BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT

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1 Financial Services AUTHORS Alon Cliff-Tavor, Principal, Digital, Technology & Analytics Wei Ying Cheah, Principal, Finance and Risk ASIA PACIFIC RISK CENTER: FINANCE AND RISK SERIES BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT FROM TACTICAL AND LOCAL PLANNING TO GLOBAL RESILIENCE AND ASSURANCE

2 The only thing harder than planning for an emergency is explaining why you didn t UNKNOWN

3 INTRODUCTION Business Continuity Management (BCM) is a holistic process that enables institutions to prepare for, and respond to, potential crisis situations that lead to disruptions in normal operations. The main objectives of BCM are first, to develop Business Continuity Plans (BCPs) to ensure continuation of critical functions in the event of a crisis; second, to implement and practise these plans so they can be executed effectively, if and when a crisis actually occurs; and third, to improve efficiency and effectiveness of these plans over time, continually adapting to changing risks. Exhibit 1: BCM Framework KEY ENABLERS NORMAL-TIME BCM RISK IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION BCM PLANS Scope and mandate Risk identification and assessment Business impact analysis (BIA) Recovery strategy Plan development Emergency response plan NORMAL TIME Governance and organization Crisis management plan Business continuity plan TRAINING AND TESTING IT contingency plan Reporting Training and awareness Testing and exercising KEY ENABLERS CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCESS CRISIS TIME Crisis mgmt. organizational structure Incident monitoring and escalation Crisis monitoring Crisis assessment Crisis decision making Back-to-normal decision making Post crisis learning TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES Many organizations that have developed BCPs have historically viewed this exercise in silos. Typically, traditional BCPs cover an institution s crisis response across the following independent elements: Location: The risk of a specific location or facility becoming unusable due to weather, natural disaster, terror attack, power failure, etc. People: The risk that human resources are unable to fulfil their functions for any reason, including pandemic outbreak Technology (IT): The risk that a specific data center or another critical infrastructure component goes offline Liquidity: The risk of a liquidity shortage due to a variety of crisis scenarios Copyright 2017 Oliver Wyman 3

4 Often, there seem to be very few coordination areas among these elements or between the functions entrusted with them. Corporate real estate takes care of buildings, IT is responsible for technology resilience, liquidity committees are dealing with their domain, and business or governance management is dealing with other resources (or is supposed to be). Over the last few years, we have witnessed several instances in which financial institutions were subject to substantial business disruptions, for which they had, at best, only partial solutions. Traditional BCM approaches have proven inadequate in times of genuine need. However, we have learned important lessons from recent crisis events and from the responses of our clients and other industry players. SHORTCOMINGS IN TRADITIONAL BCM METHODS 1. BCM REQUIRES REASSESSMENT IN LIGHT OF MORE FREQUENT AND SEVERE CRISES With climate change-related increases in frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by storms 1, for example, we believe that institutions should dedicate time and resources to re-evaluate their approaches to BCM. Recent crises have demonstrated that traditional recovery strategies and alternate site locations are not fit for the severity of natural disasters that have been encountered. For instance, a North American regional bank struggled with its response to super-storm Hurricane Sandy. Both Disaster Recovery (DR) sites for the bank were connected to the same electricity grid, which was completely wiped out by the storm. As a result, despite being geographically distant from one another, both DR sites went offline and were unusable. This example emphasizes the importance of selecting DR sites that are both geographically distant from one another and reliant on separate utilities and infrastructures. This trend also raises concerns with regard to regulatory constraints in extreme crisis events. For example, in Japan s Triple Disaster in 2011, another bank s entire operations in the country went offline. Under such circumstances, the only continuity plan would be to promptly assign critical functions and capabilities offshore. However, in this instance, local regulations prohibited the offshoring of certain key critical functions, leaving the institution unable to continue operations. This example highlights the importance of taking regulatory constraints into account when developing BCPs. Furthermore, industry bodies and individual institutions should lobby regulators to promote awareness of such matters, and to persuade them to contemplate extreme circumstances in the development of any legislation, well before crisis situations. 1 Global warming: The evolving risk landscape. Sep Copyright 2017 Oliver Wyman 4

5 2. BCM OFTEN IGNORES THE INTERCONNECTEDNESS OF GLOBAL BUSINESSES Too often, we see business continuity planning being performed by local management at the country, city or even facility level. This poses significant risks, as these localized BCPs often ignore the regional or global significance of the location or facility for one or more business lines. For example, we have seen a large global institution fail to recognize the global interconnectivity of its Germany-based facility, which played a critical and unique role in Euro clearing and in trading specific asset types. This facility in Germany was responsible for these functions globally, a fact that was not properly considered in the institution s locallydevised BCPs. It was only when the facility faced the grave risk of becoming unavailable for a substantial period of time that the relevant business heads realized the mistake. The BCP supported only local requirements. As a result, it was a woefully inadequate solution given the global network s degree of reliance on that particular facility. Many institutions would benefit greatly from a shift in perspective, moving away from preparing disaster recovery BCPs based on local priorities, to instead focusing on end-toend global resilience. These robust, global BCPs should be fully owned by global business process owners at the appropriate level. 3. SCOPE OF BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING SHOULD BE EXPANDED We have identified three additional scenarios that should be included in a robust BCP with enhanced scope, but all-too-often are not, in practice: a. Loss of license: This scenario involves the risk of losing a key license, or having it restricted in certain respects due to regulatory and/or political threats. The most recent and well-known situation was an order from the New York Department of Financial Services to an emerging market bank in August With regulatory expectations at an all-time high, and regulators and governments pursuing strict measures to ensure compliance and punish any transgressions, we might see similar situations continue to evolve. It should be noted that merely the threat of losing a license could sometimes have severe consequences, as clients might rush to draw deposits, potentially creating a liquidity shortage. b. Clients perspectives: A robust BCP should consider clients business continuity requirements and the institution s ability, readiness and willingness to support clients in such situations. For example, institutions should consider how they might support a client that is experiencing prolonged power failures or an inability to access facilities, when the institution itself remains open for business. Furthermore, institutions should consider communication strategies for customers during catastrophic events. This customer focus can be a key differentiator against competitors during times of crisis. Copyright 2017 Oliver Wyman 5

6 c. Social and political unrest: While not completely new on the catalogue of possible scenarios, the probability of such scenarios is certainly rising in many parts of the world, as highlighted in the 2017 Global Risks Report by the World Economic Forum, supported by Oliver Wyman and MMC. 2 Ensuring that scenarios relating to political upheaval, mass protests and strikes, and acts of terrorism, among others, are accounted for, is crucial in our view for a functioning BCM. QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER To address these shortcomings, there are a number of key areas within the BCM framework and a list of questions that institutions should address: FRAMEWORK COMPONENT KEY QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER SHORTCOMING MITIGATED BCM governance Who owns business continuity and management? Are they the right people/function to take a holistic view of all evolving business needs (including potential disruptions due to regulation/liquidity events)? Expansion in BCM scope How often do you conduct a thorough review of your BCP policies, procedures, guidelines and plans to ensure they continue to fit your business needs and realities? Reassessment of whether BCM is fitfor-purpose BCM scope and mandate BCM risk identification and mitigation BCM plans Training and testing Do your BCM policy, procedures and guidelines: Take a business-focused view and are able to handle the consequences of an increasingly global business/ product eco-system in an increasingly regulated environment? Consider potentially providing support to clients in business continuity events? As part of your normal-time BCM risk identification process, do you: Consider sufficiently severe scenarios? Account for new/emerging business continuity risks? Employ an eco-system lens (end-to-end process and data flow view) when examining the resilience of our infrastructure, so as to identify people, location, regulatory, technology, telecom and other dependencies and soft-spots, in order to formulate business and function resilience plans? As part of your BCM plans, do you: Ensure your BCPs are able to cater for a wide range of scenarios including a large-scale/ unusually severe disturbance? Ensure your alternate sites do not suffer from the same weaknesses experienced by several institutions in recent years? Consider potential plans for a move to out-of-country, regional or global disaster recovery site approach? When planning for continuity events and threats, are you taking a specific location and asset view or a truly broad, global, business-centric view? Do those responsible for BCPs have the right knowledge, skills and access to assess and plan continuity from a holistic and strategic business perspective? Do you conduct regular and robust training, including BCM simulations Expansion in BCM scope + interconnectedness of global business New/emerging or unusually severe crisis New/emerging or unusually severe crisis Interconnectedness of global busines Expansion in BCM scope + interconnectedness of global business 2 Marsh & McLennan Companies. Global Risks Report. Jan 2017 Copyright 2017 Oliver Wyman 6

7 CONCLUSION While the nature and timing of continuity events are never predictable, their consequences unavailability of systems, facilities, and people and the impact of these consequences on institutional processes, can generally be anticipated. Institutions should focus on building robust, globally-focused plans to mitigate common crisis repercussions. BCM training and testing of BCPs, coupled with proper governance, are critical to effective crisis management. Exhibit 2: Illustration of effective BCM in action OPERATIONAL STATUS 100% INCIDENT MORE RESILIENT TO DISRUPTION SHORTER RECOVER TIME Effective BCM No BCM TIME Copyright 2017 Oliver Wyman 7

8 Oliver Wyman is a global leader in management consulting that combines deep industry knowledge with specialized expertise in strategy, operations, risk management, and organization transformation. For more information please contact the marketing department by at info-fs@oliverwyman.com or by phone at one of the following locations: ASIA PACIFIC AMERICAS EMEA ABOUT Marsh & McLennan Companies Asia Pacific Risk Center draws on the expertise of Marsh, Mercer, Guy Carpenter, and Oliver Wyman, along with top-tier research partners, to address the major threats facing industries, governments, and societies in the Asia Pacific region. We highlight critical risk issues, bring together leaders from different sectors to stimulate new thinking, and deliver actionable insights that help businesses and governments respond more nimbly to the challenges and opportunities of our time. Our regionally focused digital news hub, BRINK Asia, provides top executives and policy leaders up-to-the-minute insights, analysis, and informed perspectives on developing risk issues relevant to the Asian market. For more information, please the team at contactaprc@mmc.com. Copyright 2017 Oliver Wyman All rights reserved. This report may not be reproduced or redistributed, in whole or in part, without the written permission of Oliver Wyman and Oliver Wyman accepts no liability whatsoever for the actions of third parties in this respect. The information and opinions in this report were prepared by Oliver Wyman. This report is not investment advice and should not be relied on for such advice or as a substitute for consultation with professional accountants, tax, legal or financial advisors. Oliver Wyman has made every effort to use reliable, up-to-date and comprehensive information and analysis, but all information is provided without warranty of any kind, express or implied. Oliver Wyman disclaims any responsibility to update the information or conclusions in this report. Oliver Wyman accepts no liability for any loss arising from any action taken or refrained from as a result of information contained in this report or any reports or sources of information referred to herein, or for any consequential, special or similar damages even if advised of the possibility of such damages. The report is not an offer to buy or sell securities or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell securities. This report may not be sold without the written consent of Oliver Wyman.