Political Economy of Corporate Governance (BEM/EC 185 ) The Stakes

Size: px
Start display at page:

Download "Political Economy of Corporate Governance (BEM/EC 185 ) The Stakes"

Transcription

1 Method Political Economy of Corporate Governance (BEM/EC 185 ) The Stakes Page 1 Responsibilities Mine Yours Preparing for Thursday (BBR) What is it Corporate Governance Corporation Firms Political Economy Politics of law Politics of Regulation Politics of Businesses Ownership Control The Practical Stakes It s a big deal Public corporations account for the majority of total private output in most economies (more than 50%) Corporations account for the bulk of output (50-80%)

2 Multi-owner business firms get you into the 90% range. Yet there are problems Corporate scandals Enron, WorldCom, Tyco AIG, Citibank, Societe Generale Externalities Microsoft vs the rest of the industry; Credit crunch and agency problems in the mortgage market Detroit and parts suppliers Other stakeholders intervene Hershey Airbus/EADS Government in Bail Out These Issues are long standing As problems VOC and EIC 1600 and 1602 Chapters of Erie s Roaring Twenties and Great Depression Corporations endure Scale provides survival benefits Charters are rarely changed The consequence of bad governance The Consequence of bad governance Page 2

3 More distortion Extraction of private benefits most often is inefficient Less entry and competition Less capital Investors are not willing to fund projects if they are not protected Less growth Page 3 So How are they run? Internal organization Sources of capital Regulation and the legal system The social design problem The nature of the firm (more on this next Tuesday) A multi-actor organization Management; Investors; Labor; Government It has rules (articles of association) E.g, limited liability, one share one vote, capacity to block purchases of capital by outsiders And enforcement mechanism provided by courts. It has a well defined social goal Maximize profits But is that the only goal? Private actors have preferences What are those preferences?

4 Private profit maximization does not imply maximizing the firm s profits Four major categories Inside equity Outside equity Long term debt Short term debt Impact Inside equity is expensive but provides stable control Short term debt is cheap but exposes the firm to shocks. The financial design problem Page 4 The legal stakes Ex-ante (at Birth) Offer frameworks to design business constitutions Allow entry Reduce fraud During the life of the firm Balance the need to let the firm do what it needs to prosper Claims of third parties (shareholders) Ex post (when problems arise) Balance the value of the going concern, claims of creditors.

5 The political stakes Fiscal issues Corporate income taxes can be very important Big firms can engage in lobbying to reduce their burden (Blackstone) Location of firms affects revenues Interest group issues Labor vs capital Experts (lawyers, financiers, accountants) vs the public Incumbent firms Problem of corruption Bubble act, Credit Mobilier, Panama Canal What political regimes favor good governance? Open problem We have not solved the problem of CG! OR We know the solution but We have not solved the implementation pb Or It does not have an aggregate solution? It does not have an a-temporal solution Method (for this class) Maximize the variance across the disciplines across the globe (sort of ) Page 5

6 across time (Sort of) Mix theory with facts Key piece of theory. Page 6 Key conflict Individual sets Marginal cost effort to marginal return (MC=MR) If sole owner of firm. Sets marginal cost of effort to marginal profit of firm=> efficiency not owner of firm set marginal cost of effort to marginal personal return. MC=MR What is marginal personal return (it cant be marginal profit of firm because not owner) If own α of firm. MC=MR MC=αMR If bonus is α of firm profit. MC=MR MC=αMR If wage? Assume manager has choice of two projects. H and L. H succeeds with prob 1/2 and earns 1; if fails earns -1 L succeeds with prob 3/4 and earns 0.5 ; if fails earns 0 0< 3/8 {the company prefers the safe project) But private return is α0.5 vs α 3/8 Manager picks the unsafe project.

7 Organization Each meeting around one or two readings Class begins with discussion minutes I may take over to go through something that needs clarification I will try to sum up; What we have learned; What we would like to know Last 15 minutes, lecture to frame reading for next time Responsibilities Yours Engage the material Read Write (very short essays; so you have something to say) discuss Reading on the web Lecture slides on the web Reading questions Find an issue to think through & Write a final paper. Mine Frame the issues Lead discussion Bring issues to a conclusion Read your work and provide feed back Page 7

8 Becht, Bolton, Roehl The paper seems very long but you do not need to print the 55 pages of bibliography Please focus on Sections 1 to 5(p 1-38) and Section 8 (65-75) Find questions on the questions page Identify Central problems in CG, Public vs Private solutions Then think through whether we have fixes or trade-offs? A fix solves a problem without making other things worse A trade-off means you reduce one problem and make another worse Page 8 Questions for BBR Identify Central problems in CG Public vs Private solutions Structure of Analysis Then think through whether we have fixes or trade-offs? A fix solves a problem without making other things worse A trade-off means you reduce one problem and make another worse

2. From BBR s point of view are problems of corporate governance problems of the market or problems of regulation. What do you think?

2. From BBR s point of view are problems of corporate governance problems of the market or problems of regulation. What do you think? BEM 185 meet 2 Becht Bolton Roell A primer for theory; A list of questions 1. What are the central problems of corporate governance, what do you think is the most important? Why? 2. From BBR s point of

More information

Externality and Corrective Measures

Externality and Corrective Measures Externality and Corrective Measures Ram Singh Microeconomic Theory Lecture 20 Ram Singh: (DSE) Market Failure Lecture 20 1 / 25 Questions Question What is an externality? What corrective measures are available

More information

ECON 4245 Economics of the Firm

ECON 4245 Economics of the Firm ECON 4245 Economics of the Firm Lecturer: Tore Nilssen, office ES 1216, tore.nilssen@econ.uio.no Seminars: Diderik Lund, office ES 1130, diderik.lund@econ.uio.no 13 lectures; 6 seminars (in two groups)

More information

Discussion of Limited Partners and the LB0 Process by Paul Schultz and Sophie Shive

Discussion of Limited Partners and the LB0 Process by Paul Schultz and Sophie Shive Discussion of Limited Partners and the LB0 Process by Paul Schultz and Sophie Shive Discussion by Adair Morse University of California, Berkeley Southern California Private Equity Conference 2017 Overview

More information

Externality and Corrective Measures

Externality and Corrective Measures Externality and Corrective Measures Ram Singh Lecture 21 Nov 12, 2016 Ram Singh: (DSE) Externality Nov 12, 2016 1 / 25 Questions Question What is an externality? What corrective measures are available

More information

Financial Economics: Syllabus

Financial Economics: Syllabus : Syllabus Shuoxun Hellen Zhang WISE & SOE XIAMEN UNIVERSITY Sep, 2016 1 / 16 Administrative Group QQ: 538177151; email: hellenzsx@gmail.com My office hours: Tuesday and Thursday 15:00 16:00, room B211

More information

Externality and Corrective Measures

Externality and Corrective Measures Externality and Corrective Measures Ram Singh Lecture 22 November 13, 2015 Ram Singh: (DSE) Externality November 13, 2015 1 / 20 Questions Question What corrective measures are available to control externality?

More information

Chapter 1 Introduction to Corporate Finance

Chapter 1 Introduction to Corporate Finance Chapter 1 Introduction to Corporate Finance Konan Chan Financial Management, Fall 2018 Topics Covered Corporate finance and financial manager Forms of business organization Goal of financial management

More information

Topics in Contract Theory Lecture 6. Separation of Ownership and Control

Topics in Contract Theory Lecture 6. Separation of Ownership and Control Leonardo Felli 16 January, 2002 Topics in Contract Theory Lecture 6 Separation of Ownership and Control The definition of ownership considered is limited to an environment in which the whole ownership

More information

To lower auto insurance rate premium we should put a stake on each steering wheel

To lower auto insurance rate premium we should put a stake on each steering wheel Risk and the market for insurance Armen Alchian: To lower auto insurance rate premium we should put a stake on each steering wheel 1 Outline Risk and Risk attitudes Kinds of risk Mitigating ii i risk ik

More information

Defining Corporate Governance

Defining Corporate Governance Defining Corporate Governance q Historical origins: the term corporate governance derives from an analogy between the government of cities, nations or states and the governance of corporations. q Corporate

More information

The 2 nd Midterm 12. Job Search. Explaining the Natural Rate: An Overview. Explaining Structural Unemployment. U.S. Unemployment Since 1960

The 2 nd Midterm 12. Job Search. Explaining the Natural Rate: An Overview. Explaining Structural Unemployment. U.S. Unemployment Since 1960 The 2 nd Midterm 12 U.S. Unemployment Since 1960 This coming Thursday; Regular classroom and lecture time; Please arrive 5 minutes earlier; No.2 pencils, scantron forms, ink pens, nonprogrammable calculators,

More information

ECON 4245 ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM

ECON 4245 ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM ECON 4245 ECONOMICS OF THE FIRM Course content Why do firms exist? And why do some firms cease to exist? How are firms financed? How are firms managed? These questions are analysed by using various models

More information

Why are Banks Highly Interconnected?

Why are Banks Highly Interconnected? Why are Banks Highly Interconnected? Alexander David Alfred Lehar University of Calgary Fields Institute - 2013 David and Lehar () Why are Banks Highly Interconnected? Fields Institute - 2013 1 / 35 Positive

More information

Monetary credibility problems. 1. In ation and discretionary monetary policy. 2. Reputational solution to credibility problems

Monetary credibility problems. 1. In ation and discretionary monetary policy. 2. Reputational solution to credibility problems Monetary Economics: Macro Aspects, 2/4 2013 Henrik Jensen Department of Economics University of Copenhagen Monetary credibility problems 1. In ation and discretionary monetary policy 2. Reputational solution

More information

CHAPTER 29. Corporate Governance. Chapter Synopsis

CHAPTER 29. Corporate Governance. Chapter Synopsis CHAPTER 29 Corporate Governance Chapter Synopsis 29.1 Corporate Governance and Agency Costs Corporate governance is the system of controls, regulations, and incentives designed to maximize firm value and

More information

A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions

A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions A New Capital Regulation For Large Financial Institutions Oliver Hart Harvard University Luigi Zingales University of Chicago Motivation If there is one lesson to be learned from the 2008 financial crisis,

More information

Capital Structure. Outline

Capital Structure. Outline Capital Structure Moqi Groen-Xu Outline 1. Irrelevance theorems: Fisher separation theorem Modigliani-Miller 2. Textbook views of Financing Policy: Static Trade-off Theory Pecking Order Theory Market Timing

More information

Trade led Growth in Times of Crisis Asia Pacific Trade Economists Conference 2 3 November 2009, Bangkok. Session 1

Trade led Growth in Times of Crisis Asia Pacific Trade Economists Conference 2 3 November 2009, Bangkok. Session 1 Trade led Growth in Times of Crisis Asia Pacific Trade Economists Conference 2 3 November 2009, Bangkok Session 1 Do We Need a New Approach to Trade? Alan V. Deardorff Asia Pacific Research and Training

More information

RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION

RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION RISK MANAGEMENT AND VALUE CREATION Risk Management and Value Creation On perfect capital market, risk management is irrelevant (M&M). No taxes No bankruptcy costs No information asymmetries No agency problems

More information

Presentation Notes for Take It to the Bank- A Guide to Saving and Investments. Take It To The Bank. A Guide to Saving and Investments

Presentation Notes for Take It to the Bank- A Guide to Saving and Investments. Take It To The Bank. A Guide to Saving and Investments Presentation Notes for - A Guide to Saving and Investments Slide 1 Take It To The Bank A Guide to Saving and Investments Page1 Slide 2 Copyright Copyright Texas Education Agency, 2013. These Materials

More information

Econ 1101 Spring Radek Paluszynski 5/8/2013

Econ 1101 Spring Radek Paluszynski 5/8/2013 Econ 1101 Spring 2013 Radek Paluszynski 5/8/2013 Announcements Final exam: Tuesday, May 14 th, 6.30-8.30pm If you have exam conflict, there is a makeup final on Thursday, May 16 th, 10am-12pm Registration

More information

Business 33001: Microeconomics

Business 33001: Microeconomics Business 33001: Microeconomics Owen Zidar University of Chicago Booth School of Business Week 6 Owen Zidar (Chicago Booth) Microeconomics Week 6: Capital & Investment 1 / 80 Today s Class 1 Preliminaries

More information

EMBRACING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AMONG LISTED ENTITIES. Presentation by: CPA Tom Kimaru

EMBRACING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AMONG LISTED ENTITIES. Presentation by: CPA Tom Kimaru EMBRACING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AMONG LISTED ENTITIES Presentation by: CPA Tom Kimaru Director, Regulatory Affairs, Nairobi Securities Exchange Limited Wednesday, 22 nd March 2017 Uphold public

More information

European Parliament, CONT Committee #EUBudget4Results

European Parliament, CONT Committee #EUBudget4Results European Parliament, CONT Committee #EUBudget4Results 24 May 2016 Outline 1. What is performance and what are the challenges? (BFOR)? 2. EU budget performance framework: MFF, PBB and political decision-making

More information

Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati

Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati Game Theory and Economics Prof. Dr. Debarshi Das Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati Module No. # 03 Illustrations of Nash Equilibrium Lecture No. # 02

More information

Cross-border banking regulating according to risk. Thorsten Beck

Cross-border banking regulating according to risk. Thorsten Beck Cross-border banking regulating according to risk Thorsten Beck Following 2008: Lots of regulatory reforms Basel 3: Higher quantity and quality of capital and liquid assets Additional capital buffers for

More information

ECON 3010 Intermediate Macroeconomics. Chapter 5 Inflation: Its Causes, Effects, and Social Costs

ECON 3010 Intermediate Macroeconomics. Chapter 5 Inflation: Its Causes, Effects, and Social Costs ECON 3010 Intermediate Macroeconomics Chapter 5 Inflation: Its Causes, Effects, and Social Costs U.S. inflation 1960 2012 12% % change from 12 mos. earlier 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% % change in GDP deflator 0% 1960

More information

Capital structure I: Basic Concepts

Capital structure I: Basic Concepts Capital structure I: Basic Concepts What is a capital structure? The big question: How should the firm finance its investments? The methods the firm uses to finance its investments is called its capital

More information

Introduction: addressing too big to fail

Introduction: addressing too big to fail Address by Francois Groepe, Deputy Governor, South African Reserve Bank at the public workshop on the discussion paper titled Strengthening South Africa s resolution framework for financial institutions

More information

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018 Professor David Romer LECTURE 21 ASSET PRICE BUBBLES APRIL 11, 2018

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018 Professor David Romer LECTURE 21 ASSET PRICE BUBBLES APRIL 11, 2018 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Economics 134 DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS Spring 2018 Professor David Romer LECTURE 21 ASSET PRICE BUBBLES APRIL 11, 2018 I. BUBBLES: BASICS A. Galbraith s and Case, Shiller, and Thompson

More information

Aalto. Derivatives LECTURE 5. Professor: Matti SUOMINEN. 17 Pages

Aalto. Derivatives LECTURE 5. Professor: Matti SUOMINEN. 17 Pages Aalto Derivatives LECTURE 5 Professor: Matti SUOMINEN 17 Pages REAL OPTIONS / OPTIONS IN CAPITAL BUDGETING Traditional NPV calculations do not take into account the value of flexibility in investments.

More information

EC248-Financial Innovations and Monetary Policy Assignment. Andrew Townsend

EC248-Financial Innovations and Monetary Policy Assignment. Andrew Townsend EC248-Financial Innovations and Monetary Policy Assignment Discuss the concept of too big to fail within the financial sector. What are the arguments in favour of this concept, and what are possible negative

More information

Discussion of. Paul Glasserman Columbia Business School. Atlanta Fed Day-Ahead Conference January 3, 2019

Discussion of. Paul Glasserman Columbia Business School. Atlanta Fed Day-Ahead Conference January 3, 2019 Discussion of Bank Bailouts, Bail-ins, or No Regulatory Intervention? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulation by Berger, Himmelberg, Roman, and Tsyplakov Paul Glasserman Columbia Business

More information

Macroeconomics CHAPTER 6. Macroeconomics: The Big Picture

Macroeconomics CHAPTER 6. Macroeconomics: The Big Picture Macroeconomics CHAPTER 6 Macroeconomics: The Big Picture PowerPoint Slides by Can Erbil 2006 Worth Publishers, all rights reserved What you will learn in this chapter: An overview of macroeconomics, the

More information

Asymmetric Information and the Role of Financial intermediaries

Asymmetric Information and the Role of Financial intermediaries Asymmetric Information and the Role of Financial intermediaries 1 Observations 1. Issuing debt and equity securities (direct finance) is not the primary source for external financing for businesses. 2.

More information

Revision Lecture Microeconomics of Banking MSc Finance: Theory of Finance I MSc Economics: Financial Economics I

Revision Lecture Microeconomics of Banking MSc Finance: Theory of Finance I MSc Economics: Financial Economics I Revision Lecture Microeconomics of Banking MSc Finance: Theory of Finance I MSc Economics: Financial Economics I April 2005 PREPARING FOR THE EXAM What models do you need to study? All the models we studied

More information

Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information

Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information-1 Chapter 16: Financial Distress, Managerial Incentives, and Information I. Basic Ideas 1. As debt increases, chance of bankruptcy

More information

Restructuring the EU banking system

Restructuring the EU banking system Restructuring the EU banking system Memorandum 9 April 2013, Brussels Arlene McCarthy Member of the European Parliament, rapporteur on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector The culture has not

More information

Some Practice Questions for Test 1

Some Practice Questions for Test 1 ENGI 44 Probability and Statistics Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science Some Practice Questions for Test. Note that this question attempts to cover various aspects of descriptive statistics. In the

More information

American, European and Asia-Pacific Corporate Governance Models:

American, European and Asia-Pacific Corporate Governance Models: American, European and Asia-Pacific Corporate Governance Models: Differences and Convergence Ray Ball Sidney Davidson Professor of Accounting University of Chicago Bangkok 25 July 2005 Outline What is

More information

Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies

Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies Financial Crises, Dollarization and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies Luigi Bocola Stanford, Minneapolis Fed, and NBER Guido Lorenzoni Northwestern and NBER Restud Tour Reunion Conference May 2018

More information

Commitment Problems 1 / 24

Commitment Problems 1 / 24 Commitment Problems 1 / 24 A Social Dilemma You would take a good action if I would credibly promise to do something in the future 2 / 24 A Social Dilemma You would take a good action if I would credibly

More information

The Tragedy of the Commons

The Tragedy of the Commons S1 The Tragedy of the Commons S2 The Tragedy of the Commons The Tragedy of Local Government? Why This Framework? Makes finance everyone s business Everyone is involved in using resources, everyone needs

More information

Corporate Governance and Control in Europe. Nico Dewaelheyns Faculty of Economics & Business

Corporate Governance and Control in Europe. Nico Dewaelheyns Faculty of Economics & Business Corporate Governance and Control in Europe Nico Dewaelheyns Faculty of Economics & Business Why do governance and control matter? Central financial goal of companies: maximize shareholder value, while

More information

Finally ERM Made Easy: ERM for Dummies Has Evolved!

Finally ERM Made Easy: ERM for Dummies Has Evolved! CONFERENCE PRESENTS Finally ERM Made Easy: ERM for Dummies Has Evolved! Presented by; Joanna Makomaski, P. Eng., CRM Dr. James Kallman, ARM Agenda Tuesday, September 23, 2008 8:30am to 10:00am Finally

More information

The Lehman Shock Financial Disaster the Effects on Japan. found out an attractive and interesting article, which showed the world economic

The Lehman Shock Financial Disaster the Effects on Japan. found out an attractive and interesting article, which showed the world economic 1 The Lehman Shock Financial Disaster the Effects on Japan Introduction In the third cycle, I researched about Greece s financial crisis. In the research process, I found out an attractive and interesting

More information

FIN 540 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) Why Issue Public Equity?

FIN 540 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) Why Issue Public Equity? FIN 540 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) Why Issue Public Equity? Cost & Benefits of IPOs Why Is There Underpricing? Hot Issues Markets Why Issue Public Equity? 1. lower the cost of capital for the firm

More information

The Leverage Cycle. John Geanakoplos

The Leverage Cycle. John Geanakoplos The Leverage Cycle John Geanakoplos Collateral Levels = Margins = Leverage From Irving Fisher in 890s and before it has been commonly supposed that the interest rate is the most important variable in the

More information

Abhijit V. Banerjee: The paper argues that while deficits in India are large, at least in the short

Abhijit V. Banerjee: The paper argues that while deficits in India are large, at least in the short Comment for 01 Buiter-Patel Abhijit V. Banerjee: The paper argues that while deficits in India are large, at least in the short run the risk of a deficit-induced crisis is minimal. The main reason to worry

More information

The Causes of the Great Depression. A Depressing Power Point Presentation Brought to You by Ms. Shen

The Causes of the Great Depression. A Depressing Power Point Presentation Brought to You by Ms. Shen The Causes of the Great Depression A Depressing Power Point Presentation Brought to You by Ms. Shen What is the difference between a recession and a depression? Recession: A period of temporary economic

More information

INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT INTRODUCTION TO FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT Meaning of Financial Management As we know finance is the lifeblood of every business, its management requires special attention. Financial management is that activity

More information

Lecture 9: Markov and Regime

Lecture 9: Markov and Regime Lecture 9: Markov and Regime Switching Models Prof. Massimo Guidolin 20192 Financial Econometrics Spring 2017 Overview Motivation Deterministic vs. Endogeneous, Stochastic Switching Dummy Regressiom Switching

More information

There is an old saying that goes something like "walk a mile in my shoes before..."

There is an old saying that goes something like walk a mile in my shoes before... The Secretary Ontario Securities Commission 20 Queen Street West 19th Floor, Box 55 Toronto, Ontario M5H 3S8 Me Anne-Marie Beaudoin Corporate Secretary Autorité des marchés financiers 800, square Victoria,

More information

Economics 302 Intermediate Macroeconomic

Economics 302 Intermediate Macroeconomic Economics 302 Intermediate Macroeconomic Theory and Policy (Spring 2010) Lecture 28-29 May 3-5, 2010 slide 0 Outline Why is the long run important? The determinants of economic growth Full employment and

More information

Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets

Price Theory of Two-Sided Markets The E. Glen Weyl Department of Economics Princeton University Fundação Getulio Vargas August 3, 2007 Definition of a two-sided market 1 Two groups of consumers 2 Value from connecting (proportional to

More information

Bailouts, Bail-ins and Banking Crises

Bailouts, Bail-ins and Banking Crises Bailouts, Bail-ins and Banking Crises Todd Keister Rutgers University Yuliyan Mitkov Rutgers University & University of Bonn 2017 HKUST Workshop on Macroeconomics June 15, 2017 The bank runs problem Intermediaries

More information

Markus K. Brunnermeier

Markus K. Brunnermeier Markus K. Brunnermeier 1 Overview Two world views 1. No financial frictions sticky price 2. Financial sector + bubbles Role of the financial sector Leverage Maturity mismatch maturity rat race linkage

More information

Chapter 18. Financial Regulation. Chapter Preview

Chapter 18. Financial Regulation. Chapter Preview Chapter 18 Financial Regulation Chapter Preview The financial system is one of the most heavily regulated industries in our economy. In this chapter, we develop an economic analysis of why regulation of

More information

Introduction The Goals and Nature of Credit Analysis

Introduction The Goals and Nature of Credit Analysis Chapter 1 Introduction The Goals and Nature of Credit Analysis Credit analysis is an art, not a science. The goal of credit analysis is to make a judgment about an obligor s ability and willingness to

More information

Recitation VI. Jiro E. Kondo

Recitation VI. Jiro E. Kondo Recitation VI Jiro E. Kondo Summer 2003 Today s Recitation: Capital Structure. I. MM Thm: Capital Structure Irrelevance. II. Taxes and Other Deviations from MM. 1 I. MM Theorem. A company is considering

More information

Financial Distress Costs and Firm Value

Financial Distress Costs and Firm Value 1 2 I. Limits to Use of Debt According to MM Propositions with corporate taxes, firms should have a capital structure almost entirely composed of debt. Does it make sense in the real world? Why? Note 14

More information

Mark T. Williams Boston University Finance Department

Mark T. Williams Boston University Finance Department Accounting Finance & Risk Management: Session 600 Mark T. Williams Boston University Finance Department Williams@bu.edu Goals Explain core concepts 1. Role of accounting and finance in business 2. Core

More information

Since Robo contributes more on a per minute basis, the firm should use additional time in the Assembly Department to produce Robo.

Since Robo contributes more on a per minute basis, the firm should use additional time in the Assembly Department to produce Robo. SECTION A CASE QUESTIONS (Total: 50 marks) Answer 1(a) Heli HK$ Robo HK$ Selling price 8,000 24,000 Variable costs (3,240) (9,400) Contribution per unit 4,760 14,600 Answer 1(b) Time required for target

More information

Monetary Policy: Rules versus discretion..

Monetary Policy: Rules versus discretion.. Monetary Policy: Rules versus discretion.. Huw David Dixon. March 17, 2008 1 Introduction Current view of monetary policy: NNS consensus. Basic ideas: Determinacy: monetary policy should be designed so

More information

Bank Bailouts, Bail-ins, or No Regulatory Intervention? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulation

Bank Bailouts, Bail-ins, or No Regulatory Intervention? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulation Bank Bailouts, Bail-ins, or No Regulatory Intervention? A Dynamic Model and Empirical Tests of Optimal Regulation Allen N. Berger University of South Carolina Wharton Financial Institutions Center European

More information

Secure Information Destruction; A Legal Imperative

Secure Information Destruction; A Legal Imperative In this Issue Information as a Double-Edged Sword Not Knowing the Law Secure Information Destruction and Legal Compliance Information Security Recommendations From Shred-it Secure Information Destruction;

More information

Investor monitoring. Tore Nilssen Corporate Governance Set 8 Slide 1

Investor monitoring. Tore Nilssen Corporate Governance Set 8 Slide 1 Investor monitoring Comparative corporate governance o The Anglo-Saxon model: A well-developed stock market, strong investor protection, disclosure requirements, shareholder activism, takeovers. May suffer

More information

Ex ante moral hazard on borrowers actions

Ex ante moral hazard on borrowers actions Lecture 9 Capital markets INTRODUCTION Evidence that majority of population is excluded from credit markets Demand for Credit arises for three reasons: (a) To finance fixed capital acquisitions (e.g. new

More information

Math 5760/6890 Introduction to Mathematical Finance

Math 5760/6890 Introduction to Mathematical Finance Math 5760/6890 Introduction to Mathematical Finance Instructor: Jingyi Zhu Office: LCB 335 Telephone:581-3236 E-mail: zhu@math.utah.edu Class web page: www.math.utah.edu/~zhu/5760_12f.html What you should

More information

Financial Statements Analysis & Reporting Dr. Anil Kumar Sharma Department of Management Studies Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee

Financial Statements Analysis & Reporting Dr. Anil Kumar Sharma Department of Management Studies Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee Financial Statements Analysis & Reporting Dr. Anil Kumar Sharma Department of Management Studies Indian Institute of Technology, Roorkee Lecture 52 Cash Flow Statement - Introduction Part I Welcome students.

More information

Markus K. Brunnermeier

Markus K. Brunnermeier Markus K. Brunnermeier 1 Overview 1. Underlying mechanism Fire-sale externality + Liquidity spirals (due to maturity mismatch) Hoarding externality (interconnectedness) Runs 2. Crisis prevention Macro-prudential

More information

The Great Depression & New Deal ( ) Part 1: Basic Economics + Causes of GD

The Great Depression & New Deal ( ) Part 1: Basic Economics + Causes of GD The Great Depression & New Deal (1929-1941) Part 1: Basic Economics + Causes of GD Introduction The nation, like all capitalist nations, had suffered economic downturns many times, including longterm depressions

More information

Lecture 12 Creditors and Auditors. Prof. Daniel Sungyeon Kim

Lecture 12 Creditors and Auditors. Prof. Daniel Sungyeon Kim Lecture 12 Creditors and Auditors Prof. Daniel Sungyeon Kim Debt as a disciplinary mechanism Institutional lenders as corporate monitors Credit rating agencies International perspective Financial Reporting

More information

Financial Crises: Why They Occur and What to Do about Them. E. Maskin Institute for Advanced Study

Financial Crises: Why They Occur and What to Do about Them. E. Maskin Institute for Advanced Study Financial Crises: Why They Occur and What to Do about Them E. Maskin Institute for Advanced Study current financial crisis only latest in long sequence history of financial crises goes back hundreds of

More information

Taxing Risk* Narayana Kocherlakota. President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Economic Club of Minnesota. Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Taxing Risk* Narayana Kocherlakota. President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Economic Club of Minnesota. Minneapolis, Minnesota. Taxing Risk* Narayana Kocherlakota President Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Economic Club of Minnesota Minneapolis, Minnesota May 10, 2010 *This topic is discussed in greater depth in "Taxing Risk

More information

Stochastic Programming Modeling

Stochastic Programming Modeling IE 495 Lecture 3 Stochastic Programming Modeling Prof. Jeff Linderoth January 20, 2003 January 20, 2003 Stochastic Programming Lecture 3 Slide 1 Outline Review convexity Review Farmer Ted Expected Value

More information

The Crisis and Beyond: Financial Sector Policies. Asli Demirguc-Kunt The World Bank May 2011

The Crisis and Beyond: Financial Sector Policies. Asli Demirguc-Kunt The World Bank May 2011 The Crisis and Beyond: Financial Sector Policies Asli Demirguc-Kunt The World Bank May 2011 Financial crisis crisis of confidence in policies The global crisis and the response to the crisis extensive

More information

Adventures in Monetary Policy: The Case of the European Monetary Union

Adventures in Monetary Policy: The Case of the European Monetary Union : The Case of the European Monetary Union V. V. Chari & Keyvan Eslami University of Minnesota & Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis The ECB and Its Watchers XIX March 14, 2018 Why the Discontent? The Tell-Tale

More information

Lecture 10 Game Plan. Hidden actions, moral hazard, and incentives. Hidden traits, adverse selection, and signaling/screening

Lecture 10 Game Plan. Hidden actions, moral hazard, and incentives. Hidden traits, adverse selection, and signaling/screening Lecture 10 Game Plan Hidden actions, moral hazard, and incentives Hidden traits, adverse selection, and signaling/screening 1 Hidden Information A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. So is a lot. -

More information

Lecture 8: Markov and Regime

Lecture 8: Markov and Regime Lecture 8: Markov and Regime Switching Models Prof. Massimo Guidolin 20192 Financial Econometrics Spring 2016 Overview Motivation Deterministic vs. Endogeneous, Stochastic Switching Dummy Regressiom Switching

More information

PEACENEXUS INVESTMENT GUIDELINES

PEACENEXUS INVESTMENT GUIDELINES PEACENEXUS INVESTMENT GUIDELINES Introduction The overall purpose of PeaceNexus (PN) is to improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding. An investment aligned with this purpose does not fuel conflict and

More information

Institutional Finance

Institutional Finance Institutional Finance Lecture 09 : Banking and Maturity Mismatch Markus K. Brunnermeier Preceptor: Dong Beom Choi Princeton University 1 Select/monitor borrowers Sharpe (1990) Reduce asymmetric info idiosyncratic

More information

Presentation to August 14,

Presentation to August 14, Audit Integrity Presentation to August 14, 2006 www.auditintegrity.com 1 Agenda Accounting & Governance Risk Why does it matter? Which Accounting & Governance Metrics are Most Highly Correlated to Fraud

More information

Lecture #15: Overview of Normal Operation of Fixed Exchange Rate Regime

Lecture #15: Overview of Normal Operation of Fixed Exchange Rate Regime Christiano 362, Winter, 2003 February 26, 2002. Lecture #15: Overview of Normal Operation of Fixed Exchange Rate Regime I begin with a summary of the discussion last time, and add some new discussion,

More information

Understanding Krugman s Third-Generation Model of Currency and Financial Crises

Understanding Krugman s Third-Generation Model of Currency and Financial Crises Hisayuki Mitsuo ed., Financial Fragilities in Developing Countries, Chosakenkyu-Hokokusho, IDE-JETRO, 2007. Chapter 2 Understanding Krugman s Third-Generation Model of Currency and Financial Crises Hidehiko

More information

Why the Board is Broken. Joseph Anton and Tamar Frankel

Why the Board is Broken. Joseph Anton and Tamar Frankel Why the Board is Broken Joseph Anton and Tamar Frankel Boards of Directors ( Boards ) are anachronistic to major companies in the 21 st century. Boards had their origin in an era when oversight was easily

More information

projects What explain financial structure

projects What explain financial structure Class 16 Firms as portfolio of projects What explain financial structure 1. Dealing with the market Should firm hedge? Why portfolios of projects 2. Dealing with Government Taxes and Debt Vs equity and

More information

Fundamentals of Credit. Arnold Ziegel Mountain Mentors Associates. II. Fundamentals of Financial Analysis

Fundamentals of Credit. Arnold Ziegel Mountain Mentors Associates. II. Fundamentals of Financial Analysis Fundamentals of Credit Arnold Ziegel Mountain Mentors Associates II. Fundamentals of Financial Analysis Financial Analysis is the basis for Credit Analysis January, 2008 Financial analysis is the starting

More information

Too-Big-to-Fail: The Role of Metrics 1

Too-Big-to-Fail: The Role of Metrics 1 Too-Big-to-Fail: The Role of Metrics 1 Quantifying the Too Big to Fail Subsidy Workshop Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Minneapolis, Minnesota November 18, 2013 Narayana Kocherlakota President Federal

More information

Delegated Monitoring, Legal Protection, Runs and Commitment

Delegated Monitoring, Legal Protection, Runs and Commitment Delegated Monitoring, Legal Protection, Runs and Commitment Douglas W. Diamond MIT (visiting), Chicago Booth and NBER FTG Summer School, St. Louis August 14, 2015 1 The Public Project 1 Project 2 Firm

More information

Economics and Finance,

Economics and Finance, Economics and Finance, 2014-15 Lecture 5 - Corporate finance under asymmetric information: Moral hazard and access to external finance Luca Deidda UNISS, DiSEA, CRENoS October 2014 Luca Deidda (UNISS,

More information

Macro-Modelling. with a focus on the role of financial markets. University of Pennsylvania ECON 244, Spring January 7, 2013.

Macro-Modelling. with a focus on the role of financial markets. University of Pennsylvania ECON 244, Spring January 7, 2013. with a focus on the role of financial markets University of Pennsylvania ECON 244, Spring 2013 Guillermo Ordoñez January 7, 2013 Course Information Instructor: Guillermo Ordonez (ordonez@econ.upenn.edu)

More information

10.2 Recent Shocks to the Macroeconomy Introduction. Housing Prices. Chapter 10 The Great Recession: A First Look

10.2 Recent Shocks to the Macroeconomy Introduction. Housing Prices. Chapter 10 The Great Recession: A First Look Chapter 10 The Great Recession: A First Look By Charles I. Jones Media Slides Created By Dave Brown Penn State University 10.2 Recent Shocks to the Macroeconomy What shocks to the macroeconomy have caused

More information

Managerial Accounting Prof. Dr. Varadraj Bapat Department of School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay. Lecture - 14 Ratio Analysis

Managerial Accounting Prof. Dr. Varadraj Bapat Department of School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay. Lecture - 14 Ratio Analysis Managerial Accounting Prof. Dr. Varadraj Bapat Department of School of Management Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay Lecture - 14 Ratio Analysis Dear students, in our last session we are started the

More information

Provincial Deficits and Debt Loads: Cut Spending Across the Board, Privatize Some Healthcare Functions, Say CEOs and Business Leaders

Provincial Deficits and Debt Loads: Cut Spending Across the Board, Privatize Some Healthcare Functions, Say CEOs and Business Leaders Provincial Deficits and Debt Loads: Cut Spending Across the Board, Privatize Some Healthcare Functions, Say CEOs and Business Leaders COMPAS Inc. Public Opinion and Customer Research July 5, 2010 1.0 Overview

More information

Chapter 24 Corporate Taxation

Chapter 24 Corporate Taxation Introduction Chapter 24 Corporate Taxation Jonathan Gruber Public Finance and Public Policy These companies have an obligation to the United States of American to pay their taxes. Representative Rosa DeLauro,

More information

Liquidity and capital: Substitutes or complements?

Liquidity and capital: Substitutes or complements? Marie Hoerova European Central Bank and CEPR Liquidity and capital: Substitutes or complements? Chicago Fed/ECB International Banking Conference November 3, 2016 The views expressed are those of the author

More information

Chapter 9 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION. Copyright 2005 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

Chapter 9 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION. Copyright 2005 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved. Chapter 9 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION Copyright 2005 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved. 1 Properties of Information Information is not easy to define it is difficult

More information

The Financial System: Opportunities and Dangers

The Financial System: Opportunities and Dangers CHAPTER 20 : Opportunities and Dangers Modified for ECON 2204 by Bob Murphy 2016 Worth Publishers, all rights reserved IN THIS CHAPTER, YOU WILL LEARN: the functions a healthy financial system performs

More information