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1 Thematic Report Global Economy 17 March 2015 Expect US Fed To Postpone Rate Hike To 2016 Almost all market-related discussions revolve around this question. And rightly so, because to a certain extent the answer to this question helps in understanding how monetary policies and currency markets across the world will behave. India is not an exception. Whether the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) will be able to cut policy rates further or the Indian Rupee (INR) will continue to weaken against the US dollar (USD) hinge on the US Federal Reserve s (Fed s) rate move. We believe that the two most important indicators which play a dominant role in deciding the Fed s rate move in the next quarter are wage growth and inflationary pressure. An analysis of these measures indicates that the timing is not right for the Fed to hike policy rates. A comparison of the current economic scenario with that in early 1990s also reinforces our view. Further, last time when the greenback strengthened post monetary tightening in 1994, it led to disinflationary pressure, widened the current account deficit and reduced corporate profitability in the US. None of these outcomes are desired today. Consequently, we believe the Fed will decide to postpone rate hike by 9-12 months into Accordingly, we expect the INR to strengthen to the level of 60 against the USD and the RBI to cut repo rate to 7% in FY16. On the contrary, if the Fed makes rate move as per market expectations, it may have asymmetrically high adverse impact on the US and global economy, leading to a weaker INR. The RBI will also find it difficult to cut rates. Variables that will determine the Fed s monetary policy: Those who expect the Fed to hike policy rates in June 2015 point to various economic indicators such as a decent real GDP growth, strong employment generation and falling unemployment rate to validate their thesis. However, we believe that the wage growth and inflationary pressure are the two most important data matrices which play a dominant role in deciding the Fed s rate move. Neither of these two variables has moved favourably to enable the Fed to start hiking policy rate (Page 2). Further, the stronger the USD, the more difficult it is for the Fed to hike policy rate (Page 3-4). A look at the previous (and only relevant) episode of how various economic indicators moved when the USD strengthened in late 1990s, post monetary tightening in 1994, revealed that a stronger USD led to disinflationary pressure, widened the current account deficit and reduced corporate profitability significantly in the US. None of these outcomes are desired today. US 2014 versus US 1993: Interestingly, the current US economic scenario is compared with the Fed s rate tightening in mid-1990s. After keeping interest rates unchanged in a rarity during that time - the Fed almost doubled its policy rate to 6% in a year by February Although employment generation in the recent period has been faster than in mid-1990s, leading to higher real GDP growth; none of the major variables - such as labour compensation, productivity or inflation - are close to where they were prior to the beginning of the 1994 tightening (Page 5-6). Further, the US managed the sharp rate hike of mid-1990s very well, primarily because of the productivity surge witnessed in the economy. The current underlying trend does not indicate a repetition of 1990s growth miracle in the years ahead. How the Fed s rate moves are relevant for India: A look at the long-term trend of the INR with the USD index (against major currencies, also known as narrow index) shows that the two share a strong positive relationship (Page 7). In fact, the trend is true for the broader set of emerging market (EM) currencies. Based on our statistical analysis, EM currencies tend to follow the movement in narrow USD index with a lag of months. Further, as the Fed hikes policy rate, the space for the RBI to cut policy rates further will be very limited (or negligible). This is probably one of the reasons why the RBI front-loaded rate cuts. We expect the Fed to postpone its rate hike to 2016 : We believe it is better for the Fed to lag the markets rather than lead. This is because if we turn out to be incorrect and the Fed delays its rate tightening cycle, a temporary spike in inflation may not do much harm. Nevertheless, if the Fed makes rate move, as expected, and this turns out to be incorrect, the costs would be asymmetrically high. Based on our assessment of the US economy, we are confident that the Fed will eventually decide to postpone its rate hike cycle at least by 9-12 months into 2016 (Page 8). which will help the INR to rise to the level of 60 against the USD: Consequently, we believe the INR, amid a stable domestic scenario, is likely to strengthen to the level of 60 against the USD in FY16. Further, the RBI may also feel more comfortable with a rate cut. However, lower savings will restrict the RBI from reducing the repo rate below 7% by the end of FY16 (Page 8). On the contrary, if the Fed makes rate move, as planned, in June 2015, the USD will continue to strengthen further leading to a weaker INR. Further, the prospects of more rate cuts will also wane. Nikhil Gupta nikhil.gupta@nirmalbang.com Please refer to the disclaimer towards the end of the document.

2 Jan-09 Jul-09 Jan-10 Jul-10 Jan-11 Jul-11 Jan-12 Jul-12 Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14 Jul-14 Jan-15 Dec-98 Dec-00 Dec-02 Dec-04 Dec-06 Dec-08 Dec-10 Dec-12 Dec-14 Variables that will determine the Fed s monetary policy The Fed achieving its employment objective: The Congress established the statutory objectives for monetary policy maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates in the Federal Reserve Act..., says the US Federal Reserve website. With non-farm payroll growing at an average of 250,000 in the past 18 months, the unemployment rate falling from 6.7% a year ago to 5.5% last month, and real GDP growing at 2.5% annualised per quarter since mid-2011, the hawkish tone has certainly gathered steam. Accordingly, the Fed is expected to move towards the normalisation of its monetary policy as soon as June Inflation remaining below the desired level: Nevertheless, what is largely ignored is the fact that despite the Fed engaging in unconventional monetary easing for most of the past seven years, inflation (both at headline and core level) has failed to move towards the desired level of 2% (Exhibit 1). Core (excluding food and energy) inflation measured by the price index of Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) - Fed s preferred measure of inflation - stood at 1.3% YoY in January Following the slide in energy prices, headline PCE price index is set to move into deflation - for the first time since late Labour compensation failing to pick up in the past six years: Further, while the unemployment rate has fallen dramatically towards the so-called NAIRU (non-accelerating inflationary rate of unemployment) level of ~5.4%, there are hardly any signs of growth in labour compensation. If the labour market is actually tightening, the competition among labourers should push real compensation higher. Nevertheless, real hourly compensation 1 (RHC) has failed to grow in the past six years or so (Exhibit 2). In terms of YoY change, RHC has grown at an average of 0.1% since 2008 as against ~2% growth in the pre-crisis decade. Exhibit 1: Core inflation rarely touched the desired level of 2% since 2009 Exhibit 2: Real hourly compensation has not grown in the past six years 4.0 (%, YoY) Real Hourly compensation (1.0) 92.5 (2.5) (2.0) 85.0 (5.0) Headline PCE index Core PCE index Index (2009=100) YoY change (%, RHS) Note: PCE stand for private consumption expenditure 1 We have deliberately chosen real hourly compensation (RHC), which is more appropriate to understand labour payments. According to the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), labour cost would be seriously understated by the compensation measure take from establishment payrolls because they refer exclusively to wage and salary workers. Quarterly RHC, however, include direct payments to labour wage and salary accruals (including executive compensation), commissions, tips, bonuses and payments in kind representing income to the recipients - and supplements to these payments such as employer contributions to funds for social insurance, private pension and health & welfare plans etc. 2 Global Economy

3 Mar-91 Jun-92 Sep-93 Dec-94 Mar-96 Jun-97 Sep-98 Dec-99 Mar-01 Jun-02 Sep-03 Dec-04 Mar-06 Jun-07 Sep-08 Dec-09 Mar-11 Jun-12 Sep-13 Dec-14 Mar-91 Jun-92 Sep-93 Dec-94 Mar-96 Jun-97 Sep-98 Dec-99 Mar-01 Jun-02 Sep-03 Dec-04 Mar-06 Jun-07 Sep-08 Dec-09 Mar-11 Jun-12 Sep-13 Dec-14 Stronger USD makes it difficult for the Fed to hike policy rate Further, the recent strength in USD index - up ~26% against major currencies in a year - has made it difficult for the US Federal Reserve to hike policy rate as planned. This is because a stronger currency is similar to monetary tightening. At this point in time, no major economy wants its currency to strengthen and the US is not an exception. This is because higher US demand will be shared around the world, effectively shifting US growth to the rest of the world. This happens not only through ordinary higher import channel, but also through financial markets. Unless we assume that the US economy is generous (and recovering strongly) enough to shift a portion of its economic growth to the rest of the world, the need and possibility of the Fed hiking interest rate - after the greenback strengthening by a quarter - is fairly small. An analysis of how the US economy has fared in previous cases of a stronger USD will come in handy. A peek into history of a stronger USD Since 1970s, the US economy witnessed only two cases of consistent appreciation in the USD, which coincided with the Fed s monetary tightening. The first was in early 1980s (thanks to Volcker) and the second was in mid-1990s. The former was an attempt to control high inflation, which plunged the economy into a recession. Thus, what is more relevant is the second case (mid-1990s), when the US economy managed to grow at an annualised rate of 4% over 1994 and (Please note even mid-1990s is also not a strictly comparable period because after doubling the policy rate to 6% in a year, the Fed started cutting in 1995 and reached 4.75% by the end of However, we are interested in showing how a stronger USD affected various macro-economic indicators, which we have done here.) Although we have compared the current US economic situation with that of mid-1990s in detail later, we have highlighted how a stronger USD index impacted two important indicators - core inflation and current account balance - in mid-1990s. As real GDP growth was strong in mid-1990s, we have not compared it here, but discussed it later on in this report. Despite liquidity injection, inflation (measured by core PCE price index) stood at 1.3% YoY in January Therefore, the objective is to push inflation higher to an extent. Or at least there should be strong resistance to factors capable of pulling inflation down. The previous episode of monetary tightening is not very encouraging in this respect (Exhibit 3). Core PCE price index moderated to as low as 1.1% in mid-1998 (from 2.5% at the end of 1993) before recovering to 2.0% in Further, the current account deficit (CAD) widened from ~1.5% of GDP in 1994 to around 4% by 2000-end. This time the US CAD has narrowed substantially from 6% of GDP in 2006 to 2.5% of late. Anything pushing CAD higher should receive flak from the policymakers (Exhibit 4). Exhibit 3: Stronger USD leads to lower core inflation Exhibit 4: US current account balance versus USD index (% YoY) (% of GDP) (1.0) (2.0) (3.0) (4.0) (5.0) (6.0) (7.0) Real US Dollar index Core PCE index (RHS) Real US Dollar index Current account balance (RHS) 3 Global Economy

4 Mar-91 Jun-92 Sep-93 Dec-94 Mar-96 Jun-97 Sep-98 Dec-99 Mar-01 Jun-02 Sep-03 Dec-04 Mar-06 Jun-07 Sep-08 Dec-09 Mar-11 Jun-12 Sep-13 Dec-14 Sep.93 Mar.95 Sep.96 Mar.98 Sep.99 Mar.01 Sep.02 Mar.04 Sep.05 Mar.07 Sep.08 Mar.10 Sep.11 Mar.13 Sep.14 Stronger USD is a drag on US corporate profitability Exhibit 5 shows that while US corporate profitability increased to all-time high post 2008 crisis, a stronger USD may spoil the party. In mid-1990s, when the USD strengthened post Fed tightening in 1994, US corporate profitability (after tax) declined from ~7% of GDP in 1997 to less than 5% by the end of In other words, after growing at an average of 14% YoY per quarter in the five years to 1997, corporate PAT declined by an average ~6% in the following three years. Exhibit 5: Corporate profitability suffers with a strong USD Exhibit 6: USD-denominated debt issuance up significantly (% of GDP) (US$bn) 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1,000 Issue of International debt securities in US$ currency (% of total issues) Real US Dollar index Corportae profit after tax# (RHS) Note: # With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS), Nirmal Bang Research Rising debt issuance in USD an area of concern for non-us corporate sector Another area of concern is the rising issuance of USD-denominated debt securities (bonds and notes) by the rest of the world. Exhibit 6 gives an idea of this. From ~50% in 2001, the share of USD-denominated international debt securities dropped to 29% in However, the trends reversed in the past few years, with the share rising to 39% as of 3Q2014-end (the recent data available). The outstanding amount of international debt securities issued in USD increased from USD6trn in 2010 to USD8.4trn as of 3Q2014-end. Bank for International Settlements has expressed similar concerns in a paper 2 published in January this year....while international bonds may be stickier than bank debt, the shift towards dollar credit through bond markets in recent years does raise financial stability concerns..., it said. The paper commented about emerging markets, in particular....the share of dollar credit to emerging market borrowers fell from around half to about a third on the eve of the global financial crisis. Yet, since 2009, it has since recovered to almost half, it stated. dollar credit to Brazilian, Chinese and Indian borrowers has grown rapidly since the global financial crisis (Exhibit 5). On this measure, which includes offshore bond issuance by non-banks financial subsidiaries outside the country (dark blue area), dollar borrowing has reached more than USD300bn in Brazil, USD1.1trn in China, and USD125bn in India. The rapid growth of bonds relative to loans is more evident in Brazil and India than in China. Indeed, in China and India, dollar credit continues to be extended mostly through bank loans, it added. The paper also stated that Balance of Payments data does not capture the amount of bonds issued by offshore affiliates of emerging market firms, which could weigh on the foreign exchange reserves, and thereby, on domestic currency, in times of strain. 2 BIS Working Papers No 483, Robert N McCauley, Patrick McGuire and Vladyslav Sushko, Global dollar credit: links to monetary policy and leverage, January Global Economy

5 1988 = 100 and 2009 = = 100 and 2009 = 100 US 2014 versus US 1993 Exhibit 7: Real GDP growth has been robust As stated above, there is only one relevant case of strengthening USD after the collapse of Brettton Wood system. It is, then, obvious to compare today s economic environment with that of mid-1990s. We have compared the movement of various economic variables in the six years preceding monetary tightening to 1993 for 1994 hike and 2009 to 2014 for likely 2015 hike. We have rebased all the variables: 1988=100 for mid-1990s and 2009=100 for the current period. What are hawkers looking at?: Those who believe that the time is opportune for the Fed to go for interest rate hike in June 2015 look at the two metrics shown below (Exhibit 7-8). Firstly, real GDP growth has been as strong this time as it was in mid-1990s. In the six years preceding the monetary tightening in mid-1990s, real GDP grew at a cumulative rate of 14%, almost same as 13% growth since Secondly, this section of people point to the strong surge in employment generation, which has been even better than what it was in mid-1990s. This, and the corresponding falling unemployment rate, is seen as one of the most important indicators supporting the Fed s plan to hike policy rate. Exhibit 8: Employment generation has been stronger Real GDP growth Employment What are they missing?: Nevertheless, this analysis seems grossly incomplete. If real GDP growth has actually been as strong as suggested by the headline numbers, then inflationary pressure should have also picked up. Exhibit 9 shows that inflation (measured by the core measure of PCE price index, the Fed s preferred measure) has been subdued. On an average, core PCE-based inflation averaged 1.4% YoY in the past six years as against 3.6% in the six years preceding the monetary tightening in mid-1990s. It is important to note that the Fed s monetary tightening in mid-1990s was partly motivated by the desire to reduce inflationary pressure. Today s scenario is exactly the opposite. The US is suffering with low demand and thus, subdued inflation. As shown above, with monetary tightening, core PCE index moved from 2.5% as of end to 1.1% by mid We are sure US policy makers do not want the inflation to fall from its current level. Secondly, although employment generation has been much stronger than in mid-1990s, it does not indicate any tightening in the US labour market. Normally, high labour demand leads to competition among the employers to hire, which pushes wage growth higher. This does not seem to be happening. The unit labour cost (ULC) - which measures the cost of labour input required to produce one unit of output - has failed to grow at a decent pace to generate enough demand in the economy. Thus, inflationary pressures have remained subdued creating a vicious circle. As against a cumulative growth of 13% between 1998 and 1993, ULC grew by ~5% in the past six years (Exhibit 10). 5 Global Economy

6 1988 = 100 and 2009 = = 100 and 2009 = = 100 and 2009 = = 100 and 2009 = 100 Exhibit 9: Subdued core measure of inflation Exhibit 10:Unit labour cost (ULC) lags Core PCE price index Unit labour costs (ULC) Exhibit 11: Labour productivity growth is slow US unlikely to witness growth miracle of late 1990s: Another important dimension to look at is the fact that the US economy managed to grow at a reasonable pace (average 4% post monetary tightening in 1994) primarily because of the strong surge in productivity. Will this repeat? We don t know. All we can look at is the underlying trend. Is the productivity surge gaining momentum in the past few years? Unfortunately, the answer is No. The labour productivity growth (measured by output per hour) has grown at two-third the pace as compared to mid-1990s. This does not give confidence to believe that real GDP growth of late 1990s could be replicated. Exhibit 12: USD index strengthens sharply Labour productivity (Output per hour) Movements in real US$ index USD strength has been sharper: Finally, it is important to note that the real USD index against major currencies has already strengthened ~20% in a year, as against 5%-10% appreciation post monetary tightening in The reason for the latter may be that the monetary policy was not a one-way streak in mid- 1990s, as it is expected to be currently. Although the Fed doubled policy rate to 6.00% in a year by early 1995, it went soft and reduced it to 4.75% by the end of This time, however, it is believed that the US economy is on a strong footing and the Fed is unlikely to reverse its monetary tightening. 6 Global Economy

7 Feb-97 Feb-99 Feb-01 Feb-03 Feb-05 Feb-07 Feb-09 Feb-11 Feb-13 Feb-15 Feb-73 Feb-76 Feb-79 Feb-82 Feb-85 Feb-88 Feb-91 Feb-94 Feb-97 Feb-00 Feb-03 Feb-06 Feb-09 Feb-12 Feb-15 How the Fed s rate move is relevant for India USD is relevant for INR: Notwithstanding the sharp surge in the USD in the past one year, many emerging market currencies such as Thai Baht, Philippine Peso and INR have shown great resilience. This has been perplexing. Nevertheless, a look at the long-term trend of the INR with the USD index (against major currencies) shows that the two share a strong positive relationship (Exhibit 13). In fact, the trend is true for the broader set of emerging market (EM) currencies. Our statistical analysis also indicates strong causal relationship between a narrow USD index and EM currencies. Using Granger causality test, we find that movement in the major index cause changes in EM currencies. Exhibit 14 shows that major EM currencies tend to follow the movement in the narrow USD index with a lag of almost months. If so, the EMs are in for a rude shock. Exhibit 13: USD narrow index versus INR Exhibit 14: USD narrow index versus USD broad index US$ narrow index INR/USD (RHS) US$ narrow index US$ Other currencies index one-year lag (RHS) Note: Narrow index is against major developed market currencies Euro, Japanese Yen, Pound Sterling, Canadian Dollar, Swedish Krona & Swiss franc Note: Countries whose currencies are included in the index are Mexico, China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Brazil, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, India, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Colombia. RBI s rate movement will depend on the Fed s moves: If the US Fed tightens its monetary policy as planned, the interest rate differential will narrow between the US and EM economies. This is especially true, considering the monetary easing practised by many emerging markets, including India, in the recent period. The lower differential could also lead to capital outflow from emerging economies, further weakening EM currencies. Therefore, as the Fed hikes policy rate, the space for the RBI to cut policy rates further will be very limited (or negligible). This is probably one of the reasons why the RBI has front-loaded rate cuts. On the contrary, if the Fed postpones its rate hike, RBI, along with other EM counterparts will get more space to cut policy rates. This is our base case scenario based on which we expect the RBI to lower the repo rate to 7% by the end of FY16. 7 Global Economy

8 Conclusion: Monetary tightening is not warranted We have studied the US economic conditions in three ways to understand whether its economy is ready for monetary tightening. Firstly, we see that while the Fed is successful in achieving high employment, it has yet to deliver on its objective of stable prices, which is generally considered with an inflation rate of 2%. With real hourly compensation remaining stagnant in the past six years, it is not a surprise that the core inflation stands at 1.3%, and has rarely touched 2.0% since Secondly, we show the impact of rate hike in 1994 on various economic parameters. It is apparent that higher rates led to lower inflation, widening of current account deficit and contraction in corporate profitability. The former two variables are not in a position to witness any further deterioration. Further, while corporate profitability has increased to all-time high levels, it has not yet been shared with employees in the form of higher compensation. If profitability takes a hit, the employers will find another reason to keep wage growth subdued although they don t necessarily need one. It is also important to note that the share of USDdenominated debt securities has risen from 29% in 2010 to 39% in 3Q2014, implying that the dominance of the USD has increased. Companies in emerging market in particular, have taken the advantage of low-cost borrowings, which could pose a serious threat if the environment turns less benign. If these companies try to hedge their USD borrowings, it will further strengthen the greenback, making it more difficult for these companies. If not hedged, the rise in USD borrowings could weigh on the domestic currency. Finally, a comparison of today s US economic scenario with that of early 1990s reveals that the US economy is not strong enough to warrant monetary tightening. Although real GDP growth has been as strong as in early-1990s and employment generation has been robust, the former failed to lead to an acceptable level of inflationary pressure in the economy, while the latter does not indicate tightening in the labour market with growth in ULC remaining subdued. Further, the economy managed to grow at a decent pace post tightening because of the productivity surge. With productivity growth in the past six years slower than in , it appears doubtful if the US economy is able to witness strong GDP growth post tightening this time around. Expect the Fed to postpone rate hike to All-in-all, we believe that the time is not yet ripe to allow the Fed to hike policy rates. In other words, with immense uncertainty, it is better for the Fed to lag the markets rather than lead or in other words let the labour costs to rise consistently and inflation move towards 2.0% (if not 2.5%). This is because if we turn out to be incorrect and the Fed delays its tightening cycle, a temporary spike in inflation will not do much harm. Nevertheless, if the Fed moves as expected and turns out to be incorrect, the costs would be asymmetrically high. We, therefore, believe that the rate hike could be postponed at least by 9-12 months to helping the INR to strengthen to the level of 60 against the USD If this is the case, one may witness the USD retreating. This will help the INR and other emerging market currencies to strengthen against the greenback. Further, it will give the RBI space to cut repo rate by another 50bps to 7% in FY16 (one basis point is one-hundredth of a percentage point). However, if the Fed makes rate move, as planned, in June 2015 not only will it weaken the currency, but will also reduce the prospects of further rate cuts in India. With higher USD credit, as mentioned in the BIS paper, Indian companies as well as companies in Brazil, China and other EMs, could face severe pressure. 8 Global Economy

9 Disclaimer Stock Ratings Absolute Returns BUY > 15% ACCUMULATE -5% to15% SELL < -5% This report is published by Nirmal Bang s Research desk. Nirmal Bang has other business units with independent research teams separated by Chinese walls, and therefore may, at times, have different or contrary views on stocks and markets. This report is for the personal information of the authorised recipient and is not for public distribution. This should not be reproduced or redistributed to any other person or in any form. This report is for the general information for the clients of Nirmal Bang Equities Pvt. Ltd., a division of Nirmal Bang, and should not be construed as an offer or solicitation of an offer to buy/sell any securities. We have exercised due diligence in checking the correctness and authenticity of the information contained herein, so far as it relates to current and historical information, but do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. The opinions expressed are our current opinions as of the date appearing in the material and may be subject to change from time to time without notice. Nirmal Bang or any persons connected with it do not accept any liability arising from the use of this document or the information contained therein. The recipients of this material should rely on their own judgment and take their own professional advice before acting on this information. Nirmal Bang or any of its connected persons including its directors or subsidiaries or associates or employees or agents shall not be in any way responsible for any loss or damage that may arise to any person/s from any inadvertent error in the information contained, views and opinions expressed in this publication. Nirmal Bang Equities Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as NBEPL ) is a registered Member of National Stock Exchange of India Limited, Bombay Stock Exchange Limited. NBEPL is in the process of making an application with SEBI for registering as a Research Entity in terms of SEBI (Research Analyst) Regulations, NBEPL or its associates including its relatives/analyst do not hold any financial interest/beneficial ownership of more than 1% in the company covered by Analyst. NBEPL or its associates/analyst has not received any compensation from the company covered by Analyst during the past twelve months. NBEPL /analyst has not served as an officer, director or employee of company covered by Analyst and has not been engaged in market-making activity of the company covered by Analyst. The views expressed are based solely on information available publicly and believed to be true. Investors are advised to independently evaluate the market conditions/risks involved before making any investment decision. Access our reports on Bloomberg Type NBIE <GO> Team Details: Name Id Direct Line Rahul Arora CEO rahul.arora@nirmalbang.com - Girish Pai Head of Research girish.pai@nirmalbang.com / 18 Dealing Ravi Jagtiani Dealing Desk ravi.jagtiani@nirmalbang.com , Pradeep Kasat Dealing Desk pradeep.kasat@nirmalbang.com /8101, Michael Pillai Dealing Desk michael.pillai@nirmalbang.com /8103, Umesh Bharadia Dealing Desk umesh.bharadia@nirmalbang.com Nirmal Bang Equities Pvt. Ltd. Correspondence Address B-2, 301/302, Marathon Innova, Nr. Peninsula Corporate Park, Lower Parel (W), Mumbai Board No. : /1; Fax. : Global Economy