Dispersed Information, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Communication

Transcription

1 Dispersed Information, Monetary Policy and Central Bank Communication George-Marios Angeletos MIT Central Bank Research Network Conference December 13-14, 2007

2 MOTIVATION The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is... a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality. (Friedreich A. Hayek, 1945)

3 MOTIVATION equilibrium and welfare in economies with complementarity in actions dispersed info on common fundamentals

4 MOTIVATION equilibrium and welfare in economies with complementarity in actions dispersed info on common fundamentals applications: business cycles investment in new technologies/markets financial markets

5 QUESTIONS Q1: equilibrium use of information? Q1: response to fundamentals (inertia) and noise (volatility)?

6 QUESTIONS Q1: equilibrium use of information? Q1: response to fundamentals (inertia) and noise (volatility)? Q2: inefficiency in the use of information? Q2: excessive inertia and volatility?

7 QUESTIONS Q1: equilibrium use of information? Q1: response to fundamentals (inertia) and noise (volatility)? Q2: inefficiency in the use of information? Q2: excessive inertia and volatility? Q3: policies that correct this inefficiency?

8 QUESTIONS Q1: equilibrium use of information? Q1: response to fundamentals (inertia) and noise (volatility)? Q2: inefficiency in the use of information? Q2: excessive inertia and volatility? Q3: policies that correct this inefficiency? Q4: policies that communicate additional info? Q4: CB transparency vs constructive ambiguity?

9 QUESTIONS Q1: equilibrium use of information? Q1: response to fundamentals (inertia) and noise (volatility)? Q2: inefficiency in the use of information? Q2: excessive inertia and volatility? Q3: policies that correct this inefficiency? Q4: policies that communicate additional info? Q4: CB transparency vs constructive ambiguity? Q5: aggregation of info through prices and macro data? Q4: implications for monetary policy?

10 MODELING APPROACH (Angeletos & Pavan) a broad class of linear-quadratic games that nest various applications flexible payoff interdependences strategic complementarity/substitutability dispersed info on common values

11 MODELING APPROACH (Angeletos & Pavan) a broad class of linear-quadratic games that nest various applications flexible payoff interdependences strategic complementarity/substitutability dispersed info on common values equilibrium vs. appropriate efficiency benchmark optimal corrective taxation comparative statics of equil welfare wrt information structure

12 KEY LESSONS Q1: complementarity heightens inertia and volatility Q2: inefficiency depends on social preferences over volatility and dispersion Q3: contingency of policy on aggregate activity can correct inefficiency Q4: transparency undesirable only if inefficiency Q5: aforementioned contingency can improve info in prices/macro data

13 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Corrective policies (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications: business cycles & financial markets

14 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Corrective policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications: business cycles & financial markets

15 THE ENVIRONMENT

16 THE ENVIRONMENT large, symmetric, simultaneous-move game linear-quadratic payoffs unique and bounded equilibrium and efficient allocations dispersed information on a commonly relevant fundamental

17 ACTIONS & PAYOFFS u i = U ( k i, {k j } j i, θ )

18 ACTIONS & PAYOFFS u = U ( k, K, σ 2 k, θ ) K = k dψ (k ) σ 2 k = (k K) 2 dψ (k ) Assumptions: U quadratic in (k, K, θ) and linear in σ 2 k ( best responses linear in K, θ) U such that equilibrium and first-best allocations are unique and bounded

19 EXAMPLES 1. investment complementarities (Angeletos & Pavan, 2004) u i = A k i c(k i ), A = θ + ak, c(k) = k 2 /2 k i = E i [ θ + ak ] 2. new-keynesian models (Woodford, 2002; Hellwig, 2006; Lorenzoni. 2007; Angeletos & Lao, 2007) π i = π (p i p ) 2, p = (1 φ)θ + φp p i = E i [ (1 φ)θ + φp ] 3. beauty contests (Morris & Shin, 2002; Svensson, 2005; Angeletos, Lorenzoni & Pavan, 2007)

20 INFORMATION common prior: θ N( µ θ, σ 2 θ ) private signals: x i = θ + σ x ξ i ξ i N(0, 1) public signal: y = θ + σ y ε ε N(0, 1) (with ξ i, ξ j, ε orthogonal to one another, as well as to θ)

21 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications

22 EQUILIBRIUM Proposition. A strategy is an equilibrium if and only if k(x, y) = E [ (1 α) κ(θ) + α K(θ, y) x, y ] where κ(θ) = complete-info equilibrium, K(θ, y) = E[k(x, y) θ, y], and α U kk U kk = equilibrium degree of coordination

23 EQUILIBRIUM Proposition. A strategy is an equilibrium if and only if k(x, y) = E [ (1 α) κ(θ) + α K(θ, y) x, y ] where κ(θ) = complete-info equilibrium, K(θ, y) = E[k(x, y) θ, y], and α U kk U kk = equilibrium degree of coordination higher α higher sensitivity to public info, and lower to private

24 EQUILIBRIUM to simplify, let κ(θ) = θ CE guess: k i = E i θ = λ µ µ + λ y y + λ x x i

25 EQUILIBRIUM to simplify, let κ(θ) = θ CE guess: k i = E i θ = λ µ µ + λ y y + λ x x i actual equilibrium: k i = γ µ µ + γ y y + γ x x i

26 EQUILIBRIUM to simplify, let κ(θ) = θ CE guess: k i = E i θ = λ µ µ + λ y y + λ x x i actual equilibrium: k i = γ µ µ + γ y y + γ x x i higher α higher γ µ and γ y, lower γ x Corollary. Complementarity heightens inertia and volatility.

27 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications

28 EFFICIENT USE OF INFO Definition. Efficient strategy k(x, y) maximizes ex-ante utility. team problem all agents maximize the same objective (welfare) but with different information sets planner s problem control incentives but cannot communicate info

29 EFFICIENT USE OF INFO Proposition. A strategy is efficient if and only if k(x, y) = E [ (1 α ) κ (θ) + α K(θ, y) x, y ] where κ (θ) = first-best allocation, K(θ, y) = E[k(x, y) θ, y], and α 1 U kk + 2U kk + U KK U kk + 2U σ 2 k = optimal degree of coordination

30 EFFICIENT USE OF INFO Proposition. A strategy is efficient if and only if k(x, y) = E [ (1 α ) κ (θ) + α K(θ, y) x, y ] where κ (θ) = first-best allocation, K(θ, y) = E[k(x, y) θ, y], and α 1 U kk + 2U kk + U KK U kk + 2U σ 2 k = optimal degree of coordination higher α higher efficient sensitivity to public info

31 EFFICIENT USE OF INFO Proposition. A strategy is efficient if and only if k(x, y) = E [ (1 α ) κ (θ) + α K(θ, y) x, y ] where κ (θ) = first-best allocation, K(θ, y) = E[k(x, y) θ, y], and α 1 U kk + 2U kk + U KK U kk + 2U σ 2 k = optimal degree of coordination Corollary. Equil inertia and volatility are excessive iff α > α.

32 OPTIMAL DEGREE OF COORDINATION Eu inco info = Eu first best L L = U kk + 2U kk + U KK 2 V ar(k κ ) + U kk + 2U σ 2 k 2 V ar(k K) ( welfare losses = volatility + dispersion )

33 OPTIMAL DEGREE OF COORDINATION L = U kk + 2U kk + U KK 2 Eu inco info = Eu first best L V ar(k κ ) + U kk + 2U σ 2 k 2 V ar(k K) α = 1 weight on volatility weight on dispersion

34 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications

35 POLICY timing: 1) agents receive info and choose actions timing: 2) government observes actions and implements policy

36 POLICY timing: 1) agents receive info and choose actions timing: 2) government observes actions and implements policy linear taxes: t i = τ(k, θ) k i + T(K, θ) where, by budget balance, T(K, θ) = τ(k, θ) K

37 POLICY timing: 1) agents receive info and choose actions timing: 2) government observes actions and implements policy linear taxes: t i = τ(k, θ) k i + T(K, θ) where, by budget balance, T(K, θ) = τ(k, θ) K Proposition. There exists a unique tax scheme that implements the efficient allocation as an equilibrium.

38 POLICY policy goal: correct equilibrium use of information

39 POLICY policy goal: correct equilibrium use of information instrument: sensitivity τ K of marginal tax τ wrt aggregate K controls complementarity perceived by the agents

40 POLICY policy goal: correct equilibrium use of information instrument: sensitivity τ K of marginal tax τ wrt aggregate K controls complementarity perceived by the agents Corollary. Optimal τ increases with K iff α > α.

41 POLICY policy goal: correct equilibrium use of information instrument: sensitivity τ K of marginal tax τ wrt aggregate K controls complementarity perceived by the agents Corollary. Optimal τ increases with K iff α > α. contingency of interest rates on realized inflation/aggregate activity

42 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications

43 SOCIAL VALUE OF INFO: a useful decomposition Definition. The accuracy and the commonality of available information are accuracy 1/V ar(η i ) commonality Corr(η i, η j ) where η i = θ E[θ x i, y] denotes i s forecast error

44 SVI 1: efficient economies κ = κ and α = α

45 SVI 1: efficient economies κ = κ and α = α welfare necessarily increases with accuracy welfare increases with commonality if and only if α > 0 no matter α, welfare increases with either private or public info, but higher α increases relative value of public info

46 SVI 2: inefficiency only when info is incomplete κ = κ but α α

47 SVI 2: inefficiency only when info is incomplete κ = κ but α α social value of accuracy remains positive α < α increases social value of commonality (favoring public info) α > α decreases (favoring private info)

48 SVI 2: inefficiency only when info is incomplete κ = κ but α α social value of accuracy remains positive α < α increases social value of commonality (favoring public info) α > α decreases (favoring private info) more precise public info can decrease welfare only if private incentives to coordinate are excessively high (α > α )

49 SVI 3: inefficiency even under complete info κ κ

50 SVI 3: inefficiency even under complete info κ κ now welfare can decrease with accuracy either private or public info can reduce welfare

51 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications

52 INFO AGGREGATION

53 INFO AGGREGATION dispersed info partially aggregated through prices and macro indicators informational externality: the more heavily agents rely on their private info the better the quality of info in prices/macro indicators

54 INFO AGGREGATION implications for CB communication: more public info disseminated by the CB can deteriorate info contained in prices/macro indicators

55 INFO AGGREGATION implications for CB communication: more public info disseminated by the CB can deteriorate info contained in prices/macro indicators implications for optimal monetary policy: CB can use contingency of monetary policy on realized activity to improve quality of info in prices/macro indicators

56 ROADMAP Environment Equilibrium (Question 1) Efficient benchmark (Question 2) Policy (Question 3) Social value of information (Question 4) Information aggregation (Question 5) Applications

57 APPLICATIONS

58 APPLICATION 1: beauty contest (Morris & Shin, 2002) beauty contest economy where α > 0 = α and κ = κ

59 APPLICATION 1: beauty contest (Morris & Shin, 2002) beauty contest economy where α > 0 = α and κ = κ Result. Welfare increases with accuracy but non-monotonic in commonality welfare can decrease with public info but only because private value of aligning choices not socially warranted

60 APPLICATION 2: new-keynesian monetary economies α > 0, but what about α?

61 APPLICATION 2: new-keynesian monetary economies α > 0, but what about α? negative welfare effect of price dispersion (U σ 2 k < 0) ensuring α > α

62 APPLICATION 2: new-keynesian monetary economies α > 0, but what about α? negative welfare effect of price dispersion (U σ 2 k < 0) ensuring α > α Result. Welfare increases with both accuracy and commonality welfare necessarily increases with public info central bank transparency is desirable... see Hellwig (2006), Roca (2006)

63 APPLICATION 3: inefficient fluctuations suppose Cov (κ κ, κ) 0 (e.g., κ =constant) e.g., business cycles driven by mark-up shocks

64 APPLICATION 3: inefficient fluctuations suppose Cov (κ κ, κ) 0 (e.g., κ =constant) e.g., business cycles driven by mark-up shocks Result. Welfare decreases with either private or public info. ignorance can be a (social) bless! transparency can be undesirable

65 APPLICATION 4: financial markets (Angeletos, Lorenzoni & Pavan, 2007) two-way feedback between real and financial activity: 1. positive news about aggregate activity raise financial prices 2. higher financial prices boost real investment endogenous complementarity in real investment decisions

66 APPLICATION 4: financial markets (Angeletos, Lorenzoni & Pavan, 2007) two-way feedback between real and financial activity: 1. positive news about aggregate activity raise financial prices 2. higher financial prices boost real investment endogenous complementarity in real investment decisions Result. investment and prices react too much to noise, too little to fundamentals symptoms like irrational exuberance without irrationality

67 APPLICATION 4: financial markets (Angeletos, Lorenzoni & Pavan, 2007) two-way feedback between real and financial activity: 1. positive news about aggregate activity raise financial prices 2. higher financial prices boost real investment endogenous complementarity in real investment decisions Result. investment and prices react too much to noise, too little to fundamentals symptoms like irrational exuberance without irrationality CB can correct inefficiency by stabilizing prices/using key contingency

68 CONCLUSIONS

69 CONCLUSIONS 1. lessons for CB communication transparency desirable if equil is efficient transparency more likely to be desirable with effective monetary policy caveat: mark-up shocks

70 CONCLUSIONS 1. lessons for CB communication transparency desirable if equil is efficient transparency more likely to be desirable with effective monetary policy caveat: mark-up shocks 2. lessons for monetary policy novel role for monetary policy: control degree of complementarity equil use of information correct overreaction to noisy public news improve information contained in prices/macro indicators

71 RELATED LITERATURE social value of information: Morris & Shin (2002, 2005, 2006), Heinemann & Cornand (2004), Svensson (2006), Hellwig (2006), Roca (2006), Woodford (2005), Angeletos & Pavan (2004, 2007a, 2007b). business cycles: incomplete info Woodford (2002), Hellwig (2002), Lorenzoni (2006), Amato & Shin (2003), Rodina (2006), Veldkamp & Wolfers (2006), Baeriswyl & Cornand (2007), Angeletos & Lao (2007) business cycles: sticky info/rational inattention Sims (2006), Mankiw & Reis (2002, 2006), Mackowiak & Wiederholt (2006) financial markets: Allen, Morris & Shin (2003), Cespa & Vives (2007), Angeletos, Lorenzoni & Pavan (2007) exchange rates: Bacchetta & Wincoop (2006). social learning/info externalities: Vives (1997), Amador & Weill (2007), Morris & Shin (2005) policy: Angeletos & Pavan (2007c)