Table IA.1 CEO Pay-Size Elasticity and Increased Labor Demand Panel A: IPOs Scaled by Full Sample Industry Average
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1 Table IA.1 CEO Pay-Size Elasticity and Increased Labor Demand Panel A: IPOs Scaled by Industry Average (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Ln(Market Value) (33.29) (30.84) (33.29) (33.29) (28.66) Ln(Market Value) x IPO Activity (4.14) (2.61) (1.89) (2.20) (2.48) IPO Activity (-3.36) (-1.92) (-1.25) (-1.65) (-2.41) Ln(Market Value) x PE Ratio (5.49) (5.89) Ln(Market Value) x Market Ret (-3.55) (-3.47) Excess Return (6.68) (6.80) (6.66) (3.98) Median Return (5.09) (5.31) (5.11) (4.09) Ln(Tenure) (1.56) (1.75) (1.51) (7.18) Intercept (11.50) (15.25) (1.95) (11.91) (23.04) Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Performance Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Level Elasticity No No Yes No No Year Level Elasticity No No No Yes Yes N 22,816 21,259 21,259 21,259 21,231 Adj. R-sq Avg. Pay Change ($, thousands) p-value < < <
2 Table IA.1 Continued Panel B: Total Assets (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Ln(Market Value) (37.97) (36.38) (37.97) (37.97) (33.96) Ln(Market Value) x IPO Activity (6.07) (3.57) (2.93) (2.91) (3.39) IPO Activity (-4.92) (-2.47) (-1.95) (-2.09) (-2.71) Ln(Market Value) x PE Ratio (5.75) (6.15) Ln(Market Value) x Market Ret (-3.55) (-3.61) Excess Return (10.68) (10.72) (10.65) (9.39) Median Return (9.25) (9.49) (9.13) (8.11) Ln(Tenure) (3.33) (3.42) (3.23) (8.56) Intercept (30.93) (24.57) (11.28) (17.19) (27.62) Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Performance Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Level Elasticity No No Yes No No Year Level Elasticity No No No Yes Yes N 22,566 21,104 21,104 21,104 21,079 Adj. R-sq Avg. Pay Change ($, thousands) p-value < < < < < This table reports the results of OLS regressions analogous to Table 1 with the following exceptions. Panel A scales IPO activity by the full sample average industry size. Panel B substitutes the natural log of total assets for the natural log of market value. PE Ratio is the Shiller P-E ratio. Market Ret. is the trailing 5-year CRSP value-weighted market return. Excess Return is the industry-adjusted log return on equity. Performance Controls indicates the inclusion of other firm performance related variables, detailed in Appendix 3. Industry Level Elasticity indicates an interaction between Ln(Market Value) and a full set of industry dummy variables. Year Level Elasticity indicates an interaction between Ln(Market Value) and a full set of year dummy variables. Average Pay Change is the mean change in compensation for a one standard deviation change in IPO Activity for a firm in the sample. p-value reports the p-value of the test of zero change in pay, evaluated at the mean firm market value in the sample. Reported are t-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the industry-year level. 61
3 Table IA.2 CEO Pay-Percentile Elasticity and Increased Labor Demand (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Percentile Rank (38.98) (37.71) (38.98) (38.98) (30.26) Percentile Rank x IPO Activity (4.55) (3.76) (3.48) (4.49) (4.12) IPO Activity (-0.91) (0.07) (0.27) (-1.32) (-1.70) Percentile Rank x PE Ratio (4.38) (4.27) Percentile Rank x Market Ret (-3.55) (-2.58) (5.93) (3.68) Excess Return (7.01) (7.22) (6.96) (4.24) Median Return (6.15) (6.22) (6.22) (5.34) Ln(Tenure) (1.65) (1.59) (1.62) (7.29) Intercept (22.55) (23.53) (12.86) (20.16) (37.78) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Performance Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Level Elasticity No No Yes No No Year Level Elasticity No No No Yes Yes N 22,816 21,259 21,259 21,259 21,231 Adj. R-sq This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is denoted in the column header. Ln(Market Value) is the natural log of market value of assets (debt + market value of equity). Percentile Rank is the firm s percentile rank in the industry in a given year. Percentile Rank x IPO Activity is the interaction of industry percentile rank and the three year trailing industry average number of IPOs, standardized by industry. PE Ratio is the Shiller P-E ratio. Market Ret. is the trailing 5-year CRSP value-weighted market return. Excess Return is the industry-adjusted log return on equity. Ln(Tenure) is the natural log of a CEO s tenure within her current spell. Performance Controls indicates the inclusion of other firm performance related variables, detailed in Appendix 3. Industry Level Elasticity indicates an interaction between Ln(Market Value) and a full set of industry dummy variables. Year Level Elasticity indicates an interaction between Ln(Market Value) and a full set of year dummy variables. Reported are t-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 62
4 Table IA.3 Labor Demand Effects on Pay-Size Elasticity Across Firm Sizes Ln(Market Value) (58.95) (64.34) (60.47) (44.01) (44.86) (43.57) Ln(Market Value) x IPO Activity (3.06) (3.59) (4.49) (2.53) (3.08) (3.14) IPO Activity (-2.47) (-3.08) (-3.96) (-2.10) (-2.66) (-2.80) Excess Return (6.69) (6.20) (5.83) (3.98) (3.89) (3.62) Median Return (5.21) (5.12) (4.27) (4.35) (4.51) (4.23) Ln(Tenure) (1.53) (1.63) (0.94) (7.22) (7.41) (7.00) Intercept (11.72) (8.87) (5.99) (22.47) (19.75) (14.67) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Performance Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Level Elasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 21,259 20,420 18,771 21,231 20,408 18,784 Adj. R-sq This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is denoted in the column header. Ln(Market Value) is the natural log of market value of assets (debt + market value of equity). Ln(Market Value) x IPO Activity is the interaction of log market value and the three year trailing industry average number of IPOs, standardized by industry. Ln(Tenure) is the natural log of a CEO s tenure within her current spell. Performance Controls indicates the inclusion of other firm performance related variables, detailed in Appendix 3. Year Level Elasticity indicates an interaction between Ln(Market Value) and a full set of year dummy variables. Reported are t-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 63
5 Table IA.4 Labor Demand Effects on Cash Only Compensation Ln(Salary + Bonus) Ln(Salary Only) Ln(Market Value) (44.01) (44.86) (43.57) (24.47) (30.08) (27.39) Ln(Market Value) x IPO Activity (2.53) (3.08) (3.14) (3.09) (3.16) (3.26) IPO Activity (-2.10) (-2.66) (-2.80) (-2.92) (-3.02) (-3.15) Excess Return (3.98) (3.89) (3.62) (-2.92) (-2.69) (-2.56) Median Return (4.35) (4.51) (4.23) (-2.32) (-2.16) (-1.62) Ln(Tenure) (7.22) (7.41) (7.00) (8.80) (9.17) (9.07) Intercept (22.47) (19.75) (14.67) (28.34) (24.67) (17.47) Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Performance Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Year Level Elasticity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N 21,231 20,408 18,784 21,208 20,387 18,768 Adj. R-sq This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is denoted in the column header. Ln(Market Value) is the natural log of market value of assets. Ln(Market Value) x IPO Activity is the interaction of log market value and the three year trailing industry average number of IPOs, standardized by industry. Excess Return is the industry-adjusted log return on equity. Ln(Tenure) is the natural log of a CEO s tenure within her current spell. Performance Controls indicates the inclusion of other firm performance related variables, detailed in Appendix 3. Year Level Elasticity indicates an interaction between Ln(Market Value) and a full set of year dummy variables. Reported are t-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the firm level. 64
6 Table IA.5 Within-Industry Executive Transitions Panel A: Firm Enters After 1993 All Transitions Upward Transition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) IPO Activity (2.54) (2.85) (3.03) (1.48) (2.14) (2.27) Ln(Market Value) (2.38) (1.63) Excess Return (0.07) (0.02) (-1.45) (-1.51) Median Return (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) Performance Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Number Transitions Time at Risk 42,942 38, 38, 42,942 38, 38, Wald Chi-Sq P-value < <
7 Table IA.5 Continued Panel B: Spell Enters After 1993 All Transitions Upward Transition (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) IPO Activity (5.50) (4.62) (4.91) (3.56) (3.29) (3.50) Ln(Market Value) (5.03) (3.53) Excess Return (0.32) (0.37) (-0.76) (-0.74) Median Return (2.96) (2.92) (2.17) (2.13) Performance Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Number Transitions Time at Risk 95,756 88,932 88,932 95,756 88,932 88,932 Wald Chi-Sq P-value < < < < < This table reports the results of competing risk hazard models. The failure event is denoted in the column headers. All Transitions includes all executives who leave a firm within the sample and appear in the top five executives of another firm within the industry within two years. Upward Transition requires the executive s total compensation to increase following the transition. The competing risks are defined as: a transition to a different industry, the executive s exit from Execucomp, or for Upward Transition a decrease in total compensation. IPO Activity is the three year trailing industry average number of IPOs, standardized by industry. Ln(Market Value) is the natural log of market value of assets. Excess Return is the industry-adjusted log return on equity. Performance Controls indicates the inclusion of other firm performance related controls, detailed in Appendix 3. Reported are sub-hazard ratios with z-statistics in parentheses, clustered at the industry-year level. Only firms first observed after 1993 (Panel A) and spells beginning after 1993 (Panel B) are included in the sample. 66
TABLE I SUMMARY STATISTICS Panel A: Loan-level Variables (22,176 loans) Variable Mean S.D. Pre-nuclear Test Total Lending (000) 16,479 60,768 Change in Log Lending -0.0028 1.23 Post-nuclear Test Default
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