Optimal Direct Foreign Investment Dynamics in the Presence of Technological Spillovers
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1 Optimal Direct Foreign Investment Dynamics in the Presence of Technological Spillovers Herbert Dawid Alfred Greiner Benteng Zou Bielefeld University and University of Luxembourg CEF - July 2009 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
2 Overview Introduction The Investment Problem of a Potential Foreign Investor Steady State Analysis Transition Dynamics and Sensitivity Analysis Conclusions Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
3 Introduction Motivation Worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased by factor 5 between 1996 and Traditionally market opening considerations have been seen as the main motive for FDI, but cost considerations have gained importance relative to market entry motives (Kinkel and Lay (2004)). 15 % of German manufacturing firms have moved (part of their) production abroad between About 20 % of foreign investors move production back to Germany within 5 years after the foreign investment. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
4 Introduction Motivation FDI is considered as one reason for horizontal and vertical technological spillovers towards NICs. FDI has two opposite effects: Short term cost reduction; Faster decrease of productivity advantages relative to competitors in the industrializing country. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
5 Introduction Research Questions How are incentives for FDI influenced by the initial productivity gap between the producers in different countries, the wage differentials and the spillover intensity? Can patterns of investments and de-investments in foreign capacity be caused by the intertemporal consideration of spillover effects? Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
6 Introduction Research Questions How are incentives for FDI influenced by the initial productivity gap between the producers in different countries, the wage differentials and the spillover intensity? Can patterns of investments and de-investments in foreign capacity be caused by the intertemporal consideration of spillover effects? Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
7 Introduction Research Questions How are incentives for FDI influenced by the initial productivity gap between the producers in different countries, the wage differentials and the spillover intensity? Can patterns of investments and de-investments in foreign capacity be caused by the intertemporal consideration of spillover effects? Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
8 Introduction Literature Empirical work on horizontal spillovers of FDI: e.g. Aitken and Harrison (1999), Görg and Greenaway (2004), Halpern and Murakozy (2007), Gorodnichenko et al. (2008), Smarzynska and Spatareanu (2008). Theoretical work on FDI as a market entry mode in the presence of technology transfer: e.g. Das (1987), Wang and Blomström (1992), Lin and Saggi (1999), Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Mattoo et al. (2001) Theoretical work with focus on cost-reduction motive: Glass and Saggi (2002) Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
9 The Investment Problem Basic Features of the Model We consider the dynamic foreign investment problem of a firm in the framework of a partial industry model. Two countries: developed industrialized country H newly industrializing country F n firms compete in a common market: m firms from country F, n m from country H No firm is capacity constrained in its home country Firm 1, located in country H, can use FDI to build up production capacity K F (t) in country F Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
10 The Investment Problem Basic Features of the Model We consider the dynamic foreign investment problem of a firm in the framework of a partial industry model. Two countries: developed industrialized country H newly industrializing country F n firms compete in a common market: m firms from country F, n m from country H No firm is capacity constrained in its home country Firm 1, located in country H, can use FDI to build up production capacity K F (t) in country F Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
11 The Investment Problem Basic Features of the Model We consider the dynamic foreign investment problem of a firm in the framework of a partial industry model. Two countries: developed industrialized country H newly industrializing country F n firms compete in a common market: m firms from country F, n m from country H No firm is capacity constrained in its home country Firm 1, located in country H, can use FDI to build up production capacity K F (t) in country F Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
12 The Investment Problem Basic Features of the Model We consider the dynamic foreign investment problem of a firm in the framework of a partial industry model. Two countries: developed industrialized country H newly industrializing country F n firms compete in a common market: m firms from country F, n m from country H No firm is capacity constrained in its home country Firm 1, located in country H, can use FDI to build up production capacity K F (t) in country F Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
13 The Investment Problem Basic Features of the Model We consider the dynamic foreign investment problem of a firm in the framework of a partial industry model. Two countries: developed industrialized country H newly industrializing country F n firms compete in a common market: m firms from country F, n m from country H No firm is capacity constrained in its home country Firm 1, located in country H, can use FDI to build up production capacity K F (t) in country F Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
14 The Investment Problem Production Output is produced with labor as the only variable input. Productivity: Domestic firms in country H: A H Domestic firms in country F: A F (t) Firms from country H producing in F: A HF A F (0) < A HF < A H Labor is supplied at constant wages w i,i = H,F with w H >> w F, w H /A H > w F /A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
15 The Investment Problem Production Output is produced with labor as the only variable input. Productivity: Domestic firms in country H: A H Domestic firms in country F: A F (t) Firms from country H producing in F: A HF A F (0) < A HF < A H Labor is supplied at constant wages w i,i = H,F with w H >> w F, w H /A H > w F /A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
16 The Investment Problem Production Output is produced with labor as the only variable input. Productivity: Domestic firms in country H: A H Domestic firms in country F: A F (t) Firms from country H producing in F: A HF A F (0) < A HF < A H Labor is supplied at constant wages w i,i = H,F with w H >> w F, w H /A H > w F /A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
17 The Investment Problem Production Output is produced with labor as the only variable input. Productivity: Domestic firms in country H: A H Domestic firms in country F: A F (t) Firms from country H producing in F: A HF A F (0) < A HF < A H Labor is supplied at constant wages w i,i = H,F with w H >> w F, w H /A H > w F /A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
18 The Investment Problem Foreign Direct Investment Firm 1 located in country H can invest (or disinvest) abroad: K F (t) = I(t) δ K F (t), Maximal quantity in country F: Q F 1 (t) = A HF K F (t) We assume that Q F 1 (t) < Q 1(t) t Spillovers through FDI (see e.g. Nelson and Phelps (1966), Findlay (1978), Griffith et al. (2002)): Ȧ F (t) = λ K F (t)(a HF A F (t)) Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
19 The Investment Problem Foreign Direct Investment Firm 1 located in country H can invest (or disinvest) abroad: K F (t) = I(t) δ K F (t), Maximal quantity in country F: Q F 1 (t) = A HF K F (t) We assume that Q F 1 (t) < Q 1(t) t Spillovers through FDI (see e.g. Nelson and Phelps (1966), Findlay (1978), Griffith et al. (2002)): Ȧ F (t) = λ K F (t)(a HF A F (t)) Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
20 The Investment Problem Foreign Direct Investment Firm 1 located in country H can invest (or disinvest) abroad: K F (t) = I(t) δ K F (t), Maximal quantity in country F: Q F 1 (t) = A HF K F (t) We assume that Q F 1 (t) < Q 1(t) t Spillovers through FDI (see e.g. Nelson and Phelps (1966), Findlay (1978), Griffith et al. (2002)): Ȧ F (t) = λ K F (t)(a HF A F (t)) Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
21 The Investment Problem Market Competition Oligopoly with quantity competition and inverse demand P(Q) and marginal costs c H = w H /A H, c F = w F /A F (t). Quantities and the price are determined according to the unique Cournot equilibrium: Q H (A F),Q F (A F),P (A F ) A F denotes the minimal productivity such that foreign firms can compete in the common market, i.e. Q F(A F ) > 0 A F > A F Market profit of firm 1: ( π1(k F,A F ) = QH(A F )(P (A F ) c H )+K F A HF c H w ) F A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
22 The Investment Problem Market Competition Oligopoly with quantity competition and inverse demand P(Q) and marginal costs c H = w H /A H, c F = w F /A F (t). Quantities and the price are determined according to the unique Cournot equilibrium: Q H (A F),Q F (A F),P (A F ) A F denotes the minimal productivity such that foreign firms can compete in the common market, i.e. Q F(A F ) > 0 A F > A F Market profit of firm 1: ( π1(k F,A F ) = QH(A F )(P (A F ) c H )+K F A HF c H w ) F A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
23 The Investment Problem Market Competition Oligopoly with quantity competition and inverse demand P(Q) and marginal costs c H = w H /A H, c F = w F /A F (t). Quantities and the price are determined according to the unique Cournot equilibrium: Q H (A F),Q F (A F),P (A F ) A F denotes the minimal productivity such that foreign firms can compete in the common market, i.e. Q F(A F ) > 0 A F > A F Market profit of firm 1: ( π1(k F,A F ) = QH(A F )(P (A F ) c H )+K F A HF c H w ) F A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
24 The Investment Problem Market Competition Oligopoly with quantity competition and inverse demand P(Q) and marginal costs c H = w H /A H, c F = w F /A F (t). Quantities and the price are determined according to the unique Cournot equilibrium: Q H (A F),Q F (A F),P (A F ) A F denotes the minimal productivity such that foreign firms can compete in the common market, i.e. Q F(A F ) > 0 A F > A F Market profit of firm 1: ( π1(k F,A F ) = QH(A F )(P (A F ) c H )+K F A HF c H w ) F A HF Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
25 The Investment Problem Dynamic Foreign Investment Problem of Firm 1 max I(.) J 1 = 0 e ρt [ π H(K F (t),a F (t)) β I(t) γi(t) 2] dt subject to K F (t) = I(t) δ K F (t), Ȧ F (t) = λ K F (t)(a HF A F (t)) K F 0 and A F (0) = A ini F < A HF, K F (0) = 0. β 0,ρ,δ,γ,λ > 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
26 Steady State Analysis Steady States and Basins of Attraction A HF ( Kˆ F, AHF) X A F A F 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
27 Steady State Analysis Steady States There exist two types of steady states: 1 For sufficiently small β there exists a locally asmyptotically stable catch-up steady state (ˆKF, F ) with ˆK F > 0,  F = A HF. 2 For λ > λ there exists a subset A of the interval [A F,Ā F ] with positive measure such that for each  F A there is a steady state where Î = K = 0. For ÂF int(a ) the steady state is neutrally stable. For all A F (0) > Ā F convergence to the catch-up steady state. For all A F < A F positive investments are optimal if K F = 0 : I(0,A F ) > 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
28 Steady State Analysis Steady States There exist two types of steady states: 1 For sufficiently small β there exists a locally asmyptotically stable catch-up steady state (ˆKF, F ) with ˆK F > 0,  F = A HF. 2 For λ > λ there exists a subset A of the interval [A F,Ā F ] with positive measure such that for each  F A there is a steady state where Î = K = 0. For ÂF int(a ) the steady state is neutrally stable. For all A F (0) > Ā F convergence to the catch-up steady state. For all A F < A F positive investments are optimal if K F = 0 : I(0,A F ) > 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
29 Steady State Analysis Steady States There exist two types of steady states: 1 For sufficiently small β there exists a locally asmyptotically stable catch-up steady state (ˆKF, F ) with ˆK F > 0,  F = A HF. 2 For λ > λ there exists a subset A of the interval [A F,Ā F ] with positive measure such that for each  F A there is a steady state where Î = K = 0. For ÂF int(a ) the steady state is neutrally stable. For all A F (0) > Ā F convergence to the catch-up steady state. For all A F < A F positive investments are optimal if K F = 0 : I(0,A F ) > 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
30 Steady State Analysis Steady States There exist two types of steady states: 1 For sufficiently small β there exists a locally asmyptotically stable catch-up steady state (ˆKF, F ) with ˆK F > 0,  F = A HF. 2 For λ > λ there exists a subset A of the interval [A F,Ā F ] with positive measure such that for each  F A there is a steady state where Î = K = 0. For ÂF int(a ) the steady state is neutrally stable. For all A F (0) > Ā F convergence to the catch-up steady state. For all A F < A F positive investments are optimal if K F = 0 : I(0,A F ) > 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
31 Steady State Analysis Steady States There exist two types of steady states: 1 For sufficiently small β there exists a locally asmyptotically stable catch-up steady state (ˆKF, F ) with ˆK F > 0,  F = A HF. 2 For λ > λ there exists a subset A of the interval [A F,Ā F ] with positive measure such that for each  F A there is a steady state where Î = K = 0. For ÂF int(a ) the steady state is neutrally stable. For all A F (0) > Ā F convergence to the catch-up steady state. For all A F < A F positive investments are optimal if K F = 0 : I(0,A F ) > 0 Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
32 Dynamics and Sensitivity Capital Accumulation Dynamics Depending on the Technology Gap K_F (a) t A_F t (a) (b) Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
33 Dynamics and Sensitivity Sensitivity If the absorption rate λ increases then the no-investment interval [A F,Ā F ] grows but the foreign capital stock in the catch-up steady state is unaffected. If the wage rate w H in country H decreases then A F and (for linear demand) Ā F increase and the foreign capital stock in the catch-up steady state goes down. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
34 Dynamics and Sensitivity Sensitivity If the absorption rate λ increases then the no-investment interval [A F,Ā F ] grows but the foreign capital stock in the catch-up steady state is unaffected. If the wage rate w H in country H decreases then A F and (for linear demand) Ā F increase and the foreign capital stock in the catch-up steady state goes down. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
35 Conclusions Conclusions In the presence of international competition and sufficiently large strong spillovers positive foreign investment is optimal if the productivity gap is sufficiently small. Patterns of investment followed by de-investment may be optimal if the initial technology gap is sufficiently large. Changes in initial productivity gap and domestic wages have non-continuous impact on FDI, long-run productivity in country F, total output and domestic labor income. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
36 Conclusions Conclusions In the presence of international competition and sufficiently large strong spillovers positive foreign investment is optimal if the productivity gap is sufficiently small. Patterns of investment followed by de-investment may be optimal if the initial technology gap is sufficiently large. Changes in initial productivity gap and domestic wages have non-continuous impact on FDI, long-run productivity in country F, total output and domestic labor income. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
37 Conclusions Conclusions In the presence of international competition and sufficiently large strong spillovers positive foreign investment is optimal if the productivity gap is sufficiently small. Patterns of investment followed by de-investment may be optimal if the initial technology gap is sufficiently large. Changes in initial productivity gap and domestic wages have non-continuous impact on FDI, long-run productivity in country F, total output and domestic labor income. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
38 Conclusions Conclusions Relationship between w H and accumulated total labor income is non-monotonous. Decreasing w H might have a positive impact on firm profits and accumulated total labor income in country H. Incentives to start foreign investment are not increased if domestic competitors become potential foreign investors. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
39 Conclusions Conclusions Relationship between w H and accumulated total labor income is non-monotonous. Decreasing w H might have a positive impact on firm profits and accumulated total labor income in country H. Incentives to start foreign investment are not increased if domestic competitors become potential foreign investors. Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
40 Conclusions Extensions Endogenous Absorptive Capacity Endogenous choice of the level of technology to be transferred Consider wage adjustments Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
41 Conclusions Extensions Endogenous Absorptive Capacity Endogenous choice of the level of technology to be transferred Consider wage adjustments Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
42 Conclusions Extensions Endogenous Absorptive Capacity Endogenous choice of the level of technology to be transferred Consider wage adjustments Benteng ZOU (University of Luxembourg) CEF, July / 18
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