Longevity risk in society

Transcription

1 A mature market Building a capital market for longevity risk

2 A capital market for longevity risk could help address the challenges of funding longer lives. An increased awareness of this risk, the frequent and consistent publication of data, along with the establishment of a liquid secondary market, are all key factors to consider. A market would form part of an overall solution involving the co-operation and innovation of the public and private sectors to ensure that we continue benefitting from our ageing societies. 2 A mature market

3 Longevity risk in society On average, people are living longer and are having fewer children. This is placing pressure on many societies capability to fund the income for citizens longer lives. The phenomenon has affected many areas of society, including: n Governments who are bound to pay state and civil service pensions n Employers who sponsor defined benefit pension schemes for employees n Individuals who seek to ensure the safety of their future retirement income n Insurers who offer products such as annuities, which protect against longevity risk Consequently, the exposure to longevity risk the risk of increased costs arising from underestimating life expectancy is spread widely across society. Many stakeholders might not be aware that they are exposed to such risk (Figure 1). Figure 1 Scenarios illustrating society s exposure to longevity risk Defined benefit pension funds sponsored by private companies Members live longer than expected and exhaust pension fund assets Additional funds must be deployed by the company Longevity risk borne by shareholders Defined benefit pensions sponsored by governments Retirees live longer than expected Additional funds must be deployed by the government Longevity risk borne by taxpayers Defined contribution pension schemes Individual accumulates retirement assets Individual purchases annuity with assets Individual funds retirement through investment income and asset sales Longevity risk borne by insurer Longevity risk borne by individual Source: Swiss Re, 2012 Swiss Re 3

4 Longevity risk in society The potential financial impact of this longevity risk is enormous. Each additional year of life expectancy raises pension liabilities by about 4-5%. Taking into account other costs to society, it is estimated that if individuals live just three years longer than expected, the cumulative costs of ageing could increase by 50% of GDP in advanced economies and 25% of GDP in developing economies 1. This is aggravated by the on-going low interest rate environment and poor investment returns, meaning that assets set aside to cover future pension payments are earning less investment return than expected. To what extent are shareholders exposed? The funding level the ratio between existing assets and the expected retirement obligations of the Global 500 companies pension funds is just below 76%. This means that the average pension scheme is underfunded by 24%, although this figure varies between companies and geographical regions 2. There are large global institutions with pension liabilities much greater than their total market capitalisation. For such companies, even relatively modest increases in pension liabilities due to higher life expectancy could destroy a significant proportion of shareholder value. Many insurance and reinsurance companies (re/insurers) offer, as part of their core business activities, a number of solutions for protection against longevity risk. These vary from annuities offered to individuals and pension plans to longevity insurance sometimes called indemnity longevity swaps for pension funds and insurance clients. Due to their ability to partly diversify the risk against their mortality portfolios, reinsurers are particularly well placed to take on longevity risk. Recent years have seen increases in longevity re/insurance, where a reinsurer assumes the risk of a specific pension group living longer than expected, thus removing the longevity risk from the pension fund. Reinsurers remain able to provide cost-effective longevity solutions as current client demand falls within reinsurers annual capacity targets. But the scale of exposure means that this cannot remain the case in the long term on a global basis, the aggregate value of private defined benefit pension liabilities totals USD23 trillion 3. Liabilities from other sources, such as annuities, are continually growing yet represent a fraction of this figure. To put this into context, the assets held by the global insurance industry to cover non-life risks, including natural catastrophes, totals USD2.6 trillion. Society s longevity risk could be tackled to a greater extent if re/insurers were able to expand their capacity and this could be done by encouraging capital markets investors to invest in longevity instruments. However, developing capital markets for such a new and specific type of risk is not simple and faces many challenges. This publication seeks to explain how a capital markets solution may be developed to provide long-term longevity risk capacity. 1 International Monetary Fund, Towers Watson, International Monetary Fund, A mature market

5 Transferring risk to the capital markets Capital markets, in particular equity and bond markets, allow companies to raise funds by letting investors participate in the company s profits. This involves promising to pay investors a premium to compensate them for risks to which they are exposed. In well-developed capital markets, there are efficient secondary markets. Here, the securities and instruments can be traded freely between investors at any time, at a published price, allowing them to change and manage their exposure on a real time basis. Developing longevity capital markets would involve creating instruments allowing a seller of longevity risk to pay a premium or coupon to investors and, in return, investors would assume the risk of losing some, or all, of their investment if future improvements in life expectancy are higher than a pre-agreed rate. A sample format of such instrument is a longevity bond (see Figure 2), although there are many other forms such as derivatives. Figure 2 A sample longevity bond with secondary market prices If life expectancy does not improve beyond a pre-determined level USD100m investment in longevity bond Investor receives coupons, for example USD5m Investor receives the USD100m back in addition to earned coupons Investor loses part or all of their investment If life expectancy improves beyond a pre-determined level Swiss Re 5

6 Longevity risk in society Figure 2 (continued) Sample Longevity bond Value of bond on secondary market example Value in USDm Year Big changes in value at the point when life expectancy data is published Life expectancy improvements better than expected, triggering a loss. This is released by investors over time and price gradually decreases Value of bond on secondary market example Value in USDm Year In early stages it appears that life expectancy will improve and trigger a loss, so bond prices drop Further in time, the life expectancy improvements slow down and market believes there won t be a loss. Additionally, interest rates go down making the 5% coupon rate more attractive Source: Swiss Re, 2012 We have seen capital markets already develop for a number of risks. The cases of inflation and insurance-linked securities (ILS) markets demonstrate how the market for longevity could grow and indicate some of the challenges. 6 A mature market

7 Case study A Developing the UK inflation market lessons for longevity The first UK inflation-linked bonds were issued by the government in the early 1980s. They allowed the government to match payouts on coupons with revenues received from taxes. Investors who required protection from inflation were able to buy the bonds and receive inflation-linked payments. Over time, regulation played a big role in fuelling the demand for, and supply of, inflationlinked instruments. For example, the Pension Act 1995 required pension funds to increase benefits in line with inflation, creating a higher demand for inflation-linked bonds than was actually available. Additionally, index-based pricing restrictions meant that revenues of UK utility companies were linked to inflation. Investment banks took the opportunity to structure transactions that matched their clients opposing needs. For example, they created products matching the revenues of utility companies with inflation-linked liabilities of pension funds, allowing utility companies to issue inflation-linked instruments which were purchased by pension funds. As their risk appetite changed, holders of inflation-linked instruments would want to trade their exposure when required and, for this to be possible, a secondary market had to develop. Further, to attract more investors, transparency and additional information were required about the payments, mechanics and the underlying risk on instruments. In the case of the initial bonds, transparency was achieved by developing clear ways of translating the published inflation information into how much the bond would pay. This meant that investors could trade their inflation-linked instruments in a large and liquid secondary market, which also allowed new lower-cost solutions to develop. Overall, the inflation market brings a number of lessons for developing capital markets for longevity: n The crucial role that legislation plays in shaping clients needs n The importance of having a widely accepted, reliable benchmark index for measuring risk n The importance of transparent pricing and market values to investors for developing a secondary market There are also a number of notable differences between inflation risk and longevity risk: n Inflation had been monitored and indices published for some time before the first instruments were issued, and inflation was a well-known topic before the markets were developed this is not the case for longevity risk n Inflation indices are largely published on a monthly basis on a known day published data is standardised and treated as price-sensitive; longevity information is currently only published on an annual basis with time lags of six or 12 months in many cases n Inflation indices are impacted directly by many market factors, such as oil prices or tax policy; longevity is not directly linked to market factors Swiss Re 7

8 Case studies Case study B ILS an evolving market Insurance linked securities (ILS) allow re/insurers to transfer a proportion of their exposures to natural catastrophes, like windstorms and earthquakes, certain life insurance risks, such as influenza pandemics, and other perils to the capital markets. These exposures require re/insurers to hold significant capital and the ILS market provides an attractive tool to manage their balance sheets. In the early days of the ILS market, issuers had to pay relatively high premiums to overcome investors discomfort with underlying models and the perception that issuers better understood the risks. As a result, transactions were short term and structures were relatively simple. A large proportion of initial investors were other re/insurers with a degree of comfort about the risk and who sought to earn an attractive investment return. Over time, as markets developed, improved liquidity and the fact several independent risk models became publicly available gave investors and issuers additional insights into market pricing. This provided investors with more confidence they could access a secondary market. This also led the way to new investors such as traditional money managers and specialised funds seeking non-correlated assets to enter the market. The growth of the ILS market was also helped by the expansion in the range of risks covered. For example, Swiss Re securitised the expected long-term future profits on blocks of life insurance business through the Queensgate and Alps Capital II transactions. The interest from investors supported an increase in the volume of catastrophe bonds issued between 2001 and While this trend was reversed as a result of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, volumes picked up again over 2010 and 2011 (Figure 3). Figure 3 Catastrophe bond outstanding value and issuance 18,000 USD million 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2, Property issuance Life & Health issuance Property outstanding Total outstanding Source: Swiss Re, A mature market

9 The development of the ILS market provides a number of interesting lessons for the longevity market: n The importance of educating investors to have a sufficient understanding of the risk n The importance of third-party models that provide an independent view about the level of risk and the expected loss to allow better comparison n The importance of a premium price that is attractive to early investors There are however a number of additional challenges associated with the development of longevity as an asset class: n Longevity is not considered event-driven like traditional ILS risks and it typically develops over a period which could extend more than 60 years. n It is expected a robust secondary market will take time to develop due to the long-term nature of longevity risk. What are the challenges in attracting investors to capital markets for longevity? Inflation and ILS demonstrate that developing a market takes time and there are obstacles to overcome. The main challenges include achieving transparency in measuring the risk and potential liability, building a secondary market, increasing investor education, providing the right level of return and regulation. Given the importance of transparency for investors, a reliable and widely accepted benchmark index will be needed. The recently formed Life & Longevity Markets Association (LLMA) has published longevity indices which provide a reference for transactions in England and Wales, Germany, the Netherlands and the US. However it will take time before these indices are used widely. Another obstacle is the necessary timeframe. Longevity risk requires a long-term transaction because a large proportion of liabilities will be paid in 30 to 40 years. This far into the future aspect may cause concern, since uncertainty around life expectancy increases over longer time horizons. Such a long-term requirement for protection is often in contrast to investor preferences. Experience from ILS markets shows that many investors are happy to hold a short-dated instrument until maturity. However, for an instrument as long dated as longevity, most investors will require the flexibility to trade their securities on secondary markets to exit their position in a timely and efficient manner. Such a market would be developed over time to attract enough investors to provide the required demand and supply. Swiss Re 9

10 Case studies Case study C Kortis a first step to transfer longevity to capital markets In late 2010, Swiss Re issued a USD50m bond covering USD500m of longevity trend risk to the capital markets through the Kortis ILS programme, the first bond of its kind. The bond uses government-issued data to track the longevity experienced by two populations over an eight-year period. The two populations are UK men aged 75-85, which can be seen as representing Swiss Re s pension exposures, and US men aged can be seen as representing Swiss Re s life insurance exposures. The bond looks at the offsetting nature of payments between pensions and life insurance policies. So if people generally live longer than expected, more payments are required for pensions but fewer payments are required under life insurance policies. However if different populations experience different improvement rates specifically if those with pensions experience much greater improvement than those with life policies the additional offset effect may be lost. It is in this circumstance that the bond is providing protection to Swiss Re and if this event occurs investors will lose some or all of their investment. Figure 5 Illustration of historic mortality improvements 5% Annualised index mortality improvement 4% 3% 2% 1% 0-1% -2% US index UK index Mean projections Risk period start and end Reproduced by kind permission of Risk Management Solutions, 2012 Figure 5 shows historical average mortality improvements for both the UK population the orange line and US population the red line. Historically, improvements have been volatile but came together in the mid-1980s to 2000, with a difference in trend developing since the year The years covered by the Kortis bond are shown between the black dotted vertical lines, with the solid lines being the modelled expected improvements. If the gap between the two improvements diverge significantly this will trigger the payment to Swiss Re of the protection provided by the bond. 10 A mature market

11 Transparency To provide comfort for investors, a number of measures were taken to aid transparency about the risk included in the bond. The risk of the bond being triggered was modelled by an independent consultant, which provided a risk analysis as part of the bond s sales information. Also, a rating from one of the credit rating agencies was obtained. This gave investors independent reference points in assessing the investment risk. Secondary market Following the initial issuance, there has been some secondary trading between investors, and new investors have also purchased the bond. Such secondary market interest potentially reflects an increased awareness and appetite for longevity risk. In order for investors to become comfortable investing in longevity, the understanding of the risk will need to improve through active investor education. This will enable more informed decisions about the level of premiums that will encourage investment. On the other hand, regulation regarding the recognition of longevity risk will impact the premiums that issuers would pay. The support of a wide range of investors is crucial to the development of any market. Swiss Re 11

12 Investors opinion The following examples taken from interviews with potential investors represent the diversity in opinion on a capital market s potential for development. Andrea Cavalleri Securis Investment Partners Head of Life Origination I am doubtful about the potential for an explosion in the capital markets for longevity. My main concern rests upon the pricing component. For a market to develop, prices need to show a good value both for the investors as well as the sponsor of the deal. I believe that the prices offered currently do not reflect the true extent of the underlying longevity risk, and therefore there is a gap between what sponsors are willing to pay and what investors expect to earn for taking the risk. In bridging this gap, there is a big role that the regulators, auditors and rating agencies could play. They can require companies and pension funds to show the true extent of the risk in their reserving and capital adequacy requirements. This would in turn make it worthwhile for sponsors to transfer the risk at prices attractive to investors. Marcel Grandi Credit Suisse AG, Head of Underwriting ILS I also believe that the structures will need to become more attractive to investors; bringing an element of leverage into the structure is attractive to investors and may be key for longer-dated risk transfer. More out-of-the-money structures cause less volatility and therefore may be preferable. The market is slightly lagging behind our expectations from three to four years ago. The majority of deals being originated by banks currently just end up with reinsurers. This is because reinsurers still have capacity and, given their knowledge of the underlying risk, are easier to do business with compared to pure capital market investors. This applies especially to considerations of cover, provision of collateral and the lack of liquidity in the secondary market. Given the limited capacity of reinsurers compared to the total market exposure, the medium to long-term assessment of the development of a capital market for longevity risk is very optimistic. This may also be aided by the greater attention that is being placed on longevity risk by the market and regulations. I believe there is still not enough education in the capital markets, and reinsurers could play a large role in this area. Also, secondary market liquidity will need to improve so that investors will be able to trade their positions at a fair price. Finally, it would help if structures made it easier for investors to make comparisons between different trades, which could be achieved by additional support from modelling agencies or issuing more indexlinked trades 12 A mature market

13 How could capital markets work in practice? Who should invest in longevity instruments? There is much debate over who the potential investors in longevity products might be. In swap markets that have developed before such as interest rate, currency or inflation the parties in the transaction had an opposite exposure. In the case of interest rates, for example, one party benefited from an interest rate increase and another party benefited from an interest rate decrease. In the case of longevity, there is not necessarily a clearly identified party which would financially benefit from people living longer than expected and has the required scale to support a large market. In the search for investors with opposite exposures, some thought has been given to care-home providers and pharmaceutical companies. This seems anecdotal given that care homes are unlikely to have sufficient funds and pharmaceutical companies tend to invest in research rather than financial instruments. Developing capital market instruments for transferring longevity risk would inject more capacity into the market, as well as lead to longevity being traded in a more transparent way, bringing clarity to the parties involved. In the long term, this would allow investors to choose whether to assume longevity risk, instead of being indirectly exposed through other asset classes like equities. The market for longevity is likely to consist of an investor base which takes longevity risk to earn a return and act as a diversifier from financial market risk, rather than hedge to offset their own exposure. What function could longevity instruments play in investors portfolios? In a sample investment portfolio including a wide range of instruments such as equities, government bonds and corporate bonds investors are exposed to a wide variety of risks, such as: n The overall economic performance n Technological change n Regulatory / legal changes n Unexpected catastrophic events such as hurricanes n The risk that a company s pension fund will need to be topped up due to insufficient assets to cover liabilities Investors already have an indirect exposure to longevity risk through the pension obligations of the issuers of corporate bonds, equities and government bonds. Therefore, by bringing longevity instruments into their portfolio they would not necessarily expose themselves to a new risk. Instead, their exposure to longevity risk would become more transparent, especially if the instrument is linked to an established index. In this sense, longevity instruments could be an alternative to other income-paying asset classes such as corporate bonds. Investors could use them to enhance their returns and/ or optimise their portfolio structure depending on needs such as diversification. Swiss Re 13

14 How could capital markets work in practice? Would pension funds buy longevity protection directly from the capital markets? Given their exposure to longevity risk, pension funds have a strong interest in the development of capital markets. However, there are a number of reasons why custodians of company pension schemes may be reluctant to pursue such an index solution. A pension fund s members are distinct from the general population Company pension schemes contain a specific profile of members, so mortality developments for a single plan are likely to be significantly different to those in the overall population. See Figure 6 below. Figure 6 UK period life expectancy at 65 by socio-economic class 19 Period life expectancy at 65 by socio-economic class I Professional II Mangerial & Technical IIIN Skilled Non-manual IIIM Skilled Manual IV Partly Skilled V Unskilled Unclassified* Difference of 4.1 years between professionals and unskilled workers in *Unlassified data does not include year 2006 Source: Office for National Statistics, Swiss Re calculations Index-linked protection would represent the mortality improvements of the overall population. However, the majority of pension funds cover more people in a specific socio-economic group, who are likely to experience different mortality improvements. Therefore index-based longevity protection would not cover the longevity risk specific to that pension fund without the indices accounting for this in some way. 14 A mature market

15 The low number of members in a single fund will cause uncertainty A pension fund represents a very small proportion of people in a country for example a plan with just 10,000 members represents just 0.1% of all UK pensioners meaning that straightforward statistical fluctuations would make risk mitigation highly challenging. A large proportion of the liabilities is dependent on a few individuals The distribution of risk is often skewed towards a small sub-group of members. It is not unusual for 50% of liabilities to arise from the benefits of just 10% of members. This means that the total payments made by a pension fund will be dependent to a greater extent on the life expectancy of members with higher promised benefits. Overall, the risk that the longevity profile specific to the pension plan differs substantially from the model used for reference known as basis risk presents concerns when considering an index solution. The amount of research required for a detailed understanding involves significant investment often beyond the means of most pension plans. However, pension funds can avoid this risk by receiving indemnity protection from re/insurers. Insurers and reinsurers can then aggregate longevity risk on their books and use index-based solutions to manage their overall exposures, supported by their expertise in managing the basis risk. Reinsurers in particular often have the capabilities, global scale and diversification to take on such risks on pension funds behalf. For re/insurers to purchase the protection from capital markets when required, these markets will need to develop further. Swiss Re 15

16 The way forward A liquid market for longevity capital instruments will not develop until investor awareness of this asset class increases significantly. This would involve a number of stakeholders in the industry finding new investors interested in longevity-linked assets. In the meantime, the market will need a number of buy-and-hold investors who have a long-term view in order to bridge the gap between the current situation and the eventual development of a liquid market. Since investors ultimately aim to maximise returns, the premiums paid on longevity instruments will need to be attractive. As in the case of early ILS markets, a particularly attractive premium may be required to draw enough investors to provide capacity in the early stages. Insurance companies, some specialised funds and hedge funds have the potential to drive the initial phase of this market s development. The development of a liquid market will be greatly aided once more widely-accepted, independent risk models become publicly available. This will enable investors to build more knowledge about longevity risk. Consistent accounting rules across international borders for analysing longevity risk are also vital for an increased understanding of the risk and greater interest in a developing market. While the investor base is growing, it is anticipated that re/insurers will accumulate longevity risk on their balance sheets through providing indemnity solutions to pension funds as well as through individual annuities. As they are best placed to hold the risk, re/insurers are likely to aggregate longevity risk on their balance sheets on an indemnity basis and use index-linked solutions to manage their own exposures. As the market develops, they can increase their capacity via capital markets to offer more of the indemnity solutions needed by pension funds and individuals. Figure 7 represents the key elements needed to build a capital market for longevity risk. 16 A mature market

17 Figure 7 The building blocks for a longevity risk capital market Increasing awareness of investor base Re/insurers accumulate longevity risk by providing solutions to pension funds and individuals Lobbying through organisations such as the LLMA Increasing length of cover Availability of alternative independent risk models Provision of quality and timely government data Broad pool of investors identified Risks widely traded in capital markets Liquid secondary market Source: Swiss Re, 2012 If societies around the world are to make sure that taxpayers will not be obliged to fulfil the retirement income obligations of an older generation, a form of risk sharing needs to be implemented. Any system needs to ensure that people can retire with sufficient income to enjoy the fruits of their labours into later life without endowing a huge burden on younger generations. A capital market is a potential way to share the risk burden between many areas of society on an inter- and intra-national basis. Recommendations for the insurance industry In order to continue offering products which provide guaranteed retirement income on a large scale, such as annuities, a capital market in longevity risk is essential to ensure that capacity will remain available at a reasonable price in the future. Re/insurers will play an essential role in the establishment of any capital market through creating attractive instruments for investors and seeking ways to increase confidence in any market. Re/insurers should work through industry bodies and with governments to design efficient solutions in order to encourage the development and expansion of a capital market. As regulatory regimes such as Solvency II will add further demand for longevity risk transfer, encouraging interest from investors through education and awareness will be essential. Swiss Re 17

18 The way forward Recommendations for pension plan custodians As has been demonstrated, the extent of under-reserving for longevity risk could place a significant burden on pension plans shareholders and other stakeholders in the future. There are a number of approaches to de-risking for longevity, but it appears that a majority of pension plans favour an indemnity solution. Although in the short-to-medium term, re/insurers can provide sufficient capacity to meet demand, eventually prices for indemnity solutions will rise without a capital market to mitigate risk. An increase in longevity capacity is not expected to bring the price of the protection down, but will enable re/insurers to continue providing protection. This means that pension plans are more likely to seek cover from re/insurers but would benefit from a capital market in the longer term Therefore, pension plans could support any lobbying efforts of re/insurers and other interested parties. In addition, they should assess their exposure to longevity risk and ensure any mitigation plans are carried out in a timely and efficient way. Recommendations for pension advisory industry/modelling companies Given the uncertainty around the future trend of mortality improvements, potential investors in longevity risk need a wider variety of publicly-available models to form a better view of the risk. Additional models and an open debate as to the underlying expectations of the risk should be fostered and encouraged. Recommendations for governments and regulators Increasing life expectancy could cause major financial issues for governments in the future and they should act now to prevent a substantial future burden on taxpayers. Governments are exposed to longevity risk through the future cost of state pensions and any civil service retirement schemes. The development of a capital market could help address this through providing more private-sector capacity to assist with solutions. Therefore, governments have an important role to play in encouraging a capital market for longevity risk. Governments and regulators need to work with other countries to create consistent accounting recognition of longevity-related liabilities and to encourage data sharing. Regulations need to recognise the extent to which organisations have under-reserved for longevity risk globally and create a framework which would support a capital market to manage such risks within society. Governments can also aid the development of a capital market for longevity risk by providing mortality data on a timely basis quicker after the end of each year and potentially quarterly. Data should be available on a more granular basis with mortality data split by location or other categories and support better reporting of the reasons for death specifically at older ages to provide additional information for better modelling of the risk. 18 A mature market

19 Working together to address a long-term issue Capital markets are important to develop, but they are only part of the system involved in addressing the financial issues arising from people living longer than expected. Any solution would include governments, employers, re/insurers and the wider financial services industry working together to create a sustainable model that would last long into the future. Swiss Re 19

20 Swiss Re Europe S.A., UK branch 30 St Mary Axe London EC3A 8EP United Kingdom Telephone +44 (0) Fax +44 (0) Swiss Re Europe S.A., UK branch Title: A mature market: Building a capital market for longevity risk 2012 Authors: Kerry McMullan, Senior Structurer L&H Daniel Wolongiewicz, Actuarial Analyst L&H Matt Singleton, Communications Editor: Richard Heard Graphic design: Anderson Norton Design, London The content of this brochure is subject to copyright with all rights reserved. The information may be used for private or internal purposes, provided that any copyright or other proprietary notices are not removed. Electronic reuse of the content of this brochure is prohibited. Reproduction in whole or in part or use for any public purpose is only permitted with the prior written approval of Swiss Reinsurance Company Ltd., Zurich, and if the source reference A mature market: Building a capital market for longevity risk 2012 is indicated. Courtesy copies are appreciated. Although all the information used was taken from reliable sources, Swiss Re does not accept any responsibility for the accuracy or comprehensiveness of the details given. All liability for the accuracy and completeness thereof or for any damage resulting from the use of the information contained in this brochure is expressly excluded. Under no circumstances shall Swiss Re or its Group companies be liable for any financial and/or consequential loss relating to this brochure. Visit to download or to order additional copies of this publication. Order no: _12_en