Incorporating Crop Insurance Subsidies into Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Design

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Incorporating Crop Insurance Subsidies into Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) Design RUIQING MIAO (UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS UC) HONGLI FENG (IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY) DAVID A. HENNESSY (IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY) XIAODONG DU (UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN MADISON) AAEA 2013 CROP INSURANCE AND THE FARM BILL SYMPOSIUM, LOUISVILLE, KY 9/21/2015 1

A quick overview of CRP CRP is the largest conservation program in U.S. agriculture about 27 million acres enrolled as of 2013 at an annual budget of $2 billion; was initiated in 1985; has been studied extensively; generally considered a successful program in providing multiple environmental benefits. 9/21/2015 2

Current challenges of CRP Strong demand for food and biofuel puts pressure to draw more land into production. Total enrollment cap reduced from 39.2 to 32 million acres in the 2008 farm bill; might be further reduced to 25 in the next bill. Current enrollment is 10 million acres less than peak. High crop prices also mean that farmers will be less willing to enroll land in CRP. Increasing CRP rental rates gives landowners more incentives but adds strain on federal budget. 9/21/2015 3

Crop insurance today Crop insurance is set to become the pillar of farm support. more than 250 million acres covered with more than $75 billion liability in recent years. predicted to cost about $8.9 billion per year over 2013 2022. Pays about 60 of premiums in subsidies. It was not as important in the 80s, or 90s, or even at the beginning of the century. 9/21/2015 4

Insurance premium, CRP rent, and cash rent North Dakota Iowa Year Premium Premium Subsidy CRP Rent Cash Rent Premium Premium Subsidy CRP Rent Cash Rent 2002 18.7 11.0 33.1 36.5 14.9 8.0 100.8 120 2003 22.8 13.3 33.1 36.5 16.2 8.7 101.9 122 2004 28.7 16.7 33.0 37.5 20.8 11.3 103.4 126 2005 30.8 17.9 33.1 39.0 17.2 9.4 104.3 131 2006 55.6 32.3 33.1 39.0 20.8 11.2 105.3 133 2007 55.6 32.3 33.2 41.0 36.7 19.7 106.2 150 2008 78.5 45.9 33.7 42.5 49.0 26.4 110.9 170 2009 66.6 43.6 34.0 45.5 42.3 24.3 115.8 175 2010 56.4 37.5 34.9 46.5 33.4 19.5 120.1 176 2011 82.6 55.3 36.2 51.5 56.6 32.4 128.1 196 2012 76.5 52.8 37.6 58.0 48.7 28.2 131.6 235 9/21/2015 5

CRP and crop insurance interaction We focus on one direct interaction: When land is enrolled in CRP, the crop insurance subsidies that the land was receiving when in production are avoided. Avoided subsidies have direct budgetary impacts reducing federal budget outlays. Avoided subsidies change the relative competitiveness of fields which CRP offers should be accepted into CRP can differ. 9/21/2015 6

How can crop insurance subsidies be incorporated? We first look at how CRP selects parcels to enroll in the program. We focus on general sign ups that use a competitive mechanism based on Environmental Benefit Index. 9/21/2015 7

How current EBI works? EBI rewards environmental benefits the land offers: wildlife habitat, water and air quality, reduced erosion, carbon sequestration Enrollment costs are also considered in EBI: Ceteris paribus, higher costs lower EBI less likely to be accepted Omitted in the costs is premium subsidies for crop insurance that is saved when the cropland is enrolled in CRP. 9/21/2015 8

How the omission might matter? High concentration of CRP acres in S. Corn Belt, East Dakotas, Montana, S. Great Plains. These are largely marginal cropland regions where CRP enrollment costs are low and benefits may be relatively high. Environmentally sensitive lands are often more risky which means higher premiums. 9/21/2015 9

What we do Identify how crop insurance savings can be included in a modified EBI Examine the objectives implied by the current EBI targeting and contrast it with cost effective targeting. Consider impacts of incorporating subsidies when different targeting criteria are used. Estimate environmental and budgetary impacts of incorporating subsidies. 9/21/2015 10

The formulation of current EBI EBI EEBI f( r ) extra bonus points, k r k where, f ( rk ) a(1 ) b 9/21/2015 11

sign up number 15 16 18 20 26 29 33 39 41 (sign up year) (1997) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2003) (2004) (2006) (2010) (2011) Cost component Parameter values a=190 b=165 a=125 b=165 a=125 b=165 a=125 b=165 a=125 b=185 a=125 b=185 a=125 b=204 a=125 b=220 a=125 b=220 Maximum of cost components 200 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 Maximum of EEBI 400 410 410 410 395 395 395 395 395 Maximum of EBI 600 560 560 560 545 545 545 545 545 EBI cut off for acceptance 259 247 245 246 269 248 242 200 221 9/21/2015 12

The implied objective The current EBI is consistent with the following optimization problem. Maximize environmental benefits with a linear adjustment of costs, subject to an acreage constraint. max a e f ( r ), k k k h P( ) k h s.t. a A, k h k 9/21/2015 13

Key characteristics of current EBI formula It assumes that benefits and a transformation of rental rate are measured on comparable units such that summing the two terms is a meaningful operation. It is a form of benefit targeting which we refer to as pseudo net benefits per acre targeting or simply pseudo benefit targeting 9/21/2015 14

Cost effective targeting Cost effective targeting maximizes environmental benefits for a given budget, i.e., max ae, h P( ) k h s.t. ar M. k h The implied selection criterion is: enroll if ek / rk 2; not enroll if ek / rk 2. k k k k 9/21/2015 15

Incorporating crop insurance subsidies Pseudo net benefit per acre targeting max ( s ), a e f r h P( ) k h k k k s.t. a A, k h Cost effective targeting max ae, h P( ) k h k s.t. a ( r s ) M. k k k h k k k k 9/21/2015 16

Four scenarios We have 4 scenarios: two types of targeting each of which is considered with or without the incorporation of crop insurance subsidies. Baseline (pseudo net benefits targeting) : EBI = EEBI + a (1 r / b), Sc enario 1 ( adjusted pseudo net benefits targeting) : EBI = EEBI + a [ 1 ( r s )/ b], Scenario 2 ( cost effecgtive targeting): EBI = (EEBI )/ r, 2 k Scenario 3 ( adjusted cost effective targeting) : EBI = (EEBI )/( r s ), 1 3 0 k k k k k 9/21/2015 17

The direct effects of considering s k in the problems For both pseudo benefit targeting and cost effective targeting, acres with higher crop insurance subsidies will become more competitive in CRP enrollment process. It now matters how we calculate the budget of enrolled CRP acres total CRP rental payments vs net budget (the latter is the former subtracted by total crop insurance subsidies saved.) 9/21/2015 18

Data CRP contract level data Sign up 26 held in 2003 and sign up 41 held in 2011 Variables include EEBI, weighted average soil rental rate, and rental rate requested RMA unit level data For year 2003 and 2011, variables include rate yield, premium, and premium subsides Cannot link these two datasets directly and so a quintile matching procedure is used. 9/21/2015 19

Summarize statistics We next present two tables of summary statistics for CRP and RMA, respectively. 9/21/2015 20

Offered accepted States NO. of Total Ave. Ave. EEBI Accepted Total Ave. Ave. Offers Acres Rent offers (%) Acres Rent EEBI Sign up 26 IL 7.74 208.8 86 206 64% 132.7 83 229 IN 2.76 74.5 83 193 54% 38.2 79 219 IA 7.13 242.8 106 212 52% 127.4 101 241 KS 6.63 466.9 42 183 63% 293.6 41 202 MI 3.01 99.3 65 169 41% 41.8 64 195 MN 4.43 155.7 59 181 54% 79.5 62 210 MO 3.96 197.6 68 203 77% 154.0 67 214 NE 2.97 158.7 56 183 57% 81.4 61 217 ND 3.02 250.1 35 132 9% 21.3 29 174 OH 3.17 102.0 79 186 48% 49.0 76 206 SD 2.20 178.4 42 143 15% 29.6 33 172 WS 3.96 101.7 63 189 66% 63.1 66 218 All 50.96 2,236.4 62 181 54% 1,111.7 64 213 Sign up 41 IL 1.99 46.0 127 184 74% 35.4 121 196 IN 0.46 10.0 128 176 69% 6.8 127 197 IA 2.00 51.7 167 234 83% 45.4 164 242 KS 4.84 404.2 41 157 83% 336.6 41 168 MI 0.30 6.4 82 150 67% 4.1 81 172 MN 1.64 83.2 69 125 53% 33.2 77 169 MO 2.85 134.4 111 223 95% 128.7 112 228 NE 1.41 105.3 64 177 78% 86.7 59 188 ND 2.39 228.6 39 110 45% 114.0 36 143 OH 0.21 4.7 95 167 73% 3.3 93 187 SD 0.84 78.4 49 130 51% 47.0 45 156 WS 1.01 22.0 98 190 86% 19.2 99 201 All 19.94 1,174.9 64 158 75% 860.4 66 181 9/21/2015 21

corn wheat States NO. of Acres Premium Subsidy NO. of Acres Premium Subsidy Units (millions) ($/acre) ($/acre) Units (millions) ($/acre) ($/acre) Year 2003 IL 148,562 10.8 12 6 11,275 0.5 8 5 IN 62,740 4.1 15 8 4,066 0.2 7 4 IA 167,339 13.5 12 7 131 0.0 12 7 KS 45,458 3.8 12 6 176,867 15.2 7 4 MI 19,316 1.3 14 8 7,178 0.3 9 5 MN 85,188 7.4 15 9 18,121 2.0 12 7 MO 42,348 3.3 13 8 10,467 0.6 6 4 NE 132,763 10.2 14 7 34,643 2.5 8 5 ND 18,584 1.7 18 11 108,686 11.5 9 5 OH 42,692 2.5 15 8 10,771 0.4 6 4 SD 63,143 5.4 15 9 33,595 3.9 10 6 WS 36,780 2.0 19 11 2,045 0.1 12 7 All 864,913 66.0 14 7 417,845 37.2 8 5 Year 2011 IL 165,720 10.8 38 22 14,341 0.6 31 20 IN 70,306 4.1 48 28 6,081 0.3 32 19 IA 176,911 13.5 43 25 244 0.0 40 24 KS 74,988 3.8 40 25 144,258 12.9 21 13 MI 30,019 1.3 51 35 9,692 0.5 31 20 MN 107,444 7.4 49 31 17,209 1.7 44 30 MO 52,575 3.3 49 32 10,806 0.7 23 15 NE 146,215 10.2 42 25 25,911 2.0 21 12 ND 39,143 1.7 69 46 117,137 11.6 35 23 OH 52,388 2.5 52 32 14,790 0.6 27 16 SD 86,722 5.4 55 37 34,034 3.6 35 23 WS 54,207 2.0 67 44 6,037 0.2 37 24 All 1056638 66.0 46 28 400,540 34.7 29 18 9/21/2015 22

Assessing the impacts of incorporating the insurance factor Total savings in crop insurance subsidies Total environmental benefits achieved Total program costs Total acreage The enrollment status of each field The geographical pattern of impacts 9/21/2015 23

EBI ( EEBI as / b )* EBI sc r *( EBI sr s) 13 02 0 The impacts on enrollment criteria Comparing pseudo benefit targeting with and without adjustment Comparing cost effective targeting with and without adjustment EBI Formula Value based on average of variables Sign-up 26 Sign-up 41 EBI ( a/ b)* s 3.33 15.20 1 0 Difference in % EBI EBI 3 2 Difference in % ( a/ b)* s EBI 0 EEBI c r*( r s) s r s 1.11% 5.59% 0.28 1.42 8.35% 51.69% 9/21/2015 24

Different enrollment levels The percentage of offers that can be accepted in CRP is important. The higher the acceptance rate, the less selective the program is, and the more likely we will observe smaller impacts. We consider two types of enrollment levels. One fixed at the baseline enrollment level One with varying enrollment levels (represented by Lorenz curves). 9/21/2015 25

Comparison I Comparison II Comparison III Baseline Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Baseline Scenario 3 Actual numbers Difference (%) Actual numbers Difference (%) 9/21/2015 26 Difference (in %) Sign up 26 Total acres enrolled (acres) 1,111,714 1,481,249 0.94% 34.51% Total payment per year ($) 71,520,912 0.66% 71,513,578 Insurance subsidy saved per year($) 5,475,197 3.07% 7,982,500 3.54% 51.15% Total EEBI 236,905,327 0.06% 268,779,785 0.12% 13.32% Average EEBI per acre 213.1 0.05% 181 0.56% 15.53% Average EEBI per dollar 3.31 0.72% 3.76 0.13% 13.32% Acres that change status (acres)* 4.53% 853,898 6.15% 81.54% sign up 41 Total acres enrolled (acres) 860,445 1,021,166 1.84% 20.87% Total payment per year ($) 57,003,666 0.18% 56,999,718 0.01% 0.00% Insurance subsidy saved per year($) 19,347,534 3.02% 23,115,120 4.59% 24.96% Total EEBI 155,816,320 0.09% 163,667,056 0.54% 4.47% Average EEBI per acre 181.1 0.11% 160 1.88% 13.31% Average EEBI per dollar 2.73 0.28% 2.87 0.55% 4.47% Acres that change status (acres)* 4.57% 280,223 17.36% 38.22%

Crop Insurance Subsidies Saved 12 x 106 10 8 6 4 2 Signup 26 Baseline Scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 0 0 5 10 15 Total Budget x 10 7 Crop Insurance Subsidies Saved 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 3 x 107 Signup 41 Baseline Scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 0 0 2 4 6 8 Total Budget x 10 7 9/21/2015 27

1 CRP Payment and EEBI 1 CRP Payment and EEBI Proportion of EEBI 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Baseline Scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 p 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Proportion of Payment 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 Baseline Scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Proportion of Payment 9/21/2015 28

Baseline Scenario (S0) Changes: S1 vs. S0 Changes: S2 vs. S0 Legend Scenario 2 (S2) Legend <100 100-200 200-500 500-1,500 >1,500 Changes: S3 vs. S0 < -1500-1500 - -500-500 - 0 0 0-500 500-1500 >1500 Changes: S3 vs. S2 Figure 3. County-Level CRP Acreage and Comparisons of Acreage between Scenarios (Signup 26) Note: The two maps in the left column is the absolute CRP acreage under Baseline Scenario and Scenario 2, respectively. Maps in the middle and the right columns are CRP acreage differences between scenarios. For example, the upper middle map depicts the CRP acreage change in each county under Scenario 1 when compared with that under Baseline Scenario (i.e., S0). A positive number (colored as greens) means that CRP acreage under Scenario 1 is greater than that under Baseline Scenario. Unit is in acres for all six maps. Under Scenarios 3 the CRP payment is r_k instead of r_k s_k. 9/21/2015 29

Baseline Scenario Changes: S1 vs. S0 Changes: S2 vs. S0 Legend Scenario 2 Legend <100 100-200 200-500 500-1,500 >1,500 Changes: S3 vs. S0 < -1500-1500 - -500-500 - 0 0 0-500 500-1500 >1500 Changes: S3 vs. S2 Figure 4. County-Level CRP Acreage and Comparisons of Acreage between Scenarios (Signup 41) Note: The two maps in the left column is the absolute CRP acreage under Baseline Scenario and Scenario 2, respectively. Maps in the middle and the right columns are CRP acreage differences between scenarios. For example, the upper middle map depicts the CRP acreage change in each county under Scenario 1 when compared with that under Baseline Scenario (i.e., S0). A positive number (colored as greens) means that CRP acreage under Scenario 1 is greater than that under Baseline Scenario. Unit is in acres for all six maps. Under Scenarios 3 the CRP payment is r_k instead of r_k s_k. 9/21/2015 30

Baseline Scenario Changes: S1 vs. S0 Changes: S2 vs. S0 Scenario 2 Legend No Enrollment Changes: S3 vs. S0 Legend < -1,000-1,000 - -500 Changes: S3 vs. S2 <500-500 - 0 500-2,000 0 2,000-4,000 0-1,000 4,000-6,000 1,000-4,000 >6,000 > 4,000 Figure 5. Crop Insurance Subsidy Savings and Comparisons of the Savings between Scenarios (Signup 26) Note: The two maps in the left column is the absolute crop insurance subsidy savings under Baseline Scenario and Scenario 2, respectively. Maps in the middle and the right columns are differences in the savings between scenarios. For example, the upper middle map depicts the subsidy saving changes in each county under Scenario 1 when compared with that under Baseline Scenario (i.e., S0). A positive number (colored as greens) means that CRP acreage under Scenario 1 is greater than that under Baseline Scenario. Unit is in dollars per year for all six maps. Under Scenarios 3 the CRP payment is r_k instead of r_k s_k. 9/21/2015 31

Baseline Scenario Changes: S1 vs. S0 Changes: S2 vs. S0 Scenario 2 Legend No Enrollment Changes: S3 vs. S0 Legend < -1,000-1,000 - -500 Changes: S3 vs. S2 <500-500 - 0 500-2,000 0 2,000-4,000 0-1,000 4,000-6,000 1,000-4,000 >6,000 > 4,000 Figure 6. Crop Insurance Subsidy Savings and Comparisons of the Savings between Scenarios (Signup 41) Note: The two maps in the left column is the absolute crop insurance subsidy savings under Baseline Scenario and Scenario 2, respectively. Maps in the middle and the right columns are differences in the savings between scenarios. For example, the upper middle map depicts the subsidy saving changes in each county under Scenario 1 when compared with that under Baseline Scenario (i.e., S0). A positive number (colored as greens) means that CRP acreage under Scenario 1 is greater than that under Baseline Scenario. Unit is in dollars per year for all six maps. Under Scenarios 3 the CRP payment is r_k instead of r_k s_k. 9/21/2015 32

Concluding remarks Avoided crop insurance subsidies are significant. Impacts of incorporating crop insurance subsidies on CRP enrollment depend on targeting approaches. With current targeting mechanism, impacts are small. With cost effective targeting, impacts are larger. Geographical patterns can be significantly affected. Caveats: no general equilibrium feedback to take into account market responses; a national study could show larger impacts, esp. geographical configuration. 9/21/2015 33