Construction Site Regulation and OSHA Decentralization
|
|
- Kerrie Holland
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 XI. BUILDING HEALTH AND SAFETY INTO EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY Construction Site Regulation and OSHA Decentralization Alison Morantz National Bureau of Economic Research Abstract Promoting regulatory compliance in the construction industry has long been a high institutional priority of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Yet OSHA officials carry out enforcement activities in only 29 U.S. states. Elsewhere, it is state officials who conduct inspections. This paper links the partly decentralized structure of OSHA enforcement to interstate disparities in regulatory enforcement. First, construction regulations seem to be less strictly enforced by state inspectors. Second, only in the federal enforcement regime do repeat inspections of the same construction site or firm significantly reduce the number of future violations found. Introduction Because construction workers are at especially high risk of occupational injuries and fatalities, promoting regulatory compliance in the construction sector has long been an institutional priority for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). Yet, because of a special opt-out provision of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, federal OSHA officials conduct inspections in only 29 U.S. states, two territories, and the District of Columbia. It is state officials who enforce OSHA regulations in the remaining 21 Author s address: 2 Gardner Road, Apt. 2, Brookline, MA
2 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTRUCTION 233 states and two territories (collectively known as the state plan states ). This paper explores whether the partly decentralized structure of OSHA enforcement is linked to any interstate variations in the nature or effectiveness of regulatory activity. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section compares several key characteristics of enforcement behavior across state plan states and federal OSHA. The second section examines, across regimes, the impact of an inspection on a construction site s future level of regulatory compliance. The data set on which I rely, drawn from OSHA records between the years 1987 and 1994, includes inspection data for national construction firms at or above the eightieth percentile in annual revenues. It contains information on the timing and frequency of inspections, number and severity of regulatory violations, and magnitude of fines. Comparing Patterns in Regulatory Behavior Regardless of whether it is state or federal officials who actually conduct inspections, OSHA requires enforcement officials to record many key statistics associated with an inspection of a construction site. Among the most important of these are the date and location of the inspection, the name of the inspected firm, the reason the inspection took place, the number of violations (including the subset deemed to be serious ), the number of workers in the establishment, whether the workforce is unionized, and the average size of penalties assessed. By focusing on these characteristics, one can compare the basic features of regulatory behavior across the two enforcement regimes. As is shown in Table 1, the general impression that emerges from such a comparison is that the regulations are applied less stringently in state plan states. Although the probability of an inspection is slightly higher in state plan states, the probability of an inspection carrying a penalty is much higher in federal OSHA. Federal inspectors record roughly twice as many serious violations per inspection as do their state counterparts. Average penalties per establishment worker are more than three times as large in federal OSHA as in state plan states. Even when one limits the comparison to inspections in which a penalty is imposed, the size of the fine is still twice as large in federal OSHA. The net expected penalty for each firm (i.e., the probability of an inspection the average penalty) in state plan states is more than double that of the federal OSHA system. Finally, the average monetary penalty assessed per serious violation is about 70 percent higher in the federal OSHA system than in state plan states. It is possible that the decentralization of OSHA enforcement is not the root cause of these differences. For example, the very states that are most likely to engage in lax enforcement (because of unobservable historical or political fac-
3 234 IRRA 55TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS TABLE 1 Patterns in Regulatory Behavior in Construction, Enforcement Federal State Characteristic Enforcement Enforcement Annual probability of being inspected W: 36.48% W: 40.55% U: 35.96% U: 37.22% Annual probability of having an inspection W: 19.92% W: 17.21% with a penalty U: 19.67% U: 14.20% Average penalty per worker per inspection W: $ W: $42.51 U: $ U: $57.90 Average penalty per worker per inspection if there is a penalty W: $ W: $ U: $ U: $ Probability of an inspection expected W: $47.42 W: $15.36 value of penalty U: $62.47 U: $18.63 Probability of inspection with penalty W: $78.03 W: $37.33 expected value of penalty if inspection U: $91.23 U: $35.04 carries a penalty Probability of no serious violations being W: 58.05% W: 74.56% found during an inspection U: 53.13% U: 70.29% Average number of serious violations cited W: W:.4584 per inspection U: U:.5544 Average monetary penalty assessed per W: $ W: $ serious violation recorded U: $ U: $ Note. For each regime, weighted estimates (W) treat the inspection as the unit of observation, implicitly weighting more heavily those states in which inspections are relatively frequent. Unweighted estimates (U), by using state averages as the unit of observation, give each state equal weight within a given regime. tors) may be the very states most likely to have chosen state plan status. In an effort to test for the existence of selection bias, I divided the 50 states into three propensity score strata (p > 0.5; p < 0.5; and 0.25 < p <0.75) and compared enforcement indicators within each stratum. Although the magnitude of the differentials varies, the same cross-regime disparities emerge in all of the strata. (Complete results are available on request.) Comparing the Effects of Regulatory Behavior OSHA s existence is premised on the notion that regulatory intervention can alter firm behavior. Therefore, a key litmus test of regulatory effectiveness is whether the inspection of a given construction site (or the inspection of a different site operated by the same firm) reduces the number of future
4 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTRUCTION 235 violations found at the site. Using this criterion as a basis for comparison, one can use the OSHA inspection data to determine whether construction site inspections are equally likely to improve future compliance inside and outside of the federal regime. For this phase of the analysis, I use the full sample of inspections, which often includes many repeated inspections of the same site. I share with earlier studies the critical assumption that, although firms take into account the expected net costs of hypothetical OSHA inspections in their initial optimization decision, the occurrence of an actual OSHA inspection has an independent effect on firm behavior. The goal of the modeling technique, therefore, is to quantify this specific deterrence effect of inspection behavior by examining the change in measured compliance between successive inspections. There are four key independent variables in each of the models used: the sequence number of an inspection at a particular site; the sequence number of the inspection for a particular firm (across all of its sites); and both variables interacted with state plan status. A significantly negative coefficient on any of these variables indicates a downward effect on the future number of violations. Past literature has modeled the outcome variable of interest regulatory compliance in two different ways. Focusing on the extensive margin of compliance, Weil (2000) has defined compliance as the absence of any serious recorded violations. Meanwhile, Gray (1990) has incorporated the intensive margin by using a continuous dependent variable in a count model specification. I used both techniques throughout the analysis, estimating both a probit model and a negative binomial count model. (A negative binomial specification was chosen because of the frequency of zero values and strong evidence of overdispersion.) Finally, I examine the effects of inspections in two different ways. First, I explore the impact of the very first OSHA inspection in two regimes, because undergoing a formal inspection for the first time may help alert firms and workers to simple dangers of which they were not previously aware and encourage them to implement simple safety practices that require only negligible capital investments. After the initial inspection, however, changing firm behavior may involve more systemic workplace restructuring and/or costly expenditures. Therefore, I separately model the impact of repeated OSHA inspections in the two regimes to isolate the effect of later inspections on firm behavior. This two-phased approach differs somewhat from that used in previous studies, which use a single specification to encompass the effects of all inspections (Gray 1990; Weil 2000). Table 2 summarizes the control variables included in the models. I include two factors that could affect firm-specific costs of compliance: union status and the log of the number of workers in the establishment. I also control for sev-
5 236 IRRA 55TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS TABLE 2 Summary Statistics on State and Federal OSHA Inspections in Construction, Dependent Federal State Variables Enforcement Enforcement Probability that no serious violations found during an inspection 59.92% 76.24% Average number of serious violations found per inspection Independent Variables: Inspection triggered by a complaint Inspection triggered by an accident Unionized workforce Unionized * complaint Log of prior accumulated penalties Log of prior accumulated inspection hrs Log of number workers in establishment Total inspections of contractor First inspection of site 80.08% 65.29% Inspection sequence number of site Inspection sequence number of firm Note. All data, extracted from OSHA s Integrated Management Information System, were obtained from Professor David Weil of Boston University. eral specialized triggers of OSHA inspections that could affect the thoroughness of the inspection and/or likelihood of violations: employee complaints, on-site accidents, and employee complaints issuing from unionized workplaces. (The latter interaction term was included on the theory that, in some unionized settings, employees may file OSHA complaints as part of a concerted strategy to enhance their bargaining position with management.) Two additional independent variables included in the model require elaboration. First, Gray (1990) has found that firms respond more readily to inspections with penalties than to those carrying no monetary sanction. Moreover, in an intuitive sense, one might expect that a construction site or firm that has been frequently inspected in the past, but never penalized, might respond differently than one that has faced a series of escalating penalties. (OSHA s penalty structure, for example, contains escalating penalties for repeated noncompliance.) To capture this aspect of a site s inspection history, I include the log of prior accumulated penalties as an independent variable. Second, there may be significant type heterogeneity among construction firms in terms of their inherent technological capacity, or institutional willingness, to comply with regulations. Without using a fixed effects specification, it is impossible to fully control for such site-specific variation. When firms are
6 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTRUCTION 237 subjected to a high number of inspections over a sustained period, however, it could be because inspectors have identified something about their compliance behavior, production technology, management, and/or inherent dangerousness that merits special scrutiny. I follow the lead of several earlier studies in using the total number of inspections experienced by each construction contractor during the entire study period as a rough proxy for firm type (Gray 1990; Weil 2000). In one key respect, my results show that the two regimes are statistically indistinguishable. The first inspection has a large, significant impact on a construction site s future level of compliance in both regimes. (Complete results are available on request.) As is shown in Table 3, however, a different pattern emerges when one focuses on repeat inspections (i.e., the second and sub- TABLE 3 Effect of Inspection of Construction Site on Violations Found at Next Inspection, Independent Variable Probit Model Pseudo-R 2 =.0666 Negative Binomial Model (dy/dx reported Pseudo-R 2 =.0461 in parentheses) w =.5838 State plan dummy.2443*** 1.109*** (.0216) (.0925) [.7111] Sequence number of.0299***.1125*** inspection of site (.0053) (.0205) [.0657] Sequence number of site *.0250***.0893*** state plan dummy (.0055) (.0214) [.0521] Sequence number of inspection.0008**.0027* of firm (.0003) (.0012) [.0016] Sequence number of firm *.0011***.0041*** state plan dummy (.0004) (.0014) [.0024] Employee complaint triggered the inspection (.0226) (.0845) Employee complaint trigger * state plan dummy (.0307) (.1315) On-site accident triggered the.1835***.4507*** inspection (.0312) (.0960) On-site accident trigger * state plan dummy (.0360) (.1277) Union shop (.0086) (.0333)
7 238 IRRA 55TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS Independent Variable Probit Model Pseudo-R 2 =.0666 Negative Binomial Model (dy/dx reported Pseudo-R 2 =.0461 in parentheses) w =.5838 Union shop * state plan dummy.0234*.0781 (.0121) (.0499) Union shop* complaint inspection (.0295) (.1140) Union shop* complaint inspection* state plan dummy (.0478) (.1756) Log (number workers in.0271***.1821*** establishment) (.0032) (.0123) Log (number workers in.0106*.0295 establishment)*state plan (.0045) (.0187) dummy Log (1 + penalties from first.0159***.0620*** inspection) (.0021) (.0081) Log (l + penalties from first inspection) * state plan dummy (.0028) (.0116) Total inspections of firm.0005**.0017** (.0002) (.0007) Total inspections * state plan dummy (.0002) (.0008) Year and four-digit SIC dummies Yes Yes Note. In probit model, dependent variable is presence of at least one violation and there are 27,146 observations. In negative binomial model, dependent variable is number of serious violations and there are 27,149 observations. Standard errors are given in parenthesis. Dy/dx, presented in brackets for selected coefficients, represent a 1 standard deviation change in the predicted number of events (w) or, for dummy variables, a discrete change from 0 to 1. *Statistically significant at the 5% level. **Statistically significant at the 1% level. ***Statistically significant at the.5% level. sequent inspections of the same construction site). In both of the specifications tested (probit model and negative binomial model), the coefficients on the dummies for repeat inspections are negative and highly significant. Yet their interactions with state plan status are positive, significant, and large enough to offset the negative coefficient on repeat inspections. In other words, although repeated OSHA inspections of the same construction firm or site
8 EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS IN CONSTRUCTION 239 significantly increase compliance in the federal regime, the same does not hold true for state plan states. Conclusions Since the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the provision permitting individual states to opt out of the federal enforcement system has remained controversial. Although this provision is explicitly premised on the requirement that state enforcement be at least as effective as federal OSHA, many observers in the 1970s questioned the wisdom of this partial decentralization of regulatory authority. After posing the question of whether the opt-out provision has fostered any interstate disparities in enforcement behavior or effectiveness, this study offers a preliminary answer through an analysis of OSHA inspection records. The results suggest that the partly decentralized structure of OSHA enforcement may, indeed, be linked to two salient interstate disparities in regulatory activity. First, OSHA regulations seem to be enforced more stringently when federal officials are conducting the inspections. Second, repeated inspections of the same construction site or firm significantly reduce future violations only within the federal system. These results provide some empirical basis for questioning whether state officials are at least as effective as their federal OSHA counterparts in promoting regulatory compliance in the construction industry. Elsewhere, I link these disparities in enforcement behavior to differentials in injury rates and show that similar disparities between state and federal enforcement emerge from an empirical analysis of the steel sector (Morantz 2003). Future work might profitably explore whether the disparities I identify for construction are the norm across the OSHA-regulated economy, whether they have changed significantly over time, and whether they apply in other regulatory settings. References Gray, Wayne and Carol Adaire Jones Are OSHA Inspections Effective? A Longitudinal Study in the Manufacturing Sector. NBER Working Paper No Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Morantz, Alison Has Regulatory Devolution Injured American Workers? An Empirical Comparison of State and Federal OSHA Enforcement. Paper to be presented at the American Law & Economics Association Annual Conference. September 19 21, Weil, David Assessing OSHA Performance: Evidence from the Construction Industry. IRRA Proceedings 2000 (52nd Annual Meeting). In OSHA Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance in the U.S. Construction Industry, pp
Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry
Assessing OSHA Performance The Construction Industry / 651 Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry David Weil Abstract The determinants of OSHA performance can be examined
More informationTHE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT OSHA INSPECTION TYPES ON DIFFERENT MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS,
THE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT OSHA INSPECTION TYPES ON DIFFERENT MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS, 1992-98 JOHN M. MENDELOFF and WAYNE B.GRAY* * John Mendeloff is Professor of Public Management and Policy at the
More informationCAMBRIDGE PROPERTY & CASUALTY SPECIAL REPORT
CAMBRIDGE PROPERTY & CASUALTY SPECIAL REPORT DON T PANIC - HOW TO HANDLE AN INVESTIGATION UNDER MIOSHA This Special Report was written by James F. Hermon, Attorney at Law. Mr. Herman is an attorney with
More informationObjectives. Agenda. What to expect from an OSHA inspection: 8/22/2017. Tips for Producers
What to expect from an OSHA inspection: Tips for Producers Objectives Describe employer rights and responsibilities under the Occupational Safety and Health Act Understand how OSHA chooses inspection sites
More informationOnline Appendix A: Verification of Employer Responses
Online Appendix for: Do Employer Pension Contributions Reflect Employee Preferences? Evidence from a Retirement Savings Reform in Denmark, by Itzik Fadlon, Jessica Laird, and Torben Heien Nielsen Online
More informationCAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE 2003 TAX CUTS Richard H. Fosberg
CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE 2003 TAX CUTS Richard H. Fosberg William Paterson University, Deptartment of Economics, USA. KEYWORDS Capital structure, tax rates, cost of capital. ABSTRACT The main purpose
More informationRisk Management Performance Metrics for Manufacturers Managing Employee Capital
Hanover Manufacturers Advantage Risk Management Performance Metrics for Manufacturers Managing Employee Capital Maintaining consistent and efficient throughput is crucial to any manufacturers bottom line.
More informationTHE CODING OF OUTCOMES IN TAXPAYERS REPORTING DECISIONS. A. Schepanski The University of Iowa
THE CODING OF OUTCOMES IN TAXPAYERS REPORTING DECISIONS A. Schepanski The University of Iowa May 2001 The author thanks Teri Shearer and the participants of The University of Iowa Judgment and Decision-Making
More informationHazard Prevention Program. Regulation 19
Hazard Prevention Program Regulation 19 Topics Purpose of the regulation Key terminology What is a Hazard Prevention Program? Overview of the regulation Steps for Complying with the Regulation Conclusion
More informationSources of Financing in Different Forms of Corporate Liquidity and the Performance of M&As
Sources of Financing in Different Forms of Corporate Liquidity and the Performance of M&As Zhenxu Tong * University of Exeter Jian Liu ** University of Exeter This draft: August 2016 Abstract We examine
More informationI. Identification of Partners
Work Safe Partnership Program II With the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association (Kansas City Chapter) And the Occupational Safety and Health Administration s Kansas City, MO
More informationThe Determinants of Bank Mergers: A Revealed Preference Analysis
The Determinants of Bank Mergers: A Revealed Preference Analysis Oktay Akkus Department of Economics University of Chicago Ali Hortacsu Department of Economics University of Chicago VERY Preliminary Draft:
More information1. Logit and Linear Probability Models
INTERNET APPENDIX 1. Logit and Linear Probability Models Table 1 Leverage and the Likelihood of a Union Strike (Logit Models) This table presents estimation results of logit models of union strikes during
More informationCapital allocation in Indian business groups
Capital allocation in Indian business groups Remco van der Molen Department of Finance University of Groningen The Netherlands This version: June 2004 Abstract The within-group reallocation of capital
More informationEstimating the Uninsured Vehicle Rate from the Uninsured Motorist/ Bodily Injury Ratio
January 1999, Volume V, Issue 1 1 Estimating the Uninsured Vehicle Rate from the Uninsured Motorist/ Bodily Injury Ratio by Lyn Hunstad, California Insurance Department Introduction An alternate method
More informationThe use of real-time data is critical, for the Federal Reserve
Capacity Utilization As a Real-Time Predictor of Manufacturing Output Evan F. Koenig Research Officer Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas The use of real-time data is critical, for the Federal Reserve indices
More informationBANK OF CANADA RENEWAL OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION THE INFLATION-CONTROL TARGET. May 2001
BANK OF CANADA May RENEWAL OF THE INFLATION-CONTROL TARGET BACKGROUND INFORMATION Bank of Canada Wellington Street Ottawa, Ontario KA G9 78 ISBN: --89- Printed in Canada on recycled paper B A N K O F C
More informationGender Differences in the Labor Market Effects of the Dollar
Gender Differences in the Labor Market Effects of the Dollar Linda Goldberg and Joseph Tracy Federal Reserve Bank of New York and NBER April 2001 Abstract Although the dollar has been shown to influence
More informationThe trade balance and fiscal policy in the OECD
European Economic Review 42 (1998) 887 895 The trade balance and fiscal policy in the OECD Philip R. Lane *, Roberto Perotti Economics Department, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland Columbia University,
More informationQuestions of Statistical Analysis and Discrete Choice Models
APPENDIX D Questions of Statistical Analysis and Discrete Choice Models In discrete choice models, the dependent variable assumes categorical values. The models are binary if the dependent variable assumes
More informationWage Gap Estimation with Proxies and Nonresponse
Wage Gap Estimation with Proxies and Nonresponse Barry Hirsch Department of Economics Andrew Young School of Policy Studies Georgia State University, Atlanta Chris Bollinger Department of Economics University
More informationPredicting and Preventing Severe Workplace Injuries
A PMA Companies Thought Leadership Publication April 2012 Predicting and Preventing Severe Workplace Injuries for Risk Management Professionals www.pmacompanies.com Member of Old Republic Companies Predicting
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE DECLINING EFFECTS OF OSHA INSPECTIONS ON MANUFACTURING INJURIES: 1979 TO Wayne B. Gray John M.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE DECLINING EFFECTS OF OSHA INSPECTIONS ON MANUFACTURING INJURIES: 1979 TO 1998 Wayne B. Gray John M. Mendeloff Working Paper 9119 http://www.nber.org/papers/w9119 NATIONAL
More informationDescription of the Sample and Limitations of the Data
Section 3 Description of the Sample and Limitations of the Data T his section describes the 2008 Corporate sample design, sample selection, data capture, data cleaning, and data completion. The techniques
More informationOnline Appendix to. The Value of Crowdsourced Earnings Forecasts
Online Appendix to The Value of Crowdsourced Earnings Forecasts This online appendix tabulates and discusses the results of robustness checks and supplementary analyses mentioned in the paper. A1. Estimating
More informationProgram Safety Policy
Scope and Application: The California Ironworkers Workers Compensation Trust has established a Program Safety Policy for all employers and parties who elect to participate in the Collectively Bargained
More informationNagement. Revenue Scotland. Risk Management Framework. Revised [ ]February Table of Contents Nagement... 0
Nagement Revenue Scotland Risk Management Framework Revised [ ]February 2016 Table of Contents Nagement... 0 1. Introduction... 2 1.2 Overview of risk management... 2 2. Policy Statement... 3 3. Risk Management
More informationInvestment in Information Security Measures: A Behavioral Investigation
Association for Information Systems AIS Electronic Library (AISeL) WISP 2015 Proceedings Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy (SIGSEC) Winter 12-13-2015 Investment in Information Security
More informationAnomalies under Jackknife Variance Estimation Incorporating Rao-Shao Adjustment in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey - Insurance Component 1
Anomalies under Jackknife Variance Estimation Incorporating Rao-Shao Adjustment in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey - Insurance Component 1 Robert M. Baskin 1, Matthew S. Thompson 2 1 Agency for Healthcare
More informationWhat You Don t Know Can t Help You: Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making
VERY PRELIMINARY PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE COMMENTS WELCOME What You Don t Know Can t Help You: Knowledge and Retirement Decision Making February 2003 Sewin Chan Wagner Graduate School of Public Service New
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE SOCIAL VERSUS THE PRIVATE INCENTIVE TO BRING SUIT IN A COSTLY LEGAL SYSTEM. Steven Shavell. Working Paper No.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES THE SOCIAL VERSUS THE PRIVATE INCENTIVE TO BRING SUIT IN A COSTLY LEGAL SYSTEM Steven Shavell Working Paper No. T4l NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue
More informationInspection Targeting Issues for the California Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health
Working Paper Inspection Targeting Issues for the California Department of Industrial Relations Division of Occupational Safety and Health John Mendeloff and Seth A.Seabury Center for Health and Safety
More informationDeterminants of Operating Expenses in Massachusetts Affordable Multifamily Rental Housing Prepared for Massachusetts Housing Partnership
Determinants of Operating Expenses in Massachusetts Affordable Multifamily Rental Housing Prepared for Massachusetts Housing Partnership By Jesse Elton Harvard University Kennedy School of Government,
More informationAlex Morgano Ladji Bamba Lucas Van Cleef Computer Skills for Economic Analysis E226 11/6/2015 Dr. Myers. Abstract
1 Alex Morgano Ladji Bamba Lucas Van Cleef Computer Skills for Economic Analysis E226 11/6/2015 Dr. Myers Abstract This essay focuses on the causality between specific questions that deal with people s
More informationReal Option Method and Escalation of Commitment in the Evaluation of Investment Projects
American Journal of Economics and Business Administration 3 (3): 473-478, 2011 ISSN 1945-5488 2011 Science Publications Real Option Method and Escalation of Commitment in the Evaluation of Investment Projects
More informationThe Role of APIs in the Economy
The Role of APIs in the Economy Seth G. Benzell, Guillermo Lagarda, Marshall Van Allstyne June 2, 2016 Abstract Using proprietary information from a large percentage of the API-tool provision and API-Management
More informationSarah K. Burns James P. Ziliak. November 2013
Sarah K. Burns James P. Ziliak November 2013 Well known that policymakers face important tradeoffs between equity and efficiency in the design of the tax system The issue we address in this paper informs
More informationThe Role of Industry Affiliation in the Underpricing of U.S. IPOs
The Role of Industry Affiliation in the Underpricing of U.S. IPOs Bryan Henrick ABSTRACT: Haverford College Department of Economics Spring 2012 This paper examines the significance of a firm s industry
More informationImpact on Utilization From an Increase in Workers Compensation Indemnity Benefits
NCCI RESEARCH BRIEF November 2009 by Robert Moss, Ashley Pistole, and Bruce Ritter Impact on Utilization From an Increase in Workers Compensation Indemnity Benefits Abstract The National Council on Compensation
More informationAn Estimate of the Effect of Currency Unions on Trade and Growth* First draft May 1; revised June 6, 2000
An Estimate of the Effect of Currency Unions on Trade and Growth* First draft May 1; revised June 6, 2000 Jeffrey A. Frankel Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 79 JFK Street Cambridge MA
More informationRECURSIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION. Shane Moriarity University of Oklahoma, U.S.A. Josefino San Diego Unitec New Zealand, New Zealand
RECURSIVE RELATIONSHIPS IN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION Shane Moriarity University of Oklahoma, U.S.A. Josefino San Diego Unitec New Zealand, New Zealand ABSTRACT Asian businesses in the 21 st century will learn
More informationResidential Loan Renegotiation: Theory and Evidence
THE JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 1 Residential Loan Renegotiation: Theory and Evidence Terrence M. Clauretie* Mel Jameson* Abstract. If loan renegotiations are not uncommon, this alternative should
More informationWhat Firms Know. Mohammad Amin* World Bank. May 2008
What Firms Know Mohammad Amin* World Bank May 2008 Abstract: A large literature shows that the legal tradition of a country is highly correlated with various dimensions of institutional quality. Broadly,
More informationContrarian Trades and Disposition Effect: Evidence from Online Trade Data. Abstract
Contrarian Trades and Disposition Effect: Evidence from Online Trade Data Hayato Komai a Ryota Koyano b Daisuke Miyakawa c Abstract Using online stock trading records in Japan for 461 individual investors
More informationLabor Law Regulation Part 60 Pursuant to Section 134 of the Workers. Compensation Law as amended by Chapter 6 of the Laws of 2007
DRAFT as of 08/25/08 Labor Law Regulation Part 60 Pursuant to Section 134 of the Workers Compensation Law as amended by Chapter 6 of the Laws of 2007 PART 60 WORKPLACE SAFETY AND LOSS PREVENTION INCENTIVE
More informationManagerial compensation and the threat of takeover
Journal of Financial Economics 47 (1998) 219 239 Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover Anup Agrawal*, Charles R. Knoeber College of Management, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC
More informationIn Debt and Approaching Retirement: Claim Social Security or Work Longer?
AEA Papers and Proceedings 2018, 108: 401 406 https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181116 In Debt and Approaching Retirement: Claim Social Security or Work Longer? By Barbara A. Butrica and Nadia S. Karamcheva*
More informationThe Scope and Nature of Occupational Health and Safety
Element 1: Foundations in Health and Safety The Scope and Nature of Occupational Health and Safety The study of health and safety involves the study of many different subjects including the sciences (chemistry,
More informationFiring Costs, Employment and Misallocation
Firing Costs, Employment and Misallocation Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges Omar Bamieh University of Vienna November 13th 2018 1 / 27 Why should we care about firing costs? Firing costs make it
More informationEmpirical evaluation of the 2001 and 2003 tax cut policies on personal consumption: Long Run impact
Georgia State University From the SelectedWorks of Fatoumata Diarrassouba Spring March 29, 2013 Empirical evaluation of the 2001 and 2003 tax cut policies on personal consumption: Long Run impact Fatoumata
More informationStudy of Alternative Measurement Attributes with Respect to Liabilities
Study of Alternative Measurement Attributes with Respect to Liabilities Subproject of the IAA Insurance Accounting Committee in response to a request of the IASB to help identifying an adequate measurement
More informationInvestor Competence, Information and Investment Activity
Investor Competence, Information and Investment Activity Anders Karlsson and Lars Nordén 1 Department of Corporate Finance, School of Business, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden Abstract
More informationAnalyzing State-Level Construction Fatality Rates,
Analyzing State-Level Construction Fatality Rates, 1992-2016 John Mendeloff Professor of Public Affairs University of Pittsburgh jmen@pitt.edu Wayne B. Gray Professor of Economics Clark University wgray@clarku.edu
More informationNote: This policy incorporates key elements of the former Risk Taking and Assessment Policy (SO-0080).
Risk Assessment Policy Document Title Reference Number Risk Assessment Policy Version Number V2.3 Date of Issue 01/09/06 Latest Revision 17/03/16 Distribution Owner Policy Lead Department All Employees
More informationOnline Appendix of. This appendix complements the evidence shown in the text. 1. Simulations
Online Appendix of Heterogeneity in Returns to Wealth and the Measurement of Wealth Inequality By ANDREAS FAGERENG, LUIGI GUISO, DAVIDE MALACRINO AND LUIGI PISTAFERRI This appendix complements the evidence
More informationDepression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk-Taking?
Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk-Taking? October 19, 2009 Ulrike Malmendier, UC Berkeley (joint work with Stefan Nagel, Stanford) 1 The Tale of Depression Babies I don t know
More informationHealth and Safety Attitudes and Behaviours in the New Zealand Workforce: A Survey of Workers and Employers 2016 CROSS-SECTOR REPORT
Health and Safety Attitudes and Behaviours in the New Zealand Workforce: A Survey of Workers and Employers 2016 CROSS-SECTOR REPORT NOVEMBER 2017 CONTENTS: 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 1 INTRODUCTION... 1 WORKPLACE
More informationSPECIAL REPORT. The Corporate Income Tax and Workers Wages: New Evidence from the 50 States
August 2009 No. 169 The Corporate Income Tax and Workers Wages: New Evidence from the 50 States By Robert Carroll Senior Fellow Tax Foundation Introduction While state-local corporate tax revenue has remained
More informationCHAPTER 8. Conclusion
CHAPTER 8 Conclusion 8.1 Summary and evaluation of the study The results of the study are summarized in Table 8.1. The upper part of the table, 180 which shows the analysis of the number of permits, indicates
More informationWC-5 Just How Credible Is That Employer? Exploring GLMs and Multilevel Modeling for NCCI s Excess Loss Factor Methodology
Antitrust Notice The Casualty Actuarial Society is committed to adhering strictly to the letter and spirit of the antitrust laws. Seminars conducted under the auspices of the CAS are designed solely to
More informationWhy Do Companies Choose to Go IPOs? New Results Using Data from Taiwan;
University of New Orleans ScholarWorks@UNO Department of Economics and Finance Working Papers, 1991-2006 Department of Economics and Finance 1-1-2006 Why Do Companies Choose to Go IPOs? New Results Using
More informationData and Methods in FMLA Research Evidence
Data and Methods in FMLA Research Evidence The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was passed in 1993 to provide job-protected unpaid leave to eligible workers who needed time off from work to care for
More informationLeverage Aversion, Efficient Frontiers, and the Efficient Region*
Posted SSRN 08/31/01 Last Revised 10/15/01 Leverage Aversion, Efficient Frontiers, and the Efficient Region* Bruce I. Jacobs and Kenneth N. Levy * Previously entitled Leverage Aversion and Portfolio Optimality:
More informationStudent Loan Nudges: Experimental Evidence on Borrowing and. Educational Attainment. Online Appendix: Not for Publication
Student Loan Nudges: Experimental Evidence on Borrowing and Educational Attainment Online Appendix: Not for Publication June 2018 1 Appendix A: Additional Tables and Figures Figure A.1: Screen Shots From
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MAKING SENSE OF THE LABOR MARKET HEIGHT PREMIUM: EVIDENCE FROM THE BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES MAKING SENSE OF THE LABOR MARKET HEIGHT PREMIUM: EVIDENCE FROM THE BRITISH HOUSEHOLD PANEL SURVEY Anne Case Christina Paxson Mahnaz Islam Working Paper 14007 http://www.nber.org/papers/w14007
More informationContemporaneous and Long-Term Effects of CHIP Eligibility Expansions on SSI Enrollment
Contemporaneous and Long-Term Effects of CHIP Eligibility Expansions on SSI Enrollment Michael Levere Mathematica Policy Research Sean Orzol Mathematica Policy Research Lindsey Leininger Mathematica Policy
More informationThe Next Game Changer: Predictive Analytics
Session No. 596 The Next Game Changer: Predictive Analytics Del Lisk, CTP Vice President, Safety Services Lytx. Inc. Introduction Traffic accidents and the tragic consequences impact everyone in the United
More informationAppendix B: Methodology and Finding of Statistical and Econometric Analysis of Enterprise Survey and Portfolio Data
Appendix B: Methodology and Finding of Statistical and Econometric Analysis of Enterprise Survey and Portfolio Data Part 1: SME Constraints, Financial Access, and Employment Growth Evidence from World
More informationCharacteristics of Individuals with Integrated Pensions
This article uses data from the Health and Retirement Survey to examine the characteristics of individuals who are covered under integrated pension plans by comparing them with people covered by non-integrated
More informationTECHNICAL PAPER: A risk-based approach to AML/CFT inspections Prepared by Council of Europe Expert Ms Maud Bokkerink
Project against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Serbia MOLI Serbia DGI(2013) 29 September 2013 TECHNICAL PAPER: A risk-based approach to AML/CFT inspections Prepared by Council of Europe Expert
More informationDoes shopping for a mortgage make consumers better off?
May 2018 Does shopping for a mortgage make consumers better off? Know Before You Owe: Mortgage shopping study brief #2 This is the second in a series of research briefs on homebuying and mortgage shopping
More informationVolume Title: International Taxation and Multinational Activity. Volume URL:
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: International Taxation and Multinational Activity Volume Author/Editor: James R. Hines, Jr.
More informationMulti-Dimensional Separating Equilibria and Moral Hazard: An Empirical Study of National Football League Contract Negotiations. March, 2002.
Multi-Dimensional Separating Equilibria and Moral Hazard: An Empirical Study of National Football League Contract Negotiations Mike Conlin Department of Economics Syracuse University meconlin@maxwell.syr.edu
More informationOSHA 2016 Regulatory Updates Are You Prepared?
OSHA 2016 Regulatory Updates Are You Prepared? ANHA Annual Convention September, 2016 OSHA. "Our new rule will 'nudge' employers to prevent work injuries to show investors, job seekers, customers and the
More informationDo Domestic Chinese Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment?
Do Domestic Chinese Firms Benefit from Foreign Direct Investment? Chang-Tai Hsieh, University of California Working Paper Series Vol. 2006-30 December 2006 The views expressed in this publication are those
More informationImpressions from Applying ISO to an Avalanche Mitigation Project
Impressions from Applying ISO 31000 to an Avalanche Mitigation Project Bruce Jamieson 1 and Alan Jones 2 1 Dept. of Civil Engineering, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada 2 Dynamic Avalanche Consulting
More information15 American. Option Pricing. Answers to Questions and Problems
15 American Option Pricing Answers to Questions and Problems 1. Explain why American and European calls on a nondividend stock always have the same value. An American option is just like a European option,
More informationThe following materials are designed to accompany our article Looking for Audience
Online Appendix The following materials are designed to accompany our article Looking for Audience Costs in all the Wrong Places: Electoral Institutions, Media Access and Democratic Constraint. Robustness
More informationSelf-Government and Public Goods: An Experiment
Self-Government and Public Goods: An Experiment Kenju Kamei and Louis Putterman Brown University Jean-Robert Tyran* University of Copenhagen * No blame for this draft. Centralized vs. Decentralized Sanctions
More informationWilkins Safety Group
How is Health and Safety Law Enforced? Enforcing Authorities for Health & Safety at Work The task of ensuring that health and safety at work law is enforced is shared the local authorities (LAs) and the
More informationModelling catastrophic risk in international equity markets: An extreme value approach. JOHN COTTER University College Dublin
Modelling catastrophic risk in international equity markets: An extreme value approach JOHN COTTER University College Dublin Abstract: This letter uses the Block Maxima Extreme Value approach to quantify
More informationAnother Look at Market Responses to Tangible and Intangible Information
Critical Finance Review, 2016, 5: 165 175 Another Look at Market Responses to Tangible and Intangible Information Kent Daniel Sheridan Titman 1 Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York,
More informationImpact of Intellectual Property Rights Reforms on the Diffusion of Knowledge through FDI
Impact of Intellectual Property Rights Reforms on the Diffusion of Knowledge through FDI Ioana Popovici Florida International University May 2006 This paper examines the impact of intellectual property
More informationLIQUIDITY EXTERNALITIES OF CONVERTIBLE BOND ISSUANCE IN CANADA
LIQUIDITY EXTERNALITIES OF CONVERTIBLE BOND ISSUANCE IN CANADA by Brandon Lam BBA, Simon Fraser University, 2009 and Ming Xin Li BA, University of Prince Edward Island, 2008 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL
More informationWelcome! OSHA & Workers Compensa6on Seminar. February 28, 2013
Welcome! OSHA & Workers Compensa6on Seminar February 28, 2013 Objective OSHA regulations for small business OSHA training requirements for small business OSHA inspections & citations Managing employee
More informationLabor Market Protections and Unemployment: Does the IMF Have a Case? Dean Baker and John Schmitt 1. November 3, 2003
cepr Center for Economic and Policy Research Briefing Paper Labor Market Protections and Unemployment: Does the IMF Have a Case? Dean Baker and John Schmitt 1 November 3, 2003 CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY
More informationGreen Giving and Demand for Environmental Quality: Evidence from the Giving and Volunteering Surveys. Debra K. Israel* Indiana State University
Green Giving and Demand for Environmental Quality: Evidence from the Giving and Volunteering Surveys Debra K. Israel* Indiana State University Working Paper * The author would like to thank Indiana State
More informationResidential Tenancy Branch Administrative Penalties Review. March 21, 2016
Residential Tenancy Branch Administrative Penalties Review Contents Introduction... 3 Intent of Administrative Penalties... 3 Best Practice in Administrative Penalties... 4 Residential Tenancy Branch Measures
More informationCan Hedge Funds Time the Market?
International Review of Finance, 2017 Can Hedge Funds Time the Market? MICHAEL W. BRANDT,FEDERICO NUCERA AND GIORGIO VALENTE Duke University, The Fuqua School of Business, Durham, NC LUISS Guido Carli
More informationRisks of On-Bill Financing
MODEL TESTIMONY Risks of On-Bill Financing Fisher, Sheehan & Colton Weatherization Leveraged Partnerships Project FSC S LAW & ECONOMICS INSIGHTS Issue 15-04 Fisher, Sheehan & Colton, Public Finance and
More informationIncome Shifting from Transfer Pricing: Further Evidence from Tax Return Data. Michael McDonald* OTA Technical Working Paper 2 July 2008
Income Shifting from Transfer Pricing: Further Evidence from Tax Return Data by Michael McDonald* OTA Technical Working Paper 2 July 2008 OTA Technical Working Papers is an occasional series of reports
More informationInvestment Platforms Market Study Interim Report: Annex 7 Fund Discounts and Promotions
MS17/1.2: Annex 7 Market Study Investment Platforms Market Study Interim Report: Annex 7 Fund Discounts and Promotions July 2018 Annex 7: Introduction 1. There are several ways in which investment platforms
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES TAX EVASION AND CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION. James M. Poterba. Working Paper No. 2119
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES TAX EVASION AND CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION James M. Poterba Working Paper No. 2119 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 January 1987
More informationNBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CLIMATE POLICY AND VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES: AN EVALUATION OF THE CONNECTICUT CLEAN ENERGY COMMUNITIES PROGRAM
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES CLIMATE POLICY AND VOLUNTARY INITIATIVES: AN EVALUATION OF THE CONNECTICUT CLEAN ENERGY COMMUNITIES PROGRAM Matthew J. Kotchen Working Paper 16117 http://www.nber.org/papers/w16117
More informationThe Contribution of Environmental Impairment
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 21 (No. 80, July 1996) 336-340 The Contribution of Impairment Liability () Insurance to Eco-Efficiency by Peter Zweifel * Introduction The objective of environmental
More informationQuick Reference Guide. Employer Health and Safety Planning Tool Kit
Operating a WorkSafeBC Vehicle Quick Reference Guide Employer Health and Safety Planning Tool Kit Effective date: June 08 Table of Contents Employer Health and Safety Planning Tool Kit...5 Introduction...5
More informationAnnex A. ERM Approved Inspection Authority, Certificates of Accreditation
Annex A ERM Approved Inspection Authority, Certificates of Accreditation Annex B Major Hazard Installation Legislation Government Gazette REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA Regulation Gazette No. 7122 Vol. 433
More informationBy Jack VanDerhei, Ph.D., Employee Benefit Research Institute
June 2013 No. 387 Reality Checks: A Comparative Analysis of Future Benefits from Private-Sector, Voluntary-Enrollment 401(k) Plans vs. Stylized, Final-Average-Pay Defined Benefit and Cash Balance Plans
More informationJake Jennings Director of Risk Control
OSHA Inspections: Don t Let OSHA Be A Pest Jake Jennings Director of Risk Control The Preventable Accident Can accidents be prevented? Proactive vs. reactive behavior Who s safety program is it anyway?
More informationThe Economic Policy Institute is Wrong: Public Employees. ARE Overpaid. A Report by the Center for Union Facts
The Economic Policy Institute is Wrong: Public Employees ARE Overpaid A Report by the Center for Union Facts TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY... 3 LABOR UNION COMPENSATION vs. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION...
More information