL is also developing a 60%-owned casino project called Macao Studio City in Cotai, Macau. MPEL owns a 69% stake in Melco Crown Philippines, which is listed in the Philippines and involved in developing gaming resorts. Industry outlook In the medium term we think Macau can deliver earnings growth in the mid-teens through E, driven by high teens growth in the mass segment, which in turn is driven by growth in visitation and spending levels from China. Spend per visit growth however will likely slow from years before - with the premium mass segment more penetrated- growth will have to come more from the "middle" mass. There will be costs side pressures in the medium term, with margins expansions slower than in previous years dragged by higher labour costs, opening of new properties and more liberal non-gaming comps. In the near term, a weak China macro, a lack of capacity additions, a changing political climate in China, the implementation of smoking ban and tougher comps will all lead to slower revenue growth in both VIP and mass segments. We expect MPEL to also benefit from growth of the Philippines gaming market, through its exposure in City of Dreams Manila. Revenues by business segment 2015E (%) 43% 7% 50% EBITDA by business segment 2015E (%) VIP Mass Non-gaming 7% 20% VIP Mass Non-gaming 73% Anthony Wong, Analyst, anthony-y.wong@ubs.com, Macau Gaming 2 September

16 Figure 20: Melco Crown SOTP valuation SOTP Valuation US$m US$/sh Notes Existing Macau operations Macau 2015E EBITDA 1,445 EBITDA of Altira/ City of Dreams/ Mocha less corporate costs EV/EBITDA multiple 11.1x 9x-14x target range for the industry EV of core Macau operations 16, Core Macau business net cash (debt) Equity value of core Macau business 16, Macao Studio City Attrib. equity value at end , MPEL's 60% stake, implies c3.5x book value Value of CoD hotel tower US$150m 2017E EBITDA, PV at 15% Melco Crown Philippines Attrib. value of Melco Crown Philippines at price of P11.0 SOTP equity value of MPEL 21, No of ADS outstanding (m) 550 Price per ADS 38.9 Figure 21: Studio City valuation US$m 2016E MSC gaming revenues 2,190 MSC non-gaming revenues 265 Total gross revenues 2,455 EBITDA margin 23% 2016 EBITDA m fwd EV/EBITDA 11.5 EV at end ,531 Discount rate 12% EV at end ,831 Net cash / (debt) at end Equity value at end ,236 MPEL's 60% stake at end ,142 Macau Gaming 2 September

17 Global Research 2 September 2014 MGM China Holdings Solid operations and best medium term growth Equities Hong Kong Casinos 12-month rating Buy Strong medium term growth trading at discount to sector average MGM remains one of our top medium-term picks in Macau. We forecast the company can generate the strongest EPS growth in E at 27%, substantially higher than sector average at around 15%, whilst current valuation is at a discount to sector average. We now expect MGM Cotai will open in Q (from Q2 2016), with the project close to tripling the room inventory of the current MGM Macau property when completed. MGM Cotai will likely only open after three other competitive projects have opened, therefore growth in 2015 and through part of 2016 will likely be slower than some peers. Still management has proven its track record in maintaining its share at existing property amidst increased competition, with MGM Macau holding VIP share at 10-11% and mass share at % through 2011 to 2014E. Multiple initiatives to upgrade MGM Macau in the near term We also believe company has taken proactive steps to ensure the competitiveness of MGM Macau: management recently announced plans for around US$100m of capex (from normal maintenance capex of around US$50-60m a year) at MGM Macau in each of E- a large commitment in upgrading the 7-year old property. We expect part of the premium mass areas (Supreme lounge) to be upgraded first, ensuring MGM s premium mass offering remains one of the market leading products. We also expect the older part of the 2nd floor VIP areas (accounting for around VIP tables) to be upgraded in stages. We expect these initiatives can ensure MGM Macau remain in growth territory in E, amidst intensive competition. Revisions to estimates; shifting MGM Cotai opening to Q316 We are revising our 14/15/16E EBITDA by -4%/-4%/-8% respectively. The downward revisions in 14/15E were mostly due to lower industry VIP estimates and higher staff costs. The larger downward revisions in 16E were due to a shifting of our assumed MGM Cotai opening date from Q216 to Q316 (company targets opening in 2016). Our forecast implies MGM Cotai will be the fourth new Cotai project to open after GM phase 2, MPEL's Studio City and Wynn Palace. 12m price target Price RIC: 2282.HK BBG: 2282 HK HK$31.40 Prior: HK$32.40 HK$24.75 Trading data and key metrics 52-wk range HK$ Market cap. HK$94.1bn/US$12.1bn Shares o/s 3,800m (ORD) Free float 22% Avg. daily volume ('000) 6,588 Avg. daily value (m) HK$173.5 Common s/h equity (12/14E) HK$6.66bn P/BV (12/14E) 14.2x Net debt / EBITDA (12/14E) 0.1x EPS (UBS, diluted) (HK$) From To % ch Cons. 12/14E /15E /16E Anthony Wong Analyst anthony-y.wong@ubs.com Angus Chan Analyst angus.chan@ubs.com Valuation: We lower our PT from $32.4 to $31.4.Our SOTP-derived PT is based on target 11.0x 2015E EBITDA for existing Macau business; we also value MGM Cotai at HK$8.9/sh. Our PT implies 2015E PE of 16.9x and 2015E dividend yield of 4.1%. Maintain Buy. Highlights (HK$m) 12/11 12/12 12/13 12/14E 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E 12/18E Revenues 20,294 21,774 25,728 26,756 28,946 35,276 52,065 52,486 EBIT (UBS) 4,186 4,517 5,598 6,229 7,070 7,963 12,713 12,804 Net earnings (UBS) 3,958 4,199 5,394 6,159 7,137 8,012 12,686 12,809 EPS (UBS, diluted) (HK$) DPS (HK$) Net (debt) / cash 1,456 3,398 3,836 (676) (2,635) (7,903) (1,476) 3,866 Profitability/valuation 12/11 12/12 12/13 12/14E 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E 12/18E EBIT margin % ROIC (EBIT) % EV/EBITDA (core) x P/E (UBS, diluted) x Equity FCF (UBS) yield % (0.4) Net dividend yield % Source: Company accounts, Thomson Reuters, UBS estimates. Metrics marked as (UBS) have had analyst adjustments applied. Valuations: based on an average share price that year, (E): based on a share price of HK$24.75 on 01 Sep :36 HKT Macau Gaming 2 September

18 Investment Thesis 12-month rating Buy MGM China Investment case We forecast MGM will deliver the strongest earnings growth amongst Macau names under our coverage at 26% in E. This is driven by the opening of MGM Cotai in 2016 (estimated in Q3 16), which will more than double the rooms and gaming capacity of MGM China. We think MGM also has a strong management team which is currently under-recognised by the market, as is evident in its valuation discount vs. some of its peers. The renovation plans of the original MGM Macau in E would ensure the existing properties can remain competitive, although in the near term, there are fewer company specific catalysts for MGM Our SOTP-derived PT is based on target 11.0x 2015E EBITDA for existing Macau business; we also value MGM Cotai at HK$8.9/sh. Our PT implies 2015E PE of 16.9x and 2015E dividend yield of 4.1%. Upside scenario In this scenario, we assume higher industry growth in 2015 with mass at 22%, and VIP at 5% versus our base case of 18% and 2%, respectively. This raises our Macau business 2015E EBITDA by 4%. We also assume stronger growth leads to a re-rating of existing Macau business to 13.0x 2015E EBITDA (from 11.0x). Our upside valuation is HK$36.7/sh and implies 18.8x 2015E PE and 3.7% dividend yield. 12m price target HK$31.40 Business description MGM China Holdings is one of six gaming licence holders in Macau. It owns and operates MGM Macau, a leading integrated casino property on the Macau peninsula. It is also building a large-scale casino project in Cotai, Macau to be named MGM Cotai. Industry outlook In the medium term we think Macau can deliver earnings growth in the mid-teens through E, driven by high teens growth in the mass segment, which in turn is driven by growth in visitation and spending levels from China. Spend per visit growth however will likely slow from years before - with the premium mass segment more penetrated- growth will have to come more from the "middle" mass. There will be costs side pressures in the medium term, with margins expansions slower than in previous years dragged by higher labour costs, opening of new properties and more liberal non-gaming comps. In the near term, a weak China macro, a lack of capacity additions, a changing political climate in China, the implementation of smoking ban and tougher comps will all lead to slower revenue growth in both VIP and mass segments. MGM will add substantial incremental capacity in 2016, when it opens MGM Cotai. Revenues by business segment 2015E (%) Downside scenario In this scenario, we assume lower industry growth in 2015 with mass at 13%, and VIP at -10% versus our base case of 18% and 2%, respectively. This reduces existing Macau business 2015E EBITDA by 9%. We also assume weaker growth leads to a derating of existing Macau business to 9.0x 2015E EBITDA (from 11.0x). Our downside valuation is HK$25.70/sh and implies 15.3x 2015E PE and 4.6% 2015E dividend yield. 37% 9% 41% VIP Mass Non-gaming Upcoming catalysts Monthly Macau gross gaming revenue growth and market share gain / loss, especially in the mass market segment would drive the stock; the roll out of Hong Kong Shanghai Mutual Market Access in Oct could add additional inflow into the sector from domestic investors. EBITDA by business segment 2015E (%) 6% 25% VIP Mass Non-gaming 70% Anthony Wong, Analyst, anthony-y.wong@ubs.com, Macau Gaming 2 September

19 Figure 13: MGM China SOTP valuation SOTP valuation HK$m HK$/sh Notes 2015E EBITDA 7,817 Target EV/EBITDA (x) x-14x target range for the industry EV of existing operations 85, End-2014 NPV of MGM Cotai 33, x 2017E EBITDA, then PV at 12% WACC Total EV 119, Consolidated net cash / (debt) Total equity value 119, No. of shares (m) 3,800 Equity value per share (HK$) 31.5 Figure 14: Cotai valuation HK$m 2017E MGM Cotai gaming revenues 29,838 MGM Cotai non-gaming revenues 1,905 Total gross revenues 31,743 EBITDA margin 19.0% EBITDA 6,031 12m fwd EV/EBITDA 11.0 EV at end ,342 Discount rate 12% EV at end ,887 NPV at end ,987 Macau Gaming 2 September

20 Global Research 2 September 2014 Sands China Business mix and strong yield the attractions Equities Hong Kong Casinos 12-month rating Buy Slower than expected mass market share gain The pace of Sands' market share gain in mass segment has been slower than expected. We now forecast mass market share of 31.3%/31.5% in 14/15E (30.3% in 2013), down from 32.1%/32.4% previously. The opening of the Dragon Palace at Cotai Central (c70 tables, opened in early May) have so far not been able to help Sand's capture a larger share of the premium mass segment- we sense a lack of customer preference for that area that might take more than a passage of time to solve. At the same time, non-gaming promotional allowance as % mass revenue has been on the rise, reflecting more aggressive hotel room comp strategies, in our view- this reduces mass gross margins but is a sound strategy as long as it drives incremental EBITDA dollars (and ideally above industry mass growth). Asset base advantage drives 2015; less exciting growth by 2016 We forecast Sands' can deliver 17% EBITDA growth in 2015E, driven by above industry growth in the mass segment- especially at the Cotai Central where we believe the property is still ramping to its full earnings potential. However we forecast EBITDA growth will slow to single digit in 2016E, as we expect several competitive properties will open through mid-2015 to end-2016, pressuring Sands' existing properties. We continue to forecast the Parisian to open in late 2016 (unchanged). Construction at the site was halted in June pending permits, and has recently been allowed to partially restart as Sands have received the permit for podium works. Revisions to estimates; upping dividend payout We are revising our 14/15/16E EBITDA by -7%/-7%/-6% respectively. Unlike its peers, the downward revisions for Sands were more due to lower mass market share estimates, and less due to lower industry VIP estimates. We also factored in higher staff costs inflation which contributed 2-3ppt to the downgrades. We have raised dividend payout to 100% (from 90-95%) of headline EPS as we believe Las Vegas Sands would continue to pursue more aggressive capital return policies, and with Sands China's dividend being their major source of cash. 12m price target Price RIC: 1928.HK BBG: 1928 HK HK$60.60 Prior: HK$64.10 HK$48.90 Trading data and key metrics 52-wk range HK$ Market cap. HK$394bn/US$50.9bn Shares o/s 8,064m (ORD) Free float 29% Avg. daily volume ('000) 15,893 Avg. daily value (m) HK$871.0 Common s/h equity (12/14E) US$6.75bn P/BV (12/14E) 7.5x Net debt / EBITDA (12/14E) 0.2x EPS (UBS, diluted) (US$) From To % ch Cons. 12/14E /15E /16E Anthony Wong Analyst anthony-y.wong@ubs.com Angus Chan Analyst angus.chan@ubs.com Valuation: We lower our PT from $64.1 to $ Our SOTP-derived PT is based on target 14x 2015E EBITDA (unchanged, at the highest end of industry range) for Sands' existing business; we also value Parisian at HK$4.8/sh, and Four Seasons apartments at HK$1.2/sh. Our PT implies 17.6x 2015E PE, and 5.7% 2015E dividend yield. We see Sands' attractiveness in its most stable business mix (less than 12% EBITDA in VIP) amongst peers, and a strong capital return policy. Maintain Buy. Highlights (US$m) 12/11 12/12 12/13 12/14E 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E 12/18E Revenues 4,881 6,527 8,908 10,191 11,356 12,133 14,677 14,867 EBIT (UBS) 1,262 1,559 2,327 2,991 3,607 3,905 4,434 4,480 Net earnings (UBS) 1,094 1,515 2,252 2,926 3,594 3,907 4,467 4,470 EPS (UBS, diluted) (US$) DPS (US$) Net (debt) / cash (914) (1,308) (281) (769) (1,263) (1,366) (110) 402 Profitability/valuation 12/11 12/12 12/13 12/14E 12/15E 12/16E 12/17E 12/18E EBIT margin % ROIC (EBIT) % EV/EBITDA (core) x P/E (UBS, diluted) x Equity FCF (UBS) yield % Net dividend yield % Source: Company accounts, Thomson Reuters, UBS estimates. Metrics marked as (UBS) have had analyst adjustments applied. Valuations: based on an average share price that year, (E): based on a share price of HK$48.90 on 01 Sep :36 HKT Macau Gaming 2 September