Transparency and accountability

Transcription

1 Transparency and Accountability NPT Reporting

2 TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY NPT Reporting

3 About this Publication As agreed in 2000, States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty are called to submit regular reports on their efforts to implement Article VI of the NPT nuclear disarmament and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This paper tabulates and summarizes reporting at the nine NPT review process meetings since then: the three Preparatory Committee sessions leading up to the 2005 Review Conference (2002-4), the 2005 Review Conference itself, the four Preparatory Committee sessions for the 2010 Review Conference, the 2010 Review Conference itself, and the first Preparatory Committee session for the 2015 Review Conference, held in The paper briefly reviews the background to the reporting obligation and offers recommendations for enhanced reporting that would more effectively reflect the permanence with accountability framework that is at its core. The paper was prepared by Project Ploughshares Program Officer Cesar Jaramillo. Previous editions were prepared by Cesar Jaramillo, Ernie Regehr, and Jessica West, with assistance from interns Adam Parsons, Laura Ashfield, and Melanie Ferrier. Acknowledgements We acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of The Simons Foundation of Vancouver. Project Ploughshares Project Ploughshares is the peace centre of The Canadian Council of Churches. Project Ploughshares works with churches, nongovernmental organizations, and governments, in Canada and abroad, to advance policies and actions that prevent war and armed violence and build peace. Project Ploughshares is affiliated with the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. Project Ploughshares 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada Fax Project Ploughshares 2012 First printed October 2012 Printer: Pandora Print Shop, Kitchener, Ontario, Canada ISBN

4 Table of Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations 4 Introduction 5 Background to the Reporting Provision 7 Policy Considerations 14 Objective and Participation Rate 14 Frequency 15 Structure 16 Scope 17 Reporting to Date 19 NNWS Reporting 21 Support for the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime 21 Strategic reductions 22 Tactical or non-strategic reductions 23 Irreversibility 24 The CTBT and a testing moratorium 25 Fissile material controls 25 Security assurances 26 Verification 27 The Conference on Disarmament 28 Nuclear energy 29 Export controls 30 Safeguards 31 Nuclear-weapon-free zones 32 International cooperation 33 Transparency 33 Reporting 34 NWS Reporting 36 Warhead and delivery vehicle holdings 37 Operational status 38 Tactical and Strategic reductions 39 Affirmation of Article VI 40 Doctrine 41 Security assurances 42 Fissile material control 44 Sources for NWS reporting summary 45 Notes 47 Table 1: Tabulation

5 Acronyms and Abbreviations CD CTBT EU FMCT IAEA INF NAC NAM NATO NGO NNWS NPT NSA NWFZ NWS PrepCom RevCon START WMD Conference on Disarmament Comprehensive Test Ban treaty European Union Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty International Atomic Energy Agency Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty New Agenda Coalition Non-Aligned Movement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nongovernmental Organization Non-nuclear Weapon State Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Negative Security Assurance Nuclear-weapon-free Zone Nuclear Weapon State Preparatory Committee Review Conference Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Weapons of Mass Destruction 4 Transparency and Accountability

6 Introduction The indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 was agreed to in the context of a collective commitment by States Parties to strengthening the Treaty s review process and, in particular, with a heightened sense of the need for mutual accountability in the implementation and furtherance of the aims of the Treaty. In 2000 states agreed (in step 12 of the 13 practical steps) that such accountability would be advanced by a more formalized approach to reporting by each State Party to its Treaty partners, providing regular information on the actions taken and policies followed to meet the requirements of the Treaty and to implement additional measures agreed to in the review process. The framers of the reporting obligation understood reporting as they understood the review process itself to be a potential prod to the more effective pursuit of nuclear disarmament. States Parties to the NPT have now had nine specific occasions to submit the regular reports that were agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (RevCon), and included in the 2010 Action Plan. Since the 2012 NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), 51 states have used at least one of those opportunities and have together submitted 151 reports. Only three have reported to each PrepCom and RevCon since This paper summarizes the reporting to date, provides background to the reporting commitment, reviews the continuing discussion of the appropriate scope and format of reports, broadly surveys the content of reports submitted, and recommends ways in which reporting can be strengthened and thus better meet the principle of accountability that was emphasized as part of the 1995 indefinite extension of the Treaty. As shown in Figure 1, just over one-quarter of the 189 States Parties to the NPT have reported at least once since 2000, and one in six submitted reports to the 2005 RevCon. At the 2007 Preparatory Committee one in 20 reported. And by 2009, only five reported less than one in 30. The number increased at the 2010 RevCon, when 23 States Parties submitted reports. However, the number again decreased to five at the 2012 Preparatory Committee. Figure 1: Reporting by year ( ) 51 States have submitted at least one report 10 States reported in States reported in 2003 (20 for the first time) 28 States reported in 2004 (8 for the first time) 35 States reported in 2005 (9 for the first time) 9 States reported in 2007 (none for the first time) 7 States reported in 2008 (none for the first time) 5 States reported in 2009 (none for the first time) 23 States reported in 2010 (3 for the first time) 5 States reported in 2012 (none for the first time) 17 States have submitted only once 3 States have reported to every PrepCom and RevCon since Reports have been submitted in the period Transparency and Accountability 5

7 It is noteworthy that a relatively high proportion (almost two-thirds) of the 44 states in Annex 2 of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have reported at some point since 2000 (see Figure 2, which identifies reporting by states within various groupings). Annex 2 lists states with some nuclear technology capability, three of which (India, Israel, and Pakistan) are not parties to the NPT. All must ratify the CTBT before it can enter into force. Only two nuclear weapon states (NWS) are included in the group of 51 reporting states. China submitted a report in 2005 and Russia in both 2005 and The three non-npt states in possession of nuclear weapons are not under any formal reporting requirement because they are not NPT signatories. All of the NWS that are party to the NPT have reported informally through a variety of statements and background materials. For the most part, however, NWS have chosen not to provide formal reports, in defiance of the promise made when they agreed to the 2000 reporting provision. Figure 2: Reporting by states within various international groupings 6 New Agenda Coalition states that have formally reported: Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden (Egypt, also a member, has not reported) 14 Non-Aligned Movement states that have reported: Algeria, Chile, Cuba, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand (106 of 120 NAM member states have not reported) 19 NATO states that have formally reported: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey (seven of NATO s 26 members have not reported: Denmark, Estonia, France, Iceland, Slovenia, United Kingdom, United States) 20 EU states that have formally reported: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden (the following EU states have not reported: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, France, Malta, Slovenia, United Kingdom) 32 CTBT Annex 2 states that have formally reported: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine (three of the 44 Annex 2 states India, Israel, and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT and nine that are parties to the NPT have not reported: Bangladesh, Colombia, DPR of Korea, DR Congo, Egypt, France, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam) 9 Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative states that have formally reported: Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, Turkey (United Arab Emirates has not reported) 2 Nuclear Weapon states that have formally reported: Russia, China (France, United Kingdom, United States have not submitted formal reports) 6 Transparency and Accountability

8 Background to the Reporting Provision Permanence with accountability was the central theme of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The indefinite extension of the treaty was accompanied by a commitment to strengthen the review process, focused on the Preparatory Committee and Review Conferences. The 2000 RevCon then elaborated on the accountability commitment through the provision of a specific reporting requirement. The Final Document included a list of 13 Practical Steps toward the implementation of the Treaty, among which was the Step 12 agreement to submit Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non- Proliferation Treaty, by all States parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July The obligation to submit regular reports within the framework of the review process for the Treaty was again featured in the Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Final Document, under Action 20. In addition, Action 21 called upon nuclear-weapon states to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals. The term regular reports was not defined, but it was accepted as a compromise and an alternative to annual reports. The call for reports within the framework of the strengthened review process for the NPT suggests that states are expected to report to each PrepCom and RevCon, the central features of the strengthened review process. The reporting requirement applies to all States Parties, as all signatories share in the responsibility to implement the Treaty. The reporting requirement is framed by the objectives of three internationally agreed nuclear disarmament decisions: cessation of the nuclear arms race (Article VI of the NPT); 2 reduction of nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons (Paragraph 4[c] of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament ); 3 and the obligation to achieve a precise result nuclear disarmament in all its aspects (the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996). 4 Beyond these references, there is no further definition or elaboration of the reporting requirement. Some States Parties and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have called for a standard reporting format to allow comparisons of information among states and over time, while others, including the NWS, have been opposed to any enforced or even agreed structure. Since the NPT has no permanent secretariat, there is in effect also no central entity to receive the reports and, perhaps, compile and analyze them. The recipients of the reports are other States Parties (currently the reports are at least posted and maintained, and thus remain accessible, on the website of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs). Transparency and Accountability 7

9 The reluctance of some states to accept the 2000 RevCon decision as adding a special obligation to report was reflected in disputes over the annotated agenda during the preparatory lead-up to the 2005 RevCon. In addition to dividing the PrepCom s program of work into three clusters (Cluster One, nuclear disarmament; Two, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones; and Three, the peaceful use of nuclear energy), the Chair s annotated agenda for the 2002 PrepCom included two specific items with reference to the reporting obligation: Implementation of Article VI, including the 2000 Final Document requirement for reporting; Regional issues, including the 2000 Final Document requirement for reporting on a Middle East Zone of Peace. The United States and France in particular rejected the references to required reporting, while Egypt, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), submitted a short working paper to argue the importance of retaining a separate reporting item: the reporting requirements of paragraph 12 of the nuclear disarmament part of the Final Document [2000] are an integral part of the language in the indicative timetable that we have just taken note of. Ultimately the following compromise language was agreed for the agenda item: Implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the agreements, conclusions, and commitments listed under the section entitled Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs contained in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference [emphasis added]. Regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and the implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the commitments, conclusions, and follow-up submissions to the United Nations Secretary-General, the President of the 2005 Review Conference, and the Chairpersons of the Preparatory Committee meetings, in accordance with the relevant subparagraphs listed under the section entitled Regional issues: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference [emphasis added]. Canada presented a working paper on Reporting by States Party to the NPT to the 2002 PrepCom that called for a common understanding of the reporting requirements agreed at the NPT 2000 Review Conference and for a standardized reporting format. In its formal report in fulfillment of the reporting obligation, Canada offered a model for comprehensive reporting on an article-by-article basis, a format also used by New Zealand. Canada summarized its approach as supporting a loosely defined and relatively simple common approach that balances the need for adequate and meaningful content with the desirability of keeping the procedure simple enough to facilitate compliance. Canada submitted its second Working Paper on Reporting at the 2003 PrepCom, in which it reviewed the 2002 experience of reporting and presented the results of informal consultations with states. The paper concluded that the value to be gained from reports would only be realized through 8 Transparency and Accountability

10 greater participation in reporting and wider use of the reports. Canada urged States Parties to draw on the body of information from reports to the first and second PrepComs to inform dialogues and discussion at the next PrepCom and the RevCon in The New Agenda Coalition 2002 working paper also offered reporting format and content suggestions: The reports on Article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the 13 steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, the number and specifications of warheads and delivery systems in service; the number and specifications of reductions, de-alerting measures, and existing holdings of fissile materials, including control of such materials; and achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency, and verifiability.) The reports should address current policies and intentions, as well as developments in these areas. The 13 steps, as included in the Final Document of the 2000 RevCon, are: 1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. 2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty. 3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years. 4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body. 5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures. 6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI. 7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic Transparency and Accountability 9

11 stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions. 8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency. 9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all: Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons 10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes. 11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. 12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The NPT review process did not produce a consensus document at the 2005 review conference, but the results of the 2002 and 2003 PrepComs were reviewed in factual summaries compiled by the chair in each case. The issues of transparency in general and reporting in particular featured in both. The Chair s summary of 2002 reflects the PrepCom s broad support for reporting as an instrument of accountability and confidence-building. It also accurately notes the absence of consensus on the question of whether a specific new requirement exists and the extent to which reporting should be standardized: 10 Transparency and Accountability

12 The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidencebuilding measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament were stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States Parties remained the main criteria on which to evaluate the Treaty s operation. States Parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States Parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States Parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon states, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensible information, e.g., in a standardized format. Several States Parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States Parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States Parties. The chair s summary of the 2003 PrepCom repeated the points made in 2002, but added two important observations: The nuclear-weapon states were called upon to increase transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures (para 10). It was also stated that such transparency provides valuable means to address and respond to compliance concerns. States Parties recognized the value of reports and used them in substantive deliberation, in line with their wish for enhanced interaction (para 21). The reference to making use of the reports to support discussion ( interactivity ) echoes the Canadian Working Paper s plea to States Parties to allow the reports to stimulate greater debate. During the PrepComs for the 2005 Review Conference there were frequent references to reports and some significant requests for clarification or elaboration. If the pursuit of a culture of transparency in which information is freely given and through which States Parties acknowledge that they are accountable to their Treaty partners is advancing, it must be said that it is doing so only cautiously. Nevertheless, some states continue to call for States Parties to recognize and meet their obligations. In its 2007 report the Republic of Korea said that national reporting on the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures enhances transparency and builds confidence, and therefore should be encouraged. It encourage[d] both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States to submit regular reports to the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference and noted, While there is no consensus on the content and format of national reports, more detailed information contained in them will instill greater confidence in the States nuclear policies and disarmament efforts. Transparency and Accountability 11

13 In its 2007 report Ireland described regular reporting as a key element of the 13 steps and saw reporting not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process. The Islamic Republic of Iran in 2007 called for the adoption of a format properly defining categories of information required within the review strengthening process. In its 2007 and 2009 reports Canada recalled its 2005 working paper on the concept of permanence with accountability and its call for reports to be submitted prior to each set of meetings in the review process. Canada commend[ed] the nuclear-weapon States for the information they have provided to date and encouraged them to submit information about their efforts and activities as an official report. In the report submitted to the 2010 RevCon, Canada included an annex with a summary of an earlier version of this publication, Transparency and Accountability, NPT Reporting As part of their participation in the 2002 PrepCom, NGOs prepared Shadow Reports on 44 States Parties to the NPT, 5 in a sense offering a variation on reporting models. The NGO reports assessed national positions on a variety of issues, including stated nuclear doctrine, transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials, fissile material holdings and nuclear facilities, nuclear weapons holdings, and assessments of NWS efforts to fulfill Article VI. In 2003 the shadow report was updated to include a discussion of NWS compliance with the 13 Practical Steps. The Government of Japan has been an important champion of transparency and reporting. In 2007 Japan encourage[d] all States Parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to submit reports as detailed as possible on their efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Resolution A/64/47, sponsored by Japan, encourages increased transparency (op. para 4) and invites all nuclear-weapon States to agree on transparency and confidence-building measures, while noting in this regard the increased transparency demonstrated by nuclear-weapon States on their nuclear arsenals, including the current number of their nuclear warheads (op para 5). And in a 2009 working paper setting out 11 benchmarks that would signal positive action on disarmament, Japan called on states to generally nurture a culture of disclosure and called on all states holding nuclear weapons to regularly and sufficiently supply information on their arsenals. In its 2008 Cluster 1 statement Japan offered an extensive account of the information that NWS should be providing to the NPT States Parties. Noting that nuclear disarmament will further strengthen the trust among NPT States Parties if it is accompanied by transparency measures, Japan offered examples of information to be disclosed for increased transparency, which, although not exhaustive, could include: (i) extent of reduction in nuclear stockpiles, (ii) number of reduced nuclear warheads and delivery systems, (iii) number of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems, as well as the pace of dismantlement, including the types of dismantled nuclear warheads and delivery systems, (iv) aggregate number of nuclear warheads and delivery systems and/or those deployed, (v) extent of reduction in nuclear weapons complex, including reduction in the square footage and the number of personnel, (vi) years in which the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons was ceased, 12 Transparency and Accountability

14 (vii) amount of fissile material declared excess to and removed from nuclear explosive purposes or national security requirements, and plans for its disposition, (viii) activities to assist in the removal of fissile material from dismantled weapons, (ix) efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrine, (x) plans or intentions for further nuclear disarmament measures. Transparency and Accountability 13

15 Policy Considerations Though reporting is in its infancy in the sense that only a minority of NPT states report and the amount of detail varies considerably, it can still be said that formal reports submitted in response to the 2000 reporting agreement have already begun to demonstrate their value. In them each State Party offers its own account of its disarmament commitments and activities. These accounts are not offered in a vacuum but are subject to at least an informal level of verification inasmuch as it is possible in most cases to check a State Party s reporting against independent sources. That is particularly true for NWS reporting. Formal reports by non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS), it is probably fair to say, tend to be more descriptions than national statements; they generally contain more detail about specific initiatives undertaken to pursue the goals of Article VI than do other statements. In addition to stating policy and making general assessments about the state of disarmament, States Parties use the reports to note resolutions they supported in the First Committee, the signing and ratification of relevant treaties, initiatives such as national and regional technical meetings, and to confirm their compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, export controls, and nonproliferation mechanisms. NWS reporting remains largely informal and some of it has the character of promotional material designed to build the political case for NWS commitment to disarmament. Some states have suggested that the practice of reporting could become repetitive over time. Reporting in 2003 for the first time, South Africa noted that the Preparatory Committee should make every endeavor to ensure that this does not take place as a matter of rote. The Preparatory Committee should endeavor to ensure that a seemingly endless procession of largely repetitive prepared statements and reports does not lull us into a sense of complacency in which we would come to believe that all is well. As South Africa notes, its comment is relevant to all statements to the review process. Germany, in its opening statement of 2003, explained, We have at this time decided not to submit a national report, which would have repeated in essence our last year s contribution. The following addresses recommendations regarding the objective, frequency, structure, and scope of NPT reporting. Objective and Participation Rate To be a tool for accountability, reporting must become detailed, systematic, universal. It is clear that in the case of NWS in particular, reporting will have to become a formal expression of their accountability to other States Parties to the NPT and will also need to become much more detailed and systematic if it is to mature into an effective tool that States Parties can use to assess the compliance of other states with Treaty obligations. Accountability is the fundamental purpose or objective of reporting, and reporting even at current minimal levels has begun to help states to better understand the approaches and activities of other States Parties and has helped to generate a general attitude that each owes the others an accounting of what it is doing to implement and strengthen the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. 14 Transparency and Accountability

16 There may well be a temptation for states to drift toward either minimalist, pro forma statements or overly self-serving assessments that do not yield any significant information. The intent of the reporting mandate is just the opposite that is, it anticipates reports that are regular, systematic, and detailed accounts that make a significant contribution to transparency and confidence-building. While the overall rate of explicit responses to the reporting requirement remains low, many States Parties that have formally responded have pursued a significant level of detail that suggests that reporting states accept the obligation as a serious one. That in turn suggests that overall transparency and accountability could be significantly enhanced through a determined effort to increase the response rate to the reporting requirement. The general quality of formal reports suggests that if enhanced transparency is the primary objective of reporting, it might now be useful to focus attention on increasing the response or participation rate rather than negotiating a common format. Simply achieving higher levels of participation would substantially contribute to the purpose of the reporting mandate, enhanced transparency and accountability, since it seems the very act of entering into a formal reporting mode encourages higher levels of quality and thoroughness. Of course, as the reporting experience develops, states are likely to find it useful to follow common reporting formats. But the primary objective of enhanced transparency depends more on increasing the participation rate than on the pursuit of standardized formats for reporting. In that regard, it is critically important that NWS begin to submit formal reports and thus to acknowledge and act on the fundamental principle of accountability that they agreed to in Frequency Reporting should occur at all substantive meetings of the NPT. The 2000 RevCon reporting requirement, as already noted, is for regular reports to be provided within the framework of the strengthened review process agreed to at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. And that review process, it was noted in turn, was to include the PrepComs as substantive meetings designed to promote the full implementation of the Treaty and to make recommendations to the RevCon. Since the PrepComs and RevCons are not annual events, it is logical to conclude that the decision to mandate regular reporting, rather than annual reporting, is based on the assumption that States Parties should be reporting to all PrepComs and RevCons. This would mean that states would be reporting four out of five years. Only a very few states currently meet that standard. If NPT States Parties were to move to annual decision-making meetings, as has been proposed in the context of discussions of the NPT s institutional deficit, it would follow that reporting would then become an annual requirement. Transparency and Accountability 15

17 Structure Common categories that have emerged should form the basis of more uniform reporting formats. In the absence of any agreed structure, the reports that have been submitted broadly followed the themes that dominate international disarmament discourse. The reports did not uniformly follow any discernible standard or model, although most reflected one of three basic formats (article-byarticle, the 13 steps, and general information on activities related to implementing Article VI). Over the last two years certain common or generic categories of reporting have emerged that could eventually form the basis of more uniform reporting formats. General Assessments of Developments and Trends relevant to the implementation of the Treaty Most of the reports include statements or comments on certain developments and trends within the broad nonproliferation regime. Such comments are frequently accompanied by explicit statements of welcome or regret and amount to broad assessments of the arms control and disarmament landscape. Information on National Nuclear Holdings and Doctrines Most of the NWS statements include some information on holdings and more extensive information on reductions of nuclear arsenals. They also include direct or implicit statements of doctrine, including information on operational status. While the U.K. statements have offered the most explicit detail, in all cases there is room for substantial elaboration. At the same time, with the exception of China, all NWS have included hard information on at least some elements of their holdings, reductions, doctrine, and the operational status of their arsenals. In other words, the principle of reporting on these elements is accepted; now the priority must be further progress toward comprehensive and formal reporting on each category. NWS should thus be encouraged to provide much more detailed reporting on their basic nuclear weapons facilities and on holdings in materials, warheads, and delivery systems, including: The transfer or acquisition of nuclear materials; Holdings of fissile materials; Nuclear facilities of all kinds; Holdings and production of nuclear weapons (including the numbers, types, and yields of warheads as well as numbers and types of delivery vehicles); The operational status of all weapons held; and Nuclear weapons doctrines (including security assurances) and policies to govern the use of those weapons. Descriptions of Disarmament Policies, Initiatives, and Programs (national as well as cooperative bilateral and multinational efforts) Reports also include information on national measures undertaken in support of the objectives of the Treaty, including references to studies commissioned and research undertaken in support of such efforts as those related to verification. States also use the reports to provide information on their efforts in cooperation with other states to achieve specific implementation objectives for example, 16 Transparency and Accountability

18 Scope plutonium disposition efforts, discussions on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), multinational seminars, and so on. Identification of Advocacy and Diplomatic Priorities States also report on their efforts to engage other states and forums on Treaty implementation issues, and on efforts to encourage other states to take specific actions in support of implementation and compliance. Thus, the reports could be used to identify priority items for international attention and action. In some instances states used the reports themselves as advocacy tools, calling on other States Parties to take particular actions. However, in the context of the Review Process, it might be useful to regard reports as vehicles to report actions taken, including the policies on which those actions are based, and to use national statements as vehicles for advocacy. Information on Agreements Reached and Commitments Undertaken States also report on a broad range of international agreements and treaties to which they adhere in support of NPT implementation objectives (including the CTBT, IAEA safeguards and Additional Protocols, other weapons-of-mass-destruction [WMD] agreements, and conventional arms control and disarmament efforts). Regular Declarations of Compliance Some states make specific statements of compliance with the Treaty or particular elements of it. It would be useful for States Parties to the NPT to regularly provide public assurances to other signatories, on an Article-by- Article basis, of their full compliance with the Treaty, and provide information on national mechanisms and policies designed to assure such compliance. States should report on all elements of the Treaty, as all are relevant to the implementation of Article VI. The scope or content of reporting, as distinct from the format, has been understandably guided by the international action agenda identified in the 2000 RevCon 13 steps. Some states use the 13 steps to determine the format for their submissions. Whether states report specifically on Article VI, on the 13 steps, or on an Article-by-Article basis, they implicitly acknowledge that all elements of the Treaty are relevant to the goal of implementing Article VI. Any reporting mechanism should serve as an enabling tool one that first of all encourages transparency in principle and practice, and then serves to shape information into helpful and useable forms. Thus States Parties should be encouraged to report on any and all issues important to their national and cooperative efforts toward Treaty implementation. Given the range of priorities and preoccupations of individual states, it might not be practical or useful to attempt to predefine, through the establishment of a highly structured or standardized reporting form, the range of issues on which reporting is sought; nevertheless, the practice to date does suggest elements of a format. Transparency and Accountability 17

19 Since all elements of the Treaty are relevant in achieving the objectives of Article VI paragraph 4(c) of Decision 2 of the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the most appropriate current format for reporting would be to report on each Article of the Treaty and then use the 13 steps as a means of organizing the reporting on Article VI. As noted above, NWS have an additional requirement to report on all relevant holdings. The principle of mutual accountability took a long time to develop within the NPT, but it became explicit in the 1995 decision to indefinitely extend the NPT. In the 2000 decision reporting became a particular mechanism for operationalizing that accountability. The degree to which the mechanism of reporting is accepted by States Parties will reflect the degree to which the principle of mutual accountability is accepted. 18 Transparency and Accountability

20 Reporting to Date A decline in attention to reporting is reflected in the fact that 2007 was the first year since the 2000 agreement on reporting in which no state submitted a report for the first time. This trend continued through Indeed, with only five states submitting a report, 2009 saw the lowest level of reporting since the obligation to report was undertaken. A decline from the level of reporting to the 2005 RevCon was perhaps to be expected, but a 75 per cent drop should be taken as a worrying sign about the level of commitment to transparency and accountability. The trend was temporarily reversed at the 2010 RevCon, when 23 states submitted reports, three for the first time. At the 2012 PrepCom, however, the number of states submitting reports again dropped to five. To date the greatest increase in levels of reporting occurred in 2003, when 20 states submitted reports for the first time. The highest level of reporting occurred at the 2005 RevCon when 35 states reported, 11 for the first time. Of the 51 states that have so far submitted at least one report, 34 have reported more than once; of this 34, only Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have reported at all meetings of the review process since As noted above, there are currently many variations of the reporting format. They can be divided into four basic categories, as shown in Figure 3. Reports that use the General format tend to focus on Article VI issues and broadly describe the reporting state s activities in support of disarmament. Submissions using the Articles format report on activities related to each article of the Treaty, generally on the grounds that the Treaty is an integrated whole and all its articles are relevant to the implementation of nuclear disarmament. Reports that adopt the 13 steps approach respond to each of the practical steps outlined at the 2000 RevCon. Three of the five states that submitted reports at the 2012 PrepCom focused on the implementation of the Action Plan from the Final Document of the 2010 RevCon, which includes references to the reporting obligation. Figure 3: Reporting formats used in the 150 reports submitted in the period General Articles 13 Steps Mixed Action Plan Transparency and Accountability 19

21 Although some states have used more than one format in a given year most states still prefer to report on their disarmament activities, responding to the particular language of the 2000 Final Document to entitle their reports Implementation of article VI and paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Some states simply refer to the implementation of Article VI, without mentioning the 1995 Decision. Others use the title Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, broadening the reporting mandate to the entire Treaty. 20 Transparency and Accountability

22 NNWS Reporting Table 1 provides a list, by country and year, of the 150 reports submitted to date and tabulates the major and recurring disarmament themes found in them. All but two of the reports are from nonnuclear weapon states. While the reports cover a wide range of themes, activities, and concerns, Table 1 identifies 16 issues that receive explicit and repeated attention. These 16 issues can be seen as key concerns of states in relation to the international nuclear disarmament agenda. The following elaboration on each of the issue areas includes excerpts from reports that, while illustrative, are far from exhaustive. 1. Support for the NPT and the nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation regime States have used their reports to reaffirm their commitment to the NPT and the goal of disarmament, and to express concerns or assessments of the overall health of the regime. Most reports submitted in the period made explicit reference to the well-being of the NPT and the broader regime that it anchors. In its 2004 report Austria stated that it regarded the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Thus, Austria continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to provide assistance or encouragement to States that may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices. The 2005 report submitted by Turkey stated, Turkey favours global overall disarmament and supports all efforts in the field of sustaining international security through arms control and disarmament. Turkey does not possess any weapons of mass destruction and has no intention to develop programmes for acquiring weapons of this kind. In this spirit, Turkey became a party to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1979 and to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in Non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually reinforcing processes that require continuous and irreversible progress on both fronts. Turkey remains fully committed to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and of the 1995 decisions and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in particular the 13 Practical Steps. Also in 2005 Cuba stated, Over the years, Cuba maintained reservations regarding the Treaty, which it considered to be a discriminatory international regime conductive to the existence of a club of nuclearweapons-states. On becoming a State party to the Treaty Cuba s position of principle did not change. Our country has decided to work from within the Treaty in order to further what we regard to be our priority in the area of disarmament, namely, achieving the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The only way of overcoming the built in flaws of the NPT, and its selective and discriminatory nature, is by attaining the objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, thereby guaranteeing the security of all countries on an equal footing. Transparency and Accountability 21

23 Iran s 2009 report said, The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that all provisions of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are of equal importance. Maintaining the balance of the rights and obligations enshrined in the Treaty preserves its integrity, enhances its credibility and encourages the Treaty s universality and full implementation. In this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the current selective, discriminatory and non-balanced approach towards the Treaty reflected in particular in the recent decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and through instrumental use of the Security Council by some veto holders, has seriously jeopardized this fundamental regime on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. In the report submitted at the 2012 PrepCom, the Republic of Korea stated, The Republic of Korea firmly believes that the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. It is our conviction that maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty is vital for its integrity and viability. To this end, it should be noted that nuclear disarmament is an indispensable part of the core bargain of the Treaty, and thus disarmament is obligatory for the nuclear-weapon States, as laid out in article VI of the Treaty, and is fundamental to the full implementation of the Treaty. 2. Strategic reductions Roughly one-half of all reports by non-nuclear weapon states referred to strategic reductions. This relatively low level of attention to the central Article VI obligation may in part reflect an assu;mption by NNWS that this is obviously an NWS responsibility, even though the obligation to report applies to all states and provides an opportunity for NNWS to report on their activities and policies in support of nuclear disarmament. It could also reflect a sense that the arsenals of the two leading NWS are declining, although a number of the references to reductions deplore what they see as ongoing NWS commitments to the modernization of their arsenals as well as the failure to make reductions irreversible. In 2005, for example, Brazil noted, Particularly disturbing are new approaches concerning the role of nuclear weapons in security strategies, especially studies on the possible development of low yield nuclear weapons and plans related to their tactical uses, including countering conventional forces. The unequivocal undertaking agreed upon in 2000 should be demonstrated by further, stronger nuclear disarmament measures. Little has been done since 2000 by the 5 NWS to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons at their defence and strategic doctrines. The continuous importance attached by the 5 NWS to nuclear weapons suggests to the rest of the world that such weapons are indeed relevant to security needs. This perception may generate genuine interest in such an option in other Parties, which would in turn stoke the flames of nuclear proliferation. The Republic of Korea said in its 2007 report that it hopes for deeper cuts and further engagement by nuclear-weapon States. The Republic of Korea recognizes that there is a perception gap between the record of nuclear-weapon States 22 Transparency and Accountability

24 and the level of expectations held by non-nuclear-weapon States. Closing this perception gap will certainly provide nuclear-weapon States with the moral authority and the political legitimacy to strengthen non-proliferation norms while maintaining the delicate balance among the three pillars of the Treaty. In 2010 Ireland stated, Developments since 2000 have not removed the need for a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons. Ireland notes the conclusion of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms ( New START ), but questions its contribution to effective nuclear disarmament. As Ireland has emphasized, through the New Agenda Coalition, reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, while welcome, are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. 3. Tactical or non-strategic reductions Only slightly more than a third of the reports referred to reductions on non-strategic nuclear weapons. This may in part reflect a regional concern, with NATO and European states more inclined to address it. The Netherlands report of 2004 illustrates this approach: As party to the NPT and as a member of NATO, we feel a special responsibility in relation to the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has significantly reduced the numbers of tactical nuclear weapons in its arsenal. What remains deployed in Europe is only a very small amount of the original numbers that were there 10 or more years ago. More than 80 percent of these weapons were actually eliminated. Their readiness is presently measured in weeks and months rather than in hours and days. The purpose of NATO s remaining non-strategic nuclear weapons is fundamentally political. Within NATO, a process has started between the Alliance and the Russian Federation to give appropriate attention to the question of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The dialogue, which is now starting, will hopefully lead to measures that will promote mutual confidence, transparency and stability. The 2007 report of the Republic of Korea called for progress toward reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons, as part of overall nuclear disarmament and also proposed that nuclear-weapon States should diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their nuclear doctrines. In its 2010 report Sweden stated, Sweden fully supports these steps and continues to promote advancements in their implementation. In particular, Sweden continues to press for progress regarding reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Sweden believes that it is essential that non-strategic nuclear weapons be included in international arms control and disarmament efforts. Transparency and Accountability 23

25 4. Irreversibility Step 5 of the 2000 RevCon s 13 practical steps called for the principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures and roughly half of all reports stressed its importance. For example, Argentina (2005) hopes that such principle will be explicitly included in all the bilateral and multilateral instruments that are negotiated pursuant to Article VI of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty; clearly, this is vital for the credibility of such arrangements. In 2005 Spain said, Spain believes that the principle of irreversibility should be considered as an essential principle of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of bilateral and multilateral agreements on disarmament and arms control depends very strongly on their irreversibility. Spain calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to reflect the concept of irreversibility in their agreements on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. In 2005 The Netherlands described irreversibility [as] important for multilateral and bilateral arms control alike. Although agreeing on bilateral nuclear arms reductions is primarily the responsibility of the nuclearweapon States, international stability and security are best served by irreversible reductions. It has been a consistent element in the approach of the Netherlands towards nuclear reduction talks to emphasize the importance of irreversibility. In 2008 New Zealand said in its report, New Zealand has argued, in partnership with the New Agenda Coalition, that irreversibility in nuclear disarmament, nuclear reductions and other related nuclear arms control measures is imperative. The New Agenda Coalition resolution to the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 (62/25) reaffirmed that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes requiring urgent irreversible progress on both fronts. Norway said in its 2010 report, Norway has continued to argue that disarmament must be pursued on the basis of irreversibility: only undertakings that are irreversible will command the necessary confidence that the obligations under the Treaty are respected and complied with. The Republic of Korea held a similar view in 2012: It is the view of the Republic of Korea that irreversibility is one of the fundamental principles in nuclear disarmament measures. The irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons can only ensure that redeployment will not be possible. The Republic of Korea shares the view that the principle of irreversibility should be applied in all disarmament and arms control measures. 24 Transparency and Accountability

26 5. The CTBT and a testing moratorium The most referenced item within national reports has been support for ratification of the CTBT and reiterations of the need to uphold the testing moratorium. In its 2004 report the Czech Republic noted that it has always been an adamant supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and signed it in Being the first European State that ratified it in 1997 it considers the Treaty as one of the pillars of the non-proliferation regime. Therefore it believes that its early entry into force (EEIF) continues to be a high priority task. The 2005 report from Morocco reflects the approach and concern that states regularly convey: The Kingdom of Morocco, which supports a total ban on nuclear tests, has signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. It deplores the fact that this Treaty, which was opened for signature on 24 September 1996, has still not entered into force. In this respect, it reiterates its appeal to all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty without delay. It stresses the importance of respect for the moratoriums on nuclear tests and of the convening of conferences in order to facilitate the entry into force of the Treaty. Brazil s 2005 report pointed out that it has consistently called for the universalization of the CTBT. Furthermore, [Brazil] continues to call for signatories that have not done so, particularly those 11 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, to ratify it with a view to its early entry into force. In its 2009 report Japan said, Japan, together with Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland and the Netherlands, cohosted the Fourth CTBT Friends Ministerial Meeting in September 2008, which issued a joint ministerial statement. The statement calls for immediate signing and ratification of the Treaty and the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear tests. The statement has been signed by 96 countries, exceeding the results of the past three meetings. Canada said in 2012 that it continues to call on all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as soon as possible and without condition. Canada welcomed the ratification of the Treaty by annex 2 State Indonesia in February Fissile material controls The prominence given to the need to end production of fissile material for weapons purposes is also reflected in more than three-quarters of the reports. In 2005 Lithuania declared, A fissile material cut-off Treaty constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agenda. Lithuania calls upon the immediate commencement of negotiations without preconditions on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. Transparency and Accountability 25

27 Japan s 2005 report also linked the issue of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD): Japan regards it as a primary task to reach an agreement on a programme of work at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby bring about the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. Japan has been making utmost efforts to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament and has redoubled its endeavours to that end during its Presidency of the Conference on Disarmament from 29 August to December In 2007 Ireland stated, We maintain the view that this year the Conference on Disarmament should begin negotiations without preconditions on a treaty dealing with fissile material. We believe that for such a treaty to be meaningful it must include a verification mechanism and cover existing stocks. Finland s 2010 report indicated that it has been a member of the Conference on Disarmament since 1996 and calls for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, without preconditions. Also in 2010, Mexico s report stated that the country reiterates its support for efforts within the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which should also consider the issue of existing stockpiles with a view to their destruction. In 2012 Australia s report said that it is a strong proponent of the commencement of negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, commonly known as the fissile material cut-off treaty'. In 2011, Australia encouraged the launch of treaty negotiations under the auspices of the Conference on Disarmament by cohosting with Japan a series of expert side events in Geneva to discuss technical aspects of such a treaty, and to help build confidence and momentum to begin the negotiations in the Conference. 7. Security assurances Given the importance of negative security assurances in the stalemate at the CD it is perhaps surprising that less than a quarter of the reports made reference to the issue. In its 2005 report Indonesia emphasizes the paramount importance of providing security assurances to the nonnuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons through a legally binding international instrument. This will constitute a critical element to maintain the norms of the nonproliferation regime. Turkey s 2005 report described such assurances as supporting the overall effectiveness of the NPT: As pointed out in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), Turkey recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to receive security assurances. As 26 Transparency and Accountability

28 also pointed out in the same resolution, Turkey believes that the concerns of non-nuclearweapon States are legitimate, and that, in conjunction with adherence to the Treaty, further appropriate measures [should] be undertaken to safeguard their security. While recognizing the continuing value of confidence-building-measures such as unilateral declarations of nuclear-power States, Turkey believes that the further measures mentioned above should be largely binding security assurances and that these measures will complement and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Canada stated in its 2008 report, Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT. While not itself a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Canada welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear weapon-free-zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally agreed criteria. Brazil s 2010 report indicated, In 2004, the States parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco renewed their call to the nuclearweapon States to review the negative security assurances extended to them under the auspices of the Protocols to the Treaty. Unfortunately, the nuclear-weapon States response was once again disappointing, inasmuch as they have chosen to retain their reservations to the Protocols. Brazil, both bilaterally and as a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, continues to call upon the nuclear-weapon States to review their position on this issue, with a view to providing the members of such zones with unequivocal assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. 8. Verification Verification concerns are mentioned in two-thirds of the reports. In most case the issue is raised in several contexts, including reductions, fissile material controls, and safeguards. In 2005 Norway reported that it supports the further development of and strengthening of verification capabilities, which is clearly linked to the issue of compliance. We have taken a number of steps to support verification regimes under various arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements, including the above-mentioned International Monitoring System for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Norway co-sponsored the resolution entitled Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of Verification, which was adopted at the fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In its 2007 report Canada referred to its working paper on An FMCT Scope-Verification Arrangement (CD/1819, 21 March 2007) discussing the interrelationship between the scope and verifiability of an FMCT and suggesting an approach for cost effective verification of an eventual treaty. The principles of verification and irreversibility were of major concern for states in 2003, particularly in response to the Moscow Treaty, which does not require that reductions be irreversible or verified. Transparency and Accountability 27

29 Japan pointed out in its 2009 report, Efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime, including the International Monitoring System, undertaken by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization continue. Japan has already established all the necessary monitoring stations in its territory as part of the robust worldwide verification mechanism to ensure the early detection of nuclear explosions. In 2012 the Republic of Korea indicated that it supports and contributes to the development of verification regime for the Treaty, especially by participating in the international monitoring system through its Korean Seismic Research Station, located in Wonju, the north-eastern part of the country. The Republic of Korea also hosted CTBT related trainings and technical workshops in 2005, 2008 and The Conference on Disarmament The stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been addressed by the majority of reports. Nigeria reported in 2005 that it has supported all General Assembly resolutions calling on the Conference on Disarmament to agree to commence work on substantive issues before it as soon as possible. Nigeria has continued to reiterate its full support for the Five Ambassadors Proposal as a mechanism for breaking the existing impasse in reaching a work programme for the Conference on Disarmament. Argentina pointed out in 2005 that it favours establishing a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament, which would help to advance the issues that Argentina would like the Conference on Disarmament to address pursuant to Article VI. In its 2007 report Japan recounted its efforts to end the CD stalemate: Japan has been making its utmost effort to break the current stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Japan has redoubled its endeavours for this purpose through the dispatch of high-level representatives to the Conference on Disarmament on various occasions. During the 2006 session, both the then Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Akiko Yamanaka, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Yohei Kono, delivered speeches stressing the need and the urgency for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. On 13 March 2007, Vice- Minister for Foreign Affairs Masayoshi Hamada also made a statement at the Conference on Disarmament, urging the members to commence negotiations on an FMCT in the second part of the current session, building upon the positive results in the first part. Iran s 2009 report pointed out that Iran fully supports the early establishment of a subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament, with a mandate to start negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including through a nuclear weapons convention, as a concrete step for nuclear disarmament. In 2012 Canada indicated that Canada continues to call on the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a comprehensive programme of work that addresses all of the core issues on the agenda of the Conference. 28 Transparency and Accountability

30 Also in 2012 New Zealand said that it remains disappointed that efforts to agree on a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament, including intensive efforts earlier this year, have not been successful. New Zealand supports all efforts to overcome the current impasse in the Conference on Disarmament so that substantive work in the Conference, including negotiations on fissile materials, can commence without further delay. It is of concern to New Zealand that the Conference is not fulfilling its potential and contributing to efforts to achieve progress on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 10. Nuclear energy Fewer than half the states referred directly to nuclear energy. States reporting in the article-by-article format were most likely to address the issue under Article IV. In its 2005 report Brazil emphasized the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy as existing outside the NPT: The NPT clearly recognizes the inalienable right to the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful ends, which predated the Treaty. This recognition of this inalienable right was a central part of the bargain that was struck at the creation of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. This bargain was at the core of the creation of the IAEA, and it was later to prove instrumental in establishing the NPT and in making it a permanent, quasi-universal regime. The development and uses of nuclear energy for exclusively peaceful purposes is a fundamental principle of our national policy, which is enshrined in our Constitution. We remain convinced of the potential benefits of the responsible use of nuclear technologies and of the synergies fostered by international cooperation in the nuclear field, for which the work of the IAEA is of great importance. Canada s 2005 report recognized the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, emphasizing the responsibilities that attend such use: In view of the inherent relationship between States inalienable rights to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the obligations contained elsewhere in the Treaty, cooperation by Canada with other countries in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy takes fully into account the non-proliferation credentials of the recipient country. Canada is committed to working with other States and relevant international organizations on new arrangements for the supply of nuclear items, consonant with the balance of rights and obligations agreed to in the Treaty and in particular in articles II, III and IV. In this regard, a Canadian expert participated in the recent IAEA ad hoc experts group studying new multilateral nuclear fuel cycle initiatives. In 2007 Malaysia reported that it is deeply concerned with the practice of selectivity and discrimination, as well as the trend towards unilateralism in dictating the limits of research, production and use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Malaysia calls upon NPT States parties, particularly the advanced States parties in terms of nuclear technology development, to live up to their obligations in upholding the principles of transparency and non-discrimination, to ensure that all NPT States parties can benefit from the peaceful application of nuclear technology. Transparency and Accountability 29

31 In 2010 Chile said that it supports the inalienable right of all Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I and II of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Republic of Korea stated its support for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in its 2012 report: The Republic of Korea fully recognizes the right of States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and is committed to facilitating nuclear cooperation among States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. The Republic of Korea places a higher priority on the fullest possible utilization of nuclear energy, as it can contribute not only to energy security of States, but also to human health, food security, water resource management and so on. 11. Export controls Export controls are referred to in fewer than half of the reports, but are especially addressed by states reporting in the article-by-article format. In 2004 Austria stated its commitment to export controls: Austria implements its obligation under article III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any nonnuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article, by controlling its exports in accordance with EU Council regulation (EC) 1334/2000 as amended. Hungary s 2005 report focused its attention on controls; it declared support for, and the importance of, control of fuel cycle technologies: Hungary regards the introduction and application of appropriate export control measures as an important tool for stemming the risk of clandestine nuclear programmes. As a participating State of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Hungary maintains and operates an effective national system of export controls and contributes to international efforts in this field. Hungary welcomes the adoption of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), requiring States to adopt domestic controls to prevent and preclude the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Hungarian experts participate regularly in interdiction exercises organized in the Proliferation Security Initiative framework (e.g., in Germany, Italy and Poland). Hungary has taken stock of the available administrative structure and the legislative instruments necessary for Hungary s participation in cooperation activities within the Proliferation Security Initiative framework. Hungary follows with great interest the new initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle in a multilateral and nondiscriminatory framework. The dual-use technologies, such as those related to uranium enrichment and reprocessing, are a source of concern. In 2005 New Zealand reported that in implementing its national export controls, New Zealand seeks to restrict trade related only to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or nuclear weapon programmes 30 Transparency and Accountability

32 in non-nuclear-weapon States. New Zealand advocates cooperation only with States in compliance with obligations under safeguards agreement. Canada s report to the 2009 PrepCom states, Canada maintains a national system for controlling the export of all items especially designed or prepared for nuclear use and certain nuclear-related dual-use items, including, with respect to the specific requirements of article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. It ensures that exports of nuclear items are not authorized where there is found to be an unacceptable risk of diversion to a weapons of mass destruction programme or when an export would be counter to Canada s non-proliferation policy and international commitments and obligations. 12. Safeguards Wide support for the IAEA safeguards regime is a prominent feature of the reports, with more than 80 per cent of reports addressing the issue. In 2003, Mongolia and Morocco announced entry into force of Additional Protocols, and in 2004 several EU states reported on the entry into force of the Additional Protocol between Euratom and the IAEA. States Parties including Australia (2004), Canada (2007), Croatia (2005), the Czech Republic (2004), Finland (2005), Hungary (2004, 2005), Indonesia (2005), Italy (2005), Lithuania (2005), Luxembourg (2004), Netherlands (2005), Norway (2003), Republic of Korea (2005, 2007), and Sweden (2003, 2004, 2005) called for the Additional Protocol to be the verification standard and a condition of supply for transfer of nuclear and dualuse items. Finland s 2005 report said, The international safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a fundamental pillar of the nuclear-non-proliferation regime. Finland considers that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol, represent the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1 of the Treaty. Finland calls upon all states that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol without delay. In 2007 Australia noted, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are not static and have undergone considerable evolution since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force in The Additional Protocol and the development of strengthened and integrated safeguards are the most recent manifestation of that evolution. Australia played a prominent role in negotiation of the Additional Protocol and was the first country to ratify such a protocol. It is of concern that seven non-nuclear-weapon State NPT parties with significant nuclear activities have yet to conclude an Additional Protocol. Latvia s 2007 report says, Latvia considers the IAEA safeguards system as an essential mechanism of verifying compliance with the obligations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Latvia favours the universalization of the Additional Protocol and urges all countries who have not yet signed this document to do so. Transparency and Accountability 31

33 Romania underscores the importance of safeguards in its 2008 report: In view of recent challenges to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Romania has taken every opportunity, at bilateral and multilateral level, to emphasize the importance of the observance of the nuclear non-proliferation commitments undertaken by all States Parties to the NPT. From this perspective, Romania continues to underline the necessity of strengthening the IAEA Safeguards System. In 2010 Poland indicated that it continuously supports strengthening the IAEA safeguards system and considers that the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols constitute the current verification standard. 13. Nuclear-weapon-free zones Just over one-half of all reports included references to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Croatia welcomed in 2005 the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones recognizing them as important complementary instruments to the NPT and appreciating the role they play in promoting regional and global peace and security. Croatia believes that the establishment of nuclear-weaponsfree-zones must be based on arrangements freely made among the States of the region in question, and should not interfere with the existing or evolving security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security. Malaysia reported in 2007 that it had signed the Treaty on the South-east Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) on 15 December 1995, and ratified it on 11 October Malaysia is also continuing to work actively with other member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to this treaty, particularly in encouraging the nuclear-weapon States to accede as parties to the Protocol to the Treaty at an early date. Malaysia is also of the view that the accession to the Protocol to the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States would effectively constitute a negative security assurance to the regional States parties of such nuclear-weapons-free zones. Poland indicated in its 2010 report that it welcomes the progress in arriving at and implementing nuclear weapon-free zone agreements, in particular the entry into force of the Central Asian nuclearweapon-free zone on 21 March 2009 and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty on 15 July Also in 2010 Uruguay affirmed that as a State party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which established the first nuclear weapon-free zone in the world, Uruguay calls on all States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories. Nuclear-weapon-free zones contribute to the promotion of nuclear disarmament. In its 2012 report Iran recalls that in 1974, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the first country in the Middle East region to initiate the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which was followed vigorously by subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly. 32 Transparency and Accountability

34 14. International cooperation Several states reported on disarmament measures they took in cooperation with other states. Canada (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007), Japan (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007), Germany (2002), Kazakhstan (2004), Norway (2003, 2004), Sweden (2002), and Ukraine (2004) all reported on specific programs to assist in securing former Soviet nuclear facilities, weapons, and materials. Indonesia highlighted the importance of cooperation in its 2003 report, noting that it wishes to convey the importance of promoting a framework of confidence and cooperation within which the transfer of nuclear technology and materials for peaceful purposes can take place as they play an important role in catering to the requirements of our national development. This is essential even for countries that are endowed with abundant natural resources both current and potential. In 2005 Guatemala stated in its report that it invites the international community in general to participate in national disarmament programmes through international cooperation and through physical and visual inspections at any time by international representatives and members of the press, as the most efficient method for transparency and verification. In 2007 Japan reviewed the Global Partnership program: At their Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, in June 2002, the leaders of the Group of Eight announced the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons of Materials of Mass Destruction to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Japan committed itself, for the purpose of the Partnership to make a contribution amounting to a little more than $200 million United States dollars, of which $100 million is to be allocated to the G-8 disposition programme for Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling Russian decommissioned nuclear submarines. Meanwhile, with the cooperation of Japan, for the first time, 20 kilograms of weapon grade plutonium, equivalent to two to three nuclear warheads, was successfully disposed of with the aid of advanced technology developed by Russian scientists. Under the same partnership, in December of 2003, Japan and the Russian Federation launched the first cooperation project to dismantle a Victor III class decommissioned nuclear submarine, a project which was successfully completed in December of At present, Japan and the Russian Federation are making great efforts to conclude an implementing arrangement for dismantling five additional decommissioned nuclear submarines. Kazakhstan noted in 2012 that international cooperation programmes to support the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the safe dismantling of nuclear weapons and related infrastructure, as well as the protection of nuclear facilities and materials, have played a crucial role in strengthening the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. 15. Transparency Transparency was mentioned by more than half of all reports. Referring to Step 9 of the 13 steps from the Final Document of the 2000 RevCon, Ireland indicated that we note in particular the importance of the principle of transparency contained in this step. Transparency and Accountability 33

35 Together with the principles of irreversibility and verification, this should apply to all disarmament and arms control efforts. The 2005 report of the Netherlands noted: The Netherlands has been strongly advocating increasing accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. At the last NPT Review Conference, in 2000, the Netherlands introduced proposals in this respect, together with Belgium, Germany, Italy and Norway. Regarding transparency, according to the original proposals, such measures could include a commitment by the nuclear-weapons States to make known periodically the aggregate numbers of warheads, delivery systems, and stocks of fissile material for military purposes in their possession and their nuclear policies. In 2005 Spain offered specific suggestions for NWS to use their reporting obligation to enhance transparency: It would be desirable that nuclear-weapon States submit regular reports on their arsenals, delivery systems, fissile-material stocks, and exports of technology for military use. Although it must be emphasized that some nuclear-weapon States have shown considerable proof of transparency, it should be borne in mind that any confidence-building measure and any progress made in this area is of particular importance and urgency. More specifically, one cannot ignore the risk that weapons of mass destruction may be used by terrorist organizations. This leads to the realization that non-nuclear weapon States also have important responsibilities with respect to verification and transparency: in this regard, it is essential inter alia to strengthen the role played by the IAEA. In its 2008 report Norway indicated that it has continued to advocate enhanced transparency with respect to nuclear holdings and steps taken towards nuclear disarmament. In 2012 New Zealand affirmed its commitment to transparency within the NPT regime, stating that it takes the view that transparency is a principle to which all States should adhere because it helps to reinforce compliance with Treaty obligations. The more that is known about the manner of implementation of a State s binding Treaty commitments, the greater will be the level of international trust in the regime. 16. Reporting The reporting obligation was itself a feature of more than half of the reports. Reporting was identified as both a transparency and accountability mechanism. In 2003 Slovakia said Slovakia believes that reporting as such will increase transparency and confidence within the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and despite differences in views with regard to the scope and the format of reporting, Slovakia is convinced that all parties to the Treaty are united in the their will to make the process of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament continuous and irreversible. Mexico in its 2005 report emphasized the principle of an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear-weapon and nonnuclear-weapon States and went on to make the point that the five nuclear-weapon States have a greater responsibility for submitting 34 Transparency and Accountability

36 information about steps taken to comply with the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures for nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty. Indonesia noted in 2007 that the 1995 decisions included a Strengthened Review Process and an indefinite extension of the Treaty that was intended to ensure accountability, inter alia, by submitting annual reports on the implementing of its provisions. Such reporting, called for in the 2000 document, would contribute substantively to the regime s credibility and acceptance. Ireland s 2007 report noted, Ireland considers regular reporting to be a key element of the 13 practical steps and presented reports during the last NPT review cycle. Ireland views reporting not as an end in itself but as an important tool in strengthening the NPT process, through greater transparency. New Zealand s 2009 report noted, New Zealand submitted a report to the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the eighth review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which set out New Zealand s progress with regard to each article of the Treaty. The reporting mechanism outlined in step 12 is essential in promoting transparency and to build confidence about States implementation of the Treaty. In 2012 Canada highlighted the importance of reporting, saying, Comprehensive reporting is not intended to expand the scope of the commitments made, but is a reflection of the linkages that exist among the articles of the Treaty, the 13 practical steps and the 2010 action plan. Canada calls on all other States parties to submit such comprehensive reports at Treaty meetings. We regret that so few States parties have fulfilled their commitments in this regard. Transparency and Accountability 35

37 NWS Reporting China and Russia both submitted formal reports (China in 2005 and 2010, Russia in 2005). Beyond that, NWS have not submitted reports that they specifically identify as being in response to the 2000 agreement on reporting. At the same time, all five NWS regularly report to NPT review process meetings and, while such reporting varies considerably, it has generally increased in detail and scope since It comes in the form of national statements, working papers, fact sheets, and other background material, much of which is distributed at review process meetings. This section attempts to summarize information provided on seven selected issues: Warhead and launch vehicles holdings, both tactical and strategic; Operational status of weapons held; Progress on reductions, both tactical and strategic; Affirmation of Article VI; Strategic doctrine; Security assurances; and Fissile material control. The sources from which this summary is drawn are listed and, as in the case of reporting by NNWS, the excerpts provided are illustrative rather than exhaustive. The basic guideline has been to include materials that the NWS made a point of distributing at NPT review meetings. It is clear that there is a great deal more information relevant to NWS arsenals, disarmament efforts, strategic doctrine, and security assurances available, both from the NWS governments themselves and from independent sources. The focus here is to review the information that the NWS chose to share with other States Parties to the NPT in the context of NPT review process meetings. There is a sense in which other sources represent a means to verify the accuracy and completeness of reporting to the NPT, but the present report does not include references to such external sources. Reporting to the NPT review process allows a determination of the extent to which NWS regard themselves as accountable to other States Parties to the Treaty and the extent to which they regard the reporting provision as a firm obligation. By refusing, for the most part, to submit formal reports, the NWS seem to be asserting a basic unwillingness to accept Step 12 of the 13 practical steps set out in the 2000 RevCon (and recalled in the Final Document of the 2010 RevCon) as a clear obligation linked to their accountability to other States Parties of the NPT. On the other hand, their informal reporting suggests a measure of openness to meeting the reporting requirement and giving account of themselves to the international community represented by the NPT. Generally, the documents provided range from the reasonably detailed particularly in the case of the U.K., which has provided numbers of nuclear weapons in its stockpile; their operational status; and details about disarmament and verification programs, fissile material stocks, and other policy commitments to the generally opaque, as in the case of some of China s statements and documents, which provided virtually no quantitative detail at all. Without a standardized format or more detailed reporting guidelines, NWS reporting will likely continue to be mixed. The following is an overview of the reporting under each of the seven categories referred to above. 36 Transparency and Accountability

38 1. Warhead and delivery vehicle holdings Most of the reporting on warheads and delivery vehicles has focused on past reductions rather than on current holdings. Russia, the U.K., France, and the United States have provided some information on both warheads and launch vehicles. In 2004 China reported that it possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal of all NWS, while in the same year the U.K. reported that we hold less than 200 operationally available warheads. The U.K. has provided information on current holdings, reporting a reduction of more than 70% in the potential explosive power of our deterrent to fewer than 200 warheads in The information was repeated in In 2003 the U.K. noted that it has dismantled our last Chevaline warhead part of our commitment to irreversibility in reductions in the U.K. s nuclear weapons. The U.K. updated the statistic on its warhead holdings in 2007, stating that the U.K. has decided to reduce its stockpile of operationally available warheads by a further 20% to fewer than 160. This figure was again referenced in 2010, when the U.K. indicated that it has reduced the number of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160. The U.K. has also provided details on current delivery vehicle holdings, stating in 2002 that only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol, carrying 48 warheads and maintaining this claim in In 2007 the U.K. referenced its Trident renewal program, indicating that the U.K. has decided to begin the concept and design work required to make possible a replacement for our current ballistic missile submarine fleet; and to maintain the option of using the D5 missile beyond its current life expectancy. It also stated that the UK is retaining not modernizing its deterrent. There is no change in the capabilities of the system, no move to produce more useable weapons and no change in nuclear posture or doctrine. In 2010 the U.K. stated that it has reduced to a single delivery system, single warhead design, and single launch platform. China, France, and the U.K. all report their holdings as the minimum needed for national security. France uses the term strict sufficiency ; China describes its arsenal as the minimum level for selfdefense ; and the U.K. refers to the minimum level necessary for the U.K. s national security. The United States and Russia supply data on deployment (not total holdings), frequently in reference to requirements under current treaties, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), START, and the Moscow Treaty. In a 2002 Information Paper the United States reported dismantling over 13,000 nuclear weapons since 1998, including a reduction to a level of less than 6,000 deployed warheads by December 2001, also indicating that its arsenal would be further reduced to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 warheads over the next decade. In 2007 the United States reported that, as of December 31, 2006, the United States had 3,696 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. In response to claims that the U.S Nuclear Posture Review called for new nuclear weapons, a paper titled The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons clarified that there are two activities that have been debated extensively: a modest research effort on advanced nuclear-weapon concepts that Congress recently redirected to study technologies to enhance confidence in warhead reliability without testing; and a study on whether without testing an existing weapon could be adapted to hold at risk hardened, deeply buried targets. There has been no decision to move beyond the study stage, which will require Presidential and congressional action. This stand was clarified in 2007 when the United States Transparency and Accountability 37

39 reported that it has decided to go forward with developing the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The Reliable Replacement Warhead will not provide any new or improved military capabilities compared to the older warheads it replaces in the United States arsenal. Russia has also reported holdings statistics that correspond to targets in the INF, START I, and Moscow Treaty, stating in 2002 that on the deadline date December 5, 2001 [Russia] has actually lowered the number of her deployed strategic delivery systems (ICBM, SLBM, and strategic bombers) down to 1,136 units, and the number of the reentry vehicles accounted with them down to 5,518 units. In 2007 Russia provided specific updates on START reductions, indicating that as of January 1, 2007, Russia possessed no more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4,200 warheads accountable under the START 1 Treaty. In 2010 Russia indicated that at the beginning of this year, the Russian Federation had approximately 800 deployed delivery vehicles for strategic offensive arms and 3,900 warheads attributed to them under START I. France has provided some information on delivery systems, and a chart provided in 2005 appears to show holdings of about 105 nuclear delivery vehicles, but the precise figure is not provided. In 2007 France added that the number of nuclear submarines carrying ballistic missiles has been reduced from six to four. In both 2008 and 2009 France stated that its arsenal would contain no more than 300 warheads. In 2009 it stated that in providing this information France is being completely transparent, as it has no other weapons besides those in its operational stocks. At the 2012 PrepCom France noted that it has fewer than 300 nuclear warheads in its possession. China reports few details on its nuclear warhead holdings, indicating for the first time in 2004 that it possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal of all the NWS states. This detail was not included in its official report in 2005 and no references to holdings were made in The most consistent indication of China s nuclear holdings has been the statements that China has exercised utmost restraint in developing nuclear weapons and that its weapons are for self-defence purposes only. It has not reported on holdings of delivery vehicles. 2. Operational status All NWS have reported that their nuclear arsenals have been detargeted. China has provided the fewest details on the operational status of its nuclear arsenals. In 2004 it first mentioned that China and Russia, China and the United States declared that they would not aim nuclear weapons at each other, adding in 2005 that in April 2000, the five nuclear-weapon states issued a joint statement announcing that they would not target their nuclear weapons at any countries. The readiness of China s weapons for launch has not been indicated. France has focused on detargeting measures. In 2002 it reported that as far back as 1997 France announced that none of its nuclear weapons was henceforth targeted. This information was repeated in 2004 and In 2007, however, France added the statement that the alert status of French nuclear forces has been downgraded on two occasions, in 1992 and Those reductions applied to both the response times and the number of weapons on alert. In 2009 France reiterated that it has taken a series of measures to reduce the operational readiness of (its) nuclear forces. Russia reported in 2002 that detargeting of strategic nuclear weapons has become one of Russia s steps in the area of reducing the nuclear threat. At present, as a result of implementation of that 38 Transparency and Accountability

40 initiative, all Russia s ballistic missiles are equipped with a so-called zero launch mission. In 2004 Russia added that, as a result of this initiative, the launch of missiles becomes technically impossible in the absence of a real flight mission plan. These statements were repeated in The only mention of operational status in 2007 was that Russia continues steadily reducing strategic delivery means and the related warheads. From the U.K. consistently provided information on the targeting and readiness status of its Trident nuclear weapons system, indicating that only a single Trident submarine is now on deterrent patrol at any one time, normally at several days notice to fire and with its missile detargeted. The United States reported in 2002 that U.S. nuclear forces are not targeted on any state on a dayto-day basis and that NATO has ceased to maintain standing peacetime nuclear contingency plans, and its nuclear forces no longer target any country. NATO has taken a number of steps to reduce the number and readiness of its dual-capable aircraft; readiness of these aircraft is now measured in weeks and months compared to minutes and hours as in the past. U.S. reliance on the forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons has been dramatically curtailed. The statement on the increase of NATO s launch time from minutes to months was repeated in In 2004 and 2005 the United States reported that it no longer targets any country with nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis. Strategic bombers are no longer on alert. Dual-capable aircraft no longer operate on a high-alert basis, and their readiness requirements now are measured in weeks and months, rather than minutes. There was no clear indication of the operational status of U.S. nuclear weapons in , however, aside from reports on nuclear warhead and delivery vehicle reductions. 3. Tactical and strategic reductions China has indicated that the two countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility and should take the lead in nuclear disarmament. In 2007 the U.K. committed to reduce operationally available warheads by 20% to fewer than 160. France says the number of warheads held by France has never exceeded a few hundred and that the number of delivery vehicles has been reduced by over half. In 2010 France noted that in the area of disarmament we have, in nearly 15 years, cut the number of nuclear warheads by half and communicated, for the sake of transparency, the ceiling of 300 warheads of our total arsenal. The United States reports that we have reduced the explosive power of our nuclear forces by over 70 per cent since the end of the Cold War. The general approach of Russia and the United States is to report on the implementation of bilateral treaties, such as START and New START. In reference to the New START Treaty, Russia indicated in 2010 that with this Treaty, the Russian Federation and the United States have once again clearly demonstrated their desire for large-scale strategic offensive arms reductions. The parties have agreed to cut their aggregate number of warheads by one third (the ceiling under the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was 2,200 warheads) and to reduce the limit for strategic delivery vehicles by more than half (under START I the ceiling was 1,600, while the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions placed no limits on them). Transparency and Accountability 39

41 At the RevCon of 2005 Russia submitted its first formal report and gave specific strategic reduction numbers: over the five year period that elapsed between the previous and today s NPT Review Conference the Russian Federation reduced its strategic nuclear force by 357 delivery vehicles and 1,740 nuclear warheads. In 2010 Russia stated that even though the Russian Federation had completely met its arms reduction obligations under START I, it continued to eliminate its strategic offensive arms. By 1 January 2010, it had eliminated some 1,600 ICBM and SLBM launchers, 3,100 ICBMs and SLBMs, 47 nuclear submarines and 67 heavy bombers. In its General Statement to the 2012 PrepCom France indicated that it had met the objective defined by the President of the French Republic in 2008 to reduce our deterrent s airborne component by one third, that is to say the missiles and nuclear warheads that make up this component. NWS reporting on tactical reductions tends to focus on total tactical reductions undertaken since the Cold War. Russia reported in 2002 that, in accordance with statements made by the President of the U.S.S.R. on Oct. 5, 1991 and the President of the Russian Federation on January 29, 1992 Russia consistently fulfills the initiatives, which she declared unilaterally. We would like to remind at this juncture that all nuclear weapons deployed outside of Russia, have been brought back to her territory and are in the process of liquidation. The United States reported that non-strategic weapons deployed in support of NATO have been reduced by more than 90 per cent and that all have been removed from ground forces and naval surface ships and its carrier-dual capable aircraft. In sum, the Army, Marine Corps, and surface and air components of the Navy have been denuclearized. The United Kingdom reported that it had dismantled the last of its free-fall Chevaline warheads in In 2004 France drew attention to the withdrawal of its short-range Pluton surface-to-surface missiles and AN-52 bombs. 4. Affirmation of Article VI All NWS have declared themselves to be in complete support of Article VI and committed to its implementation. China declares support for the elimination of nuclear weapons ; in 2010 it stated that China advocates that all nuclear-weapon States fulfil, in good faith, their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. When conditions are ripe, all nuclear-weapon States should join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Similarly, in 2012 China stated that all nuclear weapons states should fulfill in good faith obligations under Article VI of the NPT, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. As countries with the largest nuclear arsenals, the U.S. and Russia should continue to make drastic reductions in their arsenals in a verifiable and irreversible manner. France affirmed in 2002 the ultimate goal of eliminating [nuclear weapons] altogether and in 2003 emphasized that nuclear disarmament presupposes a context of undiminished international stability and security for all. Russia declared in 2003 that it is committed to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and in 2007 reaffirmed the NPT as being at the core of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. 40 Transparency and Accountability

42 The U.K. declared in 2003 its commitment to verifiable nuclear disarmament. In 2007 it stated that, in the absence of further measures being agreed in 2005, the U.K. continues to implement the decisions taken in previous review cycles. In 2010 the U.K. stated that it has set out its unequivocal commitment to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons in national statements and multilateral declarations (including the 2009 L'Aquila G8 statement and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887). Likewise, in 2012 the U.K. stated that as a nuclear weapon state, the United Kingdom is fully aware that it has particular responsibilities to fulfil. The U.K. remains fully committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons and we believe that we have a strong track record of meeting our disarmament commitments and obligations under the NPT. The United States regularly affirms its support for Article VI, but in 2003 pointed out that we think it is a mistake to use strict adherence to the 13 Steps as the only means by which NPT parties can fulfill their Article VI obligations. In 2005 the United States reaffirmed that it is fully committed to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI, but there can be no artificial timetable for progress in realizing our common Article VI objectives. In 2007 the United States said in a working paper on disarmament that it seeks to build a new global environment in which disarmament can become a realistic possibility. In his Prague speech of April 2009 President Barack Obama explicitly addressed the issue of disarmament and said that the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. In its statement to the 2012 PrepCom, the United States pointed out that it has made clear on many occasions that it understands its special responsibility to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons by pursuing nuclear disarmament. Russia stated in 2010 that recognizing that it has special responsibility, both as a nuclear Power and as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to meet its obligations on disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Russian Federation, in a spirit of goodwill, continues to carry out deep, irreversible and verifiable reductions of its strategic offensive arms. 5. Doctrine China s doctrinal statements tend to focus on its non-first-use commitment, its utmost constraint towards developing nuclear weapons, and its commitment to keeping its arsenal at the minimum level for self-defense. In 2005 China added that no efforts should be made to develop and deploy missile defence systems detrimental to the global strategic balance and stability, and no weapons systems should be deployed to outer space. In 2010 China indicated that its nuclear strategy and nuclear policy has been consistent, open and transparent. China unswervingly follows the path of peaceful development, pursues an independent foreign policy of peace and a defence policy that is defensive in nature. In 2012 China stated that nuclear weapons states should unequivocally undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and negotiate and conclude the Treaty on Mutual No First Use of Nuclear Weapons. France describes its policy of nuclear deterrence as based on the principle of strict sufficiency, stating in 2005 that France considers that the purpose of its deterrent forces is to guarantee that its vital interests will never be threatened by any other power and that French nuclear weapons form no part of any strategy based on the military use of such weapons and have never been considered by France to be war-fighting assets. In 2010 it advocated a safer world in which the doctrines of Transparency and Accountability 41

43 nuclear powers will restrict the role of nuclear weapons solely to extreme circumstances of selfdefence where their vital interests are under threat, with arsenals scaled down to the level of strict sufficiency in relation to the international strategic context. Russia makes several references to maintaining a nuclear arsenal at minimum levels corresponding to requirements of strategic stability, or in accordance with the idea of minimum sufficiency. In 2004 it explained that nuclear disarmament may not be pursued in isolation from other types of weapons or outside of the overall political situation in the world and Europe. In 2002 the U.K. stated that, having reduced our nuclear weapons to a single system at the minimum level necessary for the U.K. s national security, further unilateral steps we can take now without compromising that security are limited. This reference to a minimum level was repeated in In 2005 the U.K. referenced its 1998 Strategic Defence review and the 2003 Defence White Paper, which noted that due to the continuing risk of nuclear proliferation and the retention by other countries of substantial nuclear arsenals, Trident was likely to remain a necessary element of our security. We are continuing the policy we have had since the 1998 Strategic Defence Review of taking appropriate steps to ensure that the range of options for maintaining a minimum nuclear deterrent capability are kept open. The United States reported the outcome of the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, that the new U.S. defense strategy increases the role of advanced conventional forces, missile defenses, intelligence capabilities and the defense infrastructure. This approach is designed to provide the President with a broad array of options to address a wide range of contingencies. It will increase the nuclear threshold by giving U.S. Presidents additional non-nuclear options and defenses to deter an enemy attack. In 2003 it added that there has been no change in U.S. nuclear declaratory policy and the United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use. Indeed, by strengthening non-nuclear forces we will be able to hold targets at risk with an advanced conventional system that heretofore required a nuclear weapon. The result is an increase in the threshold for nuclear use. This line of reporting is consistent between 2002 and The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review stated that the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. In 2002 the United States also reported on NATO s nuclear doctrine, indicating that the United States and its NATO allies over the past decade have adapted NATO s defense posture to the new security environment. NATO has radically reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons. Its strategy is no longer dominated by the possibility of nuclear escalation, and the circumstances in which NATO might have to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons are considered to be extremely remote. 6. Security assurances China s declared determination not to be the first to use nuclear weapons represents a general security assurance to NNWS when joined by its commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear-weapon-free-zones. The no-first-use 42 Transparency and Accountability

44 policy has been consistently reiterated by China; as recently as 2010 it recalled that in April 1995, the Chinese Government issued a statement reaffirming its unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and its commitment to offering them positive security assurances. In 2000 China and the other four nuclear-weapon States issued a joint statement, reaffirming their security assurance commitment made in Security Council resolution 984 (1995). France reaffirmed its commitment to negative security assurances provided in UN Resolution 984 in , stating in 2002 that commitments made in Resolution 984 remain valid and in 2003 that France has made absolutely no change to its policy in this area. However, in 2003 this policy was qualified by the statement that states in breach of their commitments on non-proliferation cannot invoke the benefit of those safeguards, and in 2004 by reference to the natural right of legitimate self-defense. France also reports on the security assurances it provides to members of NWFZs by signing onto supporting Protocols, indicating in 2003 and 2004 that it has extended these to over 100 countries and in 2005 that among NWS, France is party to the greatest number of protocols to treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. The U.K. reports that it is fully committed to negative security assurances and also supports the establishment of NWFZ and security assurances to their members. In 2009 the U.K. said that it had given treaty-based security assurances to nearly one hundred countries. In 2010 the U.K. recalled that it had stated its policy on negative security assurances in a formal letter to the Secretary- General of the UN in 1995 (noted In UN Security Council Resolution 984). Further, the U.K. has signed and ratified the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone protocols in respect of Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga) and Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), giving treaty-based negative security assurances to almost one hundred countries. Russia s statements in 2002 and 2003 indicate that the unconditional fulfillment of negative security assurances provided in the 1995 resolution are fixed in the military doctrine of the Russian Federation. In 2004, while maintaining the right of NNWS to security assurances and continuing to support NWFZ, Russia began to call for a global, binding negative security assurance (NSA) agreement, provided it contains reservations concerning cases in which nuclear weapons may be used. This statement was continued in 2005 and 2007, with the added clarification that the instances when nuclear weapons may be used would be based on the military doctrines of NWS. In 2010 Russia indicated that considering the concern and desire of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non- Proliferation Treaty to obtain legally binding assurances which would rule out the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them, the Russian Federation, by signing the relevant Protocols, has provided such legally binding security assurances to all States which are parties to nuclear-weapon-free zone agreements. These assurances were confirmed by the Russian Federation under Security Council resolution 984 (1995). We confirm these commitments once again, as well as our intention to follow the same course as new nuclearfree zones are established. The United States indicated in that there remains no change in U.S. negative security assurances policy toward NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. In 2004 this statement was qualified. The United States did not see any justification for expanding NSAs to encompass global-legally binding assurances, asserting that these assurances are applicable only to NPT non-nuclearweapon states in compliance with the Treaty and that in this security environment [of nuclear Transparency and Accountability 43

45 proliferation], it is apparent that NSAs by the NPT nuclear weapon states are of diminishing importance as a possible remedy to the security concerns of NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. Instead the United States called for strict compliance with the NPT by all states. Similar statements were repeated in 2005, but security assurances were not mentioned in In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review the United States said that it is now prepared to strengthen its longstanding negative security assurance by declaring that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. 7. Fissile material control In their 2007 statements, working papers, and reports submitted to the NPT, each of the NWS has indicated support for a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. China attaches great importance to the recent proposals submitted by parties concerned regarding the program of work of the CD. In 2010 China indicated that it supports the early commencement, within the Conference on Disarmament, of the negotiation and conclusion of a non-discriminating, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty, in accordance with the mandate contained in the Shannon report. France declares itself ready to initiate, without preconditions, negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear-weapons at the Disarmament Conference. It reports that in 1996 it declared a definitive halt to the production of fissile weapons material and closed down the relevant facilities, making it the first State to take and implement a decision to dismantle its facilities for the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In its 2012 PrepCom statement France expressed deep regret that negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty have not yet been able to get underway at the CD, despite the clear, firm wish expressed by all the states party to the Treaty, and the laudable efforts made by the successive presidencies. Russia also declares that it is high time for the CD in Geneva to start negotiations on elaboration of the FMCT. We reaffirm our support for this idea. The sooner the deadlock situation at the CD is broken and the programme of work is agreed, the earlier it could undertake negotiating the FMCT. The United Kingdom stated in 2010 that it has a voluntary moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and has not produced fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices since Moreover, the U.K. regards a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty as a priority, and has repeatedly called for the immediate start of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on the basis of the programme of work (CD/1864) adopted by consensus in The United States declares itself a staunch advocate of a treaty to ban any further production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive purposes. In his 2009 Prague speech President Obama asserted that the U.S. will seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. 44 Transparency and Accountability

46 Sources for NWS reporting summary The references included in the above summary are illustrative of selected reporting from NWS and are certainly not intended to be exhaustive or comprehensive. Sources for the years 2004 and following are indicated below. Evidence for 2002 and 2003 comes from similar documents. China: Information for 2004: the opening statement of April 26, a Fact Sheet on Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War, a statement on Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, a Working Paper on Security Assurances, a Working Paper on NWFZs, and a Working Paper on prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Information for 2005: China s Contribution to Nuclear Disarmament; Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War, a Working Paper submitted April 26; Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Working Paper submitted May 4; Security Assurances, a Working Paper submitted May 4; NWFZ, a Working Paper submitted April 26; General Debate Statement of May 3; National Report of May 11. Information for 2007: Security Assurances, a Working Paper submitted May 7; NWFZ, a Working Paper submitted May 7; Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the Danger of Nuclear War, a Working Paper submitted May 7; Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Working Paper submitted May 7; General Debate Statement of May 1; Cluster 1 Statement of May 1; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10. Information for 2008: A statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye on April 28. Information for 2009: Statement by H.E. Mr. Cheng Jingye on May 4; Statement by the Chinese Delegation on the Issue of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on May 7; Statement on the Issue of Security Assurances on May 7. Information for 2010: Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, national report submitted May 4. Information for 2012: General statement to 2012 PrepCom delivered on April 30. France: Information for 2004: General Debate statement of April 26, Cluster 1 statement of April 29. Information for 2005: Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France s Contribution, General Debate statement of May 5. Information for 2007: Nuclear Disarmament Measures Implemented by France, General Debate Statement of May 1, Cluster 1 Statement of May 8, Cluster 2 Statement of May 9, Cluster 3 Statement of May 10. Information for 2008: Nuclear Disarmament: France s Commitment, Cluster 1 Statement on April 30, General Debate Statement of April 28, Specific Issue Nuclear disarmament and negative security assurances on May 2. Information for 2009: a working paper submitted on May 13, Nuclear Disarmament: France s Practical Commitment ; working paper submitted on May 13, Nuclear Disarmament: a Concrete step by France ; Cluster 1 Statement on May 6; Cluster 2 Statement on May 7; Cluster 3 Statement on May 8. Information for 2010: National statement delivered on May 4. Information for 2012: General statement to 2012 PrepCom delivered on April 30. Russia: Information for 2004: Opening Statement of April 27, Statement on Article VI of the Treaty, Statement on negative security assurances. Information for 2005: Practical Steps Taken by the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament, May; General Debate Statement of May 3; National Report of May 11. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30, Statement on Nuclear Disarmament and Security Assurances of May 9, Cluster 2 Statement of May 9, Cluster 3 Statement of May 10. Information for 2008: Statement on Article VI of the Treaty, April 28 May 9; Statement by H.E. Ambassador Anatoly Antonov on April 28. Information for 2009: Working Paper submitted on May 6, Development of the initiative of the Russian Federation to establish a reserve of low Transparency and Accountability 45

47 enriched uranium (LEU) for the supply of LEU to the International Atomic Energy Agency for its member States; Statement by H.E. Ambassador Anatoly Antonov on May 4; Statement on Article X of the Treaty, May 4-15; Statement, May 4-15, Practical steps of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament; Cluster 2 Statement in May; Statement May 4-15 on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Information for 2010: Report on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the Russian Federation, national report submitted May 3. Information for 2012: General statement to 2012 PrepCom delivered on April 30. United Kingdom: Information for 2004: General Debate Statement, April 26; Cluster 1 Statement, April 30; Cluster 1: Specific time: Disarmament/NSAs, May 3. Information for 2005: Strengthening Non-Proliferation: The 2005 Review Conference, April; Verification of Nuclear Disarmament: Final Report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and their Components, a Working Paper submitted April 18; General Debate Statement of May 5. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30; Cluster 1 Statement of May 8; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10; Working Paper on Cluster II Issues, submitted May 9. Information for 2008: General Statement on April 28, Cluster 1 Statement on April 30, The United Kingdom Committed to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Success of the 2010 Review Cycle. Information for 2009: General Statement on May 4, Cluster 1 Statement on May 6, Cluster 2 Statement on May 7, Cluster 3 Statement on May 8. Information for 2010: U.K. Statement to the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, delivered May 19. Information for 2012: General statement to 2012 PrepCom delivered on April 30. United States: Information for 2004: Opening statement by Under Secretary of State on The NPT: A Crisis of Non-Compliance, April 27; Article VI: The U.S. Record of Compliance, statement by Assistant Secretary of State, May 3. Information for 2005: Statement by Assistant Secretary of State Rademaker, May 2; Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, United States Department of State, April 20; The Commitment of the United States of America to Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Information for 2007: General Debate Statement of April 30; Cluster 1 Statement of May 8; Cluster 2 Statement of May 9; Cluster 3 Statement of May 10; Challenges of Non-Proliferation Compliance, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Disarmament, the United States, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Achieving and Sustaining Nuclear Weapons Elimination, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Safeguards and Nuclear Security, a Working Paper submitted May 3; Facilitating Disarmament, a Working Paper submitted May 3. Information for 2008: Cluster 1 Statement of May 2; A Recipe for Success at the 2010 Review Conference, Opening Remarks on April 28; Fact Sheet on NPT Article VI Accomplishments by the United States. Information for 2009: a Working paper submitted May 7, Progress towards nuclear disarmament by the United States of America ; General Debate statement on May 5; Cluster 1 statement on May 6; Cluster 2 statement on May 7; Cluster 3 statement on May 8; President Obama s speech in Prague on April 5; Draft of U.N. Security Council Resolution on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Disarmament on September 11; specific issue other provisions of the Treaty, including Article X on May 11; P5 Non-Proliferation Press Release; Joint Statement by U.S. President Obama and Russian President Medvedev on Nuclear Cooperation. Information for 2010: United States Nuclear Posture Review; United States information pertaining to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document submitted May 7. Information for 2012: General statement to 2012 PrepCom delivered on April Transparency and Accountability

48 Notes Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document (Volume I, Part I), Review of the operation of the Treaty, taking into account the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process for the Treaty, New York, 2000, NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), 2. Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI: Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control NPT Decisions and Resolution, Decision 2: Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament: 4(c): The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 4. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996 [relevant excerpts]: Paragraph 99: The legal import of the (Article VI) obligation goes beyond that of a mere obligation of conduct [of negotiations in good faith]; the obligation involved here is an obligation to achieve a precise result nuclear disarmament in all its aspects by adopting a particular course of conduct, namely the pursuit of negotiations in good faith. Paragraph 100: This twofold obligation to pursue and to conclude negotiations formally concerns the [then] 18 States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or, in other words, the vast majority of the international community. 5. The Reaching Critical Will Shadow Report examined holdings, policies, and activities of the 44 States identified by the IAEA as possessing nuclear weapons and/or nuclear power. Transparency and Accountability 47

49 TABLE 1: Tabulation of NPT Reports since the 2000 RevCon agreement on reporting Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Algeria 10 Article x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Argentina Steps x x x x x x x x x x Australia 02 General x x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x x x 08 General x x x x x x x x x x x 09 General x x x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 Action Plan x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Austria 04 Articles x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x 10 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Belgium Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x Brazil Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x 10 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x Bulgaria 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x 48 Transparency and Accountability

50 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility Canada 02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 07 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 08 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 09 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 Articles/ Steps/AP x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Chile 10 Article x x x x x x x x x x CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting China 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Croatia 03 General x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x Cuba 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Czech Rep Steps x x x x x x x x x Finland 03 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x Transparency and Accountability 49

51 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Germany Steps x x x x x x x x x x Greece 04 General x x x x x x x Guatemala Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Hungary 03 General x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x Indonesia 02 General x x x x x x 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x Iran 03 General x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x x 08 General x x x x x x x x 09 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x Ireland 02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 50 Transparency and Accountability

52 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Italy 05 General x x x x x x x x x Japan 02 General x x x x x x 03 General x x x x 04 General x x x x x 05 General x x x x 07 General x x x x x x 08 General x x x x x 09 General x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x Latvia 05 General x x x x x x x x Lithuania 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x Kazakhstan Luxembourg 04 Articles x x x x x x x x 05 Articles x x x Malaysia 03 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x Transparency and Accountability 51

53 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility Mexico Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x Mongolia 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Morocco 03 General x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x 10 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x Netherlands Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x New Zealand 02 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x 03 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 05 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 07 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 08 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x 09 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10 Articles/Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x Nigeria 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x 52 Transparency and Accountability

54 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility Norway Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x 07 General x x x x x x x x x x x 08 General x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Peru 03 Articles x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Poland 02 General x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x 10 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x Portugal 04 General x x x x x x x Rep of Korea 03 General x x x x x x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x x x x 05 General x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x 12 General/Action Plan x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Romania 03 General x x x x x 04 General x x x x x x 08 General x x x x x x x Transparency and Accountability 53

55 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility Russia 05 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 10 Articles x x x x x x x x x x x x x CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Slovakia 03 General x x x x x x x x x x 04 Articles x x x x x x x x x x South Africa Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Spain Steps x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Sri Lanka 03 General x x x x x x x x x x x Sweden 02 General x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x Switzerland 03 General x x x x x x 04 General x x x x 05 General x x x x x Thailand 02 General x x x x x x Turkey Steps x x x x x x x x x x x x x 54 Transparency and Accountability

56 Country Year Format NPT Regime Strategic Reductions Tactical Reductions Irreversibility Ukraine 04 General x x 05 General x x 10 Article x x x x x x x x x x x x CTBT/Moratorium FMCT Security Assurances Verification CD Nuclear Energy Export Controls Safeguards/Additional Protocol NWFZ International Cooperation Transparency Reporting Uruguay 10 Article x x x x x x x x x x x x Total Reports Total Countries Transparency and Accountability 55

57 56 Transparency and Accountability

58 PROJECT PLOUGHSHARES 57 Erb Street West Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2 Canada Fax