Econ351 Lecture 7. Coase Theorem and property rights
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1 Econ351 Lecture 7. Coase Theorem and property rights
2 Lecture outline Different ways of handling externalities Coase Theorem Transaction costs of negotiations Components of transaction costs Factors that affect transaction costs Some implications of Coase Theorem and Hobbes Theorem for property law
3 Example of externalities A chemical plant (CP) is located near a river and a fishery (F) is located downstream from the plant. CP pollutes the river and the amount of pollution depends on the amount of output it produces. CP can produce from 0 to 4 units of output, with each unit of output resulting in one unit of pollution. CP s profit and the damages incurred by F depend on the amount of output and are given in the table below:
4 Example of externalities (cont.) Output of CP MB of CP Total CP benefit MC of F Net Social benefit ,000 10,000 5,000? 2 6,000 16,000 5,000? 3 4,000 20,000 5,000? 4 2,500 22,500 5,000?
5 Example of externalities (cont.) What would be the output of profitmaximizing CP given these conditions and no other constraints on CP? What is the socially optimal output of CP?
6 Example of externalities (cont.) How would your answers change if: (1) the plant can install a filter that eliminates pollution at the cost of $3000/unit of pollution? (2) the fishery can install a filter that eliminates all pollution at the cost of $11,500?
7 Handling externalities before Coase How can socially efficient outcome be achieved (pre-coase views)? Regulation Taxation Fishery can sue for damages
8 Handling externalities before Coase Regulation: CP is told to produce certain amount of output Disadvantages of regulation (goals of regulators; informational requirements) Pigouvian (effluent) taxes: CP s output is taxed Disadvantages of Pigouvian taxes (goals of tax-setter; informational requirements) Suing for damages (how is it different from taxation?) Without full information no approach works well
9 Coase s insights First: Externalities are reciprocal (no party causes externality by itself) Second: parties can negotiate around externalities and as long as it s possible to negotiate and enforce contracts between them at low cost, neither regulation nor Pigouvian taxes are necessary
10 Coase Theorem If the transaction costs are zero (i.e., if any mutually beneficial agreement is made) then any initial allocation of property rights leads to socially efficient outcome Notes: This is a tautology Transaction costs are never zero While all outcomes are efficient, they are not necessarily the same for all initial allocations Endowment effect
11 Example of externalities (copy) Output of CP MB of CP Total CP benefit MC of F Net Social benefit ,000 10,000 5,000? 2 6,000 16,000 5,000? 3 4,000 20,000 5,000? 4 2,500 22,500 5,000?
12 Coase Theorem and the externalities example What would be the outcomes of negotiations in the earlier example of externalities (CP v. F) assuming zero TC under the following allocation of property rights? CP has the right to pollute CP has the right to pollute and can install a filter eliminating pollution at $3000/unit F has the right to clean water F has the right to clean water and can install a filter eliminating all pollution at $11,500
13 Calculation of payments CP has the right to pollute and no filtering is possible. How do we calculate payments that would result from Nash bargaining? Step 1: Determine threat points CP: F: Step 2: Determine cooperative joint wealth CP (16000) + F (-10000) = 6000 Step 3: Determine surplus S = ( ) ( ) = 3500 Add half of surplus to each threat point to arrive at cooperative allocation of wealth for each agent CP: =24250 F: = Determine payments implied by the above CP gets paid = 8250
14 Continuous values version of the externalities example Look at Externalities (calculus-based) link at andouts.html
15 Another example Sturges(Doctor, plaintiff) v. Bridgman (Confectioner, defendant), A confectioner (C) used two mortars and pestles to pound mixtures used in his business. A doctor (D) came to occupy neighboring premises and built a room for seeing patients next to C s kitchen. The noise from C s business made it difficult for D to listen to the patients for diseases in the chest. So, D sued.
16 Sturges v. Bridgman example Reciprocity? Let C value his business at 40 and D value his at 60. Alternatives are worth 0 and let TC=0 Rule 1: C has the right Rule 2: D has the right Rule 1 and C can install soundproofing for $20 Rule 2 and D can move for $18 (see class handout for an example of Nash bargaining solution for Rule 1)
17 Sturges v. Bridgman example Let TC= 25 (cont.) Rule 1: C has the right Rule 2: D has the right 2d part of Coase Theorem: If the transaction costs of negotiations are high then the efficiency of outcomes may depend on the initial allocation of property rights
18 Transaction costs of negotiations Search costs Bargaining costs Enforcement costs First two categories include private information Factors affecting transaction costs (see class handout)
19 Implications of the Coase Theorem for the structure of the law Coase: the law should be structured to reduce impediments to private agreements (i.e., lubricate bargaining ) Normative Coase theorem Hobbes alternative: Structure the law so as to minimize the harm caused by failures in private agreements (i.e., give the right to the party that values it most) Why not always use Hobbes prescription?
20 Coase v. Hobbes When does it make sense to follow Coase s prescription and when Hobbes prescription? IC < TC (and surplus > IC) Hobbes* IC > TC follow simple rules (precedent, coming to a nuisance, etc.) to decide property disputes * - IC stands for information costs or costs for the court to obtain appropriate information
21 Protection of property rights Terminology legal remedies (damages; liability rule) Equitable remedies (injunction; property rule) Damages: Compensate plaintiff Backward-looking Injunction: forward-looking What happens if defendant doesn t comply?
22 Back to CP v. F example F s right is protected by injunction TC = 0 TC >> 0 F s right is protected by damages TC = 0 TC >> 0
23 Difficulties with using injunctions Intermediate injunction: too much information is needed Absolute injunction: often relies on low transaction costs, including those generated by: Free rider problem Hold-up problem
24 Free rider problem Suppose in the example with CP and F there are 100 fishermen instead of a fishery Free-rider problem: Let CP have the right to pollute. Then each fisherman can pay CP between $65 and $100 to limit its output to 2 units. Notice that if 90 fishermen agree to pay $80>$6500/90, then the remaining fishermen can pay nothing and benefit from the socially efficient amount of pollution.
25 Hold-up problem Let the fishermen have the right to clean water. Then CP could offer between $100 and $160 to each fisherman for the right to produce 2 units of output. Let the offer be $130. Then, one of the fishermen could hold out for a much greater amount (up to ( *99) = $3130. Suppose he holds out for $1200. If there are more such smart fishermen, this can derail the negotiations.
26 Difficulties with using damages Calculating damages requires resources If damages are set incorrectly, negotiations might be necessary to achieve efficiency and that brings us back to the issue of transaction costs of negotiations With any remedy, predictability is important for the economy to function well
27 Summary on remedies Zero transaction costs - legal rule does not matter, except for distribution High transaction costs of negotiations, court has perfect information (including knowledge of all potential remedial or preventive actions) - efficiency could be achieved either under appropriate choice of injunction or under compensatory damages
28 Summary on remedies (cont.) High transaction costs, profit schedule unknown, damages known - damages may be efficient or may be not, because plaintiff has no incentive to use prevention; High transaction costs, profit schedule unknown, damages are unknown - efficiency is not achieved in a general case.
29 Practice questions Q. 1. Use the theory of transaction costs to explain whether (from the efficiency point of view) the following rights should be protected by injunction or damages: a land owner's right to exclude from his property a neighbor's gas line; a homeowner's right to be free from air pollution by a nearby factory.
30 Practice questions (cont.) Q. 2. Suppose that two people choose to litigate a dispute. Should the law presume that if two parties are prepared to litigate, transaction costs must be high, and therefore the court should choose damages as the remedy, not the injunction?
31 Practice questions (cont.) Q. 3. (a) under English common law, a landowner who built a structure that so blocked his neighbor's window, that the neighbor needed artificial light to be able to read in ½ of the room nearest the window, was considered to have infringed the neighbor's property rights, provided that the neighbor had unobstructed access to light for 20 years. Explain from the point of view of efficiency. (b) the courts did not extend this rule to protect distant views. Why? (c) this common law rule was rejected in the US. Why?
32 Practice questions (cont.) Q4. Why is smoking in public places heavily regulated and often even prohibited, while it is generally left up to the individuals in private residences?
33 So far we have looked at: The reasons for the existence of property rights (Partly) The issue of what owners may do with their property (externalities) The role of bargaining The efficiency characteristics of the remedies for violating property rights? (injunction vs. damages)
34 What should be privately owned? Should property always be private? Public goods: Non-rivalrous Non-exclusionary (or non-excludable) Example: country s defense Most public goods are not pure public goods (roads, information)
35 Example Highway: excludable, but at a cost; nonrivalrous, but only up to a point Assume a road costs $1 mln. to build and maintain. Let the combined benefit from it to all people be $1.2 mln. Such a road is beneficial to society. Suppose it is privately owned. Additional costs? Benefits? Tolls, lower consumer surplus More efficient maintenance
36 Another view of private ownership benefits Private ownership can work under contract with government (if gov-t is not too corrupt) Eliminates the need for tolls on a road; Leaves only non-contractible quality problems to take care of Competition and reputation can be used to discipline private contractors Preserves efficiency of private ownership (See, Shleifer s State vs. Private Ownership at
37 Efficiency vs. distributional justice How can legal rules work to make distribution more equal? Unintended consequences of legal rules (recall non-waivable warranty of habitability) Predictability of the law (e.g., consider Sturges v. Bridgman) Availability of better tools for redistribution (progressive taxation, social benefits)
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