Econ 2230: Public Economics. Lecture 21: Subsidizing giving

Transcription

1 Econ 2230: Public Economics Lecture 21: Subsidizing giving

2 Subsidizing charitable giving 1. Tax subsidy a) Characterizing the US deduction for charitable donations b) Optimal subsidy c) Intended and unintended consequences d) Price elasticity of giving e) Salience 2. Matching a. Difference between subsidy versus match b. Price elasticity of giving g under match c. Reconciling response from experimental and non-experimental data

3 1a. Tax subsidy for charitable giving Deductions of charitable giving: Individuals can deduct the value of contributions to non-profits Gifts of property are deductible but services are not Deductions can not exceed 50% of adjusted gross income Deduction only given to those who itemize One of the largest tax expenditures of the US government 2005 deductions of nearly $200 billion

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5 1a. Tax subsidy for charitable giving Why provide deductions for charitable giving? Positive externalities associated with charitable giving. Can reduce problem by offering a subsidy Enables government support to organizations that they otherwise are prevented from supporting What is the government funding through the subsidy?

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8 1.b. Subsidizing charitable giving Theoretical questions: Should we have such a subsidy? How large should such a subsidy be? What are the key determinants of the optimal subsidy? Saez (2004): Optimal level of subsidies depends on four factors: 1. The price elasticity of the contribution good; the optimal subsidy should rise with the price elasticity 2. Size of externality associated with provision ( particularly important for public goods the government cannot fund) 3. Crowding out: subsidy should be greater for goods for which private donations are crowded out by ypublic provision 4. Redistribution: contributions concentrated at the bottom of the income distribution should be subsidized more heavily than those concentrated at the top

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10 One public good

11 Optimal subsidy Suppose two public goods: private donations fund one, government revenue funds another public good Subsidy may be justifiable if external benefit of privately funded d charity exceed those of the public good provided by the government Equivalent to saying marginal value of charitable good (λ) greater than public good Criteria: 1. λ - externality of provision 2. β - price elasticity of giving 3. Crowding out 4. Redistribution 5. Other factors?

12 1.c. Unintended consequences Is it sufficient to consider the response in giving? Gruber (2004) Pay or pray? The impact of charitable subsidies on religious attendance Examine effect of subsidy on religiosity (giving and participation) Justification for religious subsidy Religious organizations provide transfers to low income Provide low income an opportunity to attend religious services Government prevented from direct support How does the tax subsidy influence giving and religious participation? If subsidy decreases attendance then may reduce the externalities the subsidy was thought to have.

13 1.c. Unintended consequences (Gruber, 2004) Theory: giving and attending Substitutes (Azzi and Ehrenber, 1975) Individuals id allocate resources between religious i and secular commodities to maximize lifetime and afterlife utility Complements Need to attend to give. Warm glow relies on visibility Empirical evidence: Complements: positive correlation between attendance and contributions (e.g., Olson and Caddell,1994). Omitted variable? Substitutes: United Church of Christ congregations, the congregations with the highest per capita financial giving were the congregations that were losing members most rapidly (Olson and Caddell,1994). Omitted variable?

14 1.c. Unintended consequences (Gruber, 2004) Theory: giving and attending Substitutes (Azzi and Ehrenber, 1975) Individuals allocate resources between religious and secular commodities to maximize lifetime and afterlife utility Complements Need to attend to give. Warm glow relies on visibility Empirical evidence: Complements: positive correlation between attendance and contributions (e.g., Olson and Caddell,1994). Omitted variable? more religious more likely to attend and give Substitutes: United Church of Christ congregations, the congregations with the highest h per capita financial i giving i were the congregations that were losing members most rapidly (Olson and Caddell,1994). Omitted variable? natural life cycle, those that remain are those most dedicated.

15 1.c. Unintended consequences (Gruber, 2004) Exploit variation in the subsidization over time, across income groups, across states to identify effect of subsidy on giving and attending General Social Survey, nationally representative sample since 1972, on religious attendance Consumer Expenditure Survery (CEX) nationally representative sample on giving activity TAXSIM to calculate cu ate deductions (It allows one to calculate cu ate federal and state income tax liabilities from survey data)

16 Gruber (2004) finding

17 Gruber (2004) finding

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19 1.c. Unintended consequences Gruber (2004) 1% increase in religious giving decreases religious participation by 1.1% Crucial to evaluate the overall welfare effects of extending deductions to religious giving May not be sufficient to examine price elasticity if the objective is to achieve certain external effects

20 1.d. How responsive is giving to the price of giving? Prince and File 1994, survey of 200 big donors awareness of tax advantages was ranked the third most important motivator for making a charitable donation Aggregate data despite substantial changes in the marginal tax rates during the 1980's the share of income donated remained fairly constant. suggest little if any response to price changes. Look at subgroups: Look at those for whom the price of giving increased and those for whom it decreased

21 1.d. Are deductions treasury efficient? β=-1 1 Cross-sectional data: Existing studies have estimated price elasticity β and γ income elasticity log(g) = α + β log(1 - t) + γ log y + ε Cross sectional results γ = 0.8, β = (Feldstein and Taylor 1976, Clotfelter 1985) General cross sectional results <β β < Problem with cross sectional data?

22 1.d. Are deductions treasury efficient? β=-1 1 Cross-sectional data: Existing studies have estimated price elasticity β and γ income elasticity log(g) = α + β log(1 - t) + γ log y + ε Cross sectional results γ = 0.8, β = (Feldstein and Taylor 1976, Clotfelter 1985) General cross sectional results <β β < Problem with cross sectional data? difficult to separately identify the effect of changes in income from that of prices. Since the marginal tax rate increases with income, one cannot determine whether a positive correlation between giving and income is caused by people giving more when they face a higher h income or when they face a lower price.

23 1.d. Are deductions treasury efficient? β=-1 1 Panel data: Randolph (1995): 10-year panel of tax-return data : period with two major tax reforms Income elasticity: larger in the long-term than in the short-term. Limited response to temporary changes in income Price elasticity: donors time their giving to take advantage of temporary changes in the tax prices, whereas permanent changes in price have a small effect. Finds short-term term elasticities: 1.2; long-term elasticities: Concern that tax incentives merely affect the timing of giving rather than, as intended, the level of giving.

24 1.d. Are deductions treasury efficient? β=-1 1 Auten, Sieg and Clotfelter (2002) use a similar (although longer) panel of tax payers, but employ a different estimation technique. Analysis capitalizes on restrictions placed on the covariance matrices of income and price by assumptions of the permanent income hypothesis Confirm finding that the permanent income elasticity exceeds that of the temporary one. Permanent price elasticity of (very small temporary effect)

25 1.d. Are deductions treasury efficient? β=-1 1 Bakija and Heim (2010) Follow on strand on papers trying to account for anticipated permanent changes in tax law. This literature typically finds small persistent price elasticities and larger transitory price elasticities, but with wide confidence intervals. Panel of over 550,000 disproportionately high-income tax returns ( ) Deals with expectations; allowing people at different income levels to have different degrees responsiveness to taxation and different time paths of unobservable influences on giving Permanent price elasticity 0.7

26 1.d. Are deductions treasury efficient? β=-1 1 The sensitivity of the estimates to the estimation technique and the identification strategy has left the literature unsettled as to the true values of price and income elasticities iti Are there ways in which we could increase response to the subsidy? Is the deduction salient?

27 1.e. Salience Response to taxes and subsidies depend on how salient they are People are not fully aware of the taxes they face? Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) test this assumption and generalize theory to allow for salience effects Test whether salience (visibility of tax-inclusive price) affects behavioral responses to commodity taxation Does effect of a tax on demand depend on whether it is included in posted price? Experiment Non-experimental data

28 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) Experiment manipulating salience of sales tax implemented at a supermarket that belongs to a major grocery chain 30% of products sold in store are subject to sales tax Posted tax-inclusive prices on shelf for subset of products subject to sales tax (7.375% in this city) Data: Scanner data on price and weekly quantity sold by product

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30 Classroom survey Individuals are aware of the magnitude of the sales tax Students were asked to choose two items from image Asked to report Total bill due at the register for these two items

31 Field experiment Quasi-experimental difference-in-differences Treatment group: Products: Cosmetics, Deodorants, and Hair Care Accessories (relatively high price and high price elasticity) Store: One large store in Northern California Time period: 3 weeks (February 22, March 15, 2006) Control groups: Products: Other prods. in same aisle (toothpaste, skin care, shave) of the store Stores: same products at two nearby stores similar in demographic characteristics Time period: prior to intervention calendar year 2005 and first 6 weeks of 2006

32 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

33 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) Experimental period Period prior to experiment

34 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) Sale of non treatment products increased by 0.8 units during treatment Experimental period Period prior to experiment

35 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

36 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

37 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

38 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

39 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

40 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) Evaluate response Posting tax inclusive prices decreases demand by 8% Price elasticity of demand range from 1 to 1.5 Tax-inclusive price reduced demand by nearly same amount as a percent price increase Vast majority of customers do not take sales tax into account Non-experimental data Compare effects of price changes and tax changes Alcohol subject to two state-level taxes in the U.S.: Excise tax: included in price Sales tax: added at register, not shown in posted price Exploiting state-level changes in these two taxes

41 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

42 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009)

43 Chetty and Saez, 2009 Salience of income taxation Examine Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) The EITC is the largest cash transfer program for low income families in the United States and it generates large marginal subsidies or taxes on the earnings of recipients. A refundable tax credit primarily for individuals and couples with qualifying children. For tax year 2010: maximum EIC for a person or couple without qualifying children is $457 with one qualifying child is $3,050 with two qualifying children is $5,036 with three or more qualifying children is $5,666

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45 Chetty and Saez, H&R Block offices in Chicago metro area; 43,000 EITC clients 1,461 tax professionals implemented experiment Tax Season 2007: Jan. 1 to April 15, 2007 EITC clients randomly assigned to control or treatment group Control group: standard tax preparation procedure Only mentions the EITC amount, with no info on EITC structure Treatment

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50 One potential explanation for this response is that the non-compliers are tax professionals who framed the EITC incentive effects as being small relative to the benefits of earning a higher income

51 1.e. Salience Salience plays a key role in determining response to taxation or subsidies Accounting for the limited salience Thaler and Sunstein (2008) propose a Charity Debit Card Can be used only for charitable donations Provides statement on deduction Summary statement sent straight to IRS for deductions One way of determining response to salient tax deductions is the lab

52 2. Matching Government provided incentives typically provided in the form of deductions. Private incentives in the form of matches Experimental evidence typically examine matches. Attraction is that cost salient in experimental studies a. Are rebates and subsidies equivalent? Eckel and Grossman (2003) b. How does the magnitude of the match influence giving? Meier (2007) Karlan and List (2007), Karlan, List, and Shafir (2010) c. Reconciling evidence from experimental and non-experimental data

53 Next: Matching Groups: Norms, Institutions and sorting: Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons,, chapter 3, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action Theodore Bergstrom, The Uncommon Insight of Elinor Ostrom, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2010 Ahn, T.K., Mark Isaac and Timothy C. Salmon. Coming and Going: Experiments on Endogenous Group Sizes for Excludable Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93, No. 1-2 (2009): Ahn, T.K., Mark Isaac and Timothy C. Salmon.Endogenous Group Formation, Journal of Public Economic Theory, Vol 10. No. 2 (2008) Sutter, Matthias, Stefan D. Haigner, and Martin G. Kocher Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations. Cinyabuguma, Matthias, Talbot Page, and Louis Putterman Cooperation under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment. Journal of Public Economics, 89: Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, and Claudia Keser Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run. Gürerk, Özgür, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Bettina Rockenbach The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions. Science, 312(5770):