ESPN Thematic Report on minimum income schemes. Spain 2015

Transcription

1 ESPN Thematic Report on minimum income schemes 2015 Rodríguez-Cabrero, Arriba, Marbán, Montserrat and Moreno-Fuentes October 2015

2 EUROPEAN COMMISSION Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion Directorate C - Social Affairs Unit C.2 Modernisation of social protection systems Contact: Emanuela Tassa Emanuela.TASSA@ec.europa.eu European Commission B-1049 Brussels

3 EUROPEAN COMMISSION European Social Policy Network (ESPN) ESPN Thematic Report on minimum income schemes 2015 Gregorio Rodríguez-Cabrero (Coordinator), University of Alcalá (Madrid) Ana Arriba González de Durana, University of Alcalá (Madrid) Vicente Marbán Gallego, University of Alcalá (Madrid) Julia Montserrat Codorniu, Centre of Social Policy Studies (Barcelona) Francisco Javier Moreno-Fuentes, IPP, CSIC (Madrid) 2016 Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion

4 The European Social Policy Network (ESPN) was established in July 2014 on the initiative of the European Commission to provide high-quality and timely independent information, advice, analysis and expertise on social policy issues in the European Union and neighbouring countries. The ESPN brings together into a single network the work that used to be carried out by the European Network of Independent Experts on Social Inclusion, the Network for the Analytical Support on the Socio-Economic Impact of Social Protection Reforms (ASISP) and the MISSOC (Mutual Information Systems on Social Protection) secretariat. The ESPN is managed by LISER and APPLICA, with the support of OSE - European Social Observatory. For more information on the ESPN, see: Europe Direct is a service to help you find answers to your questions about the European Union. Freephone number (*): (*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you). LEGAL NOTICE This document has been prepared for the European Commission, however it reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet ( European Union, 2016 Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged

5 Contents SUMMARY... 5 PART I DESCRIPTION OF MAIN FEATURES OF MINIMUM INCOME SCHEME GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS Levels of governance Delivery arrangements Rights-based versus discretionary benefits DESIGN OF MINIMUM INCOME SCHEME Level of benefit Eligibility conditions Conditionality rules Duration Transitions LINKS WITH OTHER SOCIAL BENEFITS AND SERVICES Components covered by minimum income schemes Other means-tested benefits Passport to other services and benefits PART II ANALYSIS OF MINIMUM INCOME SCHEMES ASSESSMENT OF ADEQUACY, COVERAGE, TAKE-UP AND IMPACT Adequacy Coverage Take-up Impact LINKS TO THE OTHER TWO PILLARS OF ACTIVE INCLUSION Inclusive labour markets Access to quality services SUMMARY TABLE REFERENCES

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7 Summary Regional minimum income schemes (MIS) are social assistance programmes for lowincome families that seek those families social inclusion; they are a last resort for potentially active people excluded from the labour market. Autonomous Communities have full responsibility for their regulation, planning, financing, implementation and evaluation. MIS are integrated into regional social services systems, except in the case of the Basque Country, where the scheme is managed by the regional public employment service (PES). There is no single scheme, but rather a highly diverse set of regional minimum income schemes, whose diversity (and relatively poor protective capacity) makes it very difficult to speak of a coherent programme of minimum income in. All programmes aim at guaranteeing a certain level of income within the household, complementing other potential available resources. Benefits are adjusted to a basic amount defined for a single-person household, supplemented according to the additional household members. However, there is considerable variation in both the basic amount and the supplements, resulting in territorial inequalities and insufficient levels of adequacy protection against poverty. The minimum income benefits are framed within an activation perspective: MIS recipients are obliged to sign up and follow a personalised integration plan, as well as to attend certain activities. Conditionality rules in some regions include an obligation to accept any job offer that fits the profile of the beneficiary; in other regions the applicant is only required to be registered as a job seeker. Coordination problems between agencies involved in the running of social protection programmes seriously limit the possibilities for active labour market policies (ALMPs) within the MIS. Since 2011, pressure from fiscal consolidation, as well as from increased demand, has led to a series of wide-ranging reforms within MIS. Measures adopted by the Autonomous Regions have sought to: a) narrow down access to benefits by increasing personal, family and job-related requirements (residence, means test, or unemployment registration) (Basque Country, Catalonia, Cantabria, Madrid, Navarre or Rioja); b) cut benefit amounts (Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre or Rioja); and c) tighten sanctions and fraud control (Catalonia, Cantabria or Madrid). In the course of that process, some regions have strengthened their orientation towards active inclusion (Basque Country), whereas others (Catalonia or Navarre) have focused on the most vulnerable groups with low levels of employability. These initiatives seem to have focused on reducing demand (as well as the number of beneficiaries), while social inclusion objectives appear to have been relegated to the second level of priority. Recently, the role of MIS has been the subject of growing attention in social and political debate. Different proposals concerning the renewal of these schemes have been put forward by social policy actors (trade unions, political parties, third-sector organisations and non-governmental organisation (NGO) platforms). Ahead of the December 2015 general elections, a number of political initiatives were launched by several political parties to improve the situation of those segments of the Spanish population most exposed to the effects of the economic downturn by creating basic legislation on MIS at the central government level. Despite the heterogeneity of those proposals and the actual mechanisms suggested, they generally agree on the need to tackle the social emergency caused by the socio-economic vulnerability in which many households find themselves. 5

8 Part I Description of main features of minimum income scheme 1 Governance arrangements 1.1 Levels of governance The Autonomous Communities minimum income schemes (MIS) constitute a lastresort social protection safety net in. They were created within the framework of the regions exclusive powers on social assistance and social services. The Basque Country was the first region to implement an MIS programme, in By the mid- 1990s, all 17 Autonomous Communities, plus the two autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla, had implemented their own MIS, for which they have full responsibility regarding regulation, planning, financing, implementation and evaluation. The MIS in constitute, therefore, a group of unconnected schemes, which nonetheless share certain basic features: they combine a cash transfer programme (to guarantee some minimum monetary resources) with labour market activation and/or social insertion programmes, all with a very low intensity of protection. The development of these programmes has followed a long and tortuous path, due to their uneven development and complete lack of coordination. There is neither a basic legal framework at the central government level to define the fundamental traits of MIS programmes in, nor a system to articulate the potential interactions between those schemes. Central government tries to facilitate the exchange of information and the sharing of experience and good practice among the Autonomous Communities through the participation of regional government officials responsible for MIS programmes on the Social Services Inter-territorial Board (Consejo Territorial de Servicios Sociales y del Sistema para la Autonomía y Atención a la Dependencia), which is responsible for the basic articulation of social services at the national level. 1 The national Ministry of Health and Social Affairs is also responsible for the drafting of annual reports on MIS, which collect the basic information provided by the Autonomous Communities on the functioning of their regional MIS. 2 Nevertheless, and despite the fact that the design of these schemes has been strongly influenced by horizontal emulation and policy learning between the Autonomous Communities, there is a high degree of diversity among the different regional MIS programmes. This variability is reflected in every aspect of the design and implementation of these programmes (from delivery arrangements to eligibility requirements, including level of benefits), as we will show in this report. In the context of the sustained economic crisis experienced by since 2008, the growing realisation of the great diversity that exists between the different regional MIS has contributed to spark a lively debate among experts, trade unions, civil society organisations, political parties and policy makers about the need to improve the articulation of these programmes throughout the country, with the objective of reducing the profound inequalities that emanate from the current state of affairs. The idea of 1 The 2013 National Social Services Reference Catalogue included MIS as benefits to which Spanish citizens must have access in similar conditions of quality and entitlement across the country (MSSSI, 2013). Similarly, the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion considered regional MIS among its essential social cohesion mechanisms, responsible for preventing poverty among vulnerable groups (MSSSI, 2014). 2 Given the complexity created by the juxtaposition of regional MIS, and the relatively scarce available comparable data about the actual functioning of those 19 different minimum income systems, the reports drafted by the MSSSI constitute the main source of information on MIS in. Nevertheless, the relatively wide diversity existing between those different schemes in their design and functioning, together with the fact that these reports are based on the data provided by the Autonomous Communities, makes the scope and depth of the information provided by these publications rather limited. This report relies on information obtained from that report, complemented with a review of official documents and the most recent literature on MIS in the different Autonomous Communities of. For specific details of each programme, see Tables 2.a and 2.b in the Annex. 6

9 more direct involvement by central government in guaranteeing a similar level of protection across the country through some kind of national MIS has been placed on the political agenda by different coalitions of social and political actors. 1.2 Delivery arrangements As previously mentioned, each Autonomous Community has full responsibility for the design, planning, regulation, financing, implementation and evaluation of its MIS programme. Regional parliaments annually approve the budgets allocated to their MIS programme financial resources which may be increased if demand exceeds initial expectations. The demand for minimum income benefits is managed by the regional social services agencies, 3 which evaluate the characteristics of applicants and decide their cases according to the requirements and conditionality rules of their particular MIS. 4 The actual handling of applications is also directly managed by the regional social services administrations (Andalusia, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile-León, Rioja and Valencia), or through the mediation of municipal social services as an entry point and first gatekeeper to the system (in the rest of the Autonomous Communities, apart from the Basque Country) (see Table 2.a in the Annex for details about each regional MIS). The drafting of individual plans and/or integration contracts for beneficiaries of minimum income programmes is generally handled by municipal social services, which are also responsible for the follow-up and personalised attention to individuals and families that benefit from the schemes. The municipal level is, therefore, charged with the mission of setting up the activation and social support programmes available to minimum income beneficiaries (even if they are actually provided by other public agencies and administrations). The most significant exception to this pattern is the Basque Country, an Autonomous Community where responsibility for the management of the MIS was transferred to the regional PES in 2012 (Law 4/2011, 24 November 2011). 5 Following this new organisation of the regional MIS, the Basque PES handle the cases of minimum income beneficiaries, referring them to social services whenever they consider that the support provided by those agencies is needed. Most regional MIS programmes rely on NGOs to facilitate the activation of minimum income beneficiaries, through the development of programmes and pathways that promote social participation and/or the incorporation of programme participants into the labour market. 6 In general terms, the most common features of regional MIS are the heterogeneity of arrangements, the multiplicity of actors involved in the delivery of the schemes, and the lack of a one-stop shop to handle minimum income programmes, social support and/or activation services. As a consequence, the lack of coordination and collaboration between agencies and administrations involved in those different domains of social intervention is a recurring theme. 1.3 Rights-based versus discretionary benefits Since the mid-1990s, reforms introduced in regional MIS have recognised the right of a region s residents to minimum income protection, in return for meeting a series of 3 With the exception of Catalonia and the Basque Country, where files are handled by an Interdepartmental Commission and by the regional PES, respectively. 4 The exception to this practice is the Balearic Islands, where files are reviewed and evaluated at the local level, where a decision about each case is also adopted. 5 Act 4/2011 of 24 November 2011, on modification of the Act on Income Guarantee and Social Inclusion. 6 There is no detailed information about the nature of the involvement of NGOs in ALMP. The report drafted by the MSSSI (2015) on MIS includes a list of tasks performed by third-sector organisations in this domain in 11 Autonomous Communities (including development of activation pathways, support and information for unemployed workers in their search for jobs, training, or the creation of social insertion business initiatives). No information on the number of participants in those programmes, their characteristics, the perception of MIS benefits by those participating, or the amount of investment devoted to these initiatives is published. 7

10 specifically defined requirements. This recognition has been defined using different mechanisms and wordings in the regulation of regional MIS (see Table 2.a in Annex). In certain cases, that guarantee is granted by ensuring that the necessary budgetary resources to achieve that compromise are allocated (Andalusia and Aragon). In other Autonomous Communities, the MIS is simply defined as guaranteed within the basic regulation of these schemes (Asturias, Cantabria, Castile-León and Rioja). In a third group, the guarantee is defined as an individual right (Extremadura, Madrid o Ceuta), or as a subjective right (Galicia, Murcia and the Basque Country). The remaining regions do not explicitly recognise the guaranteed nature of this benefit. If we look beyond the declarations of (good) intentions regarding the recognition of a right to benefit from an MIS programme, it is no easy matter to assess the extent to which this guarantee is effectively implemented in each Autonomous Community, due to the lack of adequate information on the actual practices taking place on the ground. The unequal coverage of these schemes in the Autonomous Communities (coverage bears little relation to the available statistical data on poverty, social exclusion or need in each of those regions) seems to indicate that significant barriers prevent potential beneficiaries from actually accessing the programmes. The lack of precision in the definition of the mechanisms to ensure the rights and obligations of potential MIS beneficiaries as well as in the definition of the reasons that prompt the suspension or exclusion of a person from the programmes seems to leave a wide margin for bureaucratic discretion and for the development of (subjective) morally loaded practices of behavioural control (Ayala, 2012; Cortinas, 2012; Serrano and Arriba, 1998). 2 Design of minimum income scheme 2.1 Level of benefit The mechanisms to establish the level of benefits are relatively similar across the different regional MIS. All programmes aim at guaranteeing a certain level of income within the household, complementing other potential available resources. Benefits are adjusted to a basic amount defined for a single-person household. Supplements (defined as a percentage of that basic amount) are added for each additional household member. In general terms, these supplements do not take into consideration the specific characteristics of each additional household member (whether they are adults, minors, or disabled). 7 In some regions, supplements are added according to household needs (see Section 3.1). The final amount received by each household is calculated by subtracting from the guaranteed income level any income already received; there is a maximum set amount that any household can receive. The intensity of protection varies quite considerably across the different regional MIS. The basic amount guaranteed for a one-person household ranges from EUR 300/month (Murcia or Ceuta), to something over double that figure (EUR 620/month in the Basque Country). This heterogeneity is also present in the case of supplements for additional household members, although, in general terms, the increases in benefits for larger households are quite modest, and certainly far removed from the scales of equivalence used in poverty measurement (in no region does a household of four members get near to double the basic amount for a single-person household: the most generous case increases that basic standard by only 60% for three additional household members). In most Autonomous Communities, benefits are annually indexed following different methods: Most regions establish MIS benefits as a specific percentage of the IPREM. 8 7 With the exception of the region of Murcia, where the supplement added for an adult is half of that granted for a child. 8 The IPREM (Indicador Público de Renta de Efectos Múltiples Public Indicator of Income for Multiple Purposes) constitutes an indicator introduced in 2004 with the objective of being used as a reference of income for a multiplicity of social protection programmes. It is supposed to be annually indexed to the annual state budget, although it has been frozen since

11 A second group of regions index their MIS using a percentage of the minimum wage (Andalusia, Navarre, the Basque Country and Melilla). Finally, a third group uses more diffuse indexing mechanisms associated with inflation (Asturias), the evolution of non-contributory pension benefits (Balearic Islands), or the evolution of the economy (Catalonia). Table 1: Regional MIS guaranteed income levels, 2014 (monthly amounts, EUR) Divorced single with no children Single person household (basic amount) Married couple with no children Two members (two-adult household) Married couple with two children (aged 7 and 14) Four members (two adults, two children) Divorced single parent with one child (aged 2) Two members (one adult, one child) Indexing Basic amount ANDALUSIA % minimum wage ARAGON Regional budget ASTURIAS Regional budget; considering inflation BALEARIC ISLANDS CANARY ISLANDS Maximu m Max. amount Evolution of noncontributory pension benefits % IPREM CANTABRIA % IPREM CASTILE-LA MANCHA % IPREM CASTILE-LEON % IPREM CATALONIA Regional budget; considering economic situation EXTREMADURA % IPREM GALICIA % IPREM MADRID Regional budget MURCIA Established 682 in 2006 NAVARRE % minimum wage BASQUE % COUNTRY minimum wage RIOJA % IPREM VALENCIA % IPREM CEUTA City budget 420 MELILLA % minimum wage Source: Based on MSSSI (2015), and regional MIS documents. Note: Scenarios of monthly amounts have been calculated by taking into consideration the complementary benefits covered by MIS (Section 3.1)

12 In recent years, neither IPREM nor the minimum wage has been uprated, and so beneficiaries of MIS have experienced a loss of purchasing power. The variety of indexing methods (on a yearly basis) does not seem to be related to any specific philosophy, but more to the objective of containing public budgets. 2.2 Eligibility conditions In addition to means-tested criteria, eligibility conditions for regional MIS include age requirements, how long the household has been together, as well as conditions of residency and how long the household has been registered in the municipality. In general terms, these conditions refer to the individual who applies for the benefits, but in certain cases they extend to the household unit (see Table 2.a in Annex). Most MIS establish specific age limits for receipt of benefits: between 25 (except Cantabria and the Basque Country, where the minimum age is 23) and 65 years. The lower limit of that range implicitly assumes that families are responsible for the protection and wellbeing of their youth. In exceptional circumstances, most MIS may extend benefits to those over 17, if the recipient is the head of the household, and particularly if there are signs of specific vulnerability (minors or disabled relatives in charge, young people from the fostering system or with disabilities, etc.). At the other end of the age range, it is expected that the protection of citizens over 64 will fall under the jurisdiction of the old-age pension system (except in those Autonomous Communities where low pensions can, in fact, be supplemented by MIS benefits, e.g. the Basque Country). Although Spanish nationality is not a condition for access to MIS benefits (except in Andalusia), 9 a certain period of residence in the specific Autonomous Community is demanded in all programmes (Laparra, 2008). Requirements vary from 6 months (Balearic Islands and Galicia) to 36 months (Canary Islands, the Basque Country and Valencia), with an extreme case of 5 years in the region of Murcia. Participation in the labour market does not in itself constitute an obstacle to receipt of MIS benefits in Spanish Autonomous Communities. However, any income from regular employment will be taken into consideration during the process of assessment of the household s financial resources. Regional MIS differ in how they take the different forms of household income into consideration (particularly income from employment and social benefits). Labour income may be partially subtracted in some regional programmes; in others, an exempted amount is set. Regarding social benefits, most MIS subtract the whole amount received by the beneficiary, but they do so only partially if those benefits are received by other family members. Benefits intended for specific needs (education scholarships, transportation allowances, medicine payments, emergency help) are usually not taken into account in the calculation of total household income. Most programmes also evaluate the patrimonial assets of applicants for MIS benefits. In some instances these are assessed according to the returns they produce (Madrid and Asturias). In other cases, they are used as an indicator of adequate means, and therefore they may prevent access to MIS benefits. In most cases, though, the value of the property where beneficiaries live is not taken into account in the process of evaluating their application (Arriba and Moreno, 2005). 2.3 Conditionality rules All regional MIS establish certain obligations for beneficiaries. These are very diverse in nature, although some general traits can be identified: recipients must use benefits to cover basic needs; they must inform the authorities of any changes regarding their personal situation; they must repay any money incorrectly received; and they must 9 Article 3.3 of the 2/1999 Decree that regulates the Andalusian MIS ( establishes that non-eu third-country nationals cannot apply to this scheme. 10

13 request other benefits to which they may be entitled. Additional conditions include school attendance and vaccination compliance for minors. Minimum income benefits are framed within an activation perspective, which means that recipients are obliged to sign personalised integration plans or contracts, as well as to attend certain activities (a feature common to all regional MIS). In some Autonomous Communities, conditionality rules attached to MIS include an obligation to accept any job offer that fits the profile of the beneficiary; other regions merely require the applicant to be registered as a job seeker with the regional PES (see Table 2.b. in the Annex). 2.4 Duration The time limit for receipt of MIS benefits varies quite considerably across the different regional MIS (see Table 2.b in Annex). The period of payment of minimum income benefits is predetermined in each of the programmes (from 6 to 24 months). Once that period is over, beneficiaries may apply for a renewal, so long as the eligibility conditions are met (Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Castile-León, Madrid and the Basque Country). In some regions, the renewal of those benefits is nevertheless limited (between 24 and 60 months), after which time claimants must start the application process all over again. In the case of the Autonomous Community of Navarre, the extension of the minimum income benefit beyond 12 months implies a reduction in the sum received to 90% of the original amount. In Andalusia and Castile-La Mancha there is no possibility to renew the benefit after 6 months of support; claimants must wait 6 months and 3 months, respectively, before reapplying. 2.5 Transitions There is no link between the end of unemployment benefits and access to regional MIS programmes. Since they are attached to completely different institutional settings (public employment agencies in the case of unemployment benefits, social services in the case of MIS), they operate with very different logic, and little interaction exists between the two types of programme. 10 Besides, MIS are, by definition, subsidiary to unemployment benefits (they can only be requested once any entitlement to unemployment benefits is exhausted). 11 The lack of any clearly demarcated transition between the different unemployment protection schemes, as well as between those and MIS, implies that many unemployed workers spend long periods of time without any (or with only very limited) income, and without the support of resources aimed at reintegrating them into the labour market. This situation makes it more difficult to implement a comprehensive, personalised longterm strategy to get them out of unemployment, as the European Council Recommendation on the integration of the long-term unemployed into the labour market proposes (European Council, 2015). In most cases, joining the labour market implies losing the entitlement to minimum income benefits, since the income threshold for receipt of MIS is quite likely to be surpassed. In certain regions, labour market incomes are partially subtracted (or a certain amount is exempted), so that beneficiaries are not left without protection, and so as to avoid introducing disincentives to take up employment. With this in mind, for more than a decade the MIS of the Basque Country has been running a version of the benefit that aims to supplement the employment-related income of households that fall below the threshold established by the minimum income programme of that region. This complementary minimum income scheme excludes a certain percentage of labour market income from the calculation of 10 Some informants point out that certain requirements linked to the perception of unemployment protection schemes prevent potential beneficiaries from accessing them ( or that once unemployed people benefit from the schemes, those requirements block them from complementing those subsidies with additional tapering transfers from regional MIS. 11 The Basque MIS scheme provides additional payments for employment using a tapering system when the beneficiaries receive a salary through labour market participation. A similar clause is formally included in the case of the Galician MIS (Rodríguez-Cabrero et al., 2015). 11

14 household income prior to determining eligibility for the MIS, with the objective of introducing incentives to keep links with employment. Since 2013, the region of Galicia has maintained two levels of MIS with benefits that are higher than the basic programme: one for beneficiaries participating in social integration programmes, and the other for those participating in pathways to labour market insertion (over time, the amount gradually decreases). 3 Links with other social benefits and services 3.1 Components covered by minimum income schemes Certain Autonomous Communities offer complementary monetary transfers for households with specific needs and that face additional problems (see tables in Annex for details of each regional MIS). These benefits sometimes involve an increase (calculated as a certain percentage) in the basic income that corresponds to a particular household, according to its circumstances and needs (Aragon, Asturias and Extremadura). On other occasions, it is calculated as a fixed complement to the monthly benefit (Catalonia and the Basque Country), or as a single payment (Rioja). The needs covered by those complementary schemes differ across regions. In some cases, the schemes aim at improving support for households with disabled, sick or dependent members (Aragon, Asturias, Catalonia and Extremadura). In other Autonomous Communities, they focus on supporting single-parent households or households with children (Catalonia, the Basque Country and Rioja). Finally, two regions include a complementary measure to help households deal with housing costs: in the Basque Country the extra payment can reach EUR 250/month (in December 2014 it was received by 43.8% beneficiaries of the MI scheme); while in Aragon it may be up to 20% of the final MIS amount (though the maximum amount to be received still applies), and in 2014 it was received by 25.1% of MIS recipients Other means-tested benefits There are other social assistance schemes aimed at supporting working-age people at risk of poverty in. On the one hand, there is the unemployment social assistance scheme, 13 which offers support to unemployed workers whose entitlement to contributory unemployment insurance benefits has already been exhausted. On the other hand, there is the non-contributory pension scheme, aimed at people with disabilities who cannot join the labour market. 14 Both of these schemes are part of the national social security system, responsibility for which rests with the Spanish central government. Unemployment assistance protection consists, in fact, of a series of means-tested programmes, including Unemployment Assistance Benefits, 15 the Agrarian Unemployment Subsidy and Income, 16 the Active Integration Income (RAI), the Professional Requalification Programme (PREPARA) and the Employment Activation Programme (PAE). These schemes have been gradually integrated into the social security unemployment protection system at various stages of the different labour market reforms implemented in over the years. The result is a layering of segmented programmes, with different eligibility criteria and variable duration of 12 Data provided by the respective Autonomous Governments. 13 The different mean-tested unemployment assistance schemes had a monthly average of nearly 1.5 million beneficiaries in In 2014, the monthly average figure for disability non-contributory pensioners was roughly 197, Unemployed workers older than 45 access the Unemployment Assistance Benefits scheme with less demanding requirements, and they do so for a longer period. In the case of those unemployed over 55 who fulfil all the other conditions for retirement, the duration of unemployment benefits is extended until the age of retirement. 16 The working of the Agrarian Unemployment Subsidy and Income Scheme is restricted to the Autonomous Communities of Andalusia and Extremadura, where it plays a very significant role in the protection of landless peasants who only find work during certain periods of the year in the tasks associated with the harvesting of specific crops. 12

15 protection, depending on previous contributions, family responsibilities and specific social conditions (disability, being the victim of gender violence, being a returning migrant, or being over 45). In the realm of family and childcare support, a scheme of non-contributory cash transfers for low-income families benefits some 797,634 children under the age of 18; in 2014 they received around EUR 291 a year (EUR 1,000 for disabled children with less than 33% disability coming from families with annual income of less than EUR 11,519.16). The scheme also benefits families with disabled children over 18 (there were around 178,450 beneficiaries in 2014, receiving around EUR 4,390 a year if the disability was between 65% and 75%, and EUR 6,587 if the disability was over 75%). Since 2009, employed mothers who are ineligible for a contributory maternity benefit have been entitled to a flat-rate non-contributory maternity allowance for 42 days. Some regional governments have also introduced flat-rate benefits in order to promote parental leave. The social services departments of the Autonomous Communities also operate a series of means-tested emergency schemes for people with urgent non-recurring economic needs (MSSSI, 2015). Once again, the great diversity that exists across the different regional social policies makes it hard to paint a clear picture of the nature and extent of these schemes. In general terms, these programmes respond to occasional emergency needs of vulnerable households by providing small sums of money to help the households cope with certain expenses (utility bills, mortgage or other type of loan payments, etc.) if the household is not covered by the MIS (due to insufficient period of residency in the Autonomous Community or some other aspect that prevents it from being included in the minimum income programme). 3.3 Passport to other services and benefits Mapping the exact nature of the links between MIS and other social services and benefits in is not an easy task, due to the lack of unified data and information. The highly decentralised nature of those welfare schemes (housing, education, healthcare, public transportation or labour market activation policies) and the fact that regional and local authorities are responsible for them make this task even more complex. In general terms, the preferential access of minimum income beneficiaries to other social protection schemes is enshrined not in the legal framework of MIS, but rather in the regulations governing those other programmes. 17 Certain Autonomous Communities offer their MIS beneficiaries access to school grants, childcare, social housing, medication, public transportation subsidies and technical support for disabled people, but these policies are quite uneven, and the information available about their interconnections is quite scarce. 17 An exception to this norm is the regulation of the access to social housing for those households receiving MIS benefits and that lack a place of residence (either rented or owned). 13

16 Part II Analysis of minimum income schemes 1 Assessment of adequacy, coverage, take-up and impact 1.1 Adequacy As previously mentioned, MIS benefits are established as the difference between the resources of the household and a specific threshold (defined in relation to a basic amount, plus extra sums related to the size of the household), defined in each region. Figure 1: Regional MIS amounts (in EUR) by household type, national noncontributory benefits, minimum wage, IPREM and national median income levels, 2014* Single adult Two adults with two dependent children Maximum amount Unemployment assistance benefit Two adults Single person with dependent children Non contributory pension Minimum wage Sources: MSSSI (2015); documentation from Autonomous Communities; MEYSS (2014); EU-SILC Eurostat. *Note: National median income and poverty threshold refer to 2013, as EU-SILC data refer to the year prior to the last available survey, Amounts by month, annual equivalences. As Figure 1 (and Table 3 in the Annex) show, the basic amounts are generally below 40% of the national median income (NMI), with the exceptions of Navarre (49.6%) and the Basque Country (56%). This situation implies that a gap remains between the poverty line and the income levels guaranteed by MIS benefits. The MIS basic amounts position these schemes at a similar level of protection as other assistance programmes in (unemployment subsidies or non-contributory pensions). Most Autonomous Regions set the maximum MIS benefit at the IPREM index level (see footnote 8); some reach the level of the minimum wage (Aragon, Asturias and the Balearic Islands); and 14

17 only Navarre and the Basque Country surpass it. The definition of these thresholds is guided by the dual objective of containing costs and maintaining incentives for MIS beneficiaries to join the labour market. Inequalities mainly appear in relation to the amount of the extra sums that are dependent on the size of the household, as well as in terms of the definition of the maximum amount that can be received by a household. In general terms, the extra sums are very flat: a household consisting of a couple with two children will receive between 50% and 60% of the NMI (below the poverty line), with the aforementioned exceptions of Navarre and Basque Country, where that figure reaches 80% of the NMI. In the cases of Castile-La Mancha, Murcia, Valencia, Rioja and Ceuta, the MIS benefit does not vary with the size of the household. The lack of sensitivity to the size of the household, together with the weak nature of family support programmes, helps explain the very high levels of child poverty in (Cantó and Ayala, 2014). On the other hand, the absence of extra sums for situations of special need (single parenthood, children, disabilities or housing needs) in most regional MIS, together with the weakness or complete absence of alternative services or benefits, explains why households in those circumstances appear particularly vulnerable. Since 2009 benefits provided by MIS have at best grown very slowly; they have remained frozen in some regions (where they are indexed to the IPREM or the minimum wage); and at worst they have even been reduced in some regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre and Rioja) (Arriba, 2014). Nevertheless, the reduction in the NMI due to the economic crisis meant a lowering of the poverty thresholds, which implied that the adequacy of MIS did not deteriorate very significantly (Ayala, 2016). Regional MIS offer significantly different levels of protection to individuals and households with very similar levels of vulnerability; and those levels are well below European adequacy standards (Ayala, 2016; Marchal and Van Mechelen, 2014). In order to deal with territorial inequalities and with the low level of adequacy of MIS benefits, a common mechanism for indexing benefits across the regions could be suggested. The definition of a common minimum benefit for all schemes, as well as a significant increase in the magnitude of the household size-related supplements, would also be highly advisable. 1.2 Coverage Regional MIS are not categorical, but are comprehensive, targeting all households in poverty (defined as those below a certain threshold, adjusted by the size of the household). In several Autonomous Communities, MIS is defined as a right. According to the previously mentioned eligibility conditions, those groups excluded from the schemes are those that are above the income threshold defined in each region, the young (age criterion), recently formed households, the homeless and those who have settled in the region only recently (residence criterion). In recent years, a series of measures aimed at narrowing down access to MIS benefits by increasing personal, family and job-related requirements (residence, means tests, or unemployment registration) have been introduced in some regions (Basque Country, Catalonia, Cantabria, Madrid, Navarre and Rioja). Other Autonomous Communities have proceeded to reduce the benefit amounts (Basque Country, Catalonia, Navarre and Rioja), or to increase sanctions and fraud control (Catalonia, Cantabria and Madrid). In that process, some regions have strengthened their orientation towards active inclusion (Basque Country), whereas others (Catalonia and Navarre) have focused on more vulnerable groups with low levels of employability. This trend is in contrast to the path pursued by those regions which have strengthened their MIS (Castile-Leon, Rioja and Extremadura). Over the past two years, it is estimated that around 700,000 households have no income. 18 This population could be regarded as the currently unaddressed potential 18 Labour Income Survey, Spanish Statistics Institute ( 15

18 target population for MIS. To this group we should add those households with income below the current thresholds established for those programmes. Despite a considerable increase in the total number of households receiving MIS benefits since 2008 (reaching a little over 260,000 households in 2014 (MSSSI, 2015)), a series of factors reviewed in the following section continue to limit the coverage of the schemes. Figure 2: Percentages of households receiving regional MIS, by Autonomous Community, Basque Country Navarre Asturias Ceuta & Melilla Extremadura Cantabria Rioja TOTAL Aragon Castile-Leon Galicia TOTAL (without Basque Country) Madrid Catalonia Canary Islands Valencia Andalusia Balearic Islands Murcia Castile-La Mancha Source: MSSSI (2015); documentation from Autonomous Communities; Labour Force Survey (2008 Q2 ; 2010 Q2 ; 2012 Q2) and Continous Household Survey (2014), Spanish Statistics Institute The unequal coverage of these regional programmes also indicates the limits to their comprehensive nature. As Figure 2 (and Table 5 in the Annex) shows, a large number of Autonomous Communities (Madrid, Catalonia, the Canary Islands, Valencia, Andalusia, the Balearic Islands, Murcia and Castile-La Mancha) did not even cover 1% of their households under the MIS programmes in Only Navarre (4%) and the Basque Country (8%) included a significant share of their population in these minimum income programmes, while the rest of the regions addressed between 1% and 3% of households. This unequal level of coverage is not related to the levels of wealth or poverty in each of the regions. The role of MIS has recently come more to the fore in social and political debates. Different proposals concerning the potential reforms to be introduced in these schemes have been promoted by social policy actors. Among these, the new guaranteed minimum income scheme proposed by the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN)- within the framework of the European Minimum Income Network (EMIN) European Project should be mentioned (Malgesini Rey, 2014), as should the Citizens Legislative Initiative, driven and presented by the trade unions (General Union of 16

19 Workers (UGT) and the Workers Commissions (CCOO)) in the Spanish parliament in April Ahead of the December 2015 general elections, a series of political initiatives was presented by several political parties, designed to improve the situation of those segments of the Spanish population most exposed to the effects of the economic downturn through the creation of basic legislation on MIS at the central government level. 20 Despite the heterogeneity of those proposals and the actual mechanisms suggested, they generally agree on the need to tackle the social emergency caused by the socio-economic vulnerability in which many households find themselves. In the meantime, different local authorities (i.e. cities like Coruña or Barcelona) and Autonomous Regions (Aragon, Valencia and Navarre) are currently planning significant reforms of their MIS programmes, in order to make them more responsive to the widespread poverty and social exclusion that are not adequately addressed by existing programmes. 1.3 Take-up Little evidence exists about the reasons why groups of potential MIS beneficiaries end up not accessing the programmes. It could be a combination of factors: lack of information among vulnerable groups regarding their rights and the existence and functioning of MIS; the poor public visibility of these programmes before the current crisis; the complexity of the bureaucratic procedures; the relatively fuzzy rules that guide their implementation; the highly discretionary nature of the procedures related to MIS (both in the intermediation and during the decision-making process); the length of time that people have to wait before receiving an answer to their application; or the fear of stigmatisation. Many of these potential obstacles are linked to institutional factors regarding the actual administration of the programmes, which are designed as comprehensive but actually tend towards social control, and which are poorly endowed with the human and material resources required for their functioning. 1.4 Impact In general terms, the income protection system has relatively little impact on reducing the levels of poverty in. 21 The social protection programmes with more impact in this matter are actually the pensions and unemployment schemes (Ayala, 2015). Regional MIS, on the other hand, have a very large internal diversity regarding their adequacy and coverage, so it is very difficult to evaluate their overall impact in combating poverty. 22 The only exception to this is the case of the Basque Country, where a causal relationship can be established between low levels of poverty and the functioning of the Basque MIS (Sanzo, 2013; Zalakain, 2014b). 19 The Citizens Legislative Initiative promoted by the two main trade unions proposes a non-contributory benefit for active workers without income within the general framework of social security (annual estimated cost of EUR 11 billion). Another Citizens Legislative Initiative was presented before the Catalonian parliament by a Popular Platform in The Socialist Party (PSOE) proposes creating an MIS, as well as improving benefits for low-income families with children (at an annual estimated cost of EUR 6.5 billion). Podemos proposes a guaranteed income with a supplement for low salaries (annual estimated cost EUR 15 billion). Ciudadanos argues in favour of a supplement for workers on low salaries, while it also refers in a vague manner to the need to slightly improve MIS benefits (no estimate of costs has been published). Izquierda Unida proposes a guaranteed employment scheme (annual estimated cost EUR 9.6 billion), together with a reform of MIS. 21 Few evaluations about regional MIS have been conducted. The Basque Country publishes evaluations about its MIS (Sanzo, 2010). The Catalan public evaluation agency Ivàlua also conducted an evaluation of the regional MIS (Ivàlua, 2010). Most analyses of the working of regional MIS are academic in nature and in truth are not evaluation initiatives. 22 In fact, in the work of EUROMOD, regional MIS are implemented but switched off because some specific conditions cannot be simulated (Adiego et al., 2014). 17

20 2 Links to the other two pillars of active inclusion 2.1 Inclusive labour markets Since the early 1990s, regional MIS have been framed by the philosophy of a dual right to a minimum income and social integration, mainly through access to the labour market. Nowadays, several Autonomous Communities refer to the 2008 Commission Recommendation on the active inclusion of people excluded from the labour market (2008/867/EC) in their MIS regulations. That orientation has been pursued by all 19 regional MIS schemes by means of an integration contract or action plan (under different titles) and a focus on social condition improvement and/or activation. The scope of these plans may vary according to the perceived employability of claimants and the kind of support they are supposed to need. Conditionality rules attached to MIS include an obligation to accept any job offer that fits the profile of the beneficiary, or registration as a job seeker with the regional PES. In addition, regional MIS include specific programmes for social integration and activation support. Nevertheless, social services responsible for these schemes do not usually identify unemployment as one of their targets, and they have confronted the challenge to coordinate with different administrations that control the implementation of ALMP. The different governance arrangements include: In most regions, local and regional authorities share responsibility for designing and monitoring these integration plans. At the regional level, the agencies in charge are generally departments of social welfare (Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, Valencia and Melilla). In some cases, responsibility is shared between the departments of employment and social services (Castile-Leon, Navarre). Finally, in other cases responsibility is not shared, but rests with regional departments of employment (Catalonia and the Basque Country), or with local social services (Canary Islands, Castile-La Mancha, Rioja and Ceuta). There is generally no single point of contact or one-stop shop to coordinate income support, social and unemployment services, in order to offer a joint response to the challenges derived from lack of employment or other situations that push people towards social exclusion. There are some regions which though they have not established a one-stop shop as such do nevertheless have more streamlined coordination protocols between employment and social services, while maintaining the autonomy of both systems. The employment service may lead this coordination (Basque social and unemployment services), or it may be led by social services (Social and Employment Integration Act of Rioja; Madrid Autonomous Region protocol of referral between social services and unemployment offices; cooperation between services in Castile and Leon). For example, in the Basque Country, the previously mentioned transfer of responsibility for MIS to the regional PES has channelled all income benefits and support towards a single point of access. Access to social services is still separate, but there is an automatic referral protocol between the two services. In Catalonia, the departments of social welfare and employment share the management of minimum income, but access is the sole responsibility of social services, while PES offices are not involved. It is difficult to know the exact nature of the efforts actually made to put the activation orientation of MIS into practice in the different Autonomous Communities, since there are no data either about the activities implemented or about the number of beneficiaries who have participated in them. In the midst of the economic crisis, which has brought an exponential rise in demand for MIS, the actual capacity of regional and local administrations to design integrated action plans and to offer them to beneficiaries of the schemes has prevented this individualised service from really being provided (Rodríguez-Cabrero et al., 2015). In general terms, the aggregated expenditure on 18