Lariviere & Porteus 2001

Transcription

1 * / VBM Willis and Jurkus Harri L. Kulmala Jari Paranko Erkki Uusi - Rauva 2002 Cooper & Ellram 1993 Handfield & Nichols 1999 Cooper and Slagmulder 1999 Stefan Seuring Lariviere & Porteus 2001 / Cachon & Lariviere 2002 * 11YJA SM RXM BGL022 67

2 1. Winner - Take - Most Gereffi & Korzeniewicz Deeds & Hill 1999 Joshi & Stump 1999 Jeffery 1996 Kaplinsky & Morris 2001 Andaleeb 1996 Warnecke Hüser 1995 Jaikumar 1986 Walton Susman 1987 Gereffi Humphrey and Sturgeon 2005 Market Modular Relational Cap- tive Hierarchy 3. Cooper and Slagmulder 1999 Seuring 1999 Dyer 1996 Ellram 2000 Dyer Kale & Singh 2008 Kajuter 2000 Kajuter Hines Silvi Bartolini and Raschi 2004 Taylor and Rebitzer

3 Mehafdi 2004 PCB Johnson 18 & Kaplan % % + PCB % Shank Govindarajan 1993 Gereffi Humphrey and Sturgeon

4 1. VS KPI 40% kanplan & Noton Dekker and Van Goor PCB

5 30-35% 5% Drill Down Charles H. Fine Roger Vardan Robert Pethick Jamal El - Hout Rapid - Response Capability in Value - Chain Design. MIT Sloan Management Review ~ 75 Chopra S. & Meindl P Supply Chain Management Strategy Planning and Operations Strategy Planning and Operation Publisher Prentice Hall 210 ~ 536 Dekker H. C Control of Inter - organizational Relationships Evidence on Appropration Concers and Coordination Requirements Accounting Organization and society ~ 49 Dyer J. K. Kale P. Singh H Splitting the Pie Rent Distribution in Alliances and Networks.. Managerial and Decision Economics 4 Gereffi G. Humphrey J. Sturgeon T The Governance of Global Value Chain. Review of International Politi- cal Economy ~ Harri L. Kulmala Jari Paranko Erkki Uusi - Rauva The Role of Cost Management in Network Relationships 4. International Journal of Production Economics ~ 43 Jensen The Agency Cost of Overvalued Equity. Working paper Stefan Seuring Supply Chain Costing with Target Costing and Activity Based Costing. Verlag Franz Vahlen 60% München 10 ~

6 jectives of assessment transfered from lower hierarchy to high hierarchy to realize assessment layer by layer. The Effect of Large Shareholder's Control on Managers' Ownership Incentive Zhou Renjun & Gao Kaijuan This article attempts to study the supervision and conflict between large shareholder control and the managers' ownership incentive. The consequence shows that the conflict impacts on the managerial ownership incentive. In addition to this the paper also contrasts the effect of large shareholder's control between state - owned and privately - owned high - tech and non high - tech companies. The results are that monitoring exists in state - owned corporations obviously while conflict is in privately - owned companies. That means in private enterprise the more the large shareholder owns the equity the more negative impact on the managers' equity incentive and in state - owned companies the ownership of large shareholder has an positive effect on the managerial ownership. Compared with non high - tech enterprises high - tech companies have conflicts between the large shareholder and managers. This suggests that the effect of managerial ownership stimulation is low when the high - tech company' ownership structure is concentrate. The consequence explains the poor effect of managers' ownership incentive in China and demonstrates that supervision especially the conflict has an effect on the ownership incentive. This reminds us we must pay attention to the large shareholder when we carry out ownership incentive mechanism. The Impact of Limited Investor Attention on Accrual Mispricing Evidence from Chinese A - share Stock Market Rao Yulei et al. We empirically study the impact of limited investor attention on accrual mispricing in Chinese A - share market. We divide the investors into high - attention and low - attention groups to test the difference of accrual mispricing by the two groups. High - attention Low - attention means the investors would wouldn't attend to the components of earnings i. e. accruals and cash flows. The results indicate that high - attention investors' accrual pricing is accurate while low - attention investors highly price the accrual's persistence. Furthermore high - attention and low attention investors' accrual pricing are different between the optimistic and pessimistic market. The Across - organizational Integration of Resources Based on Value Chain Cost Management A Field Study Mu Linjuan & Jia Qi Originating in the 1980s and with the goal of maximizing the value of equity the company value management mode VBM evolved gradually from the capital - oriented management with the main line of strategic choice - capital operation and acquisition strategy - estimation and appreciation of equity value to the industry - business - oriented management with the main line of strategic choice - - value chain analysis and inter - organization process reengineering - win - win cooperation and management integration across the organization. As the typical representative of Chinese manufacturing industry Shennan circuit had carried out integration based on the value chain cost management on the customer - oriented research and design - lean management production - customer value guide - flexible organization management to make the enterprise defend the economic crisis successfully and improve the performance significantly. The value chain cost management experience of Shennan circuit is worthy to study by other enterprises. An Analysis of the Coupling of the Internal Control and Financial Early - Warning for Enterprises An Analysis Frame Base on the Contract Theory Xu Guanghua & Shen Yi How to control the risk of the enterprises is a hot topic that both the scholars and businessman focus on. In order to unify the internal control system and early warning system of financial affairs based on the contract theory this paper dissertated the essence of the internal control system and early warning system of financial affairs further more it analyzed the main factors which could affect the risks of the enterprises and the strategy of control. Finally this paper built a frame system of analysis which could be treated as a coupling of both sides. Institutional Environment Auditing Supply - Demand and Audit Governance An Empirical Study on Auditor Switch from Chinese Listed Companies Zhang Ming et al. This paper analyzes the relationship between the institutional environment and the audit governance based on the auditor switch in China's security market. The evidence indicates that firstly companies switch auditors much more frequently in relatively less developed institutional environment. Secondly the companies tend to upgrade their auditors in relatively well developed area because they need high - quality auditor's services. Thirdly the companies change auditors aim at audit opinion - shopping in less developed area for the lower litigation risk and cost. It means that audit governance cannot make up the deficiency of institutional environment. The findings reflect institutional environment not only affects the demands but also influences the supply of auditing and the institutional environment and audit governance promote with each other in conclusion. The Effect of Audit Firm Mergers on Audit Pricing Evidence from Chinese Stock Market Li Minghui et al. Whether audit firm mergers would increase or decrease audit price depends on the net effect of audit price premium resulting from increased reputation or /and market power of the audit firms and cost reduction resulting from scale effect. Using panel data of listed clients before and after the mergers the authors test the effect of audit firm mergers on audit fee. The results show audit fee would increase significantly after the mergers especially in the first year after the mergers. In addition as to constant clients the effect of mergers related with BIG4 is more significant than that of mergers between domestic accounting firms while there's no significant difference between the effect of mergers by absorption and that of mergers by consolidation. 94