6th International Conference on Electronics, Mechanics, Culture and Medicine (EMCM 2015)

Transcription

1 6th International Conference on Electronics Mechanics Culture an Meicine (EMCM 2015) esearch on the Evolution Mechanism an Countermeasures of Green Builing Market Base on Evolutionary Game Theory Zhongfu Qin1a Jingping Li1 b* an Zhongyang Xu1c 1 College of Civil Engineering an Architecture Zhejiang University Hangzhou Zhejiang China a qinzhongfu@zju.eu.cn blijingping980322@163.com c4002@zju.eu.cn Keywors: Green builing market; Evolutionary game; Evolution mechanism; eplication ynamics; Development tren Abstract. In orer to stuy the evolution mechanism an forecast the evelopment irection of green builing market this paper establishes a moel of asymmetric evolutionary game in the green builing market by using the iea of evolutionary game firstly. Then the ynamic equations of the two strategies are set up by using the iea of replicator ynamics in evolution game. Lastly the evolutionary game equilibrium moel is establishe. The analysis results show that (buil green buy green)(buil non greenbuy non green) are the two evolutionary stable situations. Through the empirical analysis the evelopment of green builing in our country is ivie into three evelopment stages. An through analyzing the evolution characteristics of each stage the evolution mechanism an evelopment tren of green builing in our country are obtaine. Introuction There are many efinitions of green builing but green builings generally are escribe as ones which are esigne an built in consieration of the integration of environmental feeback an resource efficiency[1].at present there are 40 billion square meters of total construction areas an approximate 95% of them are high energy consumption builings. An about 20 million square meters of construction area coul meet the green builing stanars which only account for 0.05% of the total construction area [2]meaning that there is great evelopment potentiality for green builing[3]. Some scholars have conucte a more in-epth stuy on the game of the green builing market. Such as Anna establishe a non symmetric game moel between the government an consumer groups[4] Pu Yunhui stuie the game relationship between participants of green builing public rental houses (government an tenants)[5] Wang Jinghui set up a game moel among ifferent groups of evelopers in the green builing market[6] Zhang Yun use evolutionary game theory to analyze an stuy the green transformation of existing large public builings in China[7]. However there is no iscussion on the game moel for the evelopers an buyers. Establishing Evolution Game Moel of the Green Builing Market Evolutionary game which buing biology establishes the system moel of ecological evolution to explain ecological phenomena by using pure mathematical theory[89] an it was completely summarize as the evolutionary game theory by Weibull in 1995[10]. In the value chain of green builing there are evelopers government potential buyers suppliers recycling companies an other relate interest groups[]. Among them the evelopers potential buyers an government epartments are the most irect an most significant participants[]. But in the early stageonly evelopers an potential buyers play a leaing role therefore this stuy intens to set them as the main participants of the game. Developers may take two types of strategies: one is to buil green constructions (buil green) another is to buil non green constructions (buil non green). Similarly property buyers can also take two types of strategies: one is to buy green builing (buy green) another is to buy non green The authors - Publishe by Atlantis Press 332

2 builing (buy non green). Utility parameters is escribe in table1 2 an the payment matrix is escribe in table 3. We set the proportion of evelopers who choose buil green as x then an set the proportion of evelopers who choose buil non green as 1-x. An we set the proportion of buyers who choose buy green is y an set the proportion of buyers who choose buy non green as 1-y. So the expecte benefit when evelopers choose to buil green builings is: U1 y( I C S) (1 I C S ) Developers total benefit is: U1 xy( I C S) I C S ) (1 x) y( I C ) (1 x)(1 I C) (2) The expecte benefit when buyer choose to buy green builings is: U 2 x( I C S) (1 x)( I C ) Buyers total benefit is: U 2 xy( I C S) (1 x) y( I C ) I 22 C22 22) (1 x)(1 I 22 C22) (4) (3) Table 1 Game players utility parameters uner ifferent strategies Developers Buyers Buil green Buil non green Buy green Buy non green Incomes(I) I I I I 22 Costs(C) C C C C 22 Subsiies(S) S S isks() 22 I C I C S I C I 22 C 22 S 22 Table 2 Meaning of utility parameters Developers income when choosing green builings Developers cost when choosing green builings Developers income when choosing non green builings Developers cost when choosing non green builings Subsiies from government for evelopers who choose green builings isk for evelopers when choosing green builings isk for evelopers when choosing non green builings Buyers income when choosing green builings Buyers cost when choosing green builings Buyers income when choosing non green builings Buyers cost when choosing non green builings Subsiies from government for buyers who choose green builings isk for buyers when choosing green builings isk for buyers when choosing non green builings Table 3 Payment matrix between buyers an evelopers Buyers Buy green(y) Buy non green(1-y) Developers Buil green(x) Buil non green(1-x) C I I C I C S I C S C 333 I I C I I C C

3 Solving Evolution Game Moel of the Green Builing Market On the one han the ynamic equations of evelopers who choose to construct green builings can be escribe as the following equation: x F x x( U1 U1) x)( I C S y y I C ) t (1)If ( I C S y y I C ) 0 F x is ientical to zero which means that all levels are stable that is x is stable. (2)If ( I C S y y I C ) 0 F 0 orer x then the result is x = 0 or x = 1. For evelopers the final outcome of the game is that all evelopers woul choose green builings or non F green builings.take the erivative of x with respect to x: x Orer (5) ( 1 2x)( I C S y y C ) C C b then: 1When y>b x x=1 <0 x x=0 >0 x=1 is the only evolutionary stable strategy. An when the proportion of buyers who choose green builings reach a certain point an show an upwar trenthe possibility of evelopers who choose to buil green builing will increase an ultimately green builing is the best choice for evelopers. 2When y<b x x=1 >0 x x=0 <0 x=0 is the only evolutionary stable strategy. An when the proportion of buyers who choose green builings cannot reach a certain point an show a ownwar tren the possibility of evelopers to buil green builing will graually ecrease an ultimately non green builing is the best choice for evelopers.the ynamic tren is shown in Fig. 1. On the other han the ynamic equations of buyers who choose to buy green builings can be escribe as the following equation: y F y y( U 2 U 2) y(1 I C22 S x x 22 I 22 C 22) t If ( I C22 x x 22 I 22 C 22) 0 F y is ientical to zero which means that all levels are stable that is y is stable. (2) If ( I C22 x x 22 I 22 C 22) 0 F 0 orer y then the result is y = 0 or y = 1. For buyers the final outcome of the game is that all buyers woul choose green builings or non green Fy builings.take the erivative of with respect to y: Orer C 22 F y ( 1 2y)( I C22 x x22 I 22 C ) y 22 I C22 S a 22 F y F y then: 1When x>a y y=1<0 y y=0 >0 y=1 is the only evolutionary stable strategy. An when the proportion of evelopers who choose green builings reach a certain point an show an upwar tren the possibility of buyers who choose to buy green builing will increase an ultimately green builing is the best choice for buyers. F y F y 2When x<a y y=1 >0 y y=0 <0 y=0 is the only evolutionary stable strategy. An when the proportion of evelopers who choose green builings cannot reach a certain point an show (7) (8) ( 6) 334

4 a ownwar tren the possibility of buyers to purchase green builing will graually ecrease an ultimately non green builing is the best choice for buyers.the ynamic tren is shown in Fig. 2. Putting Fig. 1 an Fig. 2 on the same coorinates we can get a stable strategy analysis moel which shows the changing process of evolution of ynamic. Then the moel shows that the interface is ivie into four regions by straight line x=a y=b --I II IIIIII IV as shown in Fig.3. In area I the outcome of the game is not stable; In the area II the game results will eventually achieve to (1 1); In the area III the game results will eventually achieve to (00); In the area IV the outcome of the game is not stable. Figure 1. Developers group s ynamic tren iagram Figure 2. Buyers group s Dynamic tren iagram Figure 3. Dynamic an Stability tren iagram between evelopers an buyers Analysis on the Evolution of Green Builing Market in Three Cases There are two assumptions in our analysis: 1Hypothesis1:I-C I-C I-C I22-C22 2Hypothesis2: 22 In the first case the green builing is in its initial stage where the proportion of builing or purchasing green builings is 2% the technology an market are not mature an there is no subsiies from government for evelopers an consumers who choose green builings.so a b 2 2 x=0.02 y=0.02. Obviously the game is in the region III an will eventually achieve to (00) which means all evelopers are selecte to buil non green builings an all buyers choose to buy non green builings. In the secon case the proportion of builing or purchasing green builings reach 20% there are corresponing subsiies from government for evelopers who choose green builings an we assume that the subsiy is k times of the risk. k S a b 1 k So x=0.2 y=0.2. An if k<0.6 the game is still in the region III an will eventually be achieve to (00); If k 0.6 the game is in region I an the situation is unstable that is if we on't want the game egenerate into (00) we nee to make sure that the subsiies are not less than 0.6 times of the risk. In the thir case the proportion of new green builing will reach more than 50% an there are subsiize for the evelopers an buyers who choose a green builings. So S 0S x 0.50 y 0.50 the game is in the region II an will eventually stabilize to(11) that means all evelopers are selecte green builings an all buyers choose to buy green builings. At this point even if there is no subsiies the green builing market will evolve to the situation where all evelopers an buyers choose green builings. b 335

5 Conclusions In view of the evolution of the green builing market this paper analyzes the evolutionary game theory with ynamic evolutionary thought constructs a moel of the green builing market evolution an analyzes the ynamic an incremental stability of the moel. There are four regions an two stable results. egion I means the outcome of the game is not stable; region II means the game results will eventually achieve to (1 1); region III means the game results will eventually achieve to (00); region IV means the outcome of the game is not stable. We can control these outcomes of the game by changing variable ICS an get what we want. An the this shoul be stuie in epth in the future. eferences [1] T. Li C.H. Liu LEED an the structure system of green builing evaluation criteria J. Architecture 2003: [2] Q.K. Qian E.H.W. Chan L.Y.T. Choy How transaction costs affect real estate evelopers entering into the builing energy efficiency (BEE) market J. Habitat International2013(37); [3] H. Liao Green builing subject game market constraints an governance path J. Green Technology : [4] Anna. Game Analysis of the economic incentive policies of the green builing eman sie J. Eco Economy 2002: [5] Y.H. Pu esearch on the main game of the stanar public rental housing in the green builing J. Engineering Journal of Management :2-6. [6] J.H. Wang X. QinThe evolution of the green builing evelopment behavior of real estate evelopers J. Builing science : [7] Y. Zhan J.W. Chen esearch on the evolution of the green transformation an evolution of the large public builings J. Journal of Hebei University of Technology :3-8. [8] V.C.Wynee-ewars Animal Dispersion in elation to Social Behavior New York: Hafner [9]. obert Dynamical System Theory in Biology New York:Wiley-Interscience1970. [10] W. Weibull Evolutionary Game Theory Cambrige:MIT Press [] S.G. Zheng Z.W. Zhang J.F. Zhu Analysis of the relate interest groups in the green builing -- Base on the green builing value chain perspective J.Technology Progress an Countermeasure 2018: [] M.J. Zhou On the basis of the game theory moel of green builing promotion system an system esign J.Green Builing :