Referências bibliográficas

Transcription

1 Referências bibliográficas 134 Referências bibliográficas Akerlof, George A. (1970), The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, nº 84 (August), p Atkeson, Andrew (1991), International Lending wuth Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation, Econometrica, 59, nº4 (July, 1991), p Baig, Taimur e Ilan Goldfajn (2000), The Russian default and the contagion to Brazil, PUC-Rio, Texto para discussão nº 420. Boyd, J.h. e Bruce D. Smith (1999), The Equilibrium Allocation of Investment Capital in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Costly State Verification, in RCER Working Papers from University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER). Braido, Luís H. B. (2002), Evidence on the Incentive Properties of Share Contracts, University of Chicago, fevereiro de 2002 (mimeo). Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1989a), A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, Journal of Political Economy, February 1989, nº 97, p Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1989b), Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, American Economic Review, March 1989, nº 79, p Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1991), Sovereign debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang, Quarterly Journal of Economics nº 427 (November. 1991), p Calvo, Guillermo (1996), Variety of Capital-Market Crises, University of Maryland WP nº 15, 1995 Calvo, Guillermo (1998), Balance of Payment Crises In Emerging Markets, March Camdessus, Michel (1998), Crisis in Emerging Market Economies: the Road to Recovery, IMF, September Cantor, Richard e Frank Packer (1994), The credit rating industry, Quarterly Review of the Federal Bank of New York, Summer/Fall, Vol. 19 Issue 2. Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco (1998), Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: A Canonical Model, National Bureau of Economic Research WP nº 6606, June 1998.

2 Referências bibliográficas 135 Chang, Roberto e Andrés Velasco (1998), Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: a Canonical Model, NBER Working Paper nº 6606, July Chari, V.V. and Patrick Kehoe (1998), Asking the Right Question About the IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Annual Report, Special Issue, 1998, nº 13, p Cohen, Daniel and Jeffrey Sachs (1986), Growth and External Debt Under Risk of Debt Repudiation, European Economic Review, nº 30, p Dell'Ariccia, Giovanni, Isabel Gödde e Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2002), Moral hazard and international crisis lending: a test, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/181. Diamond, Douglas and Philip Dybvig (1983), Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity, Journal of Political Economy, June 1983, nº 91, p Dooley, Michael P. (1995), A Retrospective on the Debt Crisis, in Exchange Rate Policy and Interdependence, Peter Kenan, ed. N.J.: Princeton University Press, Dooley, Michael P. (2000), Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?, NBER Working Paper nº 7531, February Dooley, Michael P. and Sujata Verma (2001), Rescue Packages and Output Losses Following Crises, NBER Working Paper nº 8315, June Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel (2000), Does IMF cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data, Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim. Dreher, Axel and Roland Vaubel (2001), Does the World Bank cause moral hazard and political business cycles? Evidence from panel data, Fakultät für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Universität Mannheim, maio de Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz (1981), Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theory and Estimation, Review of Economic Studies, April 1981, nº 48, p Eichengreen, Barry (2001), Crisis Prevention and Management: Any New Lessons from Argentina and Turkey?, background paper for the World Bank's Global Development Finance Eichengreen, Barry and Christof Rühl (2000), The Bail-in Problem: Systematic Goals, Ad Hoc Means, NBER Working Paper 7653, April 2000.

3 Referências bibliográficas 136 Eichengreen, Barry e Ashoka Mody (1998), What explains changing spreads on emerging market debt? Fundamentals or market sentiment?, NBER Working Paper Series nº Eichgreen, Barry and Richard Portes (1995), Crisis? What crisis? Orderly Workputs for Sovereign Debtors, London: The Center for Economic Policy Research, Fernández-Arias, Eduardo and Ricardo Haussman (2000a), Getting it Right: What to Reform in International Financial Markets, Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper nº 428, August Fernández-Arias, Eduardo and Ricardo Haussman (2000b), What s Wrong With International Financial Markets?, Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper nº 429, August Fernández-Arias, Eduardo and Ricardo Haussman (2000c), The Redesign of the International Financial Architecture from a Latin American Perspectives: Who Pays the Bill?, Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper nº 429, August Fischer, Stanley (1999), On the Need for an International Lender of Last Resort, paper prepared for the American Economic Association and the American Finance Association, IMF web site, Fischer, Stanley (2000), Strengthening Crisis Prevention: The Role of Contingent Credit Lines, speech given at the Banco de Mexico, November Fischer, Stanley (dezembro de 1999), Learning the lessons of financial crises: the roles of the public and private sectors, FMI, discurso na Emerging Market Traders' Association Annual Meeting, 9 de dezembro de Fischer, Stanley (março de 1998), The IMF and the Asian Crisis, FMI website. Fischer, Stanley (novembro de 1998), Reforming the International Monetary System, apresentado na David Finch Lecture, website FMI. Forbes, Kristin e Roberto Rigobon (2002), Contagion in Latin America: Definitions, Measurement, and Policy Implications, Economia, Volume 1, Number 2, 2001, pgs Forbes, Kristin e Roberto Rigobon (2002), No Contagion, Only Interdependence: Measuring Stock Market Co-movements, Journal of Finance, Volume 57, Number 5, October, 2002, pp

4 Referências bibliográficas 137 Freixas, Xavier e Jean-Charles Rochet (1997), Microeconomics of Banking, MIT Press 17 October, Goldfajn, Ilan e Rodrigo O. Valdés (1999), Liquidity Crises and the International Financial Architecture, working paper. Grossman, Herschel and John Van Huyck (1988), Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim, American Economic Review, December 1988, nº 78, p IMF (1999), Involving the Private Sector in Forestalling and Resolving Financial Crises, International Monetary Fund, Report prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department. IMF (2002), Evaluation of Prolonged Use of IMF Resources, IMF Independent Evaluation Office, setembro de Jeanne, Olivier e Jeromin Zettelmeyer (2001), International Bailouts, Moral Hazard and Condicionality, IMF Research Department, não publicado. JEC (2000), IFIAC (Meltzer) Comission Report, Joint Economic Committee of US Congress, JEC (2001), Proposal for New Approach to IMF Rescues, Joint Economic Committee of the United States Congress. JEC (2002), The subsidy in IMF lending, Joint Economic Committee of the United State Congress,November Kamin, Steven B. (1999), The Current International Financial Crisis: How Much is New?, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion Papers, nº 636, June Kamin, Steven B. (2002), Identifying the role of moral hazard in international financial markets, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System International Finance Discussion Papers nº 736. Kamin, Steven B. e Karsten von Kleist (1999), The evolution and determinants of emerging market credit spreads in the 1990s, BIS working papers nº 68. Keltzer (1994), Sovereign Debt, Journal of Economic Literature, 1994 vol. III.

5 Referências bibliográficas 138 Krueger, Anne (2001), A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, speech given at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, Delhi, India, December 20, Krueger, Anne (2001), International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, speech given at the National Economist s Club Annual Member s Dinner, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC, November 26, Krueger, Anne O. (2002), Crisis Prevention and Resolution: Lessons from Argentina, IMF, Conference on The Argentina Crisis, November Krueger, Anne O. (2002), Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism: One Year Later, IMF, presented at the Banco de Maxico s Conference, November Krugman, Paul (1988), Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang: Some Analytical Notes, Journal of Development Economics, 29: Kumar, Manmohan S., Paul Masson e Marcus Miller (2000), Global Financial Crises: Institutions and Incentives, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/105 Lane, Timothy and Steven Phillips (2000), Moral Hazard in IMF Financing, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 00/168. Lerrick, Adam and Allan Meltzer (2001), Beyond IMF Bailouts: Defaults without Disruption, Carnegie Mellon Quarterly International Economics Report, May Lerrick, Adam e Allan H. Meltzer (2001), Beyond IMF Bailouts: Default without Disruption, JEC US Congress, May Lisboa, Marcos de Barros e Naércio Aquino Menezes F (2001), Microeconomia e sociedade no Brasil, Editora da Fundação Getulio Vargas. Riod de Janeiro, Min, Hong G. (2000), Determinants of Emerging Market Bond Spread: do Economic Fundamentals Matter?, World Bank working paper. Mussa, Michael (2002), Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy, Institute for International Economics, July Nunnenkamp, Peter (1999), The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending: Making a Fuss About a Minor Problem?, Kiel Discussion Papers, March (Institut für Weltwirstschaft Kiel).

6 Referências bibliográficas 139 Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff, Foundations of International Macroeconomics, Cambridge; MIT Press, Özatay, Fatih e Güven Sak (2002), The Financial Crises in Turkey, artigo preparado para a Brookings Trade Forum 2002: Currency Crises, maio de Paasche, Bernhard e Stanley E. Zin (2001), Competition and Intervention in Sovereign Debt Markets, NBER Working Paper nº 8679, December Roberto Chang & Andres Velasco (1998), The Asian Liquidity Crisis, NBER Working Papers 6796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Rigobon, Roberto (2002) The Curse of Non-investment Grade Countries. JDE, Volume 69, Issue 2, December, 2002, pp Rigobon, Roberto, On the Measurement of the International Propagation of Shocks: Is it Stable?, Journal of International Economics, forthcoming. Rogoff, Kenneth (1999), International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability, NBER Working Paper nº 7265, July Rogoff, Kenneth (1999), International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability, NBER Working Paper nº 7265, July Rubinstein, Ariel (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, 1982, vol. 50, issue 1, pages Sachs, Jeffrey (1988), The Debt Overhang of Developing Countries, in J.B. de Macedo e R. Fidlay (eds.), Debt Stabilization and Development: Essays in Memory of Carlos Diaz-Alejandro (Oxford Basil Blackwell), pp Salanie, Bernard (1997), The Economics of Contracts: A Primer, MIT Press, Spiegel, Mark M. (2001). Solvency runs, sunspot runs, and international bailouts, Working Paper in Applied Economic Theory , Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. Stiglitz, J. and A. Weiss, (1981), Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, American Economic Review, Vol.71, pp Vaubel, Roland (1983), The Moral Hazard of IMF Lending, in Allan H. Meltzer (ed.), International Lending and the International Monetary Fund: A Conference in Memory of Wilson E. Schmidt, Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC:

7 Referências bibliográficas 140 Willet, Thomas D. (1999), Did the Mexican Bailout Really Cause the Asian Crisis?, Claremont Policy Briefs, Issue no , March 1999 (The Claremont Institute for Economic Policy Studies, The Commons Institute for International Economic Studies, and The Lowe Institute of Political Economy). Wooldridge,Jeffrey M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, Worral, Tim (1990), Debt with Potential Repudiation, European Economic Review, 34: p Zhang, Xiaoming Alan (1999), Testing for moral hazard in Emerging Markets Lending, Institute of International Finance, Research Paper nº 99-1, August 1999.