CRAIG EAST, RAYMOND MCLEAN, JAMES T. ALLARD & BARRY R. ALLARD ASSESSOR OF AREA 08 - NORTH SHORE/SQUAMISH VALLEY

Transcription

1 The following version is for informational purposes only, for the official version see: for Stated Cases see also: for PAAB Decisions SC 379 Craig East et al v. AA08 Quick Link to Stated Case #379 (BCCA) CRAIG EAST, RAYMOND MCLEAN, JAMES T. ALLARD & BARRY R. ALLARD v. ASSESSOR OF AREA 08 - NORTH SHORE/SQUAMISH VALLEY Supreme Court of British Columbia (A953458, A953459, A953460, A953461) Vancouver Registry Before the HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE C.F. Willms & J.L. Harry for the Appellants Craig East, Raymond McLean, James T. Allard & Barry R. Allard J.H. Shevchuk for the Respondent Vancouver, January 17 & 18, 1996 Strata Hotels -- Classification -- Residential v. Business and Other -- B.C. Reg. 438/81 -- Assessment Act, Section 80(3) -- Assessment Act, Section 26(8) -- Assessment Act, Section 4 -- Condominium Act, Sections 63 & 110 On December 15, 1994, B.C. Reg. 438/81 the Prescribed Classes of Property Regulation was amended to exclude certain types of condominium units pooled and operated as hotels from section 1, Class 1 - Residential of the regulation. A number of condominiums classified as Class 1 - Residential prior to the amendment were classified under section 6, Class 6 - Business & Other after the amendment. Certain owners of affected condominiums challenged the amendment on the grounds that the amendment was ultra vires the Legislature, that the amendment was retroactive and therefore not effective, that the amendment was ambiguous and uncertain, that the amendment was discriminatory, and that if the amendment was otherwise sustainable that the Assessor was required to value the condominiums on the income approach to valuation rather than the direct sales comparison approach HELD: The amendment was not ultra vires. The amendment was a regulation according to type or use and it had been passed in accordance with the provisions of the Assessment Act. If the amendment had retroactive effect, such effect was specifically contemplated by the Assessment Act. If the amendment discriminated, it did so in a manner expressly contemplated and permitted by the Assessment Act. Further, even within the same class of property it is possible for different approaches to valuation to be applied. Reasons for Judgment February 1, 1996

2 The Assessment Appeal Board has stated a case under s. 74(1) of the Assessment Act. The following paragraphs of the Stated Case set out the material facts and the questions asked of the court: 1. The structure under appeal consists of 67 strata title condominiums which are pooled by their owners and operated as Whistler Village Inns in Whistler, B.C. 2. The pooling agreement consists of an arrangement whereby the owners of the condominiums turn their strata units over to a management firm which rents them out as part of Whistler Village Inns. After all operational expenses have been paid, the net proceeds are divided among the participating members according to a pre-determined formula. 3. Because of restrictive covenants placed on titles in Whistler, and mandated by law, condominiums must be made available for rental under some form of pooling arrangement. Condominiums in ten buildings have been classified 6 - Business and Other while condominiums in one hundred and fifteen other buildings have been classified 1 - Residential. 4. Prior to the 1995 Assessment Roll all units were classified as Residential - Class For the 1995 Roll, however, the Assessor classified all the units in the Whistler Village Inns as Class 6 (Business and Other) because, in his opinion, they no longer qualified for the residential classification. 6. The owners of the units appealed the classification (Class 6) placed on their units to the 1995 Court of Revision, arguing that they should be classified as Residential (Class 1). The Court of Revision confirmed the classification on the Roll (Class 6). The actual value of these 67 units as condominiums determined on the direct sales comparison approach as of July 1, 1994 was $6,202,400 in the aggregate. 7. The Assessor did not value the 67 strata lots as an Inn but rather as 67 separate condominiums contained on separate titles and bought and sold as separate strata title units plus the strata lot, which is the common property All hotels in Whistler are assessed using the income approach. The condominiums in the structure under Appeal were assessed by the Assessor using the direct sales comparison approach for each individual strata titled condominium For 50% or more of the time during the period from October 31, 1993 to October 31, 1994 all of the strata lots which are the subject of this appeal were offered for rent or rented for periods of less than seven days to persons as overnight accommodations. The questions on which the Board is requested to ask for the opinion of the Supreme Court are: 1. On a true construction of B.C. Reg. 438/81, as amended by Order in Council 1570, are the properties participating in the condominium rental pool operated as the Whistler Village Inns required by law to be classified as Residential (Class 1) or required by law to be classified as Business and Other (Class 6) or does the Assessor have a choice in classification?

3 2. If the properties are classified class 6, may the Assessor determine the actual value of each condominium by using the direct sales comparison approach or must the Assessor determine the actual value of the properties participating in the rental pool by using the income approach? 3. Is Order in Council 1570 ultra vires, or of no force and effect with respect to the properties participating in the condominium rental pool? 4. Does Order in Council 1570 apply to the properties participating in the condominium rental pool for the 1995 Assessment Roll? This appeal was heard along with five others, all of which relate to strata title condominiums pooled by their owners and operated at Whistler in essentially the same manner as the Whistler Village Inns. As noted in para. 3 of the Stated Case (supra) all condominiums in Whistler are required to be operated in such a manner. The questions asked in this proceeding, and the three others in which Mr. Willms represents the Appellants, are identical. In the two proceedings in which Mr. Lakes represents the Appellants, the questions are somewhat different. I will answer those questions in separate reasons but, as the essential issues of law are the same, the reasons in this case will apply to all six appeals. In para. 7 of the Stated Case, it is stated that the Assessor valued the 67 strata lots as 67 separate condominiums. That course is required by ss. 63 and 110 of the Condominium Act, R.S.B.C ch. 61, which reads: 63. For the purposes of assessment and taxation, each strata lot, together with the share of its owner in the common property, common facilities and other taxable assets, shall be deemed to be a separate parcel of land and improvements For the purposes of assessment and taxation, each strata lot, together with its share in the common property, the common facilities and any taxable assets of the strata corporation, shall be deemed to be a separate parcel of land and improvements. Counsel offered no explanation for this virtual duplication of sections and I can offer none. The Assessor, as stated in para. 5 of the Stated Case, changed the classification of the units from Class 1 to Class 6 for the 1995 taxation year. His opinion that the units no longer qualified for the residential classification was based on an amendment made on December 15, 1994 to the regulations under the Assessment Act. The regulation governing classification is No. 438/81. Prior to December 15, 1994, so far as material to the present issues, that regulation read as follows: 1. Class 1 property shall include only: (a) land or improvements, or both, used for residential purposes, including single family residences, duplexes, multi-family residences, apartments, condominiums, manufactured homes, nursing homes, rest homes, summer and seasonal dwellings, bunkhouses, cookhouses, and ancillary improvements compatible with and used in conjunction with any of the above, but not including (i) hotels or motels other than the portion of the hotel or motel building occupied by the owner as his residence,

4 [The balance of the regulation covers various classes such as Crown lands and buildings, none of which are relevant material.] It will be convenient to refer to structures such as those involved in these proceedings as condominium hotels. They differ from the usual condominium structure in that the units are pooled under a single management which operates the structure so as to provide the services ordinarily provided by hotels. It is common ground that the purpose of the amendment of December 1994 was to eliminate the cost advantage conferred on condominium hotels by assessing them as Class 1 (residential), which was seen by the operators of regular hotels as unfair. Prior to that amendment, there had been an attempt to classify a condominium hotel as Class 6. In 1990, the property known as the Victoria Regent Hotel was assessed under Class 6 in reliance upon the exclusion of "hotels or motels" in s. 1(a)(i) of Reg. 438/81. That structure, situated on the inner harbour in Victoria, consisted of 57 strata title units of which, at the time of the assessment, 43 had been pooled and were being operated by a management company as a hotel. The decision of the Assessment Appeal Board directing that the "clustered" units be classified under Class 1 (residential) was upheld by Mr. Justice McColl and by the Court of Appeal. The judgments are reported as Assessor of Area 01 - Saanich/Capital v. Hardt, J. & S. et al, 4 B.C.S.C., (Case 302) The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeal is that, because the relevant unit for assessment purposes was the individual condominium units, it was irrelevant that they had been pooled in order to be operated as a hotel. Mr. Justice Cumming for the court said at p : Each of the subject properties, being an individual strata title, has a separate number on the Assessment Roll and must be separately assessed. The Board's finding is that the "subject group of condominiums is being used for the purpose of operating a hotel", not that each individual condominium constitutes a hotel. By no stretch of imagination could each of the individual condominiums be described as a "hotel", or as the same type of property as a hotel, and the Board did not so find. The power to make regulations relating to classification is, and was at the time of that decision, s. 26(8) of the Assessment Act: (8) The Lieutenant Governor in Council shall prescribe classes of property for the purpose of administering property taxes and shall define the types or uses of land or improvements, or both, to be included in each class. By Order in Council 1570 dated December 15, 1994, sub.sub. s. (iii) was added to Reg. 438/81. It reads, with the relevant language of the previously existing section: Class 1 property shall include only: (a) land or improvements, or both, used for residential purposes, including... condominiums... but not including (i) (ii) (iii) hotels (as above) n/a 20 or more strata lots

5 (A) on a parcel or contiguous parcels, (B) controlled or managed by persons, or a person, who control or manage 85% or more of the strata lots on the parcel or contiguous parcels referred to in clause (A), and (C) offered for rent, or rented, for periods of less than 7 days to persons, or a person, as overnight accommodation for at least 50% of the 12 month period ending on October 31 of the current calendar year; I will refer to sub-sub-s. (iii) as "the amendment" and to its three sub-subsections as (A), (B) and (C). The Appellants contend that the amendment, because it is not limited to defining the types or uses of lands or improvements to be excluded from Class 1, is beyond the powers conferred upon the Lieutenant Governor in Council by s. 26(8). They concede that (C) does define use but contend that, because the opening words (20 or more strata lots) do not define a type or use, and because neither (A) nor (B) standing alone defines a type or use, those provisions are ultra vires. I do not accept that submission. The whole of the amendment is a single provision, the effect of which is to exempt condominium hotels of a certain size from Class 1 if the units of the structure are on a single parcel or contiguous parcels with at least 85 per cent of the units being pooled. The fact that not all of its provisions directly define type or use does not make it any the less a regulation which defines type or use or both. Indeed, to some extent, even those provisions could be considered as defining "type" but it is enough to say that they create limitations relevant to the definition of type or use. The Appellants rely on other grounds for asserting that the amendment is invalid. The first is that the amendment does not apply to a structure in which fewer than 20 units are pooled. That is said to be discriminatory because, as is stated in para. 3 of the Stated Case, it results in ten buildings at Whistler being classified under Class 6 whereas 115 smaller operations, which are in competition with those ten, are classified as residential. On this point, the Appellants rely on the decision of this court in St. Helen's Hotel (Vancouver) Ltd. v. Assessor of Area 9 - Vancouver (1984), B.C. Stated Case 189. The property in that case was an old hotel building which had seen better days. The owners operated a beer parlour and rented out the rooms as long term residences. There was no issue as to the correctness of classifying the beer parlour as "business" but the owners challenged the classification of the room operation as business, contending that it should have been classified either as Class 1 (residential) or Class 8 (seasonal accommodation). The Assessment Appeal Board upheld the Assessor's position. On appeal to this court, Taylor, J. upheld the major aspects of the Board's decision and referred the matter back to it for further consideration on others. At p he said: Provided there is no discrimination in the application of the statute as between these premises and other similar premises in the City, the Board cannot be said to have erred in law in finding the whole property to be a "hotel" and therefore, by definition, outside the Class 1 "residential" category. * * * It follows that the only issue on which the appellant could succeed in the present case is that of equity, or "equitability". It has, of course, long been a principle of tax law, applicable in the administration of all forms of taxation, that there shall be no discrimination as between taxpayers except such as is expressly authorized by statute: Jonas v. Gilbert (1881) 5 S.C.R. 356; Reventhlow-Criminil v. Streamstown (1921), 63 S.C.R. 8; Chapman v. McLeod (1948) O.W.N. 395.

6 * * * The first and second questions submitted for the opinion of the court are answered in the negative with the qualification: "provided that the Board is satisfied that in reclassifying the property it did not treat the appellant's premises unfairly in relation to similar premises in the City occupied in a similar manner". That decision has no application to the issue now before the court. It is based on the duty upon the Assessor to not discriminate as between taxpayers. The "discrimination" here, which is between all properties having fewer than 20 units and all properties having 20 or more is, in the words of Mr. Justice Taylor "expressly authorized by statute". For this purpose, a valid regulation is no different from a statute; it is not rendered invalid by discriminating in the way it does. The next attack is based upon the words "on a parcel or contiguous parcels" in (A). The definition of "parcel" in the Assessment Act (so far as it may be applicable) reads: "parcel" means a lot, block, or other area in which real property is held or into which real property is subdivided,... Sections 63 and 110 of the Condominium Act (quoted supra) provide that each strata lot, for the purposes of assessment and taxation, together with the share of its owner in the common property, is deemed to be a separate parcel of land and improvements. So, the argument goes, the amendment to B.C. Reg. 438/81 which deals with assessment and taxation must be taken to employ the word "parcel" or "parcels" as meaning a strata lot or lots. The regulation therefore must be taken as referring to "20 or more strata lots on a strata lot or contiguous strata lots". If that was the language of the regulation, it would be an unworkable absurdity - that conclusion could be reached even without the assistance of Mr. Lakes' painstaking demonstration that a strata lot cannot be contiguous to more than eight other strata lots. The fact that such an interpretation would create an absurdity requires that interpretation to be rejected. The reference must be to "parcel" in the more ordinary meaning of that word, which is entirely consistent with the definition in the Assessment Act, of an area of land into which real property is subdivided. All strata lots are "on" a parcel of land. That is the sense in which the regulation refers to "parcel or contiguous parcels". It applies to the physical relationship of the units to the land. The circumstance that the land is assessed and taxed as part of the common property of each unit does not preclude such a reference for the purpose of classification. The attack on (B) is somewhat similar. It is directed against the provision that, in order for the group of lots to be excluded from Class 1, 85 per cent or more of the group of lots must be controlled or managed as therein defined. Therefore, it is argued, in a building with 100 units, 85 of which are being managed as a hotel but the remaining 15 of which are used for purely residential purposes, all 100 would come under Class 6. Mr. Shevchuk for the Assessor disputes that interpretation and says that the 15 units would fail to be assessed under Class 1. That issue may have to be resolved if and when it arises on the facts of a particular case. It does not arise on the facts of these cases because of the municipal requirement (see para. 3 of the Stated Case) that all strata lots in Whistler must be made available for rental under a pooling arrangement. In any event, even if the Appellant's submission is correct, this would again be a discrimination expressly authorized by statute. Mr. Willms, not supported in this instance by Mr. Lakes, makes a further submission based on s. 4 of the Assessment Act: 4. Where a building or other improvement extends over more than one parcel of land, those parcels, if contiguous, may be treated by the assessor as one parcel and assessed accordingly.

7 What is said to flow from this is explained in the following paragraph of Mr. Willms' brief: The regulation is subordinate legislation. It should be read in conjunction with section 4 of the Act which permits the Assessor to aggregate strata lots for the purpose of valuation for taxation purposes. If the Assessor chooses to aggregate under section 4 of the Act, he is then driven to exclude the aggregated contiguous parcels from Class 1 if subparagraphs (B) and (C) apply. If the Assessor does not choose to aggregate under section 4, the parcels are all Class 1. I see no reason why the regulation should be read in conjunction with s. 4 of the Act. The regulation deals only with classification, the section with assessment. Whether the section has any, and if any, what, application to assessment of strata lots was left an open question by the Court of Appeal in Assessment Commissioner v. James H. Houston (1979), 2 B.C. Stated Cases, Case 126, 753. Even if it has some application, it does not follow that the Assessor is required to rely on s. 4 of the Act as a condition of applying the amended regulation. The next issue arises from the fact, stated in para. 9 that: 9. All hotels in Whistler are assessed using the income approach. The condominiums in the structures under Appeal were assessed by the Assessor using the direct sales comparison approach for each individual strata titled condominium. That fact gives rise to the second question posed by the Board which is, in substance: must the Assessor, because he employs the income approach to determine the actual value of hotels, employ the same approach to determine the actual value of the strata lots which comprise the condominium hotels affected by the amendment? Again, the basis of the submission is that the Assessor is discriminating unfairly against the owners of the ten condominium hotels by using a different valuation approach from that which he applies to the "true hotels" at Whistler. That difference in valuation approach may be improper discrimination of the kind discussed in the St. Helen's Hotel case but it is not necessarily so. It may be quite justifiable to employ a different approach in respect of the condominium hotels, each unit of which must be assessed separately. The law does not require the Assessor to use the same approach in assessing all properties of the same class. As Taylor, J.A. speaking for the court in Vancouver Assessor, Area 9 v. Bramalea Ltd. (1990), 52 B.C.L.R. (2d) 218 said at 225: In fact there is no single mathematical formula for arriving in all cases at actual value; this is something which the Act recognizes, and the present case may well illustrate. * * * It seems to me that the Assessment Authority has the duty of deciding, so far as possible, in respect of each class of property an approach most likely to arrive at "actual value", as defined in law, and thereafter to apply available data to each in such a way as to ensure that all within the class are valued, so far as possible, on the same basis. Except to the extent justified by particular characteristics of individual lands and improvements, the Assessor is not permitted to discriminate between them in arriving at assessed value. The question whether the Assessor's use of different approaches in assessing "true hotels" and "condominium hotels" is discriminatory may be one which can be pursued in the continued hearing before the Board or in future proceedings. But the fact that different approaches have been used does not, by itself, invalidate the assessment.

8 After the decision in Bramalea, the Assessment Act was amended to remove the test of "fair and equitable" assessment in favour of the words of s. 44(1) which gives to the Court of Revision the power to "adjudicate... so that the assessments are at actual value applied in a consistent manner...". Subsequent to that amendment, the Court of Appeal held that the principle of fairness and equity in assessment still prevails. See Vancouver Assessor, Area No. 9 v. Lount, (1995), 10 B.C.L.R. (3d) 92. The remaining issue is the subject of the fourth question on which the Board asks for the Court's opinion. It is referred to by counsel for the Appellants as the retroactivity issue. Their position is that the amendment does not apply to the 1995 assessment roll. They say that, because of the several steps required by the Act to be taken from July 1 to November 30, 1994 in preparation for completing the assessment roll by December 31, 1994, the amendment came too late to affect that roll. The submission is supported by reference to the decision of the Court of Appeal in B.C. Fruit Packers Co-op v. Penticton Assessor, Area 17 (1989), 36 B.C.L.R. (2d) 16. Then as now, the valuation date for determining the actual value of property was July 1 of the year in which the roll is completed. The second key date at that time was September 30 which has since been changed to October 31. The significance of those dates appears from what is now s. 25.1(2): 25.1 (1)... (2) The actual value of property for an assessment roll is to be determined as if on the valuation date (a) the property and all other properties were in the physical condition that they are in on October 31 following the valuation date, and (b) the permitted use of the property and of all other properties were the same as on October 31 following the valuation date. On September 24, 1986, that being the year in which the roll was to be completed for the 1987 taxation year, a regulation was enacted which prevented the land in question from continuing to be classified as farm land. The court's conclusion was stated thus by Seaton, J.A. at p. 20: I am of the view that classification, which is only a means of calculating actual value, is not a "state or condition". The land was exactly the same on 30th September as it was 1st July. Its use and permitted use were the same. It was in the same state and condition. All that was changed was the method of valuation. I conclude that the regulation made on 24th September 1986 does not apply to the assessment roll prepared in 1986 for the purpose of taxation for The legislature moved with some alacrity to overrule that decision. On June 28, 1989, the Assessment (Amendment) Act S.B.C., 1989, c. 20 was given Royal Assent. It included these sections: 10. Section 80 is amended by adding the following subsection: (3) Unless the contrary is stated in the order or regulation, an order or regulation under any provision of this Act or any other Act respecting classification, valuation or exemption for assessment or taxation purposes that is made before October 1 in any year applies for the

9 purposes of assessment and taxation in the following taxation year and shall be used by the assessor in preparing the assessment roll for that taxation year. * * * 14. (1) Notwithstanding the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dated February 2, 1989 in B.C. Fruit Packers Co-operative and Naramata Co-op Growers Exchange v. Assessor Area 17 - Penticton, or any other decision of the Assessment Appeal Board or a court to the same effect made before or after this section comes into force, an order or regulation under the Assessment Act or any other Act respecting classification, valuation or exemption for assessment or taxation purposes that was made between June 30 and October 1 in any year applies for the purposes of assessment and taxation in the taxation year following the year in which it was made, and the assessment rolls for that taxation year shall be completed in accordance with the order or regulation. In 1990, the Assessment Act was extensively amended by the Assessment and Property Tax Reform Act, Section 14(1) was repealed as was s. 80(3). The latter was replaced by the present version: 80. (3) Where an order or regulation affecting classification, valuation or exemption on the assessment roll is made in any year, under this Act or another Act, on or before (a) the date fixed by section 2 for completing the assessment roll in that year, or (b) the date to which the date referred to in paragraph (a) is extended by a regulation under subsection (1)(c), the order or regulation applies for the purposes of assessment and taxation (c) (d) year. in the taxation year following the year in which the order or regulation is made, and subject to the order or regulation being amended or repealed, in any subsequent taxation Returning to the facts of this case, the amendment is a regulation affecting classification. It was made in 1994 before the date fixed by s. 2 for completing the assessment roll in 1994, i.e. December 31. Those requirements having been met, the present s. 80(3) requires the conclusion that the regulation applies for the purpose of assessment and taxation in 1995, that being the taxation year following the year in which the regulation was made. I do not understand the Appellants to contest the view that the plain meaning of the present section is that a regulation passed on or before December 31 is effective in the immediately ensuing taxation year. The argument, as I understand it, is that the legislature made the intention even more clear in the 1989 amendment by including in s. 14(1) the closing words which direct that the assessment rolls for that taxation year shall be completed in accordance with the regulation. So, it is suggested, to give to the present s. 80(3) its plain meaning would be to find that the legislature was guilty in 1989 of a tautology. As stated in Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed., p. 159, there is a presumption against tautology: It is presumed that the legislature avoids superfluous or meaningless words, that it does not pointlessly repeat itself or speak in vain. Every word in a statute is presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative purpose.

10 As Professor Driedger puts it at p. 162: Although the presumption against tautology is frequently invoked, it is also easily rebutted. In any event, it would be stretching the presumption to previously unheard of lengths to say that an existing provision of a statute is not to be given its plain meaning because to do so would imply that the legislature, in a now repealed section, was guilty of tautology. It is the present section which must be interpreted and applied. The other submission of the Appellants on this issue is that the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in the B.C. Fruit Packers case is conclusive and that the present s. 83 therefore cannot be given its plain meaning. But that reasoning applied only to the interpretation of the Assessment Act as it stood at the time of the decision. Quite apart from the fact that the legislature clearly intended to overrule that decision, the court's reasoning does not apply to the present wording. Finally, the Appellants complain that to treat the amendment as effective in taxation year 1995 would be to give retroactive effect to the amendment. The basis for that argument is that the Act required both actual value and classification to be determined by October 31, Therefore, to give effect to the amendment would be to retroactively alter the determination of classification made six weeks earlier. That is true but nothing follows from it. That moderate degree of retroactivity, which only affects what might be called the inner workings of the Assessor's office, is required by the language of s. 80(3). It is insignificant compared to the degree of retroactivity which was imposed by s. 15(2) of the 1989 amendment: 15. (2) Section 14(1) shall be deemed to have come into force on June 30, 1984 and is retroactive to the extent necessary to give it effect on and after that date and in respect of the 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 taxation years. The point is this: if the legislature expresses its will that the legislation be enforced retroactively, that must be done. The answers to the four questions set out in the Stated Case are: 1. The properties are required by law to be classified as Business and Other (Class 6). 2. Yes, provided that the use of the direct sales comparison approach does not discriminate improperly between condominium hotels and "real" hotels. 3. No. 4. Yes.

11 SC 379cont Craig East et al v. AA08 CRAIG EAST, RAYMOND MCLEAN, JAMES T. ALLARD, & BARRY R. ALLARD v. ASSESSOR OF AREA 08 - NORTH SHORE/SQUAMISH VALLEY British Columbia Court of Appeal (CA021575, CA021576, CA021577, CA021574) Vancouver Registry Before the HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CUMMING, the HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HINDS, and the HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BRAIDWOOD C.F. Willms & J.L. Harry for the Appellants J.H. Shevchuk for the Respondent Vancouver, January 13 & 14, 1997 Strata Hotels -- Classification -- Residential v. Business and Other --B.C. Reg. 438/81 -- Assessment Act - Section 80(3) -- Assessment Act - Section 26(8) -- Assessment Act - Section 4 -- Condominium Act - Sections 63 and 110 On December 15, 1994, B.C. Reg. 438/81, the Prescribed Classes of Property Regulation, was amended to exclude certain types of condominium units pooled and operated as hotels from Class 1 - Residential. A number of condominiums classified as Class 1 - Residential prior to the amendment were classified as Class 6 - Business and Other after the amendment. Certain owners of affected condominiums challenged the amendment on the grounds that the amendment was ultra vires the Legislature, that the amendment was retroactive and therefore not effective, that the amendment was ambiguous and uncertain, that the amendment was discriminatory, and that if the amendment was otherwise sustainable that the Assessor was required to value the condominiums on the Income Approach to valuation rather than the Direct Sales Comparison Approach. The Supreme Court of British Columbia held that the amendment was not ultra vires. The Appellants appealed. HELD: Appeals dismissed. Reasons for Judgment January 20, 1997 These are appeals from the orders of Esson C.J.S.C. (as he then was) pronounced 1 February 1996, in a number of Stated Cases from the Assessment Appeal Board. The Reasons for Judgment are reported at 132 D.L.R. (4th) 499 (B.C.S.C.) and 19 B.C.L.R. (3d) 151. The facts are fully and fairly set out in the Reasons for Judgment of the court below and need not be repeated here. We have carefully considered the very thorough submissions of counsel for the Appellants and the authorities to which they referred. We are not, however, persuaded that the learned judge below erred in any way as contended by the Appellants. On the contrary, in our view, the learned judge arrived at the correct conclusion for the extensive reasons which he gave and with which we are in substantial agreement.

12 We would, accordingly, dismiss these appeals.