Course Syllabus Course Information. Course Number / Section FINA Term Spring Classroom BLB 245. Professor Contact Information

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1 Course Syllabus Course Information Course Number / Section FINA Course Title Corporate Finance Seminar Term Spring 2018 Days & Times Wed 2:00 p.m. 4:50 p.m. Classroom BLB 245 Professor Contact Information Professor Tomas Mantecon Prieto Office 312 L Office Phone Office Hours Tuesdays 3:15 p.m. - 4:45p.m. and Wednesdays 11:30 a.m. 1:00 p.m. However, PhD students are welcome to drop by at other times as well, or to set up an appointment for some other convenient time. me if you wish to make an appointment. Address tomas.mantecon@unt.edu Course Description This seminar is an advance course in corporate finance. The final goal is to bring Ph.D. students to the frontier of knowledge of corporate finance so that they can conduct their own research and advance our knowledge in this field. Course Organization This course will be based on academic articles. You have the reading list in this syllabus for the first 12 class meetings. During the last 3 sessions of the course we will focus on topics which are the focus of recent research in corporate finance. I will provide the articles in advance. Students are expected to come to class prepared to discuss the assigned readings. These discussions should be the main source of learning. In every class session you will choose one of the assigned papers to write a referee report. The reports should consist of a minimum of two and a maximum of three pages. These reports must be submitted the day of the class meeting. The formatting of this report should have the following characteristics: Line spacing: Single; Font: Times New Roman, 11; Margins: Narrow (0.5 right, left, top and bottom). 1

2 You should also include an additional page with a letter to the editor recommending the acceptance of rejection of the paper. I will assign one of you to present a report in class, starting on the second class-session. These presentations should be similar to the presentations in professional meetings. They should be 20 minutes long, followed by 10 minutes of questions from the audience. Students are required to write a term paper. This should be an original research idea, a feasible attempt to extend the research frontier in corporate finance. This paper, at a minimum, should consist of 5 sections. Section 1, introduction; section 2: literature review; section 3, hypothesis to be tested. This paper can be a theoretical or empirical study. If you decide to write an empirical paper, you should provide, in sections 4 and 5 respectively, an explanation of the data you will be using and the methodology to conduct the empirical test. You will present a proposal of the paper on April 11. The final exam will be a 24-hour take-home final examination. The exam will consisting of questions similar to comprehensive exam questions. Suggested Supplementary Readings: A PhD level seminar should be an occasion to debate and to learn from each other. The discussion should be centered on exiting work and on unresolved problems in corporate finance. In my opinion, there is no adequate text-book that we can follow closely, but you may want to buy a couple of text books that contain a good summary of exiting literature: 1. Copeland, T.A., J.F. Weston, and Shastri, Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, Fourth edition, Pearson Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, The Theory of Corporate Finance by Jean Tirole, Princeton University Press,

3 Performance Evaluation a. Class presentations: 15% b. Referee reports: 15% c. Term Project: 30% d. Final Exam: 40% Grade Distribution 90% 100% = A 80% 89.9% = B 70% 79.9% = C 60% 69.9% = D Below 60% = F 3

4 1. Introduction - The Theory of the Firm Reading List Class Meeting 1 (Jan 17) Coase, R., (1937) "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, pp Klein, B. Crawford, RG and Alchian, AA., (1978) Integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process, Journal of Law & Economics, 21, 2, pp Williamson, OE, (1979), Transaction costs economics - Governance of contractual relations, Journal of Law & Economics, 22, 2, pp Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986) The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, Journal of Political Economy, 94, pp Hart, O., and Moore, J. (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 6, pp Jensen, M. (1993) "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Finance, 48, pp Zingales, L. (2000) In Search of New Foundations, Journal of Finance, 55, pp Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. The review of economic studies, 51(3), Capital Structure Class Meeting 2 (January 24) 2.1. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958) and the effect of taxes Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958) "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment," American Economic Review, June 1958, pp Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1963) "Corporate Income Taxes and the Cost of Capital," American Economic Review, June 1963, pp Miller, M. (1977) "Debt and Taxes," Journal of Finance, 32, pp DeAngelo, H., and Masulis, R., (1980) Optimal capital structure under corporate and personal taxation, Journal of Financial Economics, 8, pp MacKie-Mason, J. (1991) "Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions?" Journal of Finance, 45, pp Graham, J., (2000) How big are the tax benefits of debt? Journal of Finance, 55, 5, pp

5 Graham, John (2003) Taxes and Corporate Finance, A Review, Review of Financial Studies, 16, pp Leary, Mark T. and Michael R. Roberts (2005) Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures, Journal of Finance, 60, pp Financial Distress Warner, J. (1977) "Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence," Journal of Finance, 32, pp E. Altman, (1984) A further empirical investigation of the bankruptcy cost question, Journal of Finance, 39, pp Gilson, SC, John, K and Lang, LHP, (1990) Troubled debt restructuring - An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default, Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 2, pp Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1992) Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach, Journal of Finance, 47, pp Andrade, Gregor and Steven N. Kaplan (1998) How Costly is Financial (not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions, Journal of Finance, 53, pp Signalling Theories Class Meeting 3 (January 31) Leland, H. and D. Pyle (1977) "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, 32, pp Ross, S. (1977) "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive Signalling Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, 8, pp Agency-Based Theories Jensen, J. and W. Meckling (1976) "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics, 3, pp Myers, S. (1977) "Determinants of Corporate Borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, 5, pp Informational asymmetries and the pecking order hypothesis Ackerlof, G. A., (1970) "The market for lemons : Quality, uncertainty, and the market mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics 89, pp Myers, S. and N. Majluf (1984) "Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms have Information That Investors do not Have," Journal of Financial Economics, 13, pp Myers, S. (1984) "The Capital Structure Puzzle," Journal of Finance, 39, pp Dybvig, P. and J. Zender (1991) "Capital Structure and Dividend Irrelevance with Asymmetric Information," Review of Financial Studies, 4, pp

6 2.6. Market Timing Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2002) Market Timing and Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, 57, Surveys and Overviews Titman, S., and Wessels, R., (1988) The determinants of capital structure choice, Journal of Finance 43, pp Harris, M. and A. Raviv (1991) The Theory of Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, 46, Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1995) What do we know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data, Journal of Finance, 50, Graham, J. and C. Harvey (2001) The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance: Evidence from the Field, Journal of Financial Economics, 60, Corporate Payout Policy Class Meeting 4 (Feb 7) Black, F. (1976) "The Dividend Puzzle", Journal of Portfolio Management, 2, pp Miller, M., and Modigliani, F., (1961) Dividend policy, growth, and valuation of shares, Journal of Business, 34, pp Bhattacharya, S., (1979) "Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the 'Bird in the Hand' Fallacy," Bell Journal of Economics, Spring, T. Vermaelen, T., (1981) Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study, Journal of Financial Economics, 9, pp Miller, M. and K. Rock, (1985) "Dividend Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Journal of Finance, 40, pp Healy, P. and K. Palepu (1988) "Earnings Information Conveyed by Dividend Initiations and Omissions," Journal of Financial Economics, 21, pp Stephens, C. and Weisbach. M., (1998) Actual Share Reacquisitions in Open-Market Repurchase Programs, Journal of Finance, 53, pp Stephens, C., Jagannathan, and M. Weisbach (2000) Financial Flexibility and the Choice between Dividends and Stock Repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics, 57, pp La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A. (2000) Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance, 55, 1, pp Fama, E. and K. French, K., (2001) Disappearing Dividends: Changing Firm Characteristics or Lower Propensity to Pay? Journal of Financial Economics, 60,

7 Fama, EF; French, K., (2002) Testing trade-off and pecking order predictions about dividends and debt, Review of Financial Studies, 15, 1, pp Brav, A., J. Graham, C. Harvey and R. Michaely, (2005) Payout Policy in the 21st Century, Journal of Financial Economics, 77, Hoberg, G; Prabhala, NR, (2009) Disappearing Dividends, Catering, and Risk, Review of Financial Studies, 22, 1, pp Raising Capital 4.1. Initial Public Offerings Class Meeting 5 (Feb 14) Rock, K., (1986) "Why New Issues are Underpriced?" Journal of Financial Economics, 15, pp Tinic, S., (1988) Anatomy of initial public offering of common stock, Journal of Finance, 43, Allen, F. and Faulhaber, G., (1989) Signaling by underpricing in the IPO market, Journal of Financial Economics, 23, Benveniste, L, and Spindt (1989) How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer Price and Allocation of New Issues, Journal of Financial Economics, 24, J. Ritter, (1991) The long-run performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance, 46, Megginson, WL; Weiss, KA, (1991) Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings Journal of Finance, 46, 3, pp K. Hanley, (1993) The underpricing of initial public offerings and the partial adjustment phenomenon, Journal of financial Economics, 34, R. Cartter, F. Dark, and A. Singh, (1998) Underwriter reputation, initial returns, and the long-run performance of IPO stocks, Journal of Finance, 53, Pagano, M., F. Panetta, and L. Zingales (1998) Why do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis Journal of Finance. 51, 3, pp Loughran, T; Ritter, JR, (2002) Why don't issuers get upset about leaving money on the table in IPOs? Review of Financial Studies, 15, 2, pp Loughran, T; Ritter, J., (2004) Why has IPO underpricing changed over time? Financial Management, 33, 3, pp Pastor, L; Veronesi, P. (2005) Rational IPO waves : Journal of Finance, 60, 4, pp

8 Class Meeting 6 (February 21) 4.2. Security of Offerings Asquith, P. and D. Mullins (1986) Equity Issues and Offering Dilution, Journal of Financial Economics, 15, Mikkelson, WH, Partch M (1986) Valuation Effects of Security of Offerings and the Issuance. Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 1-2, pp Masulis, RW, Korwar, AN (1986) Seasoned Equity Offerings An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Financial Economics, 15, 1-2 pp Loughran, T. and J. Ritter (1995) The New Issues Puzzle, Journal of Finance, 50, Myers, SC., (2000) Outside equity, Journal of Finance, 55, 3, pp Jensen, MC., (2005) Agency costs of overvalued equity, Financial Management, 34, 1, pp Henderson, B., N. Jegadeesh, and M. Weisbach (2006) World Markets for Raising New Capital Journal of Financial Economics, 82, pp Kim, W. and M. Weisbach (2008) Motivations for Public Equity Offers: An International Perspective, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 87. pp Private Equity/Venture Capital Lerner, J. (1994) "Venture Capitalists and the Decision to Go Public," Journal of Financial Economics, Gompers, PA. (1995) Optimal Investments, Monitoring and the Staging of Venture Capital Journal of Finance, 50, 5, pp Kaplan, S. and A. Schoar (2005) Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows, Journal of Finance, 60, Kaplan, SN; Sensoy, BA; Stromberg, P., (2009) Should Investors Bet on the Jockey or the Horse? Evidence from the Evolution of Firms from Early Business Plans to Public Companies. Journal of Finance, 64, 1, pp Internal capital markets Stein, J. (1997) Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources, Journal of Finance, 52, Lamont, O. (1997) Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets, Journal of Finance, 52, Stulz, R and H. Shin (1998) Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113,

9 Scharfstein, D. and J. Stein (2000) The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent-Seeking and Inefficient Investment, Journal of Finance, 55, Corporate Governance and Control Class Meeting 7 (February 28) Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny, (1997) "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, 52, The Value of Governance Yermack, D., (1996) Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics, 40, 2, pp Stulz, RM, (1998) Managerial Control of Voting Rights Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 1-2, pp Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and Metrick, A., (2003) Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, Bebchuk, LA; Cohen, A., (2005) The costs of entrenched boards, Journal of Financial Economics, 78, 2, pp Core, J., W. Guay, and T. Rusticus, (2006), Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Analysts Expectations, Journal of Finance, 61, 2, pp Separation of Ownership and Control Fama, E., and M. Jensen, (1983) Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, Demsetz, H. (1983) "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics. 28,2, pp Jensen, M., (1986), Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, American Economic Review 76, Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1988) "Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Financial Economics. 20, 1-2, pp Berger, PG; Ofek, E; Yermack, DL. (1997) Managerial entrenchment and capital structure decisions Journal of Finance, 52, 4, pp La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A., (1999) Corporate ownership around the world, Journal of Finance, 54, 2 pp

10 Class Meeting 8 (March 7) 5.3. Internal Mechanisms of Control Incentive Contracts and Other Direct Incentives Jensen, M. and K. Murphy (1990) "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, 98, Hermalin, B. and M. Weisbach (1998) Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of Management, American Economic Review. 88, pp Weisbach, M. (1988) "Outside Directors and CEO Turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, 20, Yermack, D., (1996), Higher Market Valuation for Firms With a Small Board of Directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40, Shivdasani, A. and David Yermack (1999) CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Finance, 54, pp Huson, MR; Parrino, R; Starks, LT., (2001) Internal monitoring mechanisms and CEO turnover: A longterm perspective, Journal of Finance, 56, 6, pp Bebchuk, L, and J. Fried (2003) Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17, (Number 3), pp Fich, E., and A. Shivdasani, (2006) Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors? Journal of Finance, 61, 2, pp Management Turnover K. Murphy and J. Zimmerman, (1993). Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 16, D. Denis, D. Denis, and A. Sarin, (1997) Ownership structure and top executive turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 45, Bertrand, M. and A. Schoar (2003) Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, J. Coles and C. Hoi, (2003) New evidence on the market for directors: Board membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, Journal of Finance, 58, pp

11 5.4. External Mechanisms of Control Class Meetings 9 (March 21) and 10 (March 28) The Market for Corporate Control M. Jensen, (1986) Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers, American Economic Review 76, pp Roll, R., (1986) The Jubrys Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers Journal of Business, 59, 2, pp Scharfstein, D. (1988) "The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers," Review of Economic Studies, 60, Mitchell, M. and K. Lehn (1990) "Do Bad Bidders make Good Targets?" Journal of Political Economy, 98, Cotter, JF; Shivdasani, A; Zenner, M (1997) Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers? Journal of Financial Economics, 43, 2, pp Andrade, G; Mitchell, M; Stafford, E (2001) New evidence and perspectives on mergers Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, 2, pp Datta S, Iskandar-Datta M, Raman K., (2001) Executive compensation and corporate acquisition decisions Journal of Finance, 56, 6, pp Fuller, K; Netter, J; Stegemoller, M., (2002) What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions Journal of Finance, 57, 4, pp Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (2003) Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics, 70, J. Hartzell, E. Ofek, and D. Yermack, (2004) What s in it for me? CEOs whose firms are acquired, Review of Financial Studies 17, Moeller, SB; Schlingemann, FP; Stulz, RM., (2004) Firm size and the gains from acquisitions Journal of Financial Economic, 73, 2, Moeller, SB; Schlingemann, FP; Stulz, RM (2005) Wealth destruction on a massive scale? A study of acquiring-firm returns in the recent merger wave Journal of Finance, 60, 2, pp Rhodes-Kropf M, Robinson DT, Viswanathan S., (2005) Valuation waves and merger activity: The empirical evidence Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 3, pp Faccio M, McConnell JJ, Stolin D., (2006) Returns to acquirers of listed and unlisted targets Journal of Financial and Quantitiave Analysis, 41, 1, pp Dong M, Hirshleifer D, Richardson S, Teoh SH., (2006) Does investor misvaluation drive the takeover market? Journal of Finance, 61, 2, pp Lehn KM, Zhao MX., (2006) CEO turnover after acquisitions: Are bad bidders fired? Journal of Finance, 61, 4, pp

12 Malmendier U, Tate G., (2008) Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction Journal of Financial Economics, 89, 1, pp Devos E, Kadapakkam PR, Krishnamurthy S., (2009) How Do Mergers Create Value? A Comparison of Taxes, Market Power, and Efficiency Improvements as Explanations for Synergies Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3, pp Institutional investors Hartzell, J., and L. Starks, (2003) Institutional investors and executive compensation, Journal of Finance, 58, Parrino, R., R. Sias, and L. Starks, (2003) Voting with Their Feet: Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics, 68, Brav, A., W. Jiang, F. Partnoy, and R. Thomas (2008) Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance The Journal of Finance, Vol. 63. pp Protection of Shareholders Rights Class Meeting 11 (April 4) La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1997). Legal Determinants of External Finance Journal of Finance, 52, La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1998) Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy, 52, Rajan, RG; Zingales, L (1998) Financial dependence and growth, American Economic Review, 88, 3, pp Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., (2000) Tunneling American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90, La Porta, R; Lopez-De-Silanes, F; Shleifer, A, et al. (2002) Investor protection and corporate valuation:, Journal of Finance, 57, 3, pp Reese, W. and M. Weisbach (2002) Protection of Minority Shareholder Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 1, pp Dyck, A., and L. Zingales (2004) Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, Journal of Finance. 59, 2, pp Doidge, C., Karolyi, G.A., Stulz, R.M., (2004). Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more? Journal of Financial Economics. 71, 2, pp Desai, MA; Foley, CF; Hines, JR (2004) A multinational perspective on capital structure choice and internal capital markets, Journal of Finance, 59, 6, pp Doidge, C; Karolyi, GA; Stulz, RM (2007) Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance? Journal of Financial Economics, 86, Presentation of a proposal for your term project Class Meeting 12 (April 11) 12

13 Student Perceptions of Teaching (SPOT) Student feedback is important and an essential part of participation in this course. The student evaluation of instruction is a requirement for all organized classes at UNT. The short SPOT survey will be made available at the end of the semester to provide you with an opportunity to evaluate how this course is taught. You will receive an from "UNT SPOT Course Evaluations via IASystem Notification" (no-reply@iasystem.org) with the survey link. Please look for the in your UNT inbox. Simply click on the link and complete your survey. Once you complete the survey you will receive a confirmation that the survey has been submitted. For additional information, please visit the spot website at or spot@unt.edu. DISABILITY ACCOMODATION The University of North Texas is on record as being committed to both the spirit and letter of federal equal opportunity legislation; reference Public Law The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended. With the passage of new federal legislation entitled Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), pursuant to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, there is renewed focus on providing this population with the same opportunities enjoyed by all citizens. As a faculty member, I am required by law to provide "reasonable accommodations" to students with disabilities, so as not to discriminate on the basis of that disability. Student responsibility primarily rests with informing faculty of their need for accommodation and in providing authorized documentation through designated administrative channels. Information regarding specific diagnostic criteria and policies for obtaining academic accommodations can be found at Also, you may visit the Office of Disability Accommodation in the University Union (room 321) or call them at (940) If you need an accommodation, please contact me as soon as possible but at the latest by the second week of class. ACADEMIC DISHONESTY Academic dishonesty is defined in the UNT Policy on Student Standards for Academic Integrity. Any suspected case of Academic Dishonestly will be handled in accordance with the University policy and procedures. Possible academic penalties include a grade of F in the course. You will find the policy and procedures at If I suspect that you have engaged in academic dishonesty, I will deal with the situation as outlined in the University Policy shown above. You will be allowed to remain in the class during the entire time that the academic misconduct accusation is being investigated, adjudicated, and appealed. As noted above, the maximum academic penalty that can be assessed by an instructor is an F in the course. However, university officials use the academic misconduct information to decide if other misconduct sanctions are then to be applied, and the student has separate rights to appeal those decisions, remaining in the class until all appeals are exhausted. STUDENT EVALUATION OF TEACHING EFFECTIVENESS (SETE) 13

14 The Student Evaluation of Teaching Effectiveness (SETE) is a requirement for all organized classes at UNT. This short survey will be made available to you at the end of the semester, providing you a chance to comment on how this class is taught. I am very interested in the feedback that I get from students, as I work to continually improve my teaching. I consider participation in the SETE to be an important part of your involvement in this class and in all of your classes so please participate in the SETE process. The administration of the SETE will begin a couple of weeks before the end of the semester and remain open through the week of finals to try to maximize student SETE participation. You can access the SETE instrument by going to EAGLE CONNECT ACCOUNT All students should activate and regularly check their EagleConnect ( ) account. EagleConnect is used for official communication from the University to students. Many important announcements for the University and College are sent to students via EagleConnect. For information about EagleConnect, including how to activate an account and how to have EagleConnect forwarded to another address, visit STUDENT PERCEPTION OF TEACHING (SPOT) Student feedback is important and an essential part of participation in this course. The student evaluation of instruction is a requirement for all organized classes at UNT. The short SPOT survey will be made available to provide you with an opportunity to evaluate how this course is taught. You will receive an on from "UNT SPOT Course Evaluations via IASystem Notification" (noreply@iasystem.org) with the survey link. Please look for the in your UNT inbox. Simply click on the link and complete your survey. Once you complete the survey you will receive a confirmation that the survey has been submitted. For additional information, please visit the spot website at or spot@unt.edu. 14