Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica
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1 Casting a Wider Tax Net: Experimental Evidence from Costa Rica Anne Brockmeyer, Marco Hernandez, Stewart Kettle, Spencer Smith World Bank, BIT, Oxford University Zurich Conference on Public Finance in Develping Countries December 17, 2018
2 Non-Filing of Taxes and Development Non-Filing Rate Log GDP per Capita (Current USD)
3 Non-Filing of Taxes and Development Non-Filing Rate CIT: -9.9 (2.8), Max Rate= Log GDP per Capita (Current USD)
4 Non-Filing of Taxes and Development Non-Filing Rate CIT: -9.9 (2.8), Max Rate=97.1 VAT: -6.2 (2.6), Max Rate= Log GDP per Capita (Current USD)
5 Non-Filing of Taxes and Development Non-Filing Rate CIT: -9.9 (2.8), Max Rate=97.1 VAT: -6.2 (2.6), Max Rate=77.5 PIT: (3.2), Max Rate= Log GDP per Capita (Current USD)
6 Non-Filing of Taxes and Development Non-filing is costly to economies on various dimensions: Government revenue Factor allocation, productivity Tax morale Information about economy Literature so far: misreporting on intensive margin, informality This paper: compliance on the filing margin can be enhanced with simple and highly cost-effective intervention
7 A Nationwide RCT to Increase Tax Filing Target registered firms that don t file (regularly) Higher benefit from compliance Address and (sometimes) third-party information available s: Credible deterrence: variety of enforcement activities Behavioral insights: simplified, personalized, social norm Third-party information: supplier/client/financial reports Triples tax filing rate, doubles payment rates, improves reporting behavior Persistent results & highly cost-effective
8 Contributions to the Literature Taxation and development Gordon & Li 2009, Besley & Persson 2013, Best et al Third-party information: Kleven et al 2016, Pomeranz 2015, Naritomi 2015, Carillo et al 2016, Brockmeyer & Hernandez 2016 Third-party information is tool to identify non-filers, strengthen enforcement, by-product of better compliance Formalization of informal firms McKenzie & Sakho 2010, Andrade et al. 2014, Bruhn & McKenzie 2013, de Mel et al Focus on non-filers, with higher cost-effectiveness Communication experiments Blumenthal et al 2001, Fellner et al. 2013, Hallsworth 2015, Castro & Scartascini 2015, Ortega & Scartascini 2015, Dwenger et al 2016 Richer data, larger variety of outcomes (incl. dynamics)
9 Outline 1. Experiment Design 2. Results 2.1 Main Results 2.2 Spillovers 2.3 Persistence 2.4 Mechanisms 3. Conclusion
10 Experiment Design
11 Context Tax revenue 15.3% of GDP; 360,000 registered firms Target population: 50,000 non-filers Registered but did not file income tax for 2014 Average non-filer > below-median filer Today: focus on firms covered by third-party information (TPI) Third-party reporting: Firms suppliers & clients, state institutions, credit/debit card companies
12 Baseline SUBJECT:!Urgent:!Please!submit!your!tax!return!now!! Attention:!NAME,!! PLEASE*FILE*YOUR*INCOME*TAX*RETURN*IN*THE*NEXT*10*DAYS*! Declare*now*by*visiting:* According! to! our! records,! you! have! not! filed! your! tax! return! (Form! D101).! 8! out! of! 10! Costa! Ricans! have! already! filed! their! 2014! income! tax! return.! You! are! part! of! a! small! minority! of! citizens!who!have!not.!! It!is!a!serious!offense!to!not!file!your!taxes.!!! We!have!thirdUparty!information!confirming!that!you!or!your!client!performed!activities!in!2014! which!require!you!to!pay!taxes.!! If!you!do!not!file,!you!could!be!audited!and!your!business!may!be!closed.!Furthermore,!your! name!may!be!published!on!our!website!as!someone!who!did!not!contribute.!! If!you!have!any!questions,!you!can!contact!me!by!PHONE!or!EUMAIL.!I ll!be!checking!whether! you!respond!to!this!message.!! Sincerely,!! NAME!OF!OFFICIAL! POSITION!
13 Third-Party Information performed!activities!in!2014!which!require!you!to!pay!taxes.!! Firms*w/o*TPI!! " " " We!have!thirdUparty!information!confirming!that!you!or!your!client! performed!activities!in!2014!which!require!you!to!pay!taxes.!from! thirduparty!returns!(d150,!d151!and!d153),!we!know!about!your! operations,!for!example:!! Revenues*of*at*least*XXX*reported*by*COMPANY,*! Revenues* from* credit/debit* cards* of* at* least* ZZZ* repoted*by*bank,*! Sales*or*contracts*with*state*entities*of*at*least* " " " The! DGT! uses! information! from! thirduparty! returns! (D150,! D151! and!d153)!to!identify!economic!activity!and!sources!of!income.!
14 Main Results: Income Tax Compliance
15 Tax Filing *** 32.5*** Percent Start date: 4 Mar Weeks Control Baseline Information
16 Tax Payment 6 5.3*** 4.7*** 4 Percent Start date: 4 Mar Weeks Control Baseline Information
17 Reporting Behavior
18 Reporting Behavior (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Log tax Log Log Sales Log costs Log profits liability payment T1: Baseline ** 0.437** (0.318) (0.386) (0.341) (0.255) (0.222) T2: Information *** *** 0.633** 0.450** (0.308) (0.383) (0.336) (0.248) (0.221) Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Control group avg T1=T2 p-value (Wald test) Observations 2,692 2,692 2,692 2,692 2,692
19 Self-Reported Sales vs Third-party Reported Sales Percent ** *** Self-Report < TPI Self-Report TPI Self-Report > TPI Control Information
20 Self-Reported Sales vs Costs Percent *** Sales < Costs Sales Costs Sales > Costs *** Control Information
21 Why is there no evasion shifting to costs? Deduction rule for self-employed: Standard deduction of 25% of sales (no receipts required) Itemized deduction without limit (but receipts required)
22 Reported Costs vs Reported Sales Percent (Costs + 1)/(Sales + 1) Control Baseline Information
23 Reported Costs vs Reported Sales Percent (Costs + 1)/(Sales + 1) Control Baseline Information
24 Reported Costs vs Reported Sales Percent (Costs + 1)/(Sales + 1) Control Baseline Information
25 Spillovers: Other Compliance Aspects
26 Deregistration 2 2.1*** 2.0*** 1.5 Percent Start date: 4 Mar Weeks Control Baseline Information
27 Third-Party Reporting *** *** Percent Start date: 4 Mar Weeks Control Baseline Information
28 The Value of Additional Third-Party Reports (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) No. of third-party reports filed No. of reports about clients No. of reports about suppliers No. of unmatched reports No. of reports about non-filers No. of reports about underreporters T: Any *** 0.070*** *** 0.004** 0.030*** (0.024) (0.012) (0.017) (0.016) (0.002) (0.008) Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Control group avg Observations 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515
29 Persistence
30 Persistence of Treatment Effects: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Reported by Reported by Paid income Reported private state tax client client or institution supplier Filed income tax T effect in *** 0.013** 0.023*** (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) Reported by card company T effect in 2016 T effect in 2017 Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515
31 Persistence of Treatment Effects: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Reported by Reported by Paid income Reported private state tax client client or institution supplier Filed income tax T effect in *** 0.013** 0.023*** (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) Reported by card company T effect in ** 0.016** (0.010) (0.005) T effect in 2017 Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515
32 Persistence of Treatment Effects: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Reported by Reported by Paid income Reported private state tax client client or institution supplier Filed income tax T effect in *** 0.013** 0.023*** (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) Reported by card company T effect in ** 0.016** (0.010) (0.005) T effect in ** 0.010* (0.010) (0.005) Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515
33 Persistence of Treatment Effects: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Reported by Reported by Paid income Reported private state tax client client or institution supplier Filed income tax Reported by card company T effect in *** 0.013** 0.023*** (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006) T effect in ** 0.016** (0.010) (0.005) T effect in ** 0.010* (0.010) (0.005) Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Observations 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515 12,515
34 Mechanisms
35 Response to Repeated Interventions Filing Rate Treated Filing Rate Control Start: April Weeks Treated in early 2015 Control in early
36 Response to Repeated Interventions 4 8 Filing Rate Treated Filing Rate Control 0-4 Start: Jan Weeks Treated in early 2015 Control in early
37 Response to Multiple Repeated Interventions 8 5 Filing Rate (second time) Filing Rate (third/fourth time) 0-4 Start: Jan Weeks Second time Third time Fourth time 0
38 Response to Multiple Repeated Interventions 8 5 Filing Rate (second time) Filing Rate (third/fourth time) 0-4 Start: Jan Weeks Second time Third time Fourth time 0
39 Response to Multiple Repeated Interventions 8 5 Filing Rate (second time) Filing Rate (third/fourth time) 0-4 Start: Jan Weeks Second time Third time Fourth time 0
40 Welfare Analysis Cost Benefit analysis (taking into account costs of follow-up): Cost-benefit 1:4 (1:6 for firms with third-party information) Welfare Considerations (Keen & Slemrod 2017): Investment of a in enforcement capacity is welfare enhancing if ȳ0 ȳ1 v R > R + (f p 0 θy)dy + pθy dy + v a ȳ 1 0 If v = 1.4, intervention is welfare improving if filing costs <5% of R
41 Conclusion Non-filing of taxes important in lower-income countries s with deterrence + behavioral insights + third-party information Increase tax filing, payment, reporting accuracy Increase compliance with third-party reporting Effects persist in the medium term Cost effectiveness 1:4
42 Conclusion Non-filing of taxes important in lower-income countries s with deterrence + behavioral insights + third-party information Increase tax filing, payment, reporting accuracy Increase compliance with third-party reporting Effects persist in the medium term Cost effectiveness 1:4 Do countries use third-party information optimally?
43 Availability and Use of Third-Party Information Percentage of Countries Intelligence gathering rated good/very good Third-party info from financial institutions Third-party info from firms/vat annexes Third-party info from state institutions Some third-party information available Automatic cross-checks rated good/very good Compliance program rated good/very good Risk analysis rated good/very good
44 Thank you!
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