MAKING FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION MORE INCLUSIVE

Transcription

1 MAKING FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION MORE INCLUSIVE Jonathan D. Ostry Research Department, IMF Prepared for the Session: Making Globalization More Inclusive AEA Meetings, Philadelphia, January 6, 8 This presentation draws on joint work with Davide Furceri and Prakash Loungani. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy.

2 Globalization Rising; Inclusion Falling. AEs-share of countries with rising inequality since the 9s (%). EMDEs-share of countries with rising inequality since the 9s (%) Increased inequality makes growth more fragile (Berg & Ostry, ; Ostry et al., )

3 Fuelling support for protectionism Change in the probability of a party with a nativist agenda at government, % Inequality Social spending Redistribution Note: estimates based on a panel regression framework relating inequality (social spending, redistribution) with the probability of a party with a nativist agenda at government for a sample of 6 countries over the period 99-. The effects of inequality (social spending, redistribution) are based on their interquartile differences and panel regression coefficients. Social spending=education and health spending as share of GDP; Redistribution=difference between market and net Gini.

4 Technology (+) Trade (+) Capital Account (+) Domest Finance (+) Government Size (-) Currency crises (+) Share of Industry (-) Chief Executive (+) Mortality rate (+) POLICIES ARE A KEY DRIVER OF INEQUALITY Global Trends Policies Structural Determinants of the Gini measure of inequality based on a panel regression (9 countries; 5-year averages over 975 period) estimated using weighted average least squares. Each bar shows the percentage point increase in the Gini from a standard deviation increase in the variable. Global trends: Technology is share of ICT capital in total capital stock; Trade is openness variable from Penn World Tables. Policies: Capital Account Liberalization is measured using the Chinn-Ito Index. Domestic Financial Reform is measured as in Ostry et al (9). Government Size is share of government in GDP; note (-) impact: higher government size reduces inequality. Currency crisis is from Laeven and Valencia; Structural: share of industry is manufacturing value added in GDP; Chief Executive indicates whether govt. head is a military officer; mortality rate (commonly included in inequality regressions). Source: Ostry, Furceri & Loungani (6).

5 FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION: TWO PUZZLES o Financial globalization works well in theory, not so well in practice Theory predicts output (efficiency) gains from both trade and financial globalization, but gains from latter have proven difficult to demonstrate. Stiglitz: Preconditions to make financial globalization work are lacking in many countries. Rodrik: The association between capital account convertibility and economic growth is weak at best there is a strong association between financial globalization and financial crises over time Krugman (May 7): financial globalization hasn t been the force for good that trade has been Martin Wolf (): the gains [from financial globalization] have been questionable and the costs of crises enormous. Eichengreen et al. (): evidence of a positive association between capital account liberalization and growth is decidedly fragile. o Enormous literature on impact of trade on inequality, while financial globalization gets a free pass. Financial globalization can affect inequality in theory; shouldn t we look at whether it does so in practice? 5 5

6 CONTRIBUTIONS We search for output effects: giving theory a chance Use both de jure and de facto measures of financial globalization o Large changes in de jure measures = policy changes o Supplement with information on capital flows (de facto measure) Use sectoral as well as aggregate data, since causal effects hard to establish in macro data o Use of country-time fixed effects allows for cleaner identification of effects of financial globalization o Better identification of channels through which effects of financial globalization operate Trace out evolution of output in aftermath of major financial globalization episodes rather than look for permanent growth effects (Henry 7). We don t turn a blind eye to distributional effects: taking the theory seriously Impact on Gini coefficient (aggregate data) and labor shares (aggregate and sectoral data) Bottom-line: Some evidence of output effects (better identification than in previous work helps), but also strong distributional effects. 6 6

7 IDENTIFICATION OF POLICY-DRIVEN GLOBALIZATION EPISODES Policy restrictions on cross-border transactions are reported in the IMF s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) database. Information in AREAER is combined by Chinn and Ito to construct an index of capital account restrictions. Examining behavior of output (or inequality) before and after removal of major policy restrictions requires information on when restrictions were lifted; difficult to do for large sample of countries. We infer timing of major policy changes by looking at large changes in the Chinn-Ito index (Kaopen) o Assume liberalization takes place when, for a given country at a given time, the annual change in the Kaopen indicator exceeds by two standard deviations the average annual change over all observations. This criterion identifies episodes (over 97) the majority occurring in the early 9s (when inequality started to increase). Examples: several EU countries in the early 99s; India and Brazil in the mid- and late 99s. 7

8 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY MACRO LEVEL DATA 8

9 EMPIRICAL STRATEGY SECTORAL LEVEL DATA 9 9

10 RESULTS MACRO LEVEL DATA

11 INSIGNIFICANT OUTPUT GAINS BUT SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN INEQUALITY Panel. Output (%) Panel. Gini (%) Note: The solid lines indicate the response of output (inequality) to a capital account liberalization episode; dotted lines correspond to 9 percent confidence bands. The x-axis denotes time. t= is the year of the reform.

12 THE RESULTS ARE ROBUST TO ENDOGENEITY CHECKS Panel. Output (%) controlling for growth expectations Panel. Gini (%) controlling for growth expectations Panel. Output (%) IV Panel. Gini (%) IV 5 5 Note: The solid lines indicate the response of output (inequality) to a capital account liberalization episode; dotted lines correspond to 9 percent confidence bands. The solid black lines denote the baseline effect.

13 BUT OUTPUT & DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS DEPEND ON INSTITUTIONS Panel. Output (%) Panel. Gini (%) 5 * 5 ** ** *** - -5 High domestic financial liberalization Low domestic financial liberalization High financial inclusion Low financial inclusion Episodes not followed by crises * Episodes followed by crises High Low domestic domestic financial financial liberalization liberalization High financial inclusion Low financial inclusion Episodes not followed by crises Episodes followed by crises Note: Medium-term effects (that is, after five years of the reform). ***,**,* denote significance at percent, 5 percent and percent, respectively.

14 AND ON THE EXTENT OF CAPITAL FLOWS (DE FACTO MEASURE) Panel. Output (%) Panel. Gini (%) 7 6 ** 5 - Large changes in Financial Openness Small Change in Financial Openness Large changes in Financial Openness Small Change in Financial Openness Note: Medium-term effects (that is, after five years of the reform). ***,**,* denote significance at percent, 5 percent and percent, respectively. Blue (red) bars denote the medium-term response (that is, five years after the reform) of output (inequality). Flows defined as the cumulative 5-year change in total asset and liabilities as percent of GDP after the reform.

15 Results sectoral level data 5 5

16 SHORT-TERM OUTPUT GAINS, SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN LABOR SHARE Panel. Output (%) external financial dependence Panel. Labor share (ppt) external financial dependence Panel. Labor share (ppt) natural layoff rate Panel. Labor share (ppt) EOS > Note: Solid line denotes the differential effect of capital account liberalization episodes between a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution (at the 75th percentile) and a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution (at the 5th percentile). 6

17 RESULTS ROBUST TO CONTROLLING FOR DOMESTIC FINANCIAL REFORMS Panel. Output (%) external financial dependence 5 Panel. Labor share (ppt) external financial dependence 5 - Panel. Labor share (ppt) natural layoff rate Panel. Labor share (ppt) EOS > Note: Solid blue line denotes the differential effect of capital account liberalization episodes between a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution and a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution). Black lines denote baseline effects. 7

18 TRADE REFORMS Panel. Output (%) external financial dependence 5 Panel. Labor share (ppt) external financial dependence Panel. Labor share (ppt) natural layoff rate Panel. Labor share (ppt) EOS > Note: Solid blue line denotes the differential effect of capital account liberalization episodes between a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution and a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution). Black lines denote baseline effects. 8 8

19 AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE Panel. Output (%) external financial dependence 5 Panel. Labor share (ppt) external financial dependence 5 - Panel. Labor share (ppt) natural layoff rate Panel. Labor share (ppt) EOS > Note: Solid blue line denotes the differential effect of capital account liberalization episodes between a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution and a sector with a high external financial dependence/layoff rate/elasticity of substitution). Black lines denote baseline effects. 9

20 KEY FINDINGS On average, capital account liberalization has led to limited output gains & significant increases in inequality, but effects are heterogenous across countries and sectors. In aggregate data: o Liberalization increases output in countries with high financial depth. o Distributional effects are more pronounced in countries with low financial depth and low inclusion, and when liberalization is followed by a financial crisis. In sectoral data: o Stronger evidence of output effects. o Distribution impacts remain strong liberalization reduces labor share of income and effect is larger for industries with: higher external financial dependence; higher natural propensity to use layoffs to adjust to idiosyncratic shocks; higher elasticity of substitution between capital and labor.

21 CONCLUDING REMARKS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS Discussions on saving globalization should distinguish between trade & financial globalization. Financial globalization presents a more difficult efficiency-equity tradeoff than does trade o o Output benefits more difficult to establish than with trade; Distributional considerations as important as in the case of trade. Policies to improve efficiency-equity tradeoff posed by financial globalization: Sequencing matters: o reforms aimed at fostering domestic financial liberalization and depth; o policies to broaden access to finance (financial inclusion). Macroprudential & capital account policies to mitigate risk of postliberalization crisis.