EVROPSKI PARLAMENT Odbor za proračunski nadzor DELOVNI DOKUMENT

Transcription

1 EVROPSKI PARLAMENT Odbor za proračunski nadzor DELOVNI DOKUMENT o posebnem poročilu Evropskega računskega sodišča št. 22/2014 (razrešnica za leto 2014): obvladovanje stroškov projektov za razvoj podeželja, ki jih z nepovratnimi sredstvi financira EU Odbor za proračunski nadzor Poročevalec: Zigmantas Balčytis DT\ doc PE v02-00 Združena v raznolikosti

2 Audit scope, objectives and approach Main question This audit concerns the costs of the EU s rural development policy. It focuses on the grants given towards the costs of investments and other projects undertaken by farmers, businesses, local authorities and other organisations in rural areas. These grants, which make up around half of the 100 billion euro EU expenditure programmed for the period, are managed by Member State authorities under Commission supervision. The principle of economy applies to all grants or payments from the EU budget. According to this principle, subsidies should be given for the right things at the best price. In the context of rural development projects, this means that the items for which the grant is given should be of the type, quality and quantity needed to achieve the intended outputs and results. The grant for these items should be based on the lowest available price for the required specification. Scope The audit scope concerns in particular the following measures of rural development::modernisation of agricultural holdings; adding value to agricultural and forestry products; infrastructure related to the development and adaptation of agriculture and forestry; training and other measures to improve the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry; investment measures related to land management and the environment; measures to diversify the rural economy and improve quality of life; local development measures using the LEADER approach. In most cases, grants are given for only a proportion of total project costs and applicants must pay the balance from their own resources, giving the applicant an incentive to limit the project costs. Where aid rates are low, the incentive can be strong; but as aid rates increase the incentive diminishes. Key risks Any subsidy distorts the real cost-benefit relationship, which may encourage the applicant to specify a higher-cost solution than necessary, from gold-plating through to investments that are disproportionate to the outputs or results expected. Consequently there is a risk that the quantity and quality of the items financed may be greater than appropriate (risk of over specification ) representing an unnecessary cost to the EU and national budgets. Subsidies also reduce the incentive for the applicant to search for the best prices. Applicants may prefer to favour a higher-cost supplier. At the extreme, there is the possibility that they or the suppliers may manipulate the process thereby inflating the costs. These all lead to the risk that the grant may be based on prices that exceed the lowest available in a competitive market for items of the required specification (risk of uncompetitive prices ). There is also a specific risk linked to the changes made to the project after the grant has been approved. Mitigating measures should be taken to ensure that the costs are still reasonable and to deter the advantages occasionally given by the supplier that lower the real cost (risk of PE v /6 DT\ doc

3 project changes). Sub questions The Court s audits of rural development expenditure have repeatedly found that Member State authorities have not sufficiently ensured that the project costs approved are reasonable. The need to improving financial management in this area is clear. This led the Court to question whether the approaches followed by the Commission and Member States were the most effective in relation to the main risks. Court's findings and observations 1. The Court found that the approaches followed by the Commission and the Member States were not the most effective. 2. The Commission reacted after problems emerged rather than ensuring that systems were sound in the first place. Member States control systems addressed only some of the risks to economy or were flawed. More effective approaches were available but were not widely applied. 3. The Commission did not offer guidance or spread good practice at the start of the programming period. It did not ensure that Member States systems were effective before they started approving large volumes of grants. Since 2012 the Commission has adopted a more active and coordinated approach. If followed through with a greater focus on economy, this should lead to better financial management in the next programming period. 4. Regarding the Member States, by 2014 the 15 largest rural development programmes all had in place the basic systems required by the regulations for checking rural development costs. The methods used varied, and the Court identified some well-designed approaches to address certain risks. But all had weaknesses in relation to the main risks such that overall, the costs of rural development grants were not well controlled. Analysis of information from all 88 rural development programmes indicates that a similar situation prevails across the EU. In particular: (a) Member States control systems focused on the prices of the items or works in the grant applications with much less attention to the specification: whether the items themselves were reasonable or if the grant was cost-effective in relation to the policy objectives. This leads to risks of gold-plating and poor value for money. (b) The main methods used to check the prices in grant applications were to compare offers from different suppliers or to compare them to reference prices. The Court found that the systems in some Member States gave little assurance that the costs were reasonable: using reference prices that were 30 % above real market prices, for example. (c) Grants are approved in advance and paid once the applicant has purchased the items or undertaken the works concerned. Where changes to a project occurred after grant DT\ doc 3/6 PE v02-00

4 approval, loopholes in some Member State systems allowed costs to be reimbursed for which the reasonableness had not been checked. (d) The level of requirements and checks generally did not take account of different levels of risk. Many Member State authorities had the same approach to checking a euro grant as to a 1 million euro grant. The possibilities for simplification where the risks were limited were not widely followed. 5. The main flaws or gaps in the approaches are the following ones Risk of over specifications: limited use of the possibilities for restricting grants to standard costs; little consideration of whether costs are reasonable in relation to the expected outputs and results; few Member State authorities took into account the cost-effectiveness or value for money of the grant applications; a lack of reliable approaches to the risk of gold-plating. Risk of grant approvals being based on prices that are too high: standard unit costs not checked to see if they resulted in overpayments in practice; reliance on checks against price databases containing list prices that were commonly % above the real market prices; acceptance of grant applications where the prices exceeded reference prices by as much as 30 or 40 % without requiring justification; insufficient safeguards when relying on the comparison of supplier offers reliance on checking compliance with public procurement procedures (where applicable) without also checking that the costs proposed were reasonable. Risk that the costs actually reimbursed may not be reasonable: loopholes in the procedures after approval of grant applications, which mean that the costs actually reimbursed may be different from those that have been accepted as reasonable. Risk that the level of requirements and checks is insufficiently related to the level of risks: requirements and checks not increased where aid rates are high (and the applicant has little incentive to limit the costs) or for very large grants. 6. This leads the Court to conclude that there is considerable scope for making real savings in rural development project grants in the programming period by better approaches to controlling the costs. These savings could be made available to finance additional PE v /6 DT\ doc

5 projects, leading to greater outputs and results and achievement of objectives. 7. The Court also found that there were workable and cost-effective approaches to mitigate the risks identified - most of which are already implemented in some Rural Development Programmes. 8. The Court welcomes the Commission s intention to issue guidance on simplified costs (although Member States have indicated that simplified cost options are unlikely to be widely applied due to the diverse nature of rural development grants). The Court also welcomes the Commission guidance on tackling fraud and the action plans developed by the Member States on the initiative of the Commission. The plans seen by the Court show improvements in some of the basic systems but do not address many of the design weaknesses listed in paragraph 5 above. 9. In many cases, Member State authorities will develop the detail of their control systems - the forms, the instructions, the procedures and checklists-once the Rural Development Programmes for have been approved. But unless these control systems address the risks identified in this report, the weaknesses are likely to persist. Approaches are available that do not involve adding more and more requirements and checks, but better target the effort to where the risks are greatest. The best control systems are not only effective - designed to achieve economy -but also efficient - appropriate to the level of risk. Replies of the Commission The Commission accepted the Court s recommendation that Member States should have an effective and efficient control system in place up front. It will encourage the Member States to use the checklist and the criteria developed by the Court. By January 2015, the Commission has also provided guidance on controls and penalties under rural development, including a specific section on reasonableness of costs and the checklist for managing authorities annexed in the special report. Furthermore, training and sharing of experiences will be part of European Network for Rural Development activities in the period. Priporočila poročevalca za morebitno vključitev v letno poročilo o razrešnici: Glede na priporočila, ki jih je sprejelo Računsko sodišče, Evropski parlament: pozdravlja posebno poročilo Računskega o obvladovanju stroškov projektov za razvoj podeželja, ki jih z nepovratnimi sredstvi financira EU, ter podpira sklepe in priporočila iz tega poročila; ugotavlja, da je politika EU za razvoj podeželja bistvena za spodbujanje konkurenčnosti kmetijstva ter zagotavljanje trajnostnega upravljanja naravnih virov in podnebnih ukrepov; poudarja pomen teritorialnega razvoja podeželskih gospodarstev in skupnosti, vključno z ustvarjanjem in ohranjanjem delovnih mest; poudarja, da Komisija na začetku programskega obdobja ni ponudila smernic niti širila primerov dobre prakse ter ni zagotovila, da bi bili kontrolni sistemi DT\ doc 5/6 PE v02-00

6 držav članic učinkoviti, preden so začeli odobravati nepovratna sredstva; poudarja, da je bil pristop Komisije po letu 2012 bolj dejaven in usklajen; ugotavlja, da so bile odkrite številne slabosti pri tem, kako države članice obvladujejo stroške za nepovratna sredstva za razvoj podeželja; pozdravlja dejstvo, da so bili prepoznani izvedljivi, stroškovno učinkoviti pristopi, ki bi se lahko uporabljali širše, ter da Komisija sprejema te ugotovitve in je izrazila namero, da z državami članicami sodeluje za izboljšanje obvladovanja stroškov razvoja podeželja v programskem obdobju ; soglaša z mnenjem Računskega sodišča, da bi morale Komisija in države članice že zgodaj v novem programskem obdobju preveriti, ali kontrolni sistemi delujejo učinkovito in so uspešni glede na tveganja; poudarja, da bi morala Komisija spodbujati države članice k uporabi kontrolnega seznama in meril, ki jih je razvilo Evropsko računsko sodišče in so vključeni v Prilogo I 1 ; poudarja, da bi morale Komisija in države članice sodelovati, da bi zagotavljale, da pristopi pri vseh programih za razvoj podeželja izpolnjujejo merila, ki jih je določilo Računsko sodišče in so namenjena ocenjevanju, ali kontrolni sistemi odpravljajo tveganja pretirane specifikacije, nekonkurenčnih cen in sprememb projektov ter če so usmerjeni v področja z najvišjim tveganjem; del tega procesa bi moralo biti naknadno ocenjevanje ocena kontrolnih sistemov, ki bi ga morale izvajati službe organov držav članic za notranjo revizijo (ali drugi inšpekcijski ali revizijski organi); meni, da bi morale države članice širše uporabljati stroškovno učinkovite pristope, ki so bili že opredeljeni: ocenjevanje stroškov glede na pričakovane izložke ali rezultate; preverjanje, če standardni stroški privedejo do previsokih plačil; uporaba dejanskih tržnih cen ne pa cenikov dobaviteljev kot referenčnih cen za opremo, stroje itd.; preverjanje, ali so stroški razumni, tudi v primerih, ko so bili izvedeni postopki za javna naročila; strožje zahteve in/ali preverjanja za ukrepe z višjimi stopnjami pomoči itd.; pozdravlja, da se je Komisija zavezala, da bo zagotovila smernice za kontrolo in sankcije na področju razvoja podeželja, ki bodo vključevale posebne poglavje o razumnosti stroškov in kontrolni seznam za organe upravljanja, ki je priložen posebnemu poročilu; je seznanjen, da bosta usposabljanje in izmenjava izkušenj vključena v dejavnosti Evropske mreže za razvoj podeželja v obdobju Glej: Priloga I posebnega poročila Kontrolni seznam, ki ga je za ocenjevanje zasnove kontrolnih sistemov za tveganja, povezana s stroški razvoja podeželja, razvilo Evropsko računsko sodišče. PE v /6 DT\ doc