Discussion Papers Department of Economics University of Copenhagen
|
|
- Derick Stewart
- 6 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Dscusson Papers Department of Economcs Unversty of Copenhagen No Incomplete Fnancal Markets and Jumps n Asset Prces Hervé Crès, Tobas Markeprand, and Mch Tvede Øster Farmagsgade 5, Buldng 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark Tel.: Fax: ISSN: (onlne)
2 Incomplete fnancal markets and jumps n asset prces Hervé Crès Tobas Markeprand Mch Tvede Abstract A dynamc pure-exchange general equlbrum model wth uncertanty s studed. Fundamentals are supposed to depend contnuously on states of nature. It s shown that: 1. f fnancal markets are complete, then asset prces vary contnuously wth states of nature, and; 2. f fnancal markets are ncomplete, jumps n asset prces may be unavodable. Consequently ncomplete fnancal markets may ncrease volatlty n asset prces sgnfcantly. Keywords: General equlbrum, fnancal markets, jumps n asset prces. JEL-classfcaton: D52, D53, G12. Scences Po, 27 rue Sant-Gullaume, Pars, France; emal: herve.cres@scencespo.fr. Unversty of Copenhagen, Studestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark; Tel: ; Fax: ; tobas.markeprand@econ.ku.dk. Unversty of Copenhagen, Studestraede 6, 1455 Copenhagen K, Denmark; Tel: ; Fax: ; mch.tvede@econ.ku.dk. 1
3 1 Introducton In the present paper we provde an explanaton of jumps n asset prces based on the nteracton of real markets and fnancal markets. An emprcal characterstc of asset prces s that dstrbutons of prce changes have thck tals,.e., large changes n asset prces are overly represented n observed data. Indeed n Merton (1976), motvated by the observaton that stock prces tend to show far too many outlers, the study of opton prces n case of jumps n the underlyng securty prces was ntated. Thck tals are not consstent wth the standard assumpton of Gaussan processes wdely used n the fnance lterature. Therefore jump processes such as Posson processes seem to be necessary to account for the thck tals (see e.g. Andersen, Benzon & Lund (2002)). In Bansal & Shalastovch (2008) t s mentoned that the frequency of jumps s per year and that around 10 percent of the volatlty n asset prces s explaned by jumps. The consequences of jumps n asset prces are potentally sgnfcant as jumps n asset prces ncrease uncertanty: fundamentals are uncertan and small changes n fundamentals can result n dramatc changes of prces. Several contrbutons am at explanng jumps n asset prces. In Calvet & Fsher (2008) an optmal growth model where endowments and dvdends are uncertan s consdered and t s shown that jumps n the drft and/or volatlty of endowments and dvdends generate jumps n asset prces even though sample paths of endowments and dvdends are contnuous. In Balduzz, Fores & Hat (1997) and Lm, Martn & Teo (1998) partal equlbrum models wth ad hoc behavour of some nvestors are consdered and ths behavour causes supply curves to be non-monotonc leadng to jumps n asset prces. In Bansal & Shalastovch (2008) an optmal growth model wth a representatve consumer, where dvdends are uncertan, nformaton s ncomplete and the consumer can buy a precse sgnal, s consdered and t s shown that from tme to tme the representatve consumer buys the precse sgnal n whch case asset prces jump. Accordng to the market effcency hypothess changes n asset prces must 2
4 be due to changes n dvdends or condtonal expectatons because, as shown n Huang (1985), f both dvdends and condtonal expectatons vary contnuously, then asset prces vary contnuously too. In Calvet & Fsher (2008) and Bansal & Shalastovch (2008) jumps n asset prces are caused by jumps n condtonal expectatons. Some contrbutons am at explorng a possble lnk between ncomplete fnancal markets and volatlty of asset prces. In Geanakoplos (1997) the use of collateral n contracts s shown to nduce an excess volatlty n the prces of the durable goods that are used as collateral, excess volatlty n the sense that the varance s larger wth the use of collateral n contracts than wth complete markets. In Ctanna & Schmedders (2001) fnancal nnovaton s shown to nduce excess volatlty. In Calvet (2001) ncomplete fnancal markets are shown to lead to excess volatlty. The dfference between jumps n asset prces and volatlty of asset prces should be noted. Indeed volatlty of asset prces does not necessarly nvolve jumps, but merely changes of asset prces. In the present paper a dynamc, fnte horzon, pure-exchange general equlbrum model wth uncertanty s studed. Fundamentals are assumed to be contnuous functons of states of nature. We show that: 1. f fnancal markets are complete, then prces (ncludng asset prces), consumpton bundles and portfolos are contnuous functons of the states of nature, and; 2. f fnancal markets are ncomplete, then nether prces, consumpton bundles nor portfolos need to be contnuous functons of states of nature. Therefore ncompleteness of fnancal markets may ncrease volatlty n asset prces sgnfcantly. The paper proceeds as follows: In Secton 2 the set-up, the equlbrum concepts and our mantaned assumptons are ntroduced. In Secton 3, respectve Secton 4, complete fnancal markets, respectve ncomplete fnancal markets, are consdered. Fnally n Secton 5 some fnal remarks are provded. 3
5 2 The model Set-up There s a fnte number T + 1 of dates wth t {0,..., T }. There s uncertanty, the set of states at date t 1 s S = [0, 1] wth s S and π : S T R + s the densty on the set of states S T. There s a fnte number of goods l at every state wth j {1,..., l}. p t : S t R l ++, s a prce system for goods. A collecton of maps p = (p t ), where There s a fnte number m of consumers wth {1,..., m}. Consumers are descrbed by ther dentcal consumpton sets X = (R l ++) T +1, ther endowments ω = (ω t ) t, where endowments at date t s descrbed by a map ω t : S t X, and ther state utlty functons u : X R. A consumpton bundle s a collecton of maps x = (x t ) t, where x t : S t R l ++. An allocaton of goods x = (x ) s a lst of ndvdual consumpton bundles. Walrasan equlbrum Let s t = (s 1,..., s t ) denote the hstory of states up to and ncludng date t, then the problem of consumer s: max u(x 0,..., x T (s T )) π(s T ) ds T x S T s.t. p t (s t ) x t (s t ) ds T S T t Formally ntegrablty assumptons are needed. S T t p t (s t ) ω t (s t ) ds T In a Walrasan equlbrum consumers choose consumpton bundles that solve ther problems and markets clear. Defnton 1 A Walrasan equlbrum s a prce system for goods and an allocaton of goods ( p, x) such that: x s a soluton to the problem of consumer for all, and; markets clear, xt (s t ) = ωt (s t ) for all t and s t. 4
6 Fnancal market equlbrum There s a fnte number n of assets wth k {1,..., n} where the dvdend of asset k at date t s descrbed by a map a t k : St R l. An asset structure s a collecton of assets a = (a k ) k, where a k = (a t k ) t. A prce system for an asset structure s a collecton of maps q = (q t ), where q t : S t R n. A portfolo plan s a collecton of maps z = (z t ) t, where z t : S t R n. An allocaton of assets z = (z ) s a lst of portfolo plans. A prce system (p, q) s a prce system for goods and a prce system for assets. An allocaton (x, z) s an allocaton of goods and an allocaton of assets. Let a t (s t ) be the l n-matrx of dvdends (a 1 t (s t )... a n t (s t )) at date t n state s t, then the problem of consumer s: max u(x 0,..., x T (s T )) π(s T ) ds T (x,z ) S T p 0 x 0 + q 0 z 0 p 0 ω 0 p t (s t ) x t (s t ) + q t (s t ) z t (s t ) s.t. p t (s t ) ω t (s t ) + (q t (s t ) + p t (s t )a t (s t )) z t 1 (s t 1 ) for all t {1,..., T 1} p T (s T ) x T (s T ) p T (s T ) ω T (s T ) + (p T (s T )a T (s T )) z T 1 (s T 1 ) In a fnancal market equlbrum consumers choose consumpton bundles and portfolo plans that solves ther problems and markets clear. Defnton 2 A fnancal market equlbrum s a prce system and an allocaton (( p, q), ( x, z)) such that: ( x, z ) s a soluton to the problem of consumer for all, and; markets clear, xt (s t ) = ωt (s t ) and zt (s t ) = 0 for all t and s t. 5
7 Assumptons The consumers are supposed to satsfy the followng assumptons: (A.1) ω t C 1 (S t, X). (A.2) u C 2 (X, R) wth Du (x ) R lt ++ for all x and v D 2 u (x )v < 0 for all x and v 0. The economy s supposed to satsfy the followng assumptons: (A.3) π C 1 (S T, R ++ ). (A.4) a t k C1 (S t, R l ) for all k and t. Exstence of equlbrum The focus of the present paper s on propertes of equlbra rather than exstence. However a short dscusson of exstence of Walrasan equlbrum and of fnancal market equlbrum for economes wth nfnte dmensonal commodty spaces s provded below. In Bewley (1972) the exstence of a Walrasan equlbrum s shown for consumpton bundles n L and prce systems n L 1. In the proof t s crucal that consumpton sets have non-empty nteror. In Mas-Colell (1986, 1991) exstence of Walrasan equlbrum n more general vector lattces, where the consumpton set does not necessarly have a non-empty nteror, s consdered. The assumpton of unform properness of preferences, whch mples the exstence of supportng prces, replaces the assumpton that consumpton sets have non-empty nteror. The problem wth changes n the dmenson of set of ncome transfers spanned by assets carres over from economes wth fntely many states. Moreover as shown n Mas-Colell & Montero (1996) and Mas-Colell & Zame (1996) there s a problem wth feasblty of consumpton bundles. The assumpton that every feasble portfolo results n a feasble consumpton bundle appears to be needed to ensure exstence of equlbrum. However the 6
8 assumpton s very strong, especally for economes wth at least two goods per state. 3 Complete fnancal markets In the present paper functons that are dentcal except for a set of measure zero are consdered to be dentcal. Defnton 3 A measurable functon f : S T R s contnuous at ŝ T f and only f there exst a neghborhood A of ŝ T and a functon g : S T R, where g 1 (B) s open for B open, such that 1 {s T f(s T ) g(s T )} π(s T ) ds T = 0. A A functon s contnuous f and only f t s contnuous at all ponts. Walrasan equlbrum At Walrasan equlbra, prces and consumpton bundles are dfferentable functons of states of nature. The proof conssts of two steps: n Lemma 1 t s shown that prces and consumpton bundles are contnuous functons, and; n Theorem 1 t s shown that f they are contnuous functons of states, then they are dfferentable functons. Lemma 1 Suppose that ( p, x) s a Walrasan equlbrum. contnuous n s T. Then ( p, x) s Proof: Suppose that ( p, x) s a Walrasan equlbrum, then there exsts λ 1,..., λ m > 0 such that x s the soluton to the followng problem max λ u (x 0,..., x T (s T )) π(s T ) ds T x s.t. x t (s t ) = (1) ω(s t t ) for all t and s t 7
9 The proof that x s contnuous n s T s by backward nducton on t. t = T Suppose that ĉ T 1 = (ˆx 0,..., ˆx T 1 ) and ŝ T are fxed and consder the followng maxmzaton problem max λ u (ĉ T 1 x T, x T ) s.t. x T = ω T (ŝ T ). Then for every ĉ T 1 and ŝ T there exsts a unque contnuous soluton to the maxmzaton problem accordng to assumptons (A.2) and (A.3). Let f T : (X m ) T S T X m be the soluton, then t s contnuous accordng to Berge s maxmum theorem and f c T 1 = ( x 0 (s 0 ),..., x T 1 (s T 1 )), then f T (c T 1, s T ) = x T (s T ). Moreover the functon v T : (X m ) T S T 1 R defned by v T (c T 1, s T 1 ) = s strctly concave n x 0,..., x T 1. u (c T 1, f T (c T 1, s T )) π(s T s T 1 ) ds T t = T 1 Suppose that ĉ T 2 = (ˆx 0,..., ˆx T 2 ) and ŝ T 1 are fxed and consder the followng maxmzaton problem max λ v (ĉ T 2, x T 1, ŝ T 1 ) x T 1 s.t. x T 1 = ω T 1 (ŝ T 1 ). Then for every ĉ T 2 and ŝ T 1 there exsts a unque contnuous soluton to the maxmzaton problem accordng to assumptons (A.2) and (A.3). Let f T 1 : (X m ) T 1 S T 1 X m be the soluton, then t s contnuous accordng to Berge s maxmum theorem and f c T 2 = ( x 0 (s 0 ),..., x T 2 (s T 2 )), then f T 1 (c T 2, s T 1 ) = x T 1 (s T 1 ). Moreover the functon v T 1 : (X m ) T 1 S T 2 R defned by v T 1 (c T 2, s T 2 ) = v T (c T 2, f T 1 (c T 2, s T 1 ), s T 1 ) π(s T 1 s T 2 ) ds T 1 8
10 s strctly concave n c T 2. The steps for t = T 2,..., 0 are smlar to the step for t = T 1. The soluton ( x t ) t, where x t : S t X m, to problem (1) s defned as follows x 0 = f 0 x 1 (s 1 ) = f 1 ( x 0, s 1 ). x T 1 (s T 1 ) = f T 1 ( x 0, x 1 (s 1 ),..., x T 2 (s T 2 ), s T 1 ) x T (s T ) = f T ( x 0, x 1 (s 1 ),..., x T 1 (s T 1 ), s T ). The prce system p s collnear wth the gradents of the consumers, so the prce system s contnuous n s T too. Indeed there exsts τ > 0 such that p t (s t ) = τλ D x tu ( x (s T )) π(s t+1,..., s T s t ) d(s t+1,..., s T ). for all, t and s t. Remark: In the proof of Lemma 1 t s only used that utlty functons are once dfferentable and strctly concave, but t s not used that utlty functons are twce dfferentable wth negatve defnte Hessan matrces. End of remark Theorem 1 Suppose that ( p, x) s a Walrasan equlbrum. Then ( p, x) s dfferentable n s T. Proof: Suppose that ( p, x) s a Walrasan equlbrum, then accordng to Lemma 1 t s contnuous n s T and there exsts λ 1,..., λ m > 0 such that x s the soluton to the followng problem max λ u (x 0,..., x T (s T )) π(s T ) ds T x s.t. x t (s t ) = ω(s t t ) for all t and s t. 9
11 The proof that x s dfferentable n s T s by nducton on t. At step t t s assumed that x 0 s dfferentable n s 0,..., x t 1 s dfferentable n s t 1. t = 0 The frst-order condtons wth respect to x 0 at s 0 are λ D x 0u (x 0,..., x T (s T )) π(s T ) ds T α 0 = 0 for all x 0 ω 0 = 0 The l(m + 1) l(m + 1)-matrx H 0 of dervatves wth respect to x 0 and α 0 of the frst-order condtons s where D 0 D 0 1 I.... D 0 m I I I s a l l-matrx defned by = λ D 2 x 0 x 0u (x 0,..., x T (s T )) π(s T ) ds T D 0 and I s a the l l-dentty matrx. The matrx H 0 has full rank. Therefore accordng to the Implct Functon Theorem x 0 s a dfferentable functon of s 0, because x 1 s a contnuous functon of s 1,..., x T s a contnuous functon of s T. t = T The frst-order condtons wth respect to x T at s T are λ D x T u (x 0,..., x T (s T )) α T = 0 for all x T (s T ) ω T (s T ) = 0 The l(m + 1) l(m + 1)-matrx H T of dervatves wth respect to x T and α T of the frst-order condtons s D T 1 I.... D T m I I 10 I
12 where D T s a l l-matrx defned by D T = λ D 2 x T x u T (x 0,..., x T (s T )). The matrx H T has full rank. Therefore accordng to the Implct Functon Theorem x T s a dfferentable functon of s T, because x 0 s a dfferentable functon of s 0,..., x T 1 s a dfferentable functon of s T 1. The fact that p s dfferentable n s T follows from the proof that p s contnuous n s T n the proof of Lemma 1 and that x s dfferentable n s T. Fnancal market equlbrum: complete markets At fnancal market equlbra, where the allocaton s Pareto optmal, prces of goods and assets, consumpton bundles and portfolos are dfferentable functons of states. Corollary 1 Suppose that ( p, x) s a Walrasan equlbrum and that a = (a k ) k s an asset structure such that (( p, q), ( x, z)) s a fnancal market equlbrum. Then q s dfferentable n s T. Proof: The proof that q s dfferentable n s T s by backward nducton on t. t = T 1 The prce of asset k at date T 1 n state s T 1 s q T k 1(s T 1 ) = p T (s T 1, s T ) a T k (s T 1, s T ) ds T where p T s contnuous n s T accordng to Lemma 1 and a T k s contnuous n s T accordng to assumpton (A.5). Therefore q T k 1 s contnuous n st 1. t = 0 Trval because q k 0 s a number rather than a functon. However the asset prce of asset k at date 0 s q 0 k = ( p 1 (s 1 ) a 1 k(s 1 ) + q1(s k 1 )) ds 1 where p 1 s contnuous n s 1 accordng to Lemma 1 and a 1 k s contnuous n s 1 accordng to assumpton (A.5). Therefore q 0 k s contnuous. 11
13 Remark: In the proof of Corollary 1 t s only used that ( p, x) s contnuous and that a s contnuous, but t s not used that a s dfferentable. End of remark 4 Incomplete fnancal markets Fnancal market equlbrum: ncomplete markets At fnancal market equlbra, where fnancal markets are ncomplete, there may be jumps n prces ncludng asset prces, consumpton bundles and portfolos. The proof s based on an example. Theorem 2 There exsts an economy such that f (( p, q), ( x, z)) s a fnancal market equlbrum, then q s dscontnuous n s T. Proof: Consder an economy wth three dates T = 2, one good per state l = 1, two consumers m = 2 and one asset n = 1. The dvdend of the asset s supposed to be one unt of the good at the last date. Endowments and asset dvdends are supposed to ndependent of the state at the last date. For the densty π : S R ++ suppose that π(s) = 1 for all s S. Endowments at the frst date are supposed to be dentcal ω2 0 = ω1 0 and endowments at the last two dates are supposed to be reverse n the sense that ω2(s) 1 = ω1(1 2 s) and ω2(s) 2 = ω1(1 1 s). Smlarly utlty functons are supposed to be dentcal for the frst date and reverse for the last two dates n the sense that u 2 (x 0, x 1, x 2 ) = u 1 (x 0, x 2, x 1 ). For c 0 let f ( ; c 0 ) : R 2 ++ R ++ R 2 ++ denote the demand functon for the consumer wth endowments e (s) = (ω 1 (s), ω 2 (s)) and utlty functon v ( ; c 0 ) : R 2 ++ R defned by v (x 1, x 2 ; c 0 ) = u (c 0, x 1, x 2 ). Then (p, s) R 2 ++ S s an equlbrum for the Edgeworth box economy E(s; (c 0 ) ) = (e (s), v (, ; c 0 )) f and only f f 1 (p, p e 1 (s); c 0 1) + f 2 (p, p e 2 (s); c 0 2) = e 1 (s) + e 2 (s). 12
14 Clearly (p 1, p 2, s) s an equlbrum for E(s; (c 0 ) ) f and only f (p 2, p 1, 1 s) s an equlbrum for E(1 s; (d 0 ) ), where d 0 1 = c 0 2 and d 0 2 = c 0 1. Suppose that equlbrum prces are normalzed such that the sum of the prces s equal to one and let E R 2 ++ S be the equlbrum set for the collecton of Edgeworth economes (E(s; (c 0 ) ) s, where c 0 = ω 0, so E = { (p, s) (p, s; (ω 0 ) ) s an equlbrum for E(s; (ω 0 ))}. Suppose that E s S-shaped as shown n Fgure 1 and let r : S R 2 ++ be a selecton from E such that r 1 (s) s the lowest equlbrum prce for s < 1/2, r 1 (s) = (1/2, 1/2) for s = 1/2 and r 1 (s) s the hghest equlbrum prce for s > 1/2. In order to construct a fnancal market equlbrum: let the p 1 (s) 1 1 s Fgure 1: The equlbrum set E and the selecton r. allocaton x be defned by x 0 = ω 0, x j (s) = f j (r(s), e (s); ω 0 ) for j {1, 2}; let the portfolo plan z be defned by z 0 = 0 and z 1 (s) = (r 1 (s)/r 2 (s))(ω 1 (s) f 1 (r(s), e (s); ω 0 )) = f 2 (r(s), e (s); ω 0 ) ω 2 (s); let the prce system p be defned by p 2 (s) = p 1 (s) = p 0 = 1, and; let the prce system for assets q be defned by q 1 (s 1 ) = r 2 (s 1 )/r 1 (s 1 ) and q 0 > 0 such that ( u (x (s)) q 0 + q x 0 1 (s) u ) (x (s)) ds = 0. x 1 13
15 Then ((p, q), (x, z)) s a fnancal market equlbrum and the asset prce at date 1 s dscontnuous at s = 1/2. Fnally the portfolo z1 0 of consumer 1 at date 0 s bounded from below by mn s (ω1(s) 1 + q 1 (s)ω1(s))/q 2 1 (s) and from above by mn s (ω2(s) 1 + q 1 (s)ω2(s))/q 2 1 (s). Therefore suppose that (ω1(s), 1 ω1(s)) 2 s bounded from above by ε > 0 for s {0, 1} and that the margnal rates of substtuton at the Pareto optmal allocatons n the Edgeworth box economes for s {0, 1} are bounded away from zero and nfnty. Then for ε suffcently small the set of equlbra for the collecton of Edgeworth box economes s S-shaped for all feasble portfolos so there s a dscontnuty n prces. Remark: The proof of Theorem 2 reveals that any measurable selecton r : S R 2 ++ such that r 1 (s) = 1 r 1 (1 s) and r 2 (s) = 1 r 2 (1 s) s part of a fnancal market equlbrum. Therefore as shown n Mas-Colell (1991) there s a contnuum of fnancal market equlbra. End of remark On the example n the proof of Theorem 2 Let us try, nformally, to argue that the example n the proof of Theorem 2 s robust. In order to consder pertubatons of fundamentals suppose that the set of fundamentals s endowed wth the Whtney topology, endowments and dvdends wth the C 1 -topology and utlty functons wth the C 2 -topology. The S-shape of the equlbrum set E s robust to perturbatons n fundamentals and small changes n portfolos. Therefore every selecton from the equlbrum set s dscontnuous. Hence assets prces are dscontnuous. The robustness of the example n the proof of Theorem 2 shows that the symmetry n the example s not essental, but merely convenent. 14
16 5 Fnal remarks In the present paper we have shown that jumps n asset prces may be unavodable n case of ncomplete fnancal markets. Moreover we have shown that jumps are mpossble n case of complete fnancal markets. Therefore our results mples that ncompleteness of fnancal markets s a possble explanaton of jumps n asset prces. Hence ncompleteness of fnancal markets may ncrease uncertanty sgnfcantly compared to complete fnancal markets. In the example, where asset prces jump, endowments vary contnuously wth states of nature, whle dvdends are constant across states of nature. Thus t should be ponted out that jumps n asset prces have to be seen as the outcome of the nteracton of real markets and fnancal markets. From a fnance perspectve t would be nterestng to calbrate a parametrc model such as an optmal growth model or an overlappng generatons model n order to study whether jumps n asset prces are compatble wth data. From a general equlbrum perspectve a partal answer to the queston of the approprate commodty space for economes wth nfnte dmensonal commodty spaces has been provded. Indeed we have shown that for Walrasan equlbra restrctng attenton to contnuous maps on the underlyng state space as n Chchlnsky & Zhou (1998) s no real restrcton. References Andersen, T., L. Benzon & J. Lund (2002), An emprcal nvestgaton of contnuous-tme equty return models, Journal of Fnance 57, Balduzz, P., S. Fores & D. Hat (1997), Prce Barrers and the dynamcs of asset prces n equlbrum, Journal of Fnancal and Quanttatve Analyss 32,
17 Bansal, R., & I. Shalastovch (2008), Learnng, long run rsks and asset prce jumps, unpublshed manuscrpt. Bewley, T., (1972), Exstence of equlbrum n economes wth nfntely many commmodtes, Journal of Economc Theory 4, Calvet, L., (2001), Incomplete markets and volatlty, Journal of Economc Theory 98, Calvet, L., & A. Fscher (2008), Multfrequency jump dffusons: An equlbrum approach, Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 44, Chchlnsky, G., & Y. Zhou (1998), Smooth nfnte economes, Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 29, Ctanna, A., & K. Schmedders (2005), Excess prce volatlty and fnancal nnovaton, Economc Theory 26, Geanakoplos, J., (1997), Promses, Promses, n B. Arthur, W. Durlauf & S. Lane (eds.), The economy as an evolvng complex system, vol. 2, , Addson-Wesley, Readng. Geanakoplos, J., & H. Polemarchaks (1986), Exstence, regularty and constraned suboptmalty of compettve allocatons when markets are ncomplete, n W. Heller, S. Ross & D. Starret (eds.), Uncertanty, nformaton and communcaton: essays n honor of Kenneth Arrow, Volume 3, Cambrdge Unversty Press, Cambrdge. Huang, C., (1985), Informaton structure and equlbrum asset prces, Journal of Economc Theory 35, Lm, G., V. Martn & L. Teo (1998), Endogenous jumpng and asset prce dynamcs, Macroeconomc Dynamcs 2, Mas-Colell, A., (1986), The prce exstence problem n topologcal vector lattces, Econometrca 54,
18 Mas-Colell, A., (1991), Indetermnacy n ncomplete market economes, Economc Theory 1, Mas-Colell, A., & P. Montero (1996), Self-fulfllng equlbra: an exstence theorem for a general state space, Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 26, Mas-Colell, A., & B. Zame (1996), The exstence of a securty market equlbrum wth a non-atomc state space, Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 26, Merton, R., (1976), Opton prcng when the underlyng stock returns are dscontnuous, Journal of Fnancal Economcs 3,
Incomplete financial markets and jumps in asset prices
Incomplete fnancal markets and jumps n asset prces Tobas Markeprand Mch Tvede Abstract A dynamc pure-exchange general equlbrum model wth uncertanty s studed. Fundamentals are supposed to depend contnuously
More informationAppendix - Normally Distributed Admissible Choices are Optimal
Appendx - Normally Dstrbuted Admssble Choces are Optmal James N. Bodurtha, Jr. McDonough School of Busness Georgetown Unversty and Q Shen Stafford Partners Aprl 994 latest revson September 00 Abstract
More informationEquilibrium in Prediction Markets with Buyers and Sellers
Equlbrum n Predcton Markets wth Buyers and Sellers Shpra Agrawal Nmrod Megddo Benamn Armbruster Abstract Predcton markets wth buyers and sellers of contracts on multple outcomes are shown to have unque
More informationMultifactor Term Structure Models
1 Multfactor Term Structure Models A. Lmtatons of One-Factor Models 1. Returns on bonds of all maturtes are perfectly correlated. 2. Term structure (and prces of every other dervatves) are unquely determned
More informationElements of Economic Analysis II Lecture VI: Industry Supply
Elements of Economc Analyss II Lecture VI: Industry Supply Ka Hao Yang 10/12/2017 In the prevous lecture, we analyzed the frm s supply decson usng a set of smple graphcal analyses. In fact, the dscusson
More informationIntroduction to game theory
Introducton to game theory Lectures n game theory ECON5210, Sprng 2009, Part 1 17.12.2008 G.B. Ashem, ECON5210-1 1 Overvew over lectures 1. Introducton to game theory 2. Modelng nteractve knowledge; equlbrum
More informationConsumption Based Asset Pricing
Consumpton Based Asset Prcng Mchael Bar Aprl 25, 208 Contents Introducton 2 Model 2. Prcng rsk-free asset............................... 3 2.2 Prcng rsky assets................................ 4 2.3 Bubbles......................................
More informationProblem Set 6 Finance 1,
Carnege Mellon Unversty Graduate School of Industral Admnstraton Chrs Telmer Wnter 2006 Problem Set 6 Fnance, 47-720. (representatve agent constructon) Consder the followng two-perod, two-agent economy.
More information- contrast so-called first-best outcome of Lindahl equilibrium with case of private provision through voluntary contributions of households
Prvate Provson - contrast so-called frst-best outcome of Lndahl equlbrum wth case of prvate provson through voluntary contrbutons of households - need to make an assumpton about how each household expects
More informationreferences Chapters on game theory in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
Syllabus. Prelmnares. Role of game theory n economcs. Normal and extensve form of a game. Game-tree. Informaton partton. Perfect recall. Perfect and mperfect nformaton. Strategy.. Statc games of complete
More informationAppendix for Solving Asset Pricing Models when the Price-Dividend Function is Analytic
Appendx for Solvng Asset Prcng Models when the Prce-Dvdend Functon s Analytc Ovdu L. Caln Yu Chen Thomas F. Cosmano and Alex A. Hmonas January 3, 5 Ths appendx provdes proofs of some results stated n our
More informationECE 586GT: Problem Set 2: Problems and Solutions Uniqueness of Nash equilibria, zero sum games, evolutionary dynamics
Unversty of Illnos Fall 08 ECE 586GT: Problem Set : Problems and Solutons Unqueness of Nash equlbra, zero sum games, evolutonary dynamcs Due: Tuesday, Sept. 5, at begnnng of class Readng: Course notes,
More informationEconomics 1410 Fall Section 7 Notes 1. Define the tax in a flexible way using T (z), where z is the income reported by the agent.
Economcs 1410 Fall 2017 Harvard Unversty Yaan Al-Karableh Secton 7 Notes 1 I. The ncome taxaton problem Defne the tax n a flexble way usng T (), where s the ncome reported by the agent. Retenton functon:
More informationTaxation and Externalities. - Much recent discussion of policy towards externalities, e.g., global warming debate/kyoto
Taxaton and Externaltes - Much recent dscusson of polcy towards externaltes, e.g., global warmng debate/kyoto - Increasng share of tax revenue from envronmental taxaton 6 percent n OECD - Envronmental
More informationGlobal Optimization in Multi-Agent Models
Global Optmzaton n Mult-Agent Models John R. Brge R.R. McCormck School of Engneerng and Appled Scence Northwestern Unversty Jont work wth Chonawee Supatgat, Enron, and Rachel Zhang, Cornell 11/19/2004
More informationOPERATIONS RESEARCH. Game Theory
OPERATIONS RESEARCH Chapter 2 Game Theory Prof. Bbhas C. Gr Department of Mathematcs Jadavpur Unversty Kolkata, Inda Emal: bcgr.umath@gmal.com 1.0 Introducton Game theory was developed for decson makng
More informationRaising Food Prices and Welfare Change: A Simple Calibration. Xiaohua Yu
Rasng Food Prces and Welfare Change: A Smple Calbraton Xaohua Yu Professor of Agrcultural Economcs Courant Research Centre Poverty, Equty and Growth Unversty of Göttngen CRC-PEG, Wlhelm-weber-Str. 2 3773
More informationFinal Exam. 7. (10 points) Please state whether each of the following statements is true or false. No explanation needed.
Fnal Exam Fall 4 Econ 8-67 Closed Book. Formula Sheet Provded. Calculators OK. Tme Allowed: hours Please wrte your answers on the page below each queston. (5 ponts) Assume that the rsk-free nterest rate
More information2. Equlibrium and Efficiency
. Equlbrum and Effcency . Introducton competton and effcency Smt s nvsble and model of compettve economy combne ndependent decson-makng of consumers and frms nto a complete model of te economy exstence
More informationThe identification of preferences from equilibrium prices under uncertainty 12
The dentfcaton of preferences from equlbrum prces under uncertanty 12 F. Kübler, 3 P. - A. Chappor 4 I. Ekeland 5 H. M. Polemarchaks 6 Dscusson Paper No. 00 (February, 2000) CORE, Unversté Catholque de
More informationPrice and Quantity Competition Revisited. Abstract
rce and uantty Competton Revsted X. Henry Wang Unversty of Mssour - Columba Abstract By enlargng the parameter space orgnally consdered by Sngh and Vves (984 to allow for a wder range of cost asymmetry,
More informationProspect Theory and Asset Prices
Fnance 400 A. Penat - G. Pennacch Prospect Theory and Asset Prces These notes consder the asset prcng mplcatons of nvestor behavor that ncorporates Prospect Theory. It summarzes an artcle by N. Barbers,
More informationTHE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT AGENTS IN A HETEROGENEOUS ASSET-PRICING MODEL WOUTER J. DEN HAAN
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT AGENTS IN A HETEROGENEOUS ASSET-PRICING MODEL WOUTER J. DEN HAAN Department of Economcs, Unversty of Calforna at San Dego and Natonal Bureau of Economc Research
More informationLecture 7. We now use Brouwer s fixed point theorem to prove Nash s theorem.
Topcs on the Border of Economcs and Computaton December 11, 2005 Lecturer: Noam Nsan Lecture 7 Scrbe: Yoram Bachrach 1 Nash s Theorem We begn by provng Nash s Theorem about the exstance of a mxed strategy
More informationINTRODUCTION TO MACROECONOMICS FOR THE SHORT RUN (CHAPTER 1) WHY STUDY BUSINESS CYCLES? The intellectual challenge: Why is economic growth irregular?
INTRODUCTION TO MACROECONOMICS FOR THE SHORT RUN (CHATER 1) WHY STUDY BUSINESS CYCLES? The ntellectual challenge: Why s economc groth rregular? The socal challenge: Recessons and depressons cause elfare
More informationLecture Note 1: Foundations 1
Economcs 703 Advanced Mcroeconomcs Prof. Peter Cramton ecture Note : Foundatons Outlne A. Introducton and Examples B. Formal Treatment. Exstence of Nash Equlbrum. Exstence wthout uas-concavty 3. Perfect
More informationMaximum Likelihood Estimation of Isotonic Normal Means with Unknown Variances*
Journal of Multvarate Analyss 64, 183195 (1998) Artcle No. MV971717 Maxmum Lelhood Estmaton of Isotonc Normal Means wth Unnown Varances* Nng-Zhong Sh and Hua Jang Northeast Normal Unversty, Changchun,Chna
More informationReal Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Wage Stickiness and Markup Adjustments
Real Exchange Rate Fluctuatons, Wage Stckness and Markup Adjustments Yothn Jnjarak and Kanda Nakno Nanyang Technologcal Unversty and Purdue Unversty January 2009 Abstract Motvated by emprcal evdence on
More informationQuadratic Games. First version: February 24, 2017 This version: December 12, Abstract
Quadratc Games Ncolas S. Lambert Gorgo Martn Mchael Ostrovsky Frst verson: February 24, 2017 Ths verson: December 12, 2017 Abstract We study general quadratc games wth mult-dmensonal actons, stochastc
More informationQuadratic Games. First version: February 24, 2017 This version: August 3, Abstract
Quadratc Games Ncolas S. Lambert Gorgo Martn Mchael Ostrovsky Frst verson: February 24, 2017 Ths verson: August 3, 2018 Abstract We study general quadratc games wth multdmensonal actons, stochastc payoff
More informationTHE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION
THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION Statc Ramsey Tax School of Economcs, Xamen Unversty Fall 2015 Overvew of Optmal Taxaton Combne lessons on ncdence and effcency costs to analyze optmal desgn of commodty taxes.
More informationApplications of Myerson s Lemma
Applcatons of Myerson s Lemma Professor Greenwald 28-2-7 We apply Myerson s lemma to solve the sngle-good aucton, and the generalzaton n whch there are k dentcal copes of the good. Our objectve s welfare
More informationGames and Decisions. Part I: Basic Theorems. Contents. 1 Introduction. Jane Yuxin Wang. 1 Introduction 1. 2 Two-player Games 2
Games and Decsons Part I: Basc Theorems Jane Yuxn Wang Contents 1 Introducton 1 2 Two-player Games 2 2.1 Zero-sum Games................................ 3 2.1.1 Pure Strateges.............................
More informationA Set of new Stochastic Trend Models
A Set of new Stochastc Trend Models Johannes Schupp Longevty 13, Tape, 21 th -22 th September 2017 www.fa-ulm.de Introducton Uncertanty about the evoluton of mortalty Measure longevty rsk n penson or annuty
More informationUNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM
UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS DISCUSSION PAPER 99/28 Welfare Analyss n a Cournot Game wth a Publc Good by Indraneel Dasgupta School of Economcs, Unversty of Nottngham, Nottngham NG7 2RD,
More informationVanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers
Vanderblt Unversty Department of Economcs Workng Papers 17-00015 Majorty Rule and Selfshly Optmal Nonlnear Income Tax Schedules wth Dscrete Skll Levels Crag Brett Mt. Allson Unversty John A Weymark Vanderblt
More informationTwo Period Models. 1. Static Models. Econ602. Spring Lutz Hendricks
Two Perod Models Econ602. Sprng 2005. Lutz Hendrcks The man ponts of ths secton are: Tools: settng up and solvng a general equlbrum model; Kuhn-Tucker condtons; solvng multperod problems Economc nsghts:
More informationProblems to be discussed at the 5 th seminar Suggested solutions
ECON4260 Behavoral Economcs Problems to be dscussed at the 5 th semnar Suggested solutons Problem 1 a) Consder an ultmatum game n whch the proposer gets, ntally, 100 NOK. Assume that both the proposer
More informationOsaka University of Economics Working Paper Series No Hart Mas-Colell Implementation of the Discounted Shapley Value
Osaka Unversty of Economcs Workng Paper Seres No 2014-2 Hart Mas-Colell Implementaton of the Dscounted Shapley Value Tomohko Kawamor Faculty of Economcs, Osaka Unversty of Economcs November, 2014 Hart
More informationGeneral Examination in Microeconomic Theory. Fall You have FOUR hours. 2. Answer all questions
HARVARD UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS General Examnaton n Mcroeconomc Theory Fall 2010 1. You have FOUR hours. 2. Answer all questons PLEASE USE A SEPARATE BLUE BOOK FOR EACH QUESTION AND WRITE THE
More informationCOS 511: Theoretical Machine Learning. Lecturer: Rob Schapire Lecture #21 Scribe: Lawrence Diao April 23, 2013
COS 511: Theoretcal Machne Learnng Lecturer: Rob Schapre Lecture #21 Scrbe: Lawrence Dao Aprl 23, 2013 1 On-Lne Log Loss To recap the end of the last lecture, we have the followng on-lne problem wth N
More informationBorrowing Constraint and the Effect of Option Introduction
Insttut des Hautes Etudes Commercales de Carthage From the electedworks of Khaled Bennour 00 Borrowng Constrant and the Effect of Opton Introducton Khaled Amra, uffolk Unversty Khaled Bennour, Insttut
More informationOUTPUT CONTINGENT SECURITIES AND EFFICIENT INVESTMENT BY FIRMS
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW Vol. 59, No. 2, May 2018 DOI: 10.1111/ere.12294 OUTPUT CONTINGENT SECURITIES AND EFFICIENT INVESTMENT B FIRMS B LUIS H. B. BRAIDO AND V. FILIPE MARTINS-DA-ROCHA 1 Getulo Vargas
More informationQuiz on Deterministic part of course October 22, 2002
Engneerng ystems Analyss for Desgn Quz on Determnstc part of course October 22, 2002 Ths s a closed book exercse. You may use calculators Grade Tables There are 90 ponts possble for the regular test, or
More informationDynamic Analysis of Knowledge Sharing of Agents with. Heterogeneous Knowledge
Dynamc Analyss of Sharng of Agents wth Heterogeneous Kazuyo Sato Akra Namatame Dept. of Computer Scence Natonal Defense Academy Yokosuka 39-8686 JAPAN E-mal {g40045 nama} @nda.ac.jp Abstract In ths paper
More informationRational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information
Journal of Mathematcal Economcs 43 (2007) 532 548 Ratonal expectatons equlbrum and the strategc choce of costly nformaton Tom Krebs Department of Economcs, Unversty of Mannhem, L7, 3-5, 68131 Mannhem,
More information2) In the medium-run/long-run, a decrease in the budget deficit will produce:
4.02 Quz 2 Solutons Fall 2004 Multple-Choce Questons ) Consder the wage-settng and prce-settng equatons we studed n class. Suppose the markup, µ, equals 0.25, and F(u,z) = -u. What s the natural rate of
More informationAn Argument for Positive Nominal Interest 1
An Argument for Postve Nomnal Interest 1 Gaetano Blose 2 Herakles Polemarchaks 3 October 13, 2009 Work n progress 1 We are grateful to the Hotel of Gancolo for hosptalty. 2 Department of Economcs, Unversty
More informationRandom Variables. b 2.
Random Varables Generally the object of an nvestgators nterest s not necessarly the acton n the sample space but rather some functon of t. Techncally a real valued functon or mappng whose doman s the sample
More informationElton, Gruber, Brown, and Goetzmann. Modern Portfolio Theory and Investment Analysis, 7th Edition. Solutions to Text Problems: Chapter 9
Elton, Gruber, Brown, and Goetzmann Modern Portfolo Theory and Investment Analyss, 7th Edton Solutons to Text Problems: Chapter 9 Chapter 9: Problem In the table below, gven that the rskless rate equals
More informationOption pricing and numéraires
Opton prcng and numérares Daro Trevsan Unverstà degl Stud d Psa San Mnato - 15 September 2016 Overvew 1 What s a numerare? 2 Arrow-Debreu model Change of numerare change of measure 3 Contnuous tme Self-fnancng
More informationComparative analysis of CDO pricing models
Comparatve analyss of CDO prcng models ICBI Rsk Management 2005 Geneva 8 December 2005 Jean-Paul Laurent ISFA, Unversty of Lyon, Scentfc Consultant BNP Parbas laurent.jeanpaul@free.fr, http://laurent.jeanpaul.free.fr
More informationDomestic Savings and International Capital Flows
Domestc Savngs and Internatonal Captal Flows Martn Feldsten and Charles Horoka The Economc Journal, June 1980 Presented by Mchael Mbate and Chrstoph Schnke Introducton The 2 Vews of Internatonal Captal
More informationA MODEL OF COMPETITION AMONG TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS BASED ON REPEATED GAME
A MODEL OF COMPETITION AMONG TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS BASED ON REPEATED GAME Vesna Radonć Đogatovć, Valentna Radočć Unversty of Belgrade Faculty of Transport and Traffc Engneerng Belgrade, Serba
More informationProduction and Supply Chain Management Logistics. Paolo Detti Department of Information Engeneering and Mathematical Sciences University of Siena
Producton and Supply Chan Management Logstcs Paolo Dett Department of Informaton Engeneerng and Mathematcal Scences Unversty of Sena Convergence and complexty of the algorthm Convergence of the algorthm
More informationc slope = -(1+i)/(1+π 2 ) MRS (between consumption in consecutive time periods) price ratio (across consecutive time periods)
CONSUMPTION-SAVINGS FRAMEWORK (CONTINUED) SEPTEMBER 24, 2013 The Graphcs of the Consumpton-Savngs Model CONSUMER OPTIMIZATION Consumer s decson problem: maxmze lfetme utlty subject to lfetme budget constrant
More informationIntroduction. Chapter 7 - An Introduction to Portfolio Management
Introducton In the next three chapters, we wll examne dfferent aspects of captal market theory, ncludng: Brngng rsk and return nto the pcture of nvestment management Markowtz optmzaton Modelng rsk and
More informationEconomic Design of Short-Run CSP-1 Plan Under Linear Inspection Cost
Tamkang Journal of Scence and Engneerng, Vol. 9, No 1, pp. 19 23 (2006) 19 Economc Desgn of Short-Run CSP-1 Plan Under Lnear Inspecton Cost Chung-Ho Chen 1 * and Chao-Yu Chou 2 1 Department of Industral
More informationMutual Funds and Management Styles. Active Portfolio Management
utual Funds and anagement Styles ctve Portfolo anagement ctve Portfolo anagement What s actve portfolo management? How can we measure the contrbuton of actve portfolo management? We start out wth the CP
More informationOn the Relationship between the VCG Mechanism and Market Clearing
On the Relatonshp between the VCG Mechansm and Market Clearng Takash Tanaka 1 Na L 2 Kenko Uchda 3 Abstract We consder a socal cost mnmzaton problem wth equalty and nequalty constrants n whch a central
More informationII. Random Variables. Variable Types. Variables Map Outcomes to Numbers
II. Random Varables Random varables operate n much the same way as the outcomes or events n some arbtrary sample space the dstncton s that random varables are smply outcomes that are represented numercally.
More information3: Central Limit Theorem, Systematic Errors
3: Central Lmt Theorem, Systematc Errors 1 Errors 1.1 Central Lmt Theorem Ths theorem s of prme mportance when measurng physcal quanttes because usually the mperfectons n the measurements are due to several
More informationJean-Paul Murara, Västeras, 26-April Mälardalen University, Sweden. Pricing EO under 2-dim. B S PDE by. using the Crank-Nicolson Method
Prcng EO under Mälardalen Unversty, Sweden Västeras, 26-Aprl-2017 1 / 15 Outlne 1 2 3 2 / 15 Optons - contracts that gve to the holder the rght but not the oblgaton to buy/sell an asset sometmes n the
More informationFinancial Risk Management in Portfolio Optimization with Lower Partial Moment
Amercan Journal of Busness and Socety Vol., o., 26, pp. 2-2 http://www.ascence.org/journal/ajbs Fnancal Rsk Management n Portfolo Optmzaton wth Lower Partal Moment Lam Weng Sew, 2, *, Lam Weng Hoe, 2 Department
More informationProblem Set #4 Solutions
4.0 Sprng 00 Page Problem Set #4 Solutons Problem : a) The extensve form of the game s as follows: (,) Inc. (-,-) Entrant (0,0) Inc (5,0) Usng backwards nducton, the ncumbent wll always set hgh prces,
More informationCS 286r: Matching and Market Design Lecture 2 Combinatorial Markets, Walrasian Equilibrium, Tâtonnement
CS 286r: Matchng and Market Desgn Lecture 2 Combnatoral Markets, Walrasan Equlbrum, Tâtonnement Matchng and Money Recall: Last tme we descrbed the Hungaran Method for computng a maxmumweght bpartte matchng.
More informationUnderstanding Predictability (JPE, 2004)
Understandng Predctablty (JPE, 2004) Lor Menzly, Tano Santos, and Petro Verones Presented by Peter Gross NYU October 27, 2009 Presented by Peter Gross (NYU) Understandng Predctablty October 27, 2009 1
More informationParticipation and unbiased pricing in CDS settlement mechanisms
Partcpaton and unbased prcng n CDS settlement mechansms Ahmad Pevand February 2017 Abstract The centralzed market for the settlement of credt default swaps (CDS), whch governs more than $10 trllon s worth
More informationUnderstanding price volatility in electricity markets
Proceedngs of the 33rd Hawa Internatonal Conference on System Scences - 2 Understandng prce volatlty n electrcty markets Fernando L. Alvarado, The Unversty of Wsconsn Rajesh Rajaraman, Chrstensen Assocates
More informationStatic (or Simultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Information
Statc (or Smultaneous- Move) Games of Complete Informaton Nash Equlbrum Best Response Functon F. Valognes - Game Theory - Chp 3 Outlne of Statc Games of Complete Informaton Introducton to games Normal-form
More informationTHE VOLATILITY OF EQUITY MUTUAL FUND RETURNS
North Amercan Journal of Fnance and Bankng Research Vol. 4. No. 4. 010. THE VOLATILITY OF EQUITY MUTUAL FUND RETURNS Central Connectcut State Unversty, USA. E-mal: BelloZ@mal.ccsu.edu ABSTRACT I nvestgated
More informationCHAPTER 9 FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF REGRESSION MODELS
CHAPTER 9 FUNCTIONAL FORMS OF REGRESSION MODELS QUESTIONS 9.1. (a) In a log-log model the dependent and all explanatory varables are n the logarthmc form. (b) In the log-ln model the dependent varable
More informationFoundations of Machine Learning II TP1: Entropy
Foundatons of Machne Learnng II TP1: Entropy Gullaume Charpat (Teacher) & Gaétan Marceau Caron (Scrbe) Problem 1 (Gbbs nequalty). Let p and q two probablty measures over a fnte alphabet X. Prove that KL(p
More informationThe Market Selection Hypothesis
The Market Selecton Hypothess Lawrence Blume and Davd Easley Department of Economcs Cornell Unversty 1 June 1999 The authors thank Alvaro Sandron for stmulatng conversaton, and The Natonal Scence Foundaton
More informationFormation of Coalition Structures as a Non-Cooperative Game
Formaton of Coalton Structures as a Non-Cooperatve Game Dmtry Levando Natonal Research Unversty Hgher School of Economcs, Moscow, Russa dlevando@hse.ru Abstract. The paper proposes a lst of requrements
More information3/3/2014. CDS M Phil Econometrics. Vijayamohanan Pillai N. Truncated standard normal distribution for a = 0.5, 0, and 0.5. CDS Mphil Econometrics
Lmted Dependent Varable Models: Tobt an Plla N 1 CDS Mphl Econometrcs Introducton Lmted Dependent Varable Models: Truncaton and Censorng Maddala, G. 1983. Lmted Dependent and Qualtatve Varables n Econometrcs.
More informationNonlinear Monte Carlo Methods. From American Options to Fully Nonlinear PDEs
: From Amercan Optons to Fully Nonlnear PDEs Ecole Polytechnque Pars PDEs and Fnance Workshop KTH, Stockholm, August 20-23, 2007 Outlne 1 Monte Carlo Methods for Amercan Optons 2 3 4 Outlne 1 Monte Carlo
More informationWhat is the Impact of Stock Market Contagion on an Investor s Portfolio Choice?
What s the Impact of Stock Market Contagon on an Investor s Portfolo Choce? Ncole ranger Holger Kraft Chrstoph Menerdng Ths verson: prl 29, 2008 Fnance Center Münster, Westfälsche Wlhelms-Unverstät Münster,
More informationMidterm Exam. Use the end of month price data for the S&P 500 index in the table below to answer the following questions.
Unversty of Washngton Summer 2001 Department of Economcs Erc Zvot Economcs 483 Mdterm Exam Ths s a closed book and closed note exam. However, you are allowed one page of handwrtten notes. Answer all questons
More informationProvision of public goods in a large economy
Economcs Letters 61 (1998) 229 234 Provson of publc goods n a large economy Mark Gradsten* Ben-Guron Unversty and the Unversty of Pennsylvana, Pennsylvana, USA Receved 13 Aprl 1998; accepted 25 June 1998
More informationGlobal sensitivity analysis of credit risk portfolios
Global senstvty analyss of credt rsk portfolos D. Baur, J. Carbon & F. Campolongo European Commsson, Jont Research Centre, Italy Abstract Ths paper proposes the use of global senstvty analyss to evaluate
More informationCOST ALLOCATION IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE CORE AND ISSUES OF CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION. Haralambos D Sourbis*
COST ALLOCATION IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE CORE AND ISSUES OF CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION By Haralambos D Sourbs* Abstract Ths paper examnes the mplcatons of core allocatons on the provson of a servce to a communty
More informationOptimal Service-Based Procurement with Heterogeneous Suppliers
Optmal Servce-Based Procurement wth Heterogeneous Supplers Ehsan Elah 1 Saf Benjaafar 2 Karen L. Donohue 3 1 College of Management, Unversty of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125 2 Industral & Systems Engneerng,
More informationDependent jump processes with coupled Lévy measures
Dependent jump processes wth coupled Lévy measures Naoufel El-Bachr ICMA Centre, Unversty of Readng May 6, 2008 ICMA Centre Dscusson Papers n Fnance DP2008-3 Copyrght 2008 El-Bachr. All rghts reserved.
More informationCentre for International Capital Markets
Centre for Internatonal Captal Markets Dscusson Papers ISSN 1749-3412 Valung Amercan Style Dervatves by Least Squares Methods Maro Cerrato No 2007-13 Valung Amercan Style Dervatves by Least Squares Methods
More informationOn Monotone Strategy Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions for Complementary Goods
On Monotone Strategy Equlbra n Smultaneous Auctons for Complementary Goods Matthew Gentry Tatana Komarova Pasquale Schrald Wroy Shn June 20, 2018 Abstract We explore exstence and propertes of equlbrum
More informationA Utilitarian Approach of the Rawls s Difference Principle
1 A Utltaran Approach of the Rawls s Dfference Prncple Hyeok Yong Kwon a,1, Hang Keun Ryu b,2 a Department of Poltcal Scence, Korea Unversty, Seoul, Korea, 136-701 b Department of Economcs, Chung Ang Unversty,
More informationDr. A. Sudhakaraiah* V. Rama Latha E.Gnana Deepika
Internatonal Journal Of Scentfc & Engneerng Research, Volume, Issue 6, June-0 ISSN - Splt Domnatng Set of an Interval Graph Usng an Algorthm. Dr. A. Sudhakaraah* V. Rama Latha E.Gnana Deepka Abstract :
More informationWages as Anti-Corruption Strategy: A Note
DISCUSSION PAPER November 200 No. 46 Wages as Ant-Corrupton Strategy: A Note by dek SAO Faculty of Economcs, Kyushu-Sangyo Unversty Wages as ant-corrupton strategy: A Note dek Sato Kyushu-Sangyo Unversty
More informationBenefit-Cost Analysis
Chapter 12 Beneft-Cost Analyss Utlty Possbltes and Potental Pareto Improvement Wthout explct nstructons about how to compare one person s benefts wth the losses of another, we can not expect beneft-cost
More information4. Greek Letters, Value-at-Risk
4 Greek Letters, Value-at-Rsk 4 Value-at-Rsk (Hull s, Chapter 8) Math443 W08, HM Zhu Outlne (Hull, Chap 8) What s Value at Rsk (VaR)? Hstorcal smulatons Monte Carlo smulatons Model based approach Varance-covarance
More informationACADEMIC ARTICLES ON THE TESTS OF THE CAPM
ACADEMIC ARTICLES ON THE TESTS OF THE CAPM Page: o 5 The table below s a summary o the results o the early academc tests o the Captal Asset Prcng Model. The table lst the alpha correcton needed accordng
More informationMultiobjective De Novo Linear Programming *
Acta Unv. Palack. Olomuc., Fac. rer. nat., Mathematca 50, 2 (2011) 29 36 Multobjectve De Novo Lnear Programmng * Petr FIALA Unversty of Economcs, W. Churchll Sq. 4, Prague 3, Czech Republc e-mal: pfala@vse.cz
More informationAnalysis of Decentralized Decision Processes in Competitive Markets: Quantized Single and Double-Side Auctions
Analyss of Decentralzed Decson Processes n Compettve Marets: Quantzed Sngle and Double-Sde Auctons Peng Ja and Peter E. Canes Abstract In ths paper two decentralzed decson processes for compettve marets
More informationJeffrey Ely. October 7, This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 License.
October 7, 2012 Ths work s lcensed under the Creatve Commons Attrbuton-NonCommercal-ShareAlke 3.0 Lcense. Recap We saw last tme that any standard of socal welfare s problematc n a precse sense. If we want
More informationTesting for Omitted Variables
Testng for Omtted Varables Jeroen Weese Department of Socology Unversty of Utrecht The Netherlands emal J.weese@fss.uu.nl tel +31 30 2531922 fax+31 30 2534405 Prepared for North Amercan Stata users meetng
More informationClearing Notice SIX x-clear Ltd
Clearng Notce SIX x-clear Ltd 1.0 Overvew Changes to margn and default fund model arrangements SIX x-clear ( x-clear ) s closely montorng the CCP envronment n Europe as well as the needs of ts Members.
More informationVolume 30, Issue 1. Partial privatization in price-setting mixed duopoly. Kazuhiro Ohnishi Institute for Basic Economic Science, Japan
Volume 3, Issue 1 Partal prvatzaton n prce-settng mxed duopoly Kazuhro Ohnsh Insttute for Basc Economc Scence, Japan Abstract Ths paper nvestgates a prce-settng mxed model nvolvng a prvate frm and a publc
More informationMacroeconomic Theory and Policy
ECO 209 Macroeconomc Theory and Polcy Lecture 7: The Open Economy wth Fxed Exchange Rates Gustavo Indart Slde 1 Open Economy under Fxed Exchange Rates Let s consder an open economy wth no captal moblty
More informationCh Rival Pure private goods (most retail goods) Non-Rival Impure public goods (internet service)
h 7 1 Publc Goods o Rval goods: a good s rval f ts consumpton by one person precludes ts consumpton by another o Excludable goods: a good s excludable f you can reasonably prevent a person from consumng
More information