Chapter 9 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION. Copyright 2005 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved.

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Transcription:

Chapter 9 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION Copyright 2005 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved. 1

Properties of Information Information is not easy to define it is difficult to measure the quantity of information obtainable from different actions there are too many forms of useful information to permit the standard pricequantity characterization used in supply and demand analysis 2

Properties of Information Studying information also becomes difficult due to some technical properties of information it is durable and retains value after its use it can be nonrival and nonexclusive in this manner it can be considered a public good 3

The Value of Information In many respects, lack of information does represent a problem involving uncertainty for a decision maker the individual may not know exactly what the consequences of a particular action will be Better information can reduce uncertainty and lead to better decisions and higher utility 4

The Value of Information Assume an individual forms subjective opinions about the probabilities of two states of the world good times (probability = g ) and bad times (probability = b ) Information is valuable because it helps the individual revise his estimates of these probabilities 5

The Value of Information Assume that information can be measured by the number of messages (m) purchased g and b will be functions of m 6

The Value of Information The individual s goal will be to maximize subject to E(U) = g U(W g ) + b U(W b ) I = p g W g + p b W b + p m m We need to set up the Lagrangian L = g U(W g ) + b U(W b ) + (I-p g W g -p b W b -p m m) 7

8 The Value of Information First-order conditions for a constrained maximum are: 0 ) ( ' g g g g p W U W L 0 ) ( ' b b b b p W U W L 0 m p W p W p m b b g g I L

The Value of Information First-order conditions for a constrained maximum are: L dwg dwb gu'( Wg ) bu'( Wb ) m dm dm d g d dw b U( Wg ) U( Wb ) pg dm dm dm dwb pb pm 0 dm g 9

The Value of Information The first two equations show that the individual will maximize utility at a point where the subjective ratio of expected marginal utilities is equal to the price ratio (p g /p b ) The last equation shows the utilitymaximizing level of information to buy 10

Asymmetry of Information The level of information that a person buys will depend on the price per unit Information costs may differ significantly across individuals some may possess specific skills for acquiring information some may have experience that is relevant some may have made different former investments in information services 11

Information and Insurance There are a number of information asymmetries in the market for insurance Buyers are often in a better position to know the likelihood of uncertain events may also be able to take actions that impact these probabilities 12

Moral Hazard Moral hazard is the effect of insurance coverage on individuals decisions to take activities that may change the likelihood or size of losses parking an insured car in an unsafe area choosing not to install a sprinkler system in an insured home 13

Moral Hazard Suppose a risk-averse individual faces the risk of a loss (l) that will lower wealth the probability of a loss is this probability can be lowered by the amount the person spends on preventive measures (a) 14

Moral Hazard Wealth in the two states is given by W 1 = W 0 - a W 2 = W 0 - a - l The individual chooses a to maximize E(U) = E = (1- )U(W 1 ) + U(W 2 ) 15

Moral Hazard The first-order condition for a maximum is E a U( W ) (1 ) U'( W1) U( W2) U'( W2) a a U' ( W2 ) (1 ) U'( W1) [ U( W2 ) U( W1)] a 1 the optimal point is where the expected marginal utility cost from spending one additional dollar on prevention is equal to the reduction in the expected value of the utility loss that may be encountered in bad times 16 0

Behavior with Insurance and Perfect Monitoring Suppose that the individual may purchase insurance (premium = p) that pays x if a loss occurs Wealth in each state becomes W 1 = W 0 - a - p W 2 = W 0 - a - p - l + x A fair premium would be equal to p = x 17

Behavior with Insurance and Perfect Monitoring The person can maximize expected utility by choosing x such that W 1 = W 2 The first-order condition is E a (1 ) U'( W U'( W 2 ) 1 l a 1 ) 1 l a U( W 2 ) U( W a 0 1 ) a 18

Behavior with Insurance and Perfect Monitoring Since W 1 = W 2, this condition becomes 1 l a at the utility maximizing choice, the marginal cost of an extra unit of prevention should equal the marginal reduction in the expected loss provided by the extra spending with full insurance and actuarially fair premiums, precautionary purchases still occur 19 at the optimal level

Moral Hazard So far, we have assumed that insurance providers know the probability of a loss and can charge the actuarially fair premium this is doubtful when individuals can undertake precautionary activities the insurance provider would have to constantly monitor each person s activities to determine the correct probability of loss 20

Moral Hazard In the simplest case, the insurer might set a premium based on the average probability of loss experienced by some group of people no variation in premiums allowed for specific precautionary activities each individual would have an incentive to reduce his level of precautionary activities 21

Adverse Selection Individuals may have different probabilities of experiencing a loss If individuals know the probabilities more accurately than insurers, insurance markets may not function properly it will be difficult for insurers to set premiums based on accurate measures of expected loss 22

Adverse Selection W 2 certainty line W * - l E Assume that two individuals have the same initial wealth (W*) and each face a potential loss of l W * W 1 23

Adverse Selection W 2 Suppose that one person has a probability of loss equal to H, while the other has a probability of loss equal to l certainty line W * - l G F E Both individuals would prefer to move to the certainty line if premiums are actuarially fair W * W 1 24

Adverse Selection The lines show the market opportunities for each person to trade W 1 for W 2 by buying fair insurance W 2 certainty line F G slope (1 l ) l W * - l slope (1 H H ) E The low-risk person will maximize utility at point F, while the high-risk person will choose G W * W 1 25

Adverse Selection If insurers have imperfect information about which individuals fall into low- and high-risk categories, this solution is unstable point F provides more wealth in both states high-risk individuals will want to buy insurance that is intended for low-risk individuals insurers will lose money on each policy sold 26

Adverse Selection W 2 One possible solution would be for the insurer to offer premiums based on the average probability of loss certainty line W * - l G H F M E Since EH does not accurately reflect the true probabilities of each buyer, they may not fully insure and may choose a point such as M W * W 1 27

Adverse Selection W 2 Point M is not an equilibrium because further trading opportunities exist for low-risk individuals W * - l G H F M certainty line N E U H U L An insurance policy such as N would be unattractive to highrisk individuals, but attractive to low-risk individuals and profitable for insurers W * W 1 28

Adverse Selection If a market has asymmetric information, the equilibria must be separated in some way high-risk individuals must have an incentive to purchase one type of insurance, while low-risk purchase another 29

Adverse Selection Suppose that insurers offer policy G. High-risk individuals will opt for full insurance. W 2 W * - l G F certainty line U H E Insurers cannot offer any policy that lies above U H because they cannot prevent high-risk individuals from taking advantage of it W * W 1 30

Adverse Selection The best policy that low-risk individuals can obtain is one such as J W 2 certainty line F W * - l G J U H E The policies G and J represent a separating equilibrium W * W 1 31

Adverse Selection Low-risk individuals could try to signal insurers their true probabilities of loss insurers must be able to determine if the signals are believable insurers may be able to infer accurate probabilities by observing their clients market behavior the separating equilibrium identifies an individual s risk category 32

Adverse Selection Market signals can be drawn from a number of sources the economic behavior must accurately reflect risk categories the costs to individuals of taking the signaling action must be related to the probability of loss 33

The Principal-Agent Relationship One important way in which asymmetric information may affect the allocation of resources is when one person hires another person to make decisions patients hiring physicians investors hiring financial advisors car owners hiring mechanics stockholders hiring managers 34

The Principal-Agent Relationship In each of these cases, a person with less information (the principal) is hiring a more informed person (the agent) to make decisions that will directly affect the principal s own well-being 35

The Principal-Agent Relationship Assume that we can show a graph of the owner s (or manager s) preferences in terms of profits and various benefits (such as fancy offices or use of the corporate jet) The owner s budget constraint will have a slope of -1 each $1 of benefits reduces profit by $1 36

The Principal-Agent Relationship Profits * If the manager is also the owner of the firm, he will maximize his utility at profits of * and benefits of b* U 1 Owner s constraint b* Benefits 37

The Principal-Agent Profits * Relationship The owner-manager maximizes profit because any other ownermanager will also want b* in benefits b* represents a true cost of doing business U 1 Owner s constraint b* Benefits 38

The Principal-Agent Relationship Suppose that the manager is not the sole owner of the firm suppose there are two other owners who play no role in operating the firm $1 in benefits only costs the manager $0.33 in profits the other $0.67 is effectively paid by the other owners in terms of reduced profits 39

The Principal-Agent Relationship The new budget constraint continues to include the point b*, * the manager could still make the same decision that a sole owner could) For benefits greater than b*, the slope of the budget constraint is only -1/3 40

The Principal-Agent Profits Relationship Given the manager s budget constraint, he will maximize utility at benefits of b** * ** Agent s constraint U 2 Profits for the firm will be *** *** U 1 Owner s constraint b* b** Benefits 41

The Principal-Agent Relationship The firm s owners are harmed by having to rely on an agency relationship with the firm s manager The smaller the fraction of the firm that is owned by the manager, the greater the distortions that will be induced by this relationship 42

Using the Corporate Jet A firm owns a fleet of corporate jets used mainly for business purposes the firm has just fired a CEO for misusing the corporate fleet The firm wants to structure a management contract that provides better incentives for cost control 43

Using the Corporate Jet Suppose that all would-be applicants have the same utility function U(s,j) = 0.1s 0.5 + j where s is salary and j is jet use (0 or 1) All applicants have job offers from other firms promising them a utility level of at most 2.0 44

Using the Corporate Jet Because jet use is expensive, = 800 (thousand) if j =0 and = 162 if j =1 the directors will be willing to pay the new CEO up to 638 providing that they can guarantee that he will not use the corporate jet for personal use a salary of more than 400 will just be sufficient to get a potential candidate to accept the job without jet usage 45

Using the Corporate Jet If the directors find it difficult to monitor the CEO s jet usage, this could mean that the firm ends up with < 0 The owner s may therefore want to create a contract where the compensation of the new CEO is tied to profit 46

The Owner-Manager Relationship Suppose that the gross profits of the firm depend on some specific action that a hired manager might take (a) net profits = = (a) s[ (a)] Both gross and net profits are maximized when / a = 0 the owners problem is to design a salary structure that provides an incentive for the manager to choose a that maximizes 47

The Owner-Manager Relationship The owners face two issues they must know the agent s utility function which depends on net income (I M ) I M = s[ (a)] = c(a) = c 0 where c(a) represents the cost to the manager of undertaking a they must design the compensation system so that the agent is willing to take the job this requires that I M 0 48

The Owner-Manager Relationship One option would be to pay no compensation unless the manager chooses a* and to pay an amount equal to c(a*) + c 0 if a* is chosen Another possible scheme is s(a) = (a) f, where f = (a) c(a*) c 0 with this compensation package, the manager s income is maximized by setting s(a)/ a = / a = 0 49

The Owner-Manager Relationship The manager will choose a* and receive an income that just covers costs I M = s(a*) c(a*) c 0 = (a*) f c(a*) c 0 = 0 This compensation plan makes the agent the residual claimant to the firm s profits 50

Asymmetric Information Models of the principal-agent relationship have introduced asymmetric information into this problem in two ways it is assumed that a manager s action is not directly observed and cannot be perfectly inferred from the firm s profits referred to as hidden action the agent-manager s objective function is not directly observed referred to as hidden information 51

Hidden Action The primary reason that the manager s action may be hidden is that profits depend on random factors that cannot be observed by the firm s owner Suppose that profits depend on both the manager s action and on a random variable (u) (a) = (a) + u where represents expected profits 52

Hidden Action Because owners observe only and not, they can only use actual profits in their compensation function a risk averse manager will be concerned that actual profits will turn out badly and may decline the job The owner might need to design a compensation scheme that allows for profit-sharing 53

Hidden Information When the principal does not know the incentive structure of the agent, the incentive scheme must be designed using some initial assumptions about the agent s motivation will be adapted as new information becomes available 54

Important Points to Note: Information is valuable because it permits individuals to increase the expected utility of their decisions individuals might be willing to pay something to acquire additional information 55

Important Points to Note: Information has a number of special properties that suggest that inefficiencies associated with imperfect and asymmetric information may be quite prevalent differing costs of acquisition some aspects of a public good 56

Important Points to Note: The presence of asymmetric information may affect a variety of market outcomes, many of which are illustrated in the context of insurance theory insurers may have less information about potential risks than do insurance purchasers 57

Important Points to Note: If insurers are unable to monitor the behavior of insured individuals accurately, moral hazard may arise being insured will affect the willingness to make precautionary expenditures such behavioral effects can arise in any contractual situation in which monitoring costs are high 58

Important Points to Note: Informational asymmetries can also lead to adverse selection in insurance markets the resulting equilibria may often be inefficient because low-risk individuals will be worse off than in the full information case market signaling may be able to reduce these inefficiencies 59

Important Points to Note: Asymmetric information may also cause some (principal) economic actors to hire others (agents) to make decisions for them providing the correct incentives to the agent is a difficult problem 60