SEMINAR (040643) CORPORATE FINANCE

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1 SEMINAR (040643) CORPORATE FINANCE GYONGYI LORANTH COURSE OBJECTIVE: This part of the course covers the modern Economic Theory of Corporate Finance. We will study the financing decisions of companies and their implications. While Economic Theory will constitute the core of the course, we will also discuss some of the empirical evidence supporting (or not) the theories, as well as link the academic work to real business decisions. COURSE FORMAT: The course will be based on students presentations on the topics listed below: TOPICS CAPITAL STRUCTURE Frank and Goyal, 2003, Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure, JFE 67, Baker and Wurgler, 2002, Market Timing and Capital Structure, JF 57, Welch, 2004, Capital Structure and Stock Returns, JPE 112, Leary and Roberts, 2005, Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures? JF 60, Myers and Shyam-Sunders, 1999, Testing the Static Trade-Off Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure, JFE 51, Titman and Wessels, 1988, The determinants of capital structure choice, JF 43, Leary and Roberts, 2005, Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures? JF 60, Myers and Shyam-Sunders, 1999, Testing the Static Trade-Off Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure, JFE 51, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, Payout Policy in the 21st Century, JFE, 77 (2005)

2 FINANCIALLY DISTRESSED RESTRUCTURINGS AND BANKRUTPCY Topic 1: Financial Distress and Restructuring Opler and Titman, 1994, Financial Distress and Corporate Performance, JF 49, A survey of the academic research on the topic: Senbet and Seward (1995), "Financial Distress, Bankruptcy and Reorganization," in Handbook of Operations Research and Management Science, Vol 9, North-Holland. Andrade and Kaplan (1998), How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress?, Evidence from Highly Leverage Transactions that Became Distress, The Journal of Finance, Volume 53 October, Asquith, Paul, Robert Gertner, and David S. Scharfstein (1994), The Anatomy of Financial Distress: An Examination of Junk-Bond Issuers, Quarterly Journal of Economics,109: Pulvino, Todd (1998), Do Asset Fire-Sales Exist?: An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions, Journal of Finance, 53: Topic 2: Bankruptcy Davydenko and Franks (2008), Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A Study of Defaults in France, Germany and the UK, The Journal of Finance, Volume 63, Franks, J. and O. Sussman (2005), Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Sized U.K. Companies, Review of Finance, 9, Jostarndt, P. and Sautner, Z. (2010). Out-of-Court Restructuring versus Formal Bankruptcy in a Non-Interventionist Bankruptcy Setting. Review of Finance, 14, Bris, A., Welch, I., and Zhu, N., (2006), The costs of bankruptcy: cash auctions versus Chapter 11Bankruptcies, The Journal of Finance, 61-3, Thorburn, K.S., (2000), Bankruptcy Auctions: Cost, debt recovery and firm survival, Journal of Financial Economics, 58, LAW AND FINANCE La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer and Wishny (2000), Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Economics Volume 58, Issue 1-2, Djankov, Mcliesh and Shleifer (2007), Private Credit in 129 countries, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 84, Issue 4, pages Djankov, Harrt, Mcliesh and Shleifer (2009), Debt Enforcement Around the World, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 116,

3 Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), Investor Protection and Equity Markets, Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 66, INTERNAL CAPITAL MARKETS Maksimovic V. and G. Phillips, 2002, Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Resources Inefficiently Across Industries? Theory and Evidence, Journal of Finance 57, Schoar, A., 2002, Effects of Diversification on Productivity, Journal of Finance, 57, Gertner, R., E. Powers, and D. S. Scharfstein, 2002, Learning About Internal Capital Markets from Corporate Spinoffs, Journal of Finance Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Internal Versus External Capital Markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics Volume 109, Stein (1997), Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources, Journal of Finance, Volume 52, SHARE CONCENTRATION, CONTROL RIGHTS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Overview surveys Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance 52, Becht, M., P. Bolton, and A. Roell, 2003, Corporate Governance and Control in G. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz eds., Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Amsterdam: Elsevier-North Holland). Yermack, D., 2010, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, Annual Review of Financial Economics, forthcoming. Topic 1: Separation of Ownership and Control Bolton P. and E. von Thadden, ``The Ownership Structure of Firms: The Liquidity/Control Tradeoff,'' Journal of Finance, 53, (1998), Burkart, M., Gromb, D. and F. Panunzi, ``Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders'' Journal of Political Economy, 106, (1998), Khan, Ch. and A. Winton, ``Ownership Structure, Liquidity Demand, of The Firm and Shareholder Monitoring,'' Journal of Finance, 53 (1998), Fama and Jensen, 1983, Separation of ownership and control, JLE 26, Himmelberg, C Hubbard, R G. and D. Palia, 1999, Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance, Journal of Financial 3

4 Economics. v53n3, p Sundaram and Yermack, 2007, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Theories of Takeovers and Control Transfers Bebchuk, Lucian A. (1994), Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart (1980), Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Problem and the Theory of the Corporation, Bell Journal of Economics, 11: Grossman, Sanford J., and Oliver D. Hart (1988), One Share One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control, Journal of Financial Economics, 20: Grinblatt, Mark, and Sheridan Titman (1998), Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy, Chapter 19, Irwin/MacGraw-Hill. Topic 2: Corporate Governance and Performance Core, J., R. Holthausen, and D. Larcker, 1999, Corporate Governance, Chief Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, Journal of Financial Economics 51, Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick, 2003, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, Core, J., W. Guay, and T. Rusticus, 2006, Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Analysts Expectations, Journal of Finance 61, Dittmar, A., and J. Mahrt-Smith, 2007, Corporate Governance and the Value of Cash Holdings, Journal of Financial Economics 83, Atanasov, Vladimir (2005), "How much Value can Blockholders Tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian Mass Privatization Auctions." Journal of Financial Economics, 76: Yermack (2006): Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior Shareholder Returns, Journal of Financial Economics, 80(1) Cremers, M., and A. Ferrell, 2010, Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Valuation, unpublished manuscript, Yale University. Topic 3: Governance and Mergers & Acquisitions Byrd, J., and K. Hickman, 1992, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids, Journal of Financial Economics 32, Brickley, J., J.Coles, and R. Terry, 1994, Outside Directors and the Adoption of PoisonPills, Journal of Financial Economics 35, Cotter, J., A. Shivdasani, and M. Zenner, 1997, Do Independent Directors Enhance Target Shareholder Wealth During Tender Offers? Journal of Financial Economics 43,

5 Field, L., and J. Karpoff, 2002, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms, Journal of Finance 57, Masulis, R., C. Wang, and F. Xie, 2007, Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns, Journal of Finance 62, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE Kaplan, Steve, and Antoinette Schoar, 2005, Private equity performance: Returns, persistence and capital, Journal of Finance 60, Kaplan, Steve, and Per Strömberg, 2003, Financial contracting theory meets the real world: An empirical analysis of venture capital contracts, Review of Economic Studies 70, Lerner, Josh, Antoinette Schoar, and Wan Wong, 2007, Smart institutions, foolish choices? The limited partner performance puzzle, Journal of Finance 62:6, Chemmanur Thomas, Karthik Krishnan, and Debarshi Nandy, 2009, How does venture capital financing improve efficiency in private firms? A look beneath the surface., Center for Economic Studies (CES) Working Paper at the U.S. Census Bureau. Gompers, Paul A, 1996, "Grandstanding in the Venture Capital Industry." Journal of Financial Economics 42 (September, 1996): Gompers, Paul A., Josh Lerner, and David S. Scharfstein, 2005, "Entrepreneurial Spawning: Public Corporations and the Formation of New Ventures, " Journal of Finance 60, no. 2 (April 2005) Hochberg, Yael and Alexander Ljungqvist, and Yang Lu, 2007, Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance, The Journal of Finance, Volume 62: Issue 1, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS Lowry and Schwert, 2004, Is the IPO pricing process efficient?, JFE 71, Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino, 2006, Capital Market Conditions and the Volume and Pricing of Private Equit Sales, Working Paper. Alon Brav, Christopher Geczy, Paul A. Gompers, 2000, Is the abnormal return following equity issuances anomalous?, Journal of Financial Economics, 56(2), B. Espen Eckbo, Ronald W. Masulis, Oyvind Norli, Seasoned public offerings: resolution of the `new issues puzzle, Journal of Financial Economics, 56(2), Rock, 1986, Why new issues are underpriced, JFE 15, Beatty and Ritter, 1986, Investment banking reputation, and the underpricing of initial public offerings. JFE 15,

6 Hertzel and Smith, 1993, Market discounts and shareholder gains for placing equity privately, The Journal of Finance Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 1993), pp Chen, Hsuan-Chi, and Jay Ritter, 2000, The seven percent solution, Journal of Finance 55, Ellis, K., Maureen O Hara, and Roni Michaely, 2000, When the underwriter is the market maker: An examination of trading in the IPO aftermarket, Journal of Finance 55, Ofek, Eli, and Matthew Richardson, 2003, Dotcom mania: The rise and fall of internet stock prices, Journal of Finance 58, Ritter, Jay R., and Ivo Welch, 2002, A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations, Journal of Finance 57, EXECUTIVE PAY Jensen M. & Murphy K. (1990), Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 2, pp Hall, Brian J.; Liebman, Jeffrey B. BAre CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?^ National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, No Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 1997 Bebchuk, L. & Grinstein, Y. (2005): The growth of Executive Pay, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 21, No.2, pp

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