Introduction: Basic Facts and Neoclassical Growth Model

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Introduction: Basic Facts and Neoclassical Growth Model Diego Restuccia University of Toronto and NBER University of Oslo August 14-18, 2017 Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 1 / 34

Overview Facts and the neoclassical growth model Basic facts Framework: Neoclassical growth model with distortions Discussion, extensions Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 2 / 34

Some Facts Large income differences across countries at any point in time (recent history) Growth not systematically related to the level of development Strong positive relationship between real investment rates (or real capital to output ratios) and real GDP per capita across countries Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 3 / 34

GDP per capita across Countries and Time Year Decile 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014 1 3.4 3.2 3.1 2.3 1.7 1.8 2.0 2 5.5 5.1 4.5 3.2 2.7 3.0 3.3 3 7.4 6.8 6.4 4.5 3.9 4.8 5.7 4 9.6 8.9 8.0 6.8 6.2 9.2 10.9 5 12.7 11.5 11.5 10.2 10.0 14.8 18.5 6 14.9 15.8 17.4 15.4 16.1 21.9 25.6 7 22.0 22.9 24.1 22.3 22.1 29.9 35.0 8 30.5 33.4 39.1 38.0 45.3 53.0 56.7 9 49.9 56.0 62.2 65.1 72.6 77.0 79.5 10 80.1 81.3 82.6 79.3 83.5 98.3 105.0 R 10/1 23.4 25.4 27.1 34.0 49.5 53.6 51.3 Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 4 / 34

GDP per worker, ratio of 5% richest and poorest countries 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 Source: Duarte and Restuccia (2006) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 5 / 34

GDP per capita across Countries and Time Country 1960 1980 2000 2014 Botswana 2.3 7.5 21.5 29.1 Ethiopia 2.5 2.5 1.2 2.6 Malawi 4.7 4.3 2.1 1.9 Indonesia 5.3 7.1 9.0 19.8 China 5.6 5.7 9.5 24.6 India 5.9 4.0 4.4 10.5 Korea 6.2 18.3 50.5 68.2 Zimbabwe 11.3 10.0 6.1 3.1 Singapore 14.3 41.7 83.3 149.7 Japan 30.8 63.2 73.9 68.2 Mexico 32.0 38.1 25.4 31.1 Austria 53.4 62.9 77.8 92.7 France 59.4 75.4 68.3 76.5 United Kingdom 68.0 64.7 74.9 75.3 New Zealand 81.2 60.2 59.4 66.0 Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 6 / 34

GDP per capita 1960 and 2011 Source: Jones (2016) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 7 / 34

Growth in GDP per worker, 1960-1996 8 Annualized Growth in Labor Productivity (%) 6 4 2 0 2 4 TWN BWA HKG KOR THA SGP ROM JPN CHN IDN MYS PAK MUS PRT IRL COG GAB GRCESPAUT IND TUR SYR ISR LKA EGY BRA FIN FRA BEL LSO MAR NOR BGD DOM ECU GNB CHL BDI MWI NPL ZWE PAN PNG IRN GBR DNK AUS BFA CIV GTM NLD USA PRY NAM JOR MEX TTO SWE CAN TZA UGA GMB KEN PHL COL URY ZAF ARG GHA HND SLV CRI CHE BEN ETH TGO GIN JAM NZL MRT RWA CMR BOL PER NGA MGD TCDSEN ZMB VEN MOZ MLI NERCAF NIC AGO ZAR 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.75 1 Relative Output per Worker 1960 (in logs) Source: Duarte and Restuccia (2006) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 8 / 34

Real Investment to Output Ratio Source: Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 9 / 34

Neoclassical Growth Model Understand factors behind choice of investment By spelling out the economic forces determining investment we would be in better position to understand investment rate differences across countries And, therefore, part of income differences across countries Start with optimal growth and then consider a competitive market economy with distortions Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 10 / 34

A Model of Optimal Growth Preferences and Endowments Large number of infinitely-lived homogeneous households Preferences over consumption goods at each date, c t, described by the following utility function: where β (0, 1) β t u(c t ) (1) t=0 Households are endowed with one unit of productive time per period and k 0 > 0 units of the capital stock Assume population is constant over time (L normalized to one) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 11 / 34

A Model of Optimal Growth Technology At each date only one good produced with the following production function, Y t = A t K α t L 1 α t (2) where A t is total factor productivity (TFP), assumed to be constant over time Output can be allocated to consumption and investment The capital accumulation is given by, C t + X t Y t (3) K t+1 = (1 δ)k t + X t (4) where one unit of investment X t transforms into one unit of capital next period Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 12 / 34

Social Planner s Problem A benevolent social planner cares about the utility of the representative household Chooses sequences of consumption and investment to maximize (1) subject to (2), (3), and (4) Formally, subject to max {C t,x t,k t+1 } t=0 β t u(c t ) t=0 C t + X t AK α t L 1 α t t = 0, 1, 2,... K t+1 = (1 δ)k t + X t t = 0, 1, 2,... C t, K t+1 0 and K 0 > 0 given Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 13 / 34

Characterization of Planner s Problem Under mild conditions on u( ) the resource constraint is satisfied with equality (no output will be wasted) and the constraints that C t and K t+1 be non-negative are not binding Can substitute the two constraints to eliminate X t and C t from the problem and express the maximization problem as a choice of K t+1 The first order condition with respect to the capital stock next period gives, u (C t ) = βu (C t+1 ) [ αak α 1 t+1 + (1 δ)] t = 0, 1, 2,... (5) Planner is equating the marginal cost of postponing consumption to the marginal benefit Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 14 / 34

Definition: Steady State A steady state solution to the planner s problem is a K s such that K 0 = K s implies K t+1 = K t = K s for all t In a steady state the capital stock is constant over time Notice that if the capital stock is constant then investment, consumption, and output are also constant Applying the steady state definition to the equation (5) 1 = β[αak α 1 s + (1 δ)] which implies K s = ( αa 1 β (1 δ) ) 1 1 α Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 15 / 34

Steady-State Implications In steady state X s = δk s, then Xs Y s = δ Ks Y s Therefore the investment to output ratio, X s Y s = αδ [ 1 β (1 δ) ] The investment rate is determined by technology and preference parameters that are assumed to be constant across countries Explore competitive equilibrium version of the neoclassical model with distortions Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 16 / 34

Competitive Equilibrium Decentralization of the planner s solution as the solution to optimization problems of consumers and firms in competitive markets Households own the capital stock and supply capital and labor services to firms at competitive rental rates Households are endowed with equal ownership shares of all firms in the economy Large number of firms operating constant returns to scale output technology Firms hire capital and labor services at competitive rates to maximize profits Let w t and r t be the rental rates of labor and capital at each date in terms of the consumption good at date t Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 17 / 34

Representative Household s Problem Given prices, profits from firms π t, and k 0, the problem of the household is to choose sequences of c t, x t, and k t+1 to maximize the present discounted value of utility Formally, subject to max {c t,x t,k t+1 } t=0 β t u(c t ) t=0 c t + x t = w t + r t k t + π t t = 0, 1, 2,... k t+1 = (1 δ)k t + x t t = 0, 1, 2,... k 0 > 0 Notice that since households do not value leisure they allocate all their time to work in the market Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 18 / 34

Representative Firm s Problem Given prices, the firm s problem is to choose capital and labor so as to maximize profits Because the problem of the firm is static (the decisions of firms today do not affect their decisions tomorrow), we can write their problem as a sequence of one-period maximization problems, max π t = [ AKt α L 1 α ] t w t L t r t K t K t,l t>0 Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 19 / 34

Definition: Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices {w t, r t } t=0, allocations for the household {c t, x t, k t+1 } t=0, allocations for firms {K t, L t } t=0, and profits {π t } t=0 such that: (i) Given prices, profits, and k 0 > 0, the allocations for the household solve the household s problem (ii) Given prices, the allocations for firms solve the firm s problem (iii) Markets clear: Output c t + x t = Y t Capital k t = K t Labor 1 = L t Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 20 / 34

Characterization of Competitive Equilibrium The industrial organization of this economy is irrelevant because of the constant returns to scale assumption on the output technology First order conditions from the firm s problem K t : αakt α 1 L 1 α t = r t, L t : Market clearing conditions imply (1 α)ak α t L α t = w t. r t = αak α 1 t, w t = (1 α)ak α t, and therefore, the competitive equilibrium wage and rental rate of capital are equated to the marginal product of labor and capital Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 21 / 34

Characterization of Competitive Equilibrium It is straightforward to show that at these prices, the demand of capital and labor from firms imply zero profits in equilibrium (π t = 0 for all t) Also note that the the competitive assumption together with the Cobb-Douglas specification of the output technology imply that the share of capital in income is equal to α The household s first order condition with respect to the capital stock next period is given by, u (c t ) = βu (c t+1 ) [r t+1 + (1 δ)] t = 0, 1, 2,... (6) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 22 / 34

Definition: Steady State A steady state competitive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium with k s such that k 0 = k s imply k t+1 = k t = k s for all t Notice that at the equilibrium prices, equation (6) determines an allocation of capital that exactly corresponds to the solution of the planner s problem Not surprising since in this environment the fundamental welfare theorems hold, allocations of the planner s problem and the competitive equilibrium coincide Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 23 / 34

Competitive Equilibrium with Distortions The determination of the investment to output ratio in the neoclassical growth model does not leave much room for thinking about investment rate differences across countries Inspection of the Euler equation for capital accumulation of the consumer equation (6) does give some hints about the factors that may be relevant in understanding investment rate differences across countries Households would equate the marginal cost and benefit of trading consumption inter-temporally Government policies such as taxes and other distortionary practices can change the returns to investing so do inefficiencies in producing investment goods Many possibilities, here consider a tax to investment Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 24 / 34

Competitive Equilibrium with Distortions Consider a government that taxes household s investment at proportional rate τ and rebates the proceeds back to households as a lump-sum subsidy transfer The budget constraint of the household becomes, c t + (1 + θ)x t = w t + r t k t + T t t = 0, 1, 2,... where T t is a lump-sum transfer Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 25 / 34

Definition: Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices {w t, r t } t=0, allocations for the household {c t, x t, k t+1 } t=0, allocations for firms {K t, L t } t=0, and government transfers {T t } t=0 such that: (i) Given prices, transfers, and k 0 > 0, the allocations for the household solve the household s problem (ii) Given prices, the allocations for firms solve the firm s problem (iii) Markets clear: Output c t + x t = Y t, capital k t = K t, and labor 1 = L t (iv) The government s budget is balanced every period T t = θx t Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 26 / 34

Solving for CE with Distortions The Euler equation for capital accumulation from households now satisfies, [ ] u (c t ) = βu rt+1 (c t+1 ) + (1 δ) t = 0, 1, 2,... (1 + θ) Notice that with θ > 0 the allocation of capital in this version of the model will differ from the optimal planner s solution The tax will discourage investment as it lowers the return to investing relative to the cost of foregone consumption Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 27 / 34

Steady-State Implications It is straightforward to show that the steady state capital stock is inversely related to the tax rate Substituting the rental rate for capital and imposing the steady state condition in the Euler equation, [ ] αak α 1 s 1 = β + (1 δ) (1 + θ) which implies k s = αa [ ] (1 + θ) 1 β (1 δ) 1 1 α Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 28 / 34

Steady-State Implications In steady state, K s Y s = K s AK α s = K1 α s A = α [ ] (1 + θ) 1 β (1 δ) and hence does not depend on A. Researchers exploit this property in growth and development accounting to separate the contribution of TFP and capital intensity to output differences by writing the production function in intensive form Y = A 1 1 α ( ) α K 1 α Y Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 29 / 34

Steady-State Implications In steady state x s = δk s, therefore, X s Y s = αδ [ ] s (1 + θ) 1 β (1 δ) Differences in tax rates may help in accounting for investment rate differences across countries Higher taxes imply lower capital accumulation, lower investment rates, lower capital to output ratios, and lower output per worker A tax to capital income has the same qualitative implications than a tax on investment (see Restuccia and Urrutia, 2001 for an application to investment taxes and differential productivity on investment goods) What matters is effective wedges that affect the return to capital investment Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 30 / 34

Relative Price of Investment Source: Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 31 / 34

Cross-Country Implications Let y = Y/L be output per worker Then for any arbitrary countries i and j y i y j = ( ) 1 Ai A j 1 α ( s i s j ) α 1 α Solow assumed A i = A j = 1 (i.e., no differences in technology across countries), then y i y j = ( si s j ) α 1 α Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 32 / 34

Cross-Country Implications Can differences in investment to output ratios explain labor productivity differences across countries? y i /y j α s i s j 1/3 2/3 4 2 16 6 2.5 36 9 3 81 Large differences in investment rates imply small differences in output per worker if reproducible capital is physical capital A broader notion of capital, e.g. human capital, may provide amplification (see Erosa et al 2010; Manuelli and Seshadri 2014) Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 33 / 34

Discussion What determines human capital differences across countries? Standard theory implies TFP an important factor Development accounting or even modern approach to human capital differences leaves a large role for TFP differences What accounts for TFP differences? Restuccia Macro Growth and Development University of Oslo 34 / 34