Advanced Managerial Economics

Similar documents
Managerial Economics FtA

Noncooperative Oligopoly

Stochastic Games and Bayesian Games

Introduction to Industrial Organization Professor: Caixia Shen Fall 2014 Lecture Note 5 Games and Strategy (Ch. 4)

Lecture 6 Dynamic games with imperfect information

Stochastic Games and Bayesian Games

An introduction on game theory for wireless networking [1]

MKTG 555: Marketing Models

Problem 3 Solutions. l 3 r, 1

GAME THEORY: DYNAMIC. MICROECONOMICS Principles and Analysis Frank Cowell. Frank Cowell: Dynamic Game Theory

CUR 412: Game Theory and its Applications Final Exam Ronaldo Carpio Jan. 13, 2015

Resource Allocation and Decision Analysis (ECON 8010) Spring 2014 Foundations of Decision Analysis

CUR 412: Game Theory and its Applications, Lecture 9

Dynamic Games. Econ 400. University of Notre Dame. Econ 400 (ND) Dynamic Games 1 / 18

Announcements. Today s Menu

Econ 101A Final Exam We May 9, 2012.

Microeconomics of Banking: Lecture 5

Mohammad Hossein Manshaei 1394

Answer Key: Problem Set 4

Introduction to Financial Derivatives

Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information

ECON Microeconomics II IRYNA DUDNYK. Auctions.

Game Theory. Important Instructions

October 9. The problem of ties (i.e., = ) will not matter here because it will occur with probability

Advanced Microeconomics

CHAPTER 22. Real Options. Chapter Synopsis

Economic Management Strategy: Hwrk 1. 1 Simultaneous-Move Game Theory Questions.

G5212: Game Theory. Mark Dean. Spring 2017

Economics 101A (Lecture 25) Stefano DellaVigna

A brief introduction to economics

Martingale Pricing Theory in Discrete-Time and Discrete-Space Models

A brief introduction to economics. Outline. Reading reminder. Risk attitude example (take 3): antivirus software. Notes. Notes. Notes. Notes.

Math 167: Mathematical Game Theory Instructor: Alpár R. Mészáros

Eco AS , J. Sandford, spring 2019 March 9, Midterm answers

Discussion of Calomiris Kahn. Economics 542 Spring 2012

Markov Decision Process

Econ 101A Final exam Mo 18 May, 2009.

M.Phil. Game theory: Problem set II. These problems are designed for discussions in the classes of Week 8 of Michaelmas term. 1

Economics 335 March 2, 1999 Notes 6: Game Theory

General Examination in Microeconomic Theory SPRING 2014

Introduction to Game Theory

Expectimax and other Games

Lecture 5 Leadership and Reputation

ECONS 424 STRATEGY AND GAME THEORY HANDOUT ON PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM- III Semi-Separating equilibrium

Game Theory I. Author: Neil Bendle Marketing Metrics Reference: Chapter Neil Bendle and Management by the Numbers, Inc.

Regulation Policy and Economics of Regulation Class No. 1 (file 1): Introduction

Economics 101 Section 5

Binomial Trees. Liuren Wu. Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College. Options Markets

Rationalizable Strategies

Microeconomic Theory II Preliminary Examination Solutions Exam date: August 7, 2017

Commitment Problems 1 / 24

Real Options and Game Theory in Incomplete Markets

Game Theory with Applications to Finance and Marketing, I

Exercises Solutions: Game Theory

G5212: Game Theory. Mark Dean. Spring 2017

A Decision Analysis Approach To Solving the Signaling Game

Introduction to Game Theory

Economics 502 April 3, 2008

Microeconomic Theory II Spring 2016 Final Exam Solutions

MIDTERM 1 SOLUTIONS 10/16/2008

Econ 711 Homework 1 Solutions

DECISION ANALYSIS. (Hillier & Lieberman Introduction to Operations Research, 8 th edition)

Dynamic games with incomplete information

Advanced Micro 1 Lecture 14: Dynamic Games Equilibrium Concepts

1. better to stick. 2. better to switch. 3. or does your second choice make no difference?

The Intuitive and Divinity Criterion: Explanation and Step-by-step examples

Economics 101A (Lecture 26) Stefano DellaVigna

Psychology and Economics Field Exam August 2012

Exam A Questions Managerial Economics BA 445. Exam A Version 1

Thinking Like An Economist

1 R. 2 l r 1 1 l2 r 2

Lahore University of Management Sciences. ACCT 130 Principles of Management Accounting Fall Semester 2017 Waqar Ali, Omair Haroon, Ayesha Bhatti

ECON DISCUSSION NOTES ON CONTRACT LAW. Contracts. I.1 Bargain Theory. I.2 Damages Part 1. I.3 Reliance

Lahore University of Management Sciences. ACCT 130 Principles of Management Accounting Fall Semester 2016

Causes of Poor Decisions

1.The 6 steps of the decision process are:

Chapter 11: Dynamic Games and First and Second Movers

Math 152: Applicable Mathematics and Computing

Decision Making. DKSharma

Chapter 16: Payout Policy

TIm 206 Lecture notes Decision Analysis

FDPE Microeconomics 3 Spring 2017 Pauli Murto TA: Tsz-Ning Wong (These solution hints are based on Julia Salmi s solution hints for Spring 2015.

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES SCHOOL OF BANKING AND FINANCE

Econ 101A Final exam Mo 19 May, 2008.

Other Regarding Preferences

Comparative Study between Linear and Graphical Methods in Solving Optimization Problems

(a) (5 points) Suppose p = 1. Calculate all the Nash Equilibria of the game. Do/es the equilibrium/a that you have found maximize social utility?

Notes for Lecture 5 (February 28)

COS 445 Final. Due online Monday, May 21st at 11:59 pm. Please upload each problem as a separate file via MTA.

ECON 459 Game Theory. Lecture Notes Auctions. Luca Anderlini Spring 2017

U T D THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS

SI Game Theory, Fall 2008

w E(Q w) w/100 E(Q w) w/

Spring 2017 Final Exam

ECO 5341 (Section 2) Spring 2016 Midterm March 24th 2016 Total Points: 100

Principal-agent examples

Supply Contracts with Financial Hedging

ECO402 Microeconomics Spring 2009 Marks: 20

GLOBAL EDITION. Hubbard O Brien. Economics SIXTH EDITION. R. Glenn Hubbard Anthony Patrick O Brien

CS 188 Fall Introduction to Artificial Intelligence Midterm 1. ˆ You have approximately 2 hours and 50 minutes.

Transcription:

Advanced Managerial Economics Andy McLennan July 27, 2016

Course outline Topics covered in Gans Core Economics for Managers : 1. Economic decision-making (Chapters 2-4) (July 27, August 4, 11) 2. Negotiations (Chapters 5-7) (August 18, 25, September 1) 3. Pricing strategies (Chapters 8-10) (September 15, 22, October 6) 4. Contracting and incentives (Chapters 11-13) (October 13, 20, 27) Guest lecturers: Claudio Mezzetti, July 27 Shino Takayama, August 25

Course requirements Midterm exam (September 8-25%) Three parts: (1) multiple choice; (2) short answer; (3) problem solving Group project report and slides (October 14, 12:00 noon; via the online submission folder, Blackboard - 30%) Managerial economics analysis of movies (e.g., Blood Diamond, The Godfather, Heat) Report, min 3 - max 5 pages, and slides for 15 minute presentation Final exam (examination period - 45%) Three parts: (1) multiple choice; (2) short answer; (3) problem solving Office hours: 520 Colin Clark Bldg, Friday 14:00-16:00 (or 2:00-4:00pm)

Introduction KEY IDEAS of Managerial Economics: Incentives matter (most of the time) Decision makers are (mostly) rational: stable and well-defined preferences and/or goals Prices provide correct signals of relative scarcities Optimal decisions take into account the environment: customers, suppliers, competitors and complementors Information and beliefs are relevant

Introduction KEY TOOLS of Managerial Economics: Mathematical models of consumer and firm behavior Competition models: perfect competition, oligopolistic competition, monopoly Game theory: strategic interaction among players (consumers, firms, regulators, providers) Models of decision theory under uncertainty or incomplete information

Individual Decision-Making

Fundamentals of decision-making Rational decision-makers: optimizing agents with stable, well-defined preferences and goals Constraints: environment determines what is or isn t feasible (affordability/feasibility) Information: decisions under complete or incomplete information (expected profit) Time: static or dynamic decision Strategic interaction: among different players (other firms, government policies)

Decision tree Tool used to frame the decision process as an optimization problem Nodes for new available information decision node chance node Branches represent available alternatives Final nodes describe payoffs

Example TimeScape Ltd (Gans p. 15) TimeScape Ltd is a company that produces a software used on handheld computers. Catherine (managing director) has to make a decision on whether to invest in the development of a new technology that would allow their software to be used on smart phones. Develop ($200k) C Take the risk? Don t develop time

Example TimeScape Ltd (Gans p. 15) Chance node Success: 50% Develop ($200k) Enter or not? C Failure: 50% Don t develop = h time

Example TimeScape Ltd (Gans p. 15) Chance node Enter Profit hand + mob = h + M - c - 200k C Develop ($200k) Success: 50% Failure: 50% Don t Enter = h - 200k Profit hand + mob = h + m - c - 200k Don t develop = h Don t = h - 200k time

Example TimeScape Ltd (Gans p. 15) M > m Chance node Enter Profit hand + mob = h + M - c - 200k C Develop ($200k) Success: 50% Failure: 50% Don t Enter = h - 200k Profit hand + mob = h + m - c - 200k Don t develop = h Don t = h - 200k time

Solving the tree Solve it by backward induction. Chance node M > c Enter Profit hand + mob = h + M - c - 200k C Develop ($200k) Success: 50% Failure: 50% Don t M < c Enter = h - 200k Profit hand + mob = h + m - c - 200k Don t develop = h Don t = h - 200k time

Solving the tree Chance node Enter Profit hand + mob = h + M - c - 200k C Develop ($200k) Success: 50% Failure: 50% Don t m > c Enter = h - 200k Profit hand + mob = h + m - c - 200k Don t develop = h Don t m < c = h - 200k time

Three relevant cases to consider Expected profit: Develop Do not develop Case 1 0.5(h + M c 200,000) h M > m > c +0.5(h + m c 200,000) Case 2 0.5(h + M c 200,000) h M > c > m +0.5(h 200,000) Case 3 0.5(h 200,000) h c > M > m +0.5(h 200,000)

Three relevant cases to consider Expected profit: Develop Do not develop Case 1 h + 0.5(M + m) c 200,000 h M > m > c Case 2 h + 0.5(M c) 200,000 h M > c > m Case 3 h 200,000 h c > M > m

Three relevant cases to consider Expected profit: Develop Do not develop Case 1 h + 0.5(M + m) c 200,000 h M > m > c Case 2 h + 0.5(M c) 200,000 h M > c > m Case 3 h 200,000 h c > M > m

Cases 1 and 2 are ambiguous Case 1: the best option for Catherine is to develop if h+0.5(m +m) c 200,000 > h 0.5(M +m) c > 200,000 not develop otherwise. Case 2: the best option for Catherine is to develop if h + 0.5(M c) 200,000 > h M c > 400,000 not develop otherwise.

Common pitfalls: sunk cost Definition Sunk cost = expenditure that has been made and cannot be recovered. It should not be taken into account when making decisions!

Sunk costs in the example Suppose that TimeScape had already spent $100,000 on exploration of the mobile software option. Enter Profit hand + mob = h + M - c - 300k Develop Success: 50% Don t = h - 300k C Failure: 50% Enter Profit hand + mob = h + m - c - 300k Don t develop = h - 100k Don t = h - 300k time

Common pitfalls: economic versus accounting profit Definition Accounting profit = revenue - accounting cost Accounting cost = actual expenses + depreciation Definition Economic profit = revenue - economic cost Economic cost = cost to a firm of using economic resources in production, including opportunity cost Economic cost includes the opportunity cost: Definition Opportunity cost = cost associated with opportunities that are foregone when a firm s resources are not put to their best alternative use.

How to calculate economic cost Example (economic versus accounting cost) You run a small consulting firm. A portion of your firm s costs covers the office space it occupies. If you wanted to, you could sublet or rent the office space to another company for $2,500 per month. Three scenarios: 1. Two years ago, you signed a five-year lease ($2,000 per month). 2. Two years ago, you bought the office space and are paying a mortgage ($3,000 per month). 3. Two years ago, you bought your office building for $1,170,000 in cash and expect the building to be useful for 30 years. Accounting cost Economic cost Case 1 $2,000 $2,500 Case 2 $3,000 $2,500 Case 3 $3,250 $2,500

Opportunity costs in a merger Example (Disney s acquisition of ABC) One thing written in the popular press about this acquisition was that it was great. Now ABC can get programming from Disney for free. But that really does not make sense. If Disney did not give that programming to ABC, what would they do with it? They would sell the programming to some other broadcast network. And so if Disney gives a programme to ABC, they forego revenues from some other opportunity. When we think about the cost of running ABC, we have to not just include the cost that we actually see on the balance sheet that ABC pays, we have to take into account the revenues that Disney had to forego by giving programmes to ABC rather than selling them to somebody else.

Concluding remarks Decision trees help with cost-benefit analysis of choices. Identify trade-offs between the alternatives you have available. Clear out noise and irrelevant information.