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1 Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION EMERGENCY PROJECT PAPER ON A PROPOSED CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 6.63 MILLION (US$10.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) AND A PACIFIC REGION INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$1.79 MILLION (AUD 2 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF SAMOA FOR A SAMOA POST TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT October 15, 2010 Timor-Leste, Papua New Guinea & the Pacific Islands Sustainable Development Department East Asia and Pacific Region Report No: WS This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

2 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective May ) Currency Unit = Samoan Tala (SAT) SAT 1 = US$0.384 AUS 1 = US$0.9 FISCAL YEAR July 1 June 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADB Asian Development Bank M&E Monitoring and Evaluation CAS Country Assistance Strategy MIS Monitoring Information System CERP Cyclone Emergency Recovery Project MNRE Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment CFAA Country Financial Accountability Assessment MOF Ministry of Finance CIM Coastal Infrastructure Management MTI Ministry of Trade & Industry COEP Codes of Environmental Practice MWTI Ministry of Works, Transport & Infrastructure CPAR Country Procurement Assessment Report NBF Non Bank Financed CQS Selection Based on Consultant NCB National Competitive Bidding DC Development Consent NCDP National Community Development Project DMO Disaster Management Office NDP National Disaster Plan EIA Environmental Impact Assessment NEOC National Emergency Operations Center EMF Environmental Management Framework NGO Non Governmental Organization EMP Environmental Management Plan OM Operations Manual EPP Emergency Project Paper PCA Procurement Capacity Assessment ERC Emergency Recovery Credit PCRFI Pacific Catastrophe Risk Financing Initiative ESSAF Environmental & Social Screening Assessment Framework PDNA Post Disaster Needs Assessment EU European Union PFM Public Financial Management FBS Fixed Budget Selection PIC Pacific Island Countries FM Financial Management PID Project Information Document FMR Financial Management Requirements PMT Project Management Team GEF Global Environment Facility PRIF Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility GFDRR Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction PUMA Planning & Urban Management Authority GOS Government of Samoa PEAR Preliminary Environmental Assessment Report GWG Goods and works QBS Quality Based Selection IA Implementing Agency QCBS Quality Cost Based Selection IAMP Infrastructure Asset Management Project RVP Regional Vice President IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction & Development SA Special Account ICB International Competitive Bidding SAMS Samoa Asset Management System ICR Implementation Completion Report SAT Samoan Tala IDA International Development Association SBD Standard Bidding Documents IFC International Finance Corporation SIAM-2 Second Infrastructure Asset Management Project ISDS Integrated Safeguards Data Sheet SOE Statements of Expenditure ISN Interim Strategy Note TRG Technical Review Group LARAP Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan TTL Task Team Leader LARF Land Acquisition & Resettlement Framework UN United Nations LCS Least Cost Selection WB World Bank LTA Land Transport Authority Vice President: James W. Adams Country Director: Ferid Belhaj Sector Director Sector Manager John A. Roome Charles Feinstein Task Team Leader: Demetrios Papathanasiou

3 SAMOA Samoa Post Tsunami Reconstruction Project CONTENTS Page A. Introduction 1 B. Emergency Challenge: Country Context, Recovery Strategy and Rationale... 1 C. Bank Response: The Project... 3 D. Appraisal of Project Activities... 6 E. Implementation Arrangements and Financing Plan F. Project Risks and Mitigating Measures G. Terms and Conditions for Project Financing Annex 1: Detailed Description of Project Components Annex 2: Results Framework and Monitoring Annex 3: Summary of Estimated Project Costs Annex 4: Financial Management and Disbursement Arrangements Annex 5: Procurement Arrangements Annex 6: Implementation and Monitoring Arrangements Annex 7: Project Preparation and Appraisal Team Members Annex 8: Environmental and Social Safeguards Framework Annex 9: Economic and Financial Analysis Annex 10: Documents in Project Files Annex 11: Statement of Loans and Credits Annex 12: Country at a Glance Annex 13: Maps No. IBRD

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5 SAMOA SAMOA POST TSUNAMI RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT PAPER EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC EASNS Date: October 15, 2010 Country Director: Ferid Belhaj Sector Manager/Director: Charles M. Feinstein/John A. Roome Project ID: P Lending Instrument: Emergency Recovery Loan Team Leader: Demetrios Papathanasiou Sectors: Roads and highways (100%) Themes: Natural disaster management (100%) Environmental category: Partial Assessment Joint IFC: Joint Level: Project Financing Data [ ] Loan [X] Credit [ ] Grant [ ] Guarantee [ ] Other: For Loans/Credits/Others: Total Bank financing (US$m.): Proposed terms: Standard, with 40 years maturity Financing Plan (US$m) Source Local Foreign Total BORROWER/RECIPIENT International Development Association (IDA) Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility Trust Fund Total: Borrower: Ministry of Finance Samoa Responsible Agency: Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment Private Bag Samoa Tel: (685) Fax: (685) taulealea.malua@mnre.gov.ws The Land Transport Authority Land Transport Authority PO Box 1607 Samoa Tel: (685) Fax: (685) info@lta.gov.ws

6 Estimated disbursements (Bank FY/US$m) FY Annual Cumulative Project implementation period: Start November 29, 2010 End: March 12, 2013 Expected effectiveness date: November 25, 2010 Expected closing date: April 30, 2013 Does the project require any exceptions from Bank policies? Ref. Section Appraisal of Project Activities Have these been approved by Bank management? Does the project include any critical risks rated substantial or high? Ref. Section Project Risks and Mitigating Measures [ ]Yes [X] No [ ]Yes [ ] No [ ]Yes [X] No Project development objective Ref. Section Bank Response The project's Development Objective is to assist the Government of Samoa (GOS) in its efforts to support the relocation and rehabilitation of communities living in the island of Upolu affected by the tsunami of September 29, 2009, through the provision of improved infrastructure access to relocation sites; enhanced transport infrastructure, and assistance to local communities to address future natural disasters. Project description [one-sentence summary of each component] Ref. Section Bank Response The proposed project is a US$10.0 million IDA Emergency Recovery Credit (ERC) with additional grant co-financing of US$1.79 million (AUD 2 million equivalent) from the Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility to support the transport sector post-tsunami recovery plan of the GOS. The Bank and GOS agreed that the ERC would be implemented through the Land Transport Authority (LTA) and Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), with overall coordination by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). The proposed Credit incorporates five project components: (a) Component 1. Upgrading of existing access tracks and seawalls US$5.6 million. This component will provide partial retroactive financing for urgent works by LTA to: provide improved road access to relocation areas; construct a new link road that will provide an alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone; and reinstate damaged seawalls and construct new seawalls to protect the east and south coast roads. (i) Lepa/Lalomanu link road US$1.1 million. This sub-component responds to the need to provide improved road access to relocation areas and for an alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone. (ii) Upgrading of access tracks US$2.8 million. This sub-component responds to requests from village mayors to upgrade existing tracks from the east coast road to areas where residents are relocating after the tsunami. (iii) Sea wall repair and reconstruction US$1.6 million. This sub-component will restore and upgrade seawalls along critical lengths of the coastal roads. (iv) Salani Bailey Bridge repair US$0.04 million. This sub-component will repair damage caused by the tsunami. (v) Technical assistance US$0.06 million. This sub-component will finance specialist technical assistance for storm-water drainage design along all the upgraded routes. (b) Component 2. Community Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans US$0.2 million. This component will update the mapping of the affected and relocation areas, and revise the community

7 level Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans for these areas to assist with infrastructure planning and monitoring, and disaster risk reduction. CIM plans will be revised through close consultation with communities. (c) Component 3. East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) US$4.6 million. This component will provide a new road link along the east coast above the natural disaster risk zone to improve access to and for communities relocating inland from the east coast, and provide a secure transport link between Samusu and Lalomanu. (i) Route alignment study, design & supervision US$0.5 million (ii) Environmental Impact Assessment US$0.1 million (iii) Compensation cost To be determined following route alignment study (iv) Road construction US$4.0 million (d) Component 4. Dual-purpose pedestrian access routes US$0.6 million. This component will provide new and improved pedestrian access routes to relocation areas above the south east escarpment area, both to facilitate access for resettled families between their new homes and the coast, and to serve as evacuation routes in the event of a tsunami or cyclone. (i) Feasibility study, design and supervision US$0.1 million (ii) Construction of pedestrian access routes US$0.5 million (e) Component 5. Project Management and Support US$0.3 million. This component will support contracted consultant services, and staffing plus operating costs for in-house project management, administration, and monitoring and evaluation activities by LTA and MNRE. (i) Project Management US$0.23 million. Support for in-house project management, administration, training, and monitoring activities by MoF, LTA and MNRE. (ii) Monitoring & Evaluation US$0.07 million. This sub-component will support TA to establish the project evaluation framework and conduct before-and-after analysis to evaluate the impact of the project. Given the emergency preparation of the above activities, there are uncertainties regarding the final design and costs of the above components. The project will therefore include an amount of unallocated funds of US$0.50 million to cover contingencies and currently unforeseen needs. Which safeguard policies are triggered, if any? Ref. Section Appraisal of Project Activities The project triggers OP Because of the works taking place where roads already exist and/or the size of the activities is limited, the project is characterized as category B. Samoa has well-developed environmental assessment and monitoring procedures for road works. Relevant Codes of Environmental Practice (COEP) were developed with the assistance of international consultants to modern standards, have been adopted by Samoa, and are used for the SIAM-2. Appropriate environmental and social frameworks have been developed to be implemented under this emergency operation. Social Issues. The project will restore and improve access to communities and relocation areas. Overall, the impacts are expected to be positive, as access to critical infrastructure (e.g. schools, hospitals, markets) will be restored and improved bringing better development outcomes to affected communities. A Social Assessment will be conducted early in the implementation period in an effort to (i) increase awareness of the project, (ii) identify relevant social issues that may arise from the project, (iii) discuss potential impacts of the project with the community (and mitigation measures), (iv) (identify and recommend actions that will mitigate negative impacts and/or maximize positive impacts either on the general population or on specific groups, and (v) solicit input from community members into the project

8 design, in particular the alignments of the Samusu-Lalomanu road and the dual-purpose pedestrian access routes. The preparation of the social assessment and the consultations will be broad based and representative, paying particular attention to the input and experiences of women, the youth, and other potential vulnerable groups. Any relevant actionable inputs will strengthen the project design, including the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan's (LARAPs), and the Environmental and Social Screening Assessment Framework (ESSAF). Component 1 is providing retroactive financing for activities. Due diligence will be undertaken to determine whether the activities were implemented in compliance with national law and the Bank's safeguards policies. The ESSAF provides guidance on the information that is required from the due diligence including summaries of relevant legislation, summaries of the activities' location and scope, description of the scope and magnitude of adverse impacts, and details on measures put in place to mitigate those impacts. OP 4.12 is triggered as Components 3 and 4 may require involuntary land acquisitions and/or resettlement. The project aims to minimize involuntary land acquisition and/or resettlement, in part by involving communities in the design of the route alignments. In addition, a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework (LARF) has been prepared. The project has adopted a framework approach because the alignment of the relevant sub-projects under Component 3 and 4 will not be known prior to project approval. The LARF provides guidelines for temporary and permanent land acquisition, resettlement (if necessary), and compensation for loss of crops and economic trees. The LARF provides principles for land use which include the avoidance and minimization of involuntary resettlement, land acquisition, and damage to physical assets. It also details procedures on institutional roles and financial responsibilities. The LARF provides guidelines for the preparation of Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plans once the specific route alignments of sub-projects are known. Component 2 is financing the updating of Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans. The Component will include close consultation with affected communities as an integral part of the process of updating the district Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans.

9 A. Introduction 1. This Project Paper seeks the approval of the Executive Directors to provide an Emergency Recovery Credit (ERC) in an amount of SDR 6.63 million (US$10.0 million equivalent) to Samoa for post tsunami reconstruction. 2. The proposed Credit would help finance the costs associated with the rehabilitation and reconstruction program of the Government of Samoa (GOS) to recover from the tsunami that hit the country in September Over 5,000 people --more than 1 out of every 50 Samoans-- were affected; Samoa incurred damages and losses equivalent to more than 22 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). A significant part of the population has chosen to relocate inland from the shore and is currently in need of assistance to rebuild and rehabilitate their communities. 3. The proposed Project will help respond to the situation by addressing the needs of the GOS reconstruction plan, focusing primarily on the transport sector and on strengthening the affected communities risk management capacity. 4. Partnership arrangements: The Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) agreed, on December 2 nd 2009, to co-finance this proposal with an additional US$1.79 million (AUS$2 million equivalent) grant funding. There are no other multilateral or bilateral agencies co-financing the rehabilitation needs of this particular sector. B. Emergency Challenge: Country Context, Recovery Strategy and Rationale 5. Samoa is highly vulnerable to natural hazards. The World Bank s Natural Disaster Hotspots study identifies Samoa as the 30th country in the world s most exposed states to three or more hazards. Seventy percent of Samoa s population lives on the coast facing coastal hazards such as cyclones, tsunamis, flooding and storm surges. Cyclones Ofa (1990) and Val (1991) have been the most notable, affecting 195,000 and 88,000 people respectively, and costing approximately four times GDP. Geo-hazards such as earthquakes, tsunami and volcanic eruptions are also threats. The National Tsunami Plan of Samoa identifies a wave of between 7m and 9m average run-up height to occur approximately every years. With the current available analysis, this remains a best design case equivalent to a once-in-alifetime event and resembles the recent tsunami. 6. On September 29, 2009, a powerful earthquake struck south of Samoa and was followed by a tsunami that impacted American Samoa, Samoa, and northern Tonga. In Samoa there have been 143 reported deaths and an estimated 5,274 people made homeless. The main affected areas, with about 7 percent of the country s population, are the southern, eastern and southwestern coast of Upolu Island. 7. The response from the GOS and the international humanitarian community was immediate, swift and efficient. A fully functional National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) was activated near the capital Apia. Access roads to affected areas were quickly cleared allowing for rapid response efforts by communities, Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) and the national Disaster Management Office (DMO). With support from the Australian and New Zealand military and disaster relief teams, the Government provided medical facilities, tents and clean water. Strong social networks responded effectively despite the devastation, and many homeless were accommodated by family and friends. 8. The Government s Disaster Advisory Committee requested assistance from the United Nations (UN) for a multi-cluster needs assessment. Advanced teams arrived in Samoa on October 4 and 5. At the same time the Minister of Finance, in a meeting with World Bank s East Asia Pacific Vice President, 1

10 requested World Bank support for a Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) to complement the early recovery assessment and formulate a long term recovery and reconstruction strategy. A joint World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and United Nations PDNA team arrived in Samoa on October 7, 2009 to assist the GOS. 9. The Post Disaster Needs Assessment estimated the sum of direct damages and economic losses in Samoa at US$124 million (equivalent to more than 22 percent of Samoa s GDP). In economic terms, the infrastructure sectors accounted for three quarters of the total damages at US$64.8 million with an additional US$4.3 million in economic losses. The greatest costs were found in the transport sector, where the coastal road and accompanying sea walls were severely damaged. Furthermore, about 13 percent of the country s housing stock was lost. 10. A significant proportion of the affected population has chosen to relocate inland from the shore and the GOS decided to support this move with the provision of services. This move inland, as part of the recovery and future disaster risk reduction, raises the total post-tsunami recovery costs to about US$167.4 million. The GOS officially requested Bank support to address the reconstruction needs of the roads infrastructure in January Before the tsunami disaster, Samoa was performing strongly with real per capita income growing steadily since the mid-nineties. However, the country has been recently affected by the global financial crisis with real GDP falling by more than 5 percent in FY 2008/9. Many jobs have been lost in the domestic economy, primarily in the export manufacturing sector, and other jobs and associated remittances have been lost through the closure of a large tuna canning plant in neighboring American Samoa. The agriculture sector also suffered in 2008/09 as fish exports fell. Construction output was reduced due to a decline in activity following the South Pacific Games in However, the small, but growing tourism sector used to have a positive impact on incomes, but mostly in the tsunami affected area. This was reflected in growth in the hotels, restaurants, and transport and commerce sectors in the affected areas. 12. Despite the global crisis, Samoa s current account deficit narrowed, as remittances and tourism receipts --together accounting for more than 40 percent of GDP-- continued to grow in Samoan authorities responded to the crisis by lowering interest rates and increasing development spending. The deficit was budgeted to double to over 10 percent of GDP in FY 2009/10 and would be financed by soft loans and aid grants. Public debt comprises mostly concessional lending from the ADB and World Bank and is expected to reach 41 percent of GDP in 2009/10, slightly above government s target of 40 percent of GDP. Government s Strategy 13. With support from the World Bank s Infrastructure Asset Management program, Samoa has adopted a modern and comprehensive disaster risk management framework in its 2006 Disaster and Emergency Management Act. The National Disaster Council, chaired by the Prime Minister and served by the Disaster Management Office (DMO), serves as the national coordinating mechanism to oversee disaster risk management in the country, including the tsunami recovery plan. Responsibility for Disaster Management is assigned to the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE) which houses the DMO as a Section of the Meteorology Division with three staff members. 14. A National Samoa Tsunami Recovery Plan has been established by the GOS based on the integrated assessment reports prepared jointly by the GOS and development partners. The plan is coordinated by the Ministry of Finance and a supplementary budget for recovery was approved by cabinet in December The recovery plan estimates total needs at US$108 million with expenditure at 2

11 approximately US$26 million per year in the first three years of recovery. The Ministry of Finance confirmed that financing for the recovery effort will be comprised of a mix of resources including multilateral and bilateral grants, loans and restructuring. The plan includes activities already underway and lists priorities for the medium term from Longer term actions beyond 2012 are to be addressed through ongoing multi-year sector programs. 15. The National Tsunami Recovery Plan calls for a US$27.9 million investment in the transport sector in the next three years. Whilst immediate clearance of roads and superficial repair was conducted in October and November 2009, increased heavy transport combined with weakened or damaged seawalls have left vulnerabilities from displaced rocks and potential coastal erosion in exposed sections of the road. The tsunami recovery plan also calls for the upgrading of roads to resettlement areas and provides for prioritized investments in the following order: (i) restoration of existing roads; (ii) restoration of bridges and main routes; (iii) a new road to resettled communities; and (iv) reconstruction of the seawalls. 16. The GOS approached the Bank to support the recovery program through the financing of transport infrastructure for the resettled communities inland from the coast. The aim is to establish normal living conditions for these communities through the provision of services that will: i) provide better transport access to relocated communities; ii) improve access for agricultural activities in these areas to support income generation; and iii) safeguard the disaster mitigation benefits of moving exposed populations away from the coastal areas, where they are at risk from tsunami and cyclones. 17. Risk factors that affect the Government s tsunami recovery program include the concatenation of events, such as additional natural hazards that might affect the vulnerable population. Affected families have been stretched for resources and find themselves dependent on their community, the government, and family members abroad as they rebuild. While remittances from abroad have provided in many cases a life-line, the newly relocated communities are still vulnerable. The passage of cyclone Rene on February 14, 2010, and tsunami warning following the Chile Earthquake of February 27, 2010, fortunately did not materialize in significant events in Samoa, but were reminders of the potential risks Samoan communities must mitigate against. C. Bank Response: The Project 18. At the request of the GOS, within two weeks from the disaster and with financial support from the Global Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction (GFDRR), the Bank led a team of experts from the United Nations (UN) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), who together with the GOS prepared the PDNA. Early results from the PDNA were used by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to prepare the mid-year supplementary budget and the post-tsunami recovery program. 19. Given the economic impact of the disaster, the GOS and the Bank agreed to increase Samoa s IDA allocation to US$41 million. The GOS requested officially in January 2010 from the Bank: (i) assistance for the transport sector post-tsunami reconstruction program (US$10.0 million); (ii) additional financing for the existing Bank s operation in the health sector (US$3.0 million); and (iii) budget support (US$20.0 million). 20. This proposed Project is a SDR 6.63 million (US$10.0 million equivalent) IDA Emergency Recovery Credit (ERC) with an additional grant co-financing of US$1.79 (AUD 2 million equivalent) from the PRIF to support the transport sector post-tsunami recovery plan of the GOS. The Bank and GOS agreed that the ERC would be implemented through the Land Transport Authority (LTA) and the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MNRE), with overall coordination by the Ministry of Finance (MoF). LTA and MNRE are currently implementing the Second Infrastructure Asset Management (SIAM-2) Bank project. SIAM-2 progress has been satisfactory and it is proposed that 3

12 established financial and procurement management systems used for SIAM-2 will also be implemented for this Project. After Cyclone Heta in 2004, the Bank financed an Emergency Recovery Project, the ICR of which was satisfactory; lessons learned from that operation were incorporated in the design of this post-tsunami proposed Project. 21. This Project would be complemented by the Pacific Catastrophe Risk Financing Initiative (PCRFI) currently underway. The initiative is expected to deliver analytic results in early As part of that effort, the project will gather high resolution satellite data for use in mapping the building stock of Pacific Island countries. In the case of Samoa the PCRFI will acquire additional imagery over the affected areas and share this with the government of Samoa and the Tsunami Reconstruction Project team in order to inform the recovery planning and updates of community Coastal Infrastructure Management plans. Additional disaster risk management capacity building will be provided in the future through the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience 1. Project Development Objective 22. The Project s Development Objective is to assist the GOS in its efforts to support the relocation and rehabilitation of communities living in the island of Upolu affected by the tsunami of September 29, 2009, through the provision of improved infrastructure access to relocation sites; enhanced transport infrastructure, and assistance to local communities to address future natural disasters. Summary of Project Components 23. The proposed Credit incorporates five Project components: (a) Component 1. Upgrading of existing access tracks and seawalls US$5.6 million. This component will provide partial retroactive financing for urgent works by LTA to: provide improved road access to relocation areas; construct a new link road that will provide an alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone; and repair damaged seawalls to protect the east and south coast roads. (i) (ii) Lepa/Lalomanu link road US$1.1 million. This sub-component responds to the need to provide improved road access to relocation areas and for an alternative route along the south coast above the natural disaster risk zone. (ii) Upgrading of access tracks US$2.8 million. This sub-component responds to requests from village mayors to upgrade existing tracks from the east coast road to areas where residents are relocating after the tsunami. (iii) Sea wall repair and reconstruction US$1.6 million. This sub-component will restore and upgrade existing seawalls along critical lengths of the coastal roads. (iv) Salani Bailey Bridge repair US$0.04 million. This sub-component will repair damage caused by the tsunami. (v) Technical assistance US$0.06 million. This sub-component will finance specialist technical assistance for storm-water drainage design along all the upgraded routes. 1 The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, approved in November 2008, was the first program developed and operational under the Strategic Climate Fund, which is one of two funds within the design of the Climate Investment Funds 4

13 (b) Component 2. Community Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans US$0.2 million. This component will update the mapping of the affected and relocation areas, and revise the community level Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) Plans for these areas to assist with infrastructure planning and monitoring, and disaster risk reduction. CIM plans will be revised through close consultation with communities. (c) Component 3. East Coast Inland Route (Samusu-Lalomanu) US$4.6 million. This component will provide a new road link along the east coast above the natural disaster risk zone to improve access to and for communities relocating inland from the east coast, and provide a secure transport link between Samusu and Lalomanu. (i) Route alignment study, design & supervision US$0.5 million (ii) Environmental Impact Assessment US$0.1 million (iii) Compensation cost To be determined following route alignment study 2 (iv) Road construction US$4.0 million (d) Component 4. Dual-purpose pedestrian access routes US$0.6 million. This component will provide new and improved pedestrian access routes to relocation areas above the south east escarpment area, both to facilitate access for resettled families between their new homes and the coast, and to serve as evacuation routes in the event of a tsunami or cyclone. (i) (ii) Feasibility study, design and supervision US$0.1 million Construction of pedestrian access routes US$0.5 million (e) Component 5. Project Management and Support US$0.3 million. This component will support contracted consultant services, and staffing plus operating costs for in-house project management, administration, and monitoring and evaluation activities by LTA and MNRE. (i) (ii) Project Management US$0.23 million. Support for in-house project management, administration, training, and monitoring activities by MoF, LTA and MNRE. Monitoring & Evaluation US$0.07 million. This sub-component will support TA to establish the Project evaluation framework and conduct before-and-after analysis to evaluate the impact of the Project. 24. Given the emergency preparation of the above activities, there are uncertainties regarding the final design and costs of the above components. The Project will therefore include an amount of unallocated funds of about US$0.50 million to cover contingencies and currently unforeseen needs. 25. This Project does not include a separate capacity building component for disaster preparedness. Samoa has a well-established disaster risk management regime which has been supplemented by awareness-raising, training and hazard management education campaigns carried out under the IDAsupported Cyclone Emergency Recovery Project (CERP) and Infrastructure Asset Management Project (IAMP Phases 1 and 2). Furthermore, Samoa s natural disasters management will be strengthened by separate future activities under the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, which in Samoa is managed by the World Bank. 2 GOS will provide counterpart funds, as may be necessary, to fully cover any costs beyond the amounts allocated under the project for this subcomponent. 5

14 Eligibility for Processing under OP/BP The affected population requires emergency assistance to rebuild their communities. This Project would address the priority areas of transport access, community infrastructure management plans and enhance the resilience of communities before the next cyclone season. The option of additional financing for the transport sector under the Bank s SIAM-2 project was discussed, but was not selected because the GOS preferred the flexibility of the Rapid Response to Crisis and Emergency Policy of the Bank to allow for retroactive financing of expenses incurred by the GOS during the relief and early recovery stages of the disaster. In addition, the emergency operation allows for shorter time frames of processing for civil engineering and reconstruction activities. 27. The Bank has experience in disaster mitigation and emergency recovery in the region. In particular, the Bank financed the Tonga Cyclone Emergency Recovery and Management Project (2002) and more recently the Samoa Cyclone Emergency Recovery Project (2004), which sought to rehabilitate damaged land transport infrastructure and reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards. The Project team was also able to draw on the expertise of the East Asia Pacific Disaster Risk Management team with experience across the region, including reconstruction from Earthquake (Wenchuan, China 2009) and Asian Tsunami (2004), as well as the Bank s newly formed Global Expert Team on Disaster Risk Management. Consistency with Country Strategy (CAS or ISN) 28. The proposed Project is consistent with the objective of Regional Engagement Framework ( ) of the Bank, to safeguard service delivery by improving resilience to natural hazards and helping Pacific member countries to manage natural disasters, where the earthquake and earthquake-incurred tsunami will remain the potential threat in the coming years. The Project falls within the ambit of the Bank s broader development objectives for the region, to help reduce the vulnerability of small island states to economic and physical shocks. Expected Outcomes 29. The Project outcomes expected to be achieved by the proposed Credit are: (a) improved road and pedestrian access to relocation areas; (b) restored road access to communities affected by the September 29, 2009 through repairs to main and secondary land transport routes and associated seawalls damaged by the tsunami; (c) more resilient road network, that provides continued access to populated areas during and after natural disasters; and (d) improved planning through updated CIM plans and improved base and hazard mapping. The results framework and arrangements for result monitoring are in Annex 2. D. Appraisal of Project Activities Economic 30. An economic analysis of the operation is not possible at this early stage of the recovery process while the overall pattern of restoration of infrastructure and services across all sectors, and community relocation plans are underway. Subprojects to be financed under this operation are limited to the most urgent and effective works needed to restore access and coastal protection to affected communities and upgrade access to relocation areas. 31. Nevertheless, it is expected that improvement in roads infrastructure will allow for overall better transport services to areas were communities have relocated. Economic and social benefits associated with better roads conditions will positively affect education, health, access to markets and agricultural productivity. In addition, improved road infrastructure to the affected areas will reduce the vulnerability 6

15 of road assets to potential future disasters and secure alternative access routes to the South of Upolu Island. Technical 32. The works proposed under the Project repairs and reconstruction of existing seawalls and roads, improvement of tracks and construction of new roads with associated drainage are similar in nature and scope to the type of works that Ministry of Works, Transport & Infrastructure (MWTI), LTA, and their consultants and contractors have been designing and implementing under the IAMP and SIAM- 2 projects over the past decade. LTA managers and staff (mostly long-serving MWTI staff transferred to LTA within the last year) have acquired extensive design and construction supervision experience. Through the introduction of its Samoa Asset Management System (SAMS), LTA maintains an accurate current database of the national road network which provides accurate data on individual road lengths and mapping for bid document preparation. The works that have already been, and will be, implemented are all based on simple, conventional, tried and tested technology and are therefore unlikely to present any technical challenges to any of those involved in their implementation. 33. The new/upgraded roads following existing plantation tracks or routes were already identified by the local community and documented in Coastal Infrastructure Management (CIM) plans covering the affected region. These CIM plans were originally developed in 2005 as part of the SIAM-2 project and will be updated within 6-8 months from effectiveness of this Project. This should ensure that potential implementation problems are identified and addressed early, and that the alignment for the new road is developed with strong community involvement and support. 34. Local construction contractors have proven themselves to be cost-competitive for road construction, experienced, and capable of good quality works. All road works under the SIAM-2 project have been won and undertaken by local contractors under internationally competitive bidding procedures. It is expected that local contractors will be used for construction works proposed under this Project, while a significant part of construction materials will be sourced locally. This will provide employment and contribute positively to the local economy. Sustainability 35. The Project will add some 35 kilometers of upgraded or new roads to the Samoa road network (Components 1 and 3), plus associated access works (Component 4). While this will add to the overall cost of road maintenance in Samoa, Samoa has a strong road maintenance capability and the capacity to sustainably maintain these roads. This capacity has been developed over the last 10 years with Bank support as part of the SIAM Phase 1 and 2 projects. Successful reforms in the sector include: (a) Outsourcing of routine and emergency road maintenance to the private sector under a system of annual performance-based road maintenance contracts. Under this system, the island of Upolu is divided into 10 zones, each of which has a separate contract for routine maintenance. These contracts are re-bid every 12 months to ensure competitiveness and maintain standards. The system has been in place for more than 5 years and has proven successful in improving both the quality and timeliness of road maintenance, and reducing the cost. Samoa is a leader in road maintenance reform and performance in the Pacific. (b) Establishment of the LTA that assumed responsibility for road asset management in LTA is a semi-autonomous government agency with its own Board and funding from a combination of earmarked road user charges and GOS budget allocations. Continuity of road maintenance programs and capacity was achieved by transferring qualified staff and established systems from the MWTI. 7

16 36. The road maintenance framework has proved to be effective and should comfortably accommodate the additional length of roads (approximately 35 km) that will be handed over for maintenance on completion under the proposed Project. The maintenance of seawalls that protect coastal roads will also be put out to contract by LTA. Fiduciary 37. Financial Management arrangements for this Project will follow the system currently operating satisfactorily for the SIAM-2 project. LTA and MNRE already have in place an adequate financial management system which will require little adaptation to suit the needs of the proposed ERC and already meets the Bank s financial management requirements. The SIAM-2 project has achieved timely submission of the quarterly financial reports and the annual audit reports of good quality. The audit reports have not raised any accountability issue or any significant internal control weakness. 38. Infrastructure works under the Project will be procured through contracting packages under the similar procurement processes and conditions as applied to the ongoing SIAM-2 project (see Annex 5 for details). Procurement performance under SIAM-2 has been satisfactory. Procurement of works under Component 1 for contracts that have been already awarded by LTA and construction has commenced, may be eligible for retroactive financing in accordance with the Procurement Guidelines. Procurement of works, goods and consultancy services are to be procured as described in Annex 5. Lessons learned 39. Lessons learned from post-disaster reconstruction projects have informed the design of this operation and include recommendations identified in the PDNA, specific lessons learned from the Samoa Cyclone Emergency Recovery ICR, as well as best practices in reconstruction. These include: (a) Structural investments should be designed to incorporate the natural hazard and climate risks they will face and not merely to previous standards. A drainage engineer is included with the specific objectives of assessing the flood risks and flood management options to safeguard the new road infrastructure. Such drainage designs shall incorporate consideration of longer term climate risks. (b) Reallocating resources from existing projects affects the ability to attain long-term development goals and is less effective than specific reconstruction lending. (c) Project design should be simple, based on extensive participation by the local communities and beneficiaries, and take into account local implementation capacity. The project takes advantage of the previously established Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans (CIM), which were drafted before the tsunami in close consultation with the communities and which in the affected area already identified the desired mitigation options and locations of infrastructure to be relocated to reduce cyclone and tsunami risks. (d) In small countries with relatively small construction sector methodologies for calculating contracts and tendering process needs to be carefully designed and flexible allowing for slice and package 3 approaches and the possibility of bids to be repackaged or re-advertised. This operation will allow for a slice and package approach to the bidding for road upgrades and road construction whilst maintaining an emphasis on high quality supervision. 3 Slice and Package: A procedure whereby a large homogeneous project is sliced into smaller similar contracts that are bid simultaneously so as to attract the interest of both small and large firms. Firms may offer bids on individual contracts (slices) or on a group of similar contracts (packages) and award is made to the combination of bids offering the lowest cost to the Employer. 8

17 (e) Supervision needs to be relatively intensive. Emergency loans are put together over a shorter time period and as a result some details are left to be defined during project implementation. Flexibility will be required to deal with changing post-disaster conditions, therefore more Bank supervision effort will be applied to this Project. Safeguards 40. The Project triggers OP 4.01 due to civil works impacts from the rehabilitation of access roads and sea walls and construction of a new segment of national roads. Because the civil works would mostly take place in existing roads and the size of the activities is limited in scope, the Project is characterized as category B. 41. Samoa has well-developed environmental assessment and monitoring procedures and has developed, issued and implemented the Samoa Codes of Environmental Practice (COEP) since April 2007 for road works, coastal protection, quarry development and operations, drainage and construction of communications facilities, among others. The COEP were developed with the assistance of international consultants and is on par with modern and international standards. The COEP have been updated and used for the SIAM-2 project. 42. To ensure compliance with the Bank s environmental safeguards policies, before disbursements are made for the retroactively financed activities, the Bank will review for compliance the Environmental Management Plans (EMP) included in the works contracts relating to these activities. Disbursements will be made only when the Bank s environmental specialists confirm that environmental safeguards were properly addressed. 43. An appropriate Environmental and Social Screening Assessment Framework (ESSAF) has been developed building on the Samoa COEP for works for which Requests for Proposals will be issued following Board approval (Components 1.3, 3 and 4). The ESSAF provides guidance on the information that is required from the due diligence including summaries of relevant legislation, summaries of the activities location and scope, description of the scope and magnitude of adverse impacts, and details on measures put in place to mitigate those impacts. The ESSAF will guide the implementing agencies in addressing environmental and social impacts during implementation. 44. Social Issues. The Project will restore and improve access to communities and relocation areas. Overall, the impacts are expected to be positive, as access to critical infrastructure (e.g. schools, hospitals, markets) will be restored and improved bringing better development outcomes to affected communities. 45. To ensure compliance with the Bank s social safeguards policies, before disbursements are made for the retroactively financed activities, the Bank will review written reports, to be provided by the GOS, addressing social safeguards issues relating to these activities. Disbursements will be made only when the Bank s social specialists confirm that social safeguards issues were properly addressed. 9

18 46. For contracts for works to be financed under the Project and for which Request for Proposals will be issued following Board approval, a Social Assessment will be conducted early in the implementation period in an effort to (i) increase awareness of the Project, (ii) identify relevant social issues that may arise from the Project, (iii) discuss potential impacts of the Project with the community (and mitigation measures), (iv) identify and recommend actions that will mitigate negative impacts and/or maximize positive impacts either on the general population or on specific groups, and (v) solicit input from community members into the Project design, in particular the alignments of the Samusu-Lalomanu road and the dual-purpose pedestrian access routes. 47. The preparation of the social assessment and the consultations will be broad based and representative, paying particular attention to the input and experiences of women, the youth, and other potential vulnerable groups. Any relevant actionable inputs will strengthen the Project design, including the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP), and the ESSAF. 48. OP 4.12 is triggered as Components 3 and 4 may require involuntary land acquisitions and/or resettlement. The Project aims to minimize involuntary land acquisition and/or resettlement, in part by involving communities in the design of the route alignments. In addition, a Land Acquisition and Resettlement Framework (LARF) has been prepared. The Project has adopted a framework approach because the alignment of the relevant sub-projects under Component 3 and 4 will not be known prior to Project approval. 49. The LARF provides guidelines for temporary and permanent land acquisition, resettlement (if necessary), and compensation for loss of crops and economic trees. The LARF provides principles for land use which include the avoidance and minimization of involuntary resettlement, land acquisition, and damage to physical assets. It also details procedures on institutional roles and financial responsibilities. The LARF provides guidelines for the preparation of Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plans once the specific route alignments of sub-projects are known. 50. Component 2 is financing the updating of Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans. The Component will include close consultation with affected communities as an integral part of the process of updating the district Coastal Infrastructure Management Plans. E. Implementation Arrangements and Financing Plan Institutional Arrangements 51. Implementation Agencies. The implementing agencies (IA) for the proposed Credit are LTA (Components 1, 3, 4) and MNRE (Component 2), while the MoF will handle overall Project coordination. 52. MNRE is responsible for the sustainable development and management of Samoa s natural resources and environment. It is an implementing agency for the ongoing SIAM-2 project and was an IA for the CERP project. LTA is a statutory authority with responsibility for road use management (vehicle registration, driver licensing, traffic management); road safety programs; and road asset management (construction, maintenance). It was formed in 2008 as part of Government reform initiatives that consolidated road use and road asset management functions from agencies into LTA. In particular, this involved transferring road asset management functions, staff and systems along with experience with Bank safeguard policies and financial management and procurement procedures from MWTI to LTA. LTA builds on the established track record of MWTI in implementation of road construction and maintenance projects, including works under the ongoing Bank-financed SIAM-2 project and recent 10