A Theory of Endogenous Liquidity Cycles

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A Theory of Endogenous Günter Strobl Kenan-Flagler Business School University of North Carolina October 2010

Liquidity and the Business Cycle Source: Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (Journal of Finance, forthcoming)

Contributions of This Paper Develops a theory of liquidity cycles Fluctuations in liquidity are driven by endogenous changes in economic activity and the availability of informed capital Length of liquidity cycles is stochastic Liquidity is procyclical Increased liquidity is associated with high economic growth Causality runs in both directions Liquid asset markets attract more investment Larger investments make liquidity provision more profitable Liquidity dry-ups result from imperfect monitoring Information collection efforts are unobservable

The Model Entrepreneur t 1 Entrepreneur t No resources Limited liability Entrepreneur t + 1 Loan Invest $1 Financiers Uninformed Competitive Sale Risky Project Payoff {R, 0} Success prob. θ Sale Investor Informed w.p. α Long-lived

Asset Sales Sale of successful project generates surplus µr > 0 By avoiding asset substitution problem Assets are illiquid due to adverse selection Entrepreneurs have informational advantage over buyers Degree of adverse selection depends on endogenous information structure: IL = R E [P] 1 α Bargaining game Projects are sold only to informed investor Investor and entrepreneur split surplus

Equilibrium of the Stage Game Entrepreneurs invest more when liquidity is high Entrepreneurs profit increases in E [P] Invest if project quality θ θ c, where dθ c /dα < 0 Economic activity is positively related to liquidity Investor collects more info when more projects are sold Utility depends on entrepreneurs investment decisions: π(α, θ c ) = θ α θ (R P) θ c θ dθ φ(α) Unique solution α if cost function φ is sufficiently convex

Investor s Commitment Problem Increase in α has two effects Increases probability of an informative signal Increases likelihood of an asset sale (reduces θ c ) Second effect plays no role in the investor s decision Information choice is not observable to entrepreneurs Commitment to α > α leads to Pareto improvement Increases entrepreneurs expected profit... as well as investor s expected utility

Infinitely Repeated Game Self-enforcing implicit agreement Investor chooses a level of information production above α Entrepreneur invests in projects with quality below θ c Imperfect monitoring Deviations cannot be unambiguously detected Entrepreneurs can t be sure whether the investor complied E.g., the outcome of the bargaining game for a failed project does not reveal whether the investor is informed

Trigger-Strategy Equilibrium Game alternates between normal phases and punishment phases; starts in normal phase. In normal phases, investor chooses α n α and entrepreneurs invest if θ θ c (α n ). Play remains in normal phase as long as investor accepts offer to buy successful project; otherwise, it switches to punishment phase for T periods. In punishment phases, entrepreneurs and investor play the equilibrium strategies of the stage game. Proposition If the investor is sufficiently patient, there exist trigger-strategy equilibria with α n > α.

Liquidity and Investment Liquidity fluctuates over time High-liquidity periods alternate with low-liquidity periods Length of these cycles is stochastic Depends on entrepreneurs return and investor s information production technology Low-liquidity regime is triggered by a failed sale of a successful project Liquidity is procyclical Increased liquidity is associated with high economic growth Causality runs in both directions Liquid markets attract investment Larger investments make liquidity provision more profitable

Liquidity and Economic Output 1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Output Illiquidity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Conclusion Model of liquidity provision as repeated game Assets are illiquid due to adverse selection Degree of adverse selection depends on endogenous information structure Stochastic liquidity cycles Due to imperfect public monitoring Trigger-strategy equilibria Liquidity is procyclical Increased liquidity is associated with high economic growth Causality runs in both directions