Achieving Actuarial Balance in Social Security: Measuring the Welfare Effects on Individuals

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Achieving Actuarial Balance in Social Security: Measuring the Welfare Effects on Individuals Selahattin İmrohoroğlu 1 Shinichi Nishiyama 2 1 University of Southern California (selo@marshall.usc.edu) 2 Kyoto University (nishiyama@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp) October 27, 2017 Presentation at the Facing Demographic Change in a Challenging Economic Environment Workshop in Montreal, Canada 1 / 54

Effects of Aging Population on Households Aging population affects the individual decision as follows: With lower mortality rates and higher life expectancy, individual households would save more by working longer for their retirement. [direct effect] With fewer children, households would likely consume less for dependent children. [not considered] Possible changes in factor prices and government policies would affect the households current and future decisions further. [G.E. effects] 2 / 54

Effects of Aging Population on the Overall Economy Aging population affects the overall economy as follows: With the lower (higher) share of working-age (elderly) population, the labor supply per capita and GDP per capita would decrease. The government tax revenue per capita would likely decrease, and its transfer spending would increase. To finance the budgetary cost of aging, the government would have to raise taxes and/or cut spending. These fiscal policy changes would affect the overall economy further. [G.E. effects] 3 / 54

Main Questions of This Paper This paper addresses the following questions: How would the U.S. aging population affect the individual behavior and the overall economy? How large would the cost of the aging population in the Social Security pension (OASI) program be? How should (could) the government close the fiscal gap generated by the aging population? How would different policy changes to close the fiscal gap affects the overall economy and the welfare of households? 4 / 54

The Approach of This Paper This paper quantitatively analyzes the effect of the U.S. aging population in a heterogeneous-agent OLG economy in the following way: Incorporating SSA s population projection to a G.E. OLG model with idiosyncratic wage shocks. Constructing the aging baseline (calibrated to 2015 U.S. economy) as an equilibrium transition path over 1975 2200. Solving the model for 2016 2200 with alternative reform plans to close the fiscal gap in the Social Security pension (OASI) program. 5 / 54

The Model Economy The economy consists of a large number of heterogeneous & OLG households, a perfectly-competitive representative firm with CRS production technology, a government with a commitment technology. A model period is a year. In a stationary equilibrium, the economy grows with the labor-augmenting productivity growth rate, µ, the long-run population growth rate, ν, which is about 0.32%. 6 / 54

Heterogeneous Households Households are heterogeneous with respect to ages, i = 21,..., I, beginning-of-period wealth, a, average historical earnings, b, working ability, e. In each period t, the households each receive idiosyncratic working ability shocks, e, and choose consumption, c, working hours, h, wealth at the beginning of the next period, a, to maximize their (remaining) lifetime utility. 7 / 54

Individual & Aggregate States The individual state of the heterogeneous households is s = (i, a, b, e). The aggregate state vector of the economy in period t is S t = (x t (s), w G,t, W S,t ), which consists of the joint distribution function of households, x t (s), the government s net worth per capita, w G,t, the Social Security (OASI) trust funds, W S,t. 8 / 54

The Government Policy Schedule The government policy schedule as of period t is Ψ t = { c G,s, tr LS,s, τ I,s ( ), τ P,s ( ), tr SS,s ( ), τ C,s, w G,s+1, W S,s+1 } s=t, which includes the government s consumption per capita, c G,t, lump-sum transfers per capita, tr LS,t, progressive income tax function, τ I,t ( ), Social Security payroll tax function, τ P,t ( ), Social Security benefit function, tr SS,t ( ), flat consumption tax rate, τ C,t. 9 / 54

The Population Projection The population projection as of period t is, Φ t = { (p i,s ) I i=0, (φ i,s) I i=0} s=t, which consists of the population, p i,t, of age i households in year t, the survival rate, φ i,t, at the end of age i in year t, where p i,t = A B E x t (i, a, b, e)dadbde = A B E dx t (s). 10 / 54

The Household s Optimization Problem The optimization problem is { v(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ) = max u(c, h)+βφ i,t E [ v(s, S t+1 ; Ψ t+1, Φ t+1 ) s ]} c,h,a subject to the constraints of the decision variables, c > 0, 0 h < h max, a 0, and the law of motion of the individual state, s = (i + 1, a, b, e ). 11 / 54

The Laws of Motion of the State The laws of motion of the individual state are the intertemporal budget constraint, a = 1 [ (1 + r t )a + w t eh + tr 1 + µ SS,t (i, b) + tr LS,t + q t τ I,t (w t eh, r t a, tr SS,t (i, b)) τ P,t (w t eh) (1 + τ C,t )c ], the average historical earnings, b = 1 {i<ir } 1 [ (i 21) b w ] t + min(w t eh, ϑ max ) i 20 w t 1 + 1 {i IR }b. 12 / 54

The Decision Rules of the Households Solving the above problem for c, h, and a, we obtain the household s decision rules as c(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ), h(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ), a (s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ), and [ b 1 (s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ) = 1 {i<ir } (i 21) b w t i 20 w t 1 ] + min(w t eh(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ), ϑ max ) + 1 {i IR }b. 13 / 54

The Distribution of the Households (1) The households of age 21 enter the economy with no assets and working histories, i.e., dx t (21, a, b, e) = A B E E dx t (21, 0, 0, e) = p 21,t, where p 21,t is normalized to unity in 2015. The population distribution of the age 21 households is exogenous, x t (21, 0, 0, e) = π 21 (e) p 21,t, where π 21 (e) is the unconditional probability density function of working ability at age 21. 14 / 54

The Distribution of the Households (2) For i = 21,..., I, the growth-adjusted population distribution of households is obtained recursively by x t+1 (s ) = x t+1 (i + 1, a, b, e ) = φ i,t 1 + ν A B E 1 {a =a (s,s t ;Ψ t,φ t ), b =b (s,s t ;Ψ t,φ t )} π i (e e) dx t (s), where π i (e e) is the conditional probability density function of working ability e at age i + 1 given e at age i. 15 / 54

The Supply of Capital and Labor Private wealth, government debt, domestic wealth (capital stock), and labor supply are calculated as I W P,t = i=21 W G,t = w G,t A B E I p i,t, i=21 K t = W P,t + W G,t, a dx t (s), L t = I i=21 A B E eh(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ) dx t (s). 16 / 54

Production Factor Prices From the representative firm s profit-maximizing condition and the market-clearing condition, the rate of return to capital, r t, and the average wage rate, w t, are obtained as r t = F K (K t, L t ) δ, w t = F L (K t, L t ), where F(K t, L t ) is a Cobb-Douglas production function, F(K t, L t ) = A K θ t L 1 θ t. 17 / 54

The Government Revenue and Expenditure The government s income tax revenue, T I,t, payroll tax revenue, T P,t, and consumption tax revenue, T C,t, are obtained by using the distribution of households, x t (s). The government purchases, C G,t, non-s.s. (lump-sum) transfer spending, TR LS,t, and S.S. transfer spending, TR SS,t, are also obtained by using x t (s). The government collects wealth left by deceased households as accidental bequests, and it redistributes the revenue uniformly, q t, to all households. 18 / 54

The Government s Tax Revenue The government s income tax revenue, T I,t, payroll tax revenue, T P,t, and consumption tax revenue, T C,t, are obtained as I T I,t = T P,t = T C,t = i=21 I i=21 I A B E A B E i=21 A B E τ I,t (w t eh(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ), r t a, tr SS,t (i, b); ϕ t ) dx t (s), τ P,t (w t eh(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ); τ P,t ) dx t (s), τ C,t c(s, S t ; Ψ t, Φ t ) dx t (s), where ϕ t is a parameter of the income tax function, and τ P,t is the OASI payroll tax rate on earnings below the max taxable earnings. 19 / 54

The Government s Expenditure The government s purchases, C G,t, non-s.s. (lump-sum) transfer spending, TR LS,t, and S.S. transfer spending, TR SS,t, are obtained as I I C G,t = c G,t p i,t, TR LS,t = tr LS,t p i,t, i=21 I TR SS,t = i=21 A B E i=21 tr SS,t (i, b; ψ SS,t ) dx t (s), where ψ SS,t is the OASI benefit adjustment factor. 20 / 54

The Government s Intertemporal Budget Constraint The government budget is assumed to be unified, and it satisfies the following constraint, W G,t+1 = 1 [ (1 + r t )W (1 + µ)(1 + ν) G,t + T I,t (ϕ t ) + T P,t (τ P,t ) +T C,t (τ C,t ) C G,t (c G,t ) TR LS,t (tr LS,t ) TR SS,t (ψ SS,t ) ]. The OASI trust funds, W S,t, are the accounting tool to check the sustainability of the program, W S,t+1 = 1 [ (1 + µ)(1 + ν) max TR SS,t (ψ SS,t ) ]. 0, (1 + r t )W S,t + T P,t (τ P,t ) 21 / 54

Recursive Competitive Equilibrium A time series of factor prices, the gov t policy variables, the value functions, the decision rules, and the distribution of households are in a recursive competitive equilibrium if, for all s = t,...,, the households each solve their utility maximization problem, taking the current state of the economy, the gov t policy schedule, and the population projection as given; the firm solves its profit maximization problem, taking factor prices as given; the government follows its policy schedule; and the goods and factor markets clear. 22 / 54

Population Projection This paper uses SSA s intermediate population projection (1941 2100) provided for the 2014 trustees report. This paper extrapolates SSA s projection through 2200 by using the projected mortality rates in 2099, the age-specific fertility rates in 2100 (estimated from the 2006 fertility rates). Under these assumptions, the population distribution in 2200 is almost stationary, but the distribution in 2015 is non-stationary. 23 / 54

Population Growth Rate by 3.0 2.5 1.5 1950 1975 2000 2025 2050 2075 2100 2125 2150 2175 2200 SSA's Projection (2013) Long Run Growth Rate 0.3137 24 / 54

Population Distribution by Age in Selected s (1) Growth-adjusted by the long-run growth rate ν (p 21,2015 = ) 1.2 0.8 1975 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 5.10 1.2 0.8 1995 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 4.56 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 Working Age Population (21 64) Elderly Population (65+) 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 0.2 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 1.2 0.8 2015 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 4.00 1.2 0.8 2035 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 2.55 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 1.2 0.8 2055 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 2.51 1.2 0.8 2075 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 2.32 0.6 0.6 25 / 54

0.8 0.6 0.6 Population 0.4 Distribution by Age 0.4 in Selected s (2) 0.2 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Growth-adjusted by the long-run growth rate ν (p 21,2015 = ) Age Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 4.00 0.8 0.2 = 2.55 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 1.2 0.8 2055 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 2.51 1.2 0.8 2075 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 2.32 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 1.2 0.8 2100 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 2.15 1.2 0.8 2200 Working Age Pop. / Elderly Pop. = 9 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 Age 26 / 54

The Calibration Procedure (1) This paper constructs the aging-population baseline as follows: 1. the paper first solves the model for a 1975 stationary equilibrium by using the historical population distribution in 1975, assuming the households falsely believe that the population distribution is time-invariant; 2. the paper next solves the model for a 2200 stationary equilibrium and an equilibrium transition path in 1975 2200 by using the projected population distribution, assuming the households suddenly realize that the population distribution is aging in 1975. 27 / 54

The Calibration Procedure (2) To finance the budgetary cost of the aging population, the aging-population baseline economy assumes that the gov t decreases its consumption spending so that the debt per capita stays at the 2015 level after growth adjustment. This policy change will not affect the households decision, because the government s consumption is not in the households utility function or the budget constraint. Repeating the above steps 1 and 2, the parameters of the model are chosen so that the model economy in 2015 over the transition path is consistent with the 2015 U.S. economy. 28 / 54

Main Parameter Values in the Aging Baseline Table 1: Main Parameter Values of the Aging-Population Baseline Economy Parameter Value Comment Demographics Maximum age I 100 Maximum age households can work 80 Minimum age of elderly households I R 66 OASI full retirement age Productivity growth rate µ 150 Real GDP per capita growth in 1990 2015 Long-run population growth rate ν 032 Population growth projected in 2200 Total population (ages 21 100) in 2015 52.470 When p 21,t = in 2015 Working-age population (ages 21 65) in 2015 42.725 Preferences Discount factor β 012 Target: K t /Y t = 3.0 in 2015 Growth-adjusted discount factor β 0.9816 β = β(1 + µ) α(1 γ) Coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 3.0000 Share parameter of consumption α 0.6613 Target: Frisch elasticity in 2015 Production technology and wage process Share parameter of capital stock θ 0.3700 Labor income share 0.63 in 2011 2015 Depreciation rate of capital stock δ 733 Target: r t = 5 in 2015 Total factor productivity A 0.8910 Target: w t = in 2015 Auto correlation parameter of log wage ρ 0.9500 Standard deviation of log wage shocks σ 0.2800 Var. of log earnings in 2013 SCF Average hourly wage by age ē i Estimated by OLS with 2013 SCF Note: This baseline calibration uses the population projection Alternative 2 (intermediate scenario) for Social Security Administration (2014). even though they can possibly work until age 80. When this paper normalizes the population of age-21 households in 2014 to unity, the total population and the working-age population are 51.30 and 41.24, 29 / 54

Policy Parameter Values in the Aging Baseline Table 2: Fiscal Policy Parameter Values of the Aging-Population Baseline Economy under Alternative 2 Parameter Value Comment Model units Taxable labor income ratio η 0.6810 SS covered earnings / NIPA labor income in 2013 Scale adjustment a 96.596 Average earnings $71,475 in 2015 Progressive income tax Income tax: tax rate limit ϕ t 0.3960 Target: T I,t /Y t = 0.106 in 2015 : curvature ϕ 1 0.7653 } Estimated by OLS : scale ϕ 2 412 : deduction/exemptions b d 0.1706 0.6 $20,600 + 0.4 $10,300 in 2015 Social Security system S.S. payroll tax rate: OASI τ P,t 0.1060 Statutory rate in 2015 Maximum taxable earnings c ϑ max 1.5334 1.25 $118,500 in 2015 Repl. rate threshold: 0.90 & 0.32 c ϑ 1 0.1280 1.25 $824 12 in 2015 : 0.32 & 0.15 c ϑ 2 0.6451 1.25 $4,154 12 in 2015 Benefit adjustment factor: OASI ψ t 1.6753 Target: benefits 4.1% of GDP in 2015 Other policy variables Government s consumption per capita c G,t 0.1518 Calculated as a residual Consumption tax rate τ C,t 286 Target: T C,t /Y t = 17 in 2015 Government s net worth per capita w G,t -183 Target: W G,t /Y t = 0.70 in 2015 Social Security (OASI) trust fund W S,t 11.6024 Target: W S,t /Y t = 0.152 in 2015 Note: This baseline calibration uses the population projection Alternative 2 (intermediate scenario) for Social Security Administration (2014). a A unit in the model economy corresponds to $96,596 in 2015 growth-adjusted dollars. b 60% of all households are assumed to be married, and the other 40% of households are single. c Each married household is assumed to have 1.25 full-time equivalent workers. 3.7 The Social Security System 30 / 54

Demographics in the Aging-Population Economy (1) This paper uses the SSA s population projection over 1941-2100 and extrapolates it through 2200. Population Distribution by Age (in 2015) 1.20 Age 21 Population = 0 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Age Stationary Population Aging population 31 / 54

Demographics in the Aging-Population Economy (2) The old age dependency ratio indicates how the aging population will affect the Social Security budget in the future. Ratio Old Age Dependency Ratio (Ages 65 120 to 21 64) 0 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25 0.20 0.15 0.10 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 Stationary Population Aging Population 32 / 54

Demographics in the Aging-Population Economy (3) The decreasing share of working-age population partially explains how labor supply per capita will change in the future. 0.85 The Proportion of Working Age Population (Ages 21 64 to 21 120) 0.80 Ratio 0.75 0.70 0.65 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 Stationary Population Aging Population 33 / 54

Ch in % Pts from 2015 Benchma The Aging-Population Baseline -4.0 Economy (1) % changes 1980 2000 2020 2040 from 2060 2080 the2100 2015 2120 2140 2160 growth-adjusted 2180 2200 economy %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ. Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Capita %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ. Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Capita om 2015 Benchmark 1.5 - - -1.5 5.0 3.0 SS Capital (OASI) Benefits Stock Per Per Capita Capita 2.5-5.0 1.5-1 -15.0-2 - -25.0-1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 Gross Gov't Domestic Consumption Product Per Per Capita Capita - -4.0 - -1.5-6.0-8.0-2.5-1 -3.0-3.5-1 -4.0 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 1.5 - %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ. Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Capita %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ. Labor Tax Revenue Supply Per Capita 6.0 0.6 4.0 0.4 0.2-0.2-4.0-0.4-6.0-0.6-0.8-8.0 - -1-1.2-1 -1.4-14.0-1.6 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 6.0 4.0-4.0-6.0-4.0 Income, Private Payroll, Consumption and Cons. Per Tax Capita Rates -8.0-6.0 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 Rate of Return to Capital Cutting Government Consumption Average Wage Rate %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Eco 15 Benchmark Econ. 4.0-6.0-8.0-1 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 6.0 4.0-4.0 34 / 54

%Ch from 2015 Benchmark Eco Ch in % Pts from 2015 Benchma 1.5-4.0 The Aging-Population -6.0 Baseline -4.0 Economies (2) -8.0 - -1 - -1.5-1 -8.0 % changes 1980 2000 2020 2040 from 2060 2080 the 21002015 2120 2140 2160 growth-adjusted 2180 2200 economy Ch Ch in as % a Pts % of from 2015 2015 GDP Benchmark per Capita Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Capita 015 GDP per Capita SS Rate (OASI) of Benefits Return to Per Capital Capita 3.0 2.5 1.5 1.5 - - - -1.5-1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 Gov't SS (OASI) Consumption Benefits Per Capita 3.0 2.5 - - 1.5-1.5-2.5-3.0 - -3.5 - -4.0 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 - - -1.5 %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Eco %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ. Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Capita %Ch as from a % of 2015 Benchmark GDP per Capita Econ. Gov't Consumption Per Capita Cutting Government Consumption Income, Payroll, and Cons. Tax Rates 5 Benchmark Econ. 4.0-6.0-8.0-6.0-1 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 6.0 0.6 0.4 4.0 0.2-0.2-0.4-0.6-4.0-0.8 - -6.0-1.2-8.0-1.4-1 -1.6 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 6.0 4.0 Tax Average Revenue Wage Per Rate Capita Income, Tax Payroll, Revenue and Per Cons. Capita Tax Rates 0.6 6.0 0.4 0.2 4.0-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8 - -1.2-4.0-1.4-1.6-6.0 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 35 / 54

Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Cap The Aging-Population -0.6 Baseline -0.8 Economies (3) 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 % changes from the 2015 growth-adjusted economy Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Capita 2.5 1.5 - - Gov't Consumption Per Capita - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 Ch as a % of 2015 GDP per Cap %Ch from 2015 Benchmark Econ. 0.2-0.2-0.4 - -1.2-1.4-1.6 6.0 4.0-4.0 Cutting Government Consumption 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 Income, Payroll, and Cons. Tax Rates -6.0 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 36 / 54

Fiscal Gap of the OASI Program The government is assumed to keep its consumption in 2016 2200 at the 2015 level instead of cutting it to finance the budgetary cost of aging population. Ch as a % of Benchmark GDP - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0 Government Consumption 1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120 2140 2160 2180 2200 Aging-Population Baseline Fiscal Gap Generated by the Aging Population Policy Experiments 37 / 54

Increasing Payroll Tax vs Cutting Benefits (1) Following the 2016 Social Security Trustees Report, to make the OASI program sustainable for the next 75 years, the government is assumed to do either one of the following: increasing the OASI payroll tax immediately by 2.25 pp; cutting the OASI benefits immediately & proportionally by 15.8%. 38 / 54

Ch in %Pts from 2015 Economy Increasing -0.6 Payroll Tax vs Cutting 4.0 Benefits (2) % -1.6 changes from the 2015 benchmark - economy Ch as %Ch % of from Bal. Gr. Balanced GDP Per Growth Capita Path Ch as %Ch % of from Bal. Gr. Balanced GDP Per Growth Capita Path Pts from 2015 Economy 0.2-0.2-0.4-0.8 - -1.2-1.4 1 8.0 3.0 6.0 2.5 4.0 1.5-4.0 - - Capital Stock Per Capita SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Gov't Consumption Per Capita - -3.0 - -4.0 - -5.0-1.5-6.0-7.0-2.5-8.0-3.0-3.5-4.0 0.2-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8 - -1.2 Rate of Return to Capital Aging Baseline Economy Decreasing OASI Benefits by 15.8% %Ch from 2015 Economy %Ch from Balanced Growth Path Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita %Ch % of from Balanced Balanced Growth Growth GDP Path h from 2015 Economy 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 3.0 0.8-4.0 0.6-6.0-8.0 0.4-1 0.2-1 -14.0-0.2-0.4 8.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 Labor Supply Per Capita Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Private Consumption Per Capita SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 25.0-2 - 15.0-1.5 1-2.5-3.0 5.0-3.5-5.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Average Wage Rate Increasing OASI Tax Rate by 2.25pp 39 / 54

Ch %Ch in %Pts from from Balanced 2015 Economy Growth Pa 0.2 - -0.2-3.0-0.4-1.5 5.0-4.0-0.6 4.0 Increasing -5.0 Payroll Tax vs Cutting Benefits (3) -0.8-6.0 - -7.0-1.2-8.0-1.4 % -1.6 changes from the 2015 benchmark - economy Ch as % Ch of in Bal. %Pts Gr. from GDP 2015 Per Capita Economy Ch as Ch % as of % Bal. of Bal. Gr. GDP Gr. GDP Per Per Capita Capita Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Rate of Return to Capital SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita 0.2 3.0-0.2 2.5-0.4-0.6 1.5-0.8 - -1.2-1.4-1.6 - - 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 3.0 2.5 1.5 - - -1.5-2.5 - -3.0 - -3.5-4.0 - - -1.5-2.5-3.0 SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita Gov't Consumption Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Gov't Consumption Per Capita Aging Baseline Economy Decreasing OASI Benefits by 15.8% %Ch %Ch from from Balanced 2015 Economy Growth Pa Ch as % of Bal. %Ch Gr. from GDP 2015 Per Economy Capita Ch % as of % Balanced of Bal. Gr. Growth GDP Per GDP Capita f Balanced Growth GDP 8.0-7.0-6.0 3.0-2.5-3.0-3.5 Average Wage Rate Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita 8.0 7.0 6.0 0.8 5.0 4.0 0.6 3.0 0.4 0.2 - -0.2-0.4 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 25.0 0.8 2 0.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 15.0 0.4 0.2 1 5.0-0.2-0.4-5.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 25.0 2 15.0 1 5.0 SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP Increasing OASI Tax Rate by 2.25pp 40 / 54

Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Cap 1.5 0.2 Increasing Payroll Tax vs Cutting Benefits (4) - - % changes from the 2015 benchmark economy Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Cap 0.8 0.6 0.4-0.2-0.4 Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0 Gov't Consumption Per Capita Aging Baseline Economy Decreasing OASI Benefits by 15.8% % of Balanced Growth GDP 25.0 2 15.0 1 5.0-5.0 SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Increasing OASI Tax Rate by 2.25pp 41 / 54

Increasing Payroll Tax vs Cutting Benefits (5) % changes from the 2015 benchmark economy % Ch in Consumption Equivalence -4.0-6.0-8.0-1 -1-14.0 100 80 Consumption Equivalcence 60 40 20 0-20 -40-60 -80 Age in 2016-100 -120-140 Wealth Transf. as % of GDP Per Capita 10 0-10 -20-30 -40-50 -60-70 -80-90 100 Compensating Variations (-1) 80 60 40 20 0-20 -40-60 -80-100 -120-140 Age in 2016 Increasing OASI Tax Rate by 2.25pp Decreasing OASI Benefits by 15.8% 42 / 54

Covered Earnings vs Taxable Earnings The annual maximum taxable earnings in 2015 and 2016 are both $118,500. All (covered) earnings are taxable for Medicare (HI) but only those below $118,500 are taxable for OASDI. The share of taxable earnings has decreased from 9% in 1982-83 to 82.5% in 2015. Taxable Earnings / Covered Earnings % 95 90 85 80 75 70 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 Taxable Earnings (% of Total) 43 / 54

Removing Max Taxable Earnings (1) To improve the actuarial balance of the OASI program, the government is assumed to remove the maximum taxable earnings together with either one of the following changes: removing the maximum of annual earnings for the calculation of AIME as well. - The benefits of high-earnings workers will increase in the future. keeping the maximum of annual earnings for the calculation of AIME at the current level. 44 / 54

Ch in %Pts from 2015 Economy -0.4 4.0 Removing -0.6 Max Taxable Earnings 3.0 (2) % -1.2 changes from the 2015 benchmark economy Ch as %Ch % of from Bal. Gr. Balanced GDP Per Growth Capita Path %Ch from Balanced Growth Path Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita Pts from 2015 Economy -0.2-0.8 - Capital Stock Per Capita 3.0 SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita 3.5 3.0-2.5-3.0-4.0 1.5-5.0-6.0 Gross Domestic Product Per Capita - Gov't Consumption Per Capita -3.0-4.0 - -5.0 - -6.0-1.5-7.0-8.0-2.5-9.0-3.0-1 -3.5-4.0-4.5-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8 - %Ch from 2015 Economy %Ch from Balanced Growth Path Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita %Ch % of from Balanced Balanced Growth Growth GDP Path -4.0 0.8-6.0 0.6-8.0 0.4-1 0.2-1 -14.0-0.2 Labor Supply Per Capita Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Rate of Return to Capital Average Wage Rate Cutting Government Consumption 6.0 Removing Max Taxable Earnings 1 Removing Max Taxable Earnings 2 5.0 h from 2015 Economy 6.0 5.0-0.4 SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 25.0-2 - -1.5 15.0 1-2.5-3.0 5.0-3.5-4.0-5.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 4.0 3.0 Private Consumption Per Capita 45 / 54

%Ch from Balanced Growth Pa Ch in %Pts from 2015 Economy - -3.0-0.2-4.0-5.0-0.4-1.5 4.0 Removing -6.0-0.6 Max Taxable Earnings -2.5 3.0 (3) -7.0-8.0-0.8-9.0-1 - % -1.2 changes from the 2015 benchmark economy Ch as % Ch of in Bal. %Pts Gr. from GDP 2015 Per Capita Economy Ch as Ch % as of % Bal. of Bal. Gr. GDP Gr. GDP Per Per Capita Capita Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita -0.2 3.5 3.0-0.4 2.5-0.6-0.8 1.5 - -1.2 3.5 3.0 2.5 - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0-4.5 - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Rate of Return to Capital SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita Gov't Consumption Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 %Ch %Ch from from Balanced 2015 Economy Growth Pa Ch as % of Bal. %Ch Gr. from GDP 2015 Per Economy Capita Ch % as of % Balanced of Bal. Gr. Growth GDP Per GDP Capita 6.0 5.0 0.8 4.0 0.6 3.0 0.4 0.2-0.2-0.4 Average Wage Rate Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Gov't Consumption Per Capita SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP Cutting Government Consumption 25.0 Removing Max Taxable Earnings 1 Removing Max Taxable Earnings 2 f Balanced Growth GDP 6.0 - - 5.0-3.0-3.5-4.0 25.0 0.8 2 0.6 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 15.0 0.4 0.2 1 5.0-0.2-0.4-5.0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 2 15.0 1 5.0 46 / 54

Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Cap 3.0 2.5 1.5 0.2 Removing Max Taxable Earnings (4) % changes from the 2015 benchmark economy Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Cap 0.8 0.6 0.4-0.2-0.4 Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0-4.5 Gov't Consumption Per Capita % of Balanced Growth GDP Cutting Government Consumption Removing Max Taxable Earnings 1 Removing Max Taxable Earnings 2 25.0 2 15.0 1 5.0-5.0 SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 47 / 54

Removing Max Taxable Earnings (5) % changes from the 2015 benchmark economy % Ch in Consumption Equivalence 0.4 0.2-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8 - -1.2-1.4-1.6-1.8 100 80 Consumption Equivalcence 60 40 20 0-20 -40-60 -80 Age in 2016-100 -120-140 Wealth Transf. as % of GDP Per Capita 8.0 6.0 4.0-4.0-6.0-8.0 100 Compensating Variations (-1) 80 60 40 20 0-20 -40-60 -80-100 -120-140 Age in 2016 Raising Max Taxable Earnings 1 Raising Max Taxable Earnings 2 48 / 54

Taxing All Benefits vs Raising FRA (1) The OASI benefits are partially income-taxable if the sum of the other income and 50% of benefits is larger than $25,000 for a single household and $32,000 for a married household. To close the fiscal gap, the government is assumed to introduce one of the following policy changes: making all OASI benefits taxable and move the increase in income tax revenue into the OASI budget; raising the full retirement age of the program gradually from age 67 to age 69. 49 / 54

Ch in %Pts from 2015 Economy -0.4 Taxing -0.6 All Benefits vs Raising 3.0 FRA (2) 4.0 % -1.4 changes from the 2015 benchmark - economy Ch as %Ch % of from Bal. Gr. Balanced GDP Per Growth Capita Path Ch as %Ch % of from Bal. Gr. Balanced GDP Per Growth Capita Path Pts from 2015 Economy 0.2-0.2-0.8 - -1.2 Capital Stock Per Capita 7.0 6.0 SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita 3.0 5.0 2.5 4.0 3.0 1.5 - Gross Domestic Product Per Capita Gov't Consumption Per Capita - -3.0 - -4.0 - -5.0-1.5-6.0-7.0-2.5-8.0-3.0-3.5-4.0 0.2-0.2-0.4-0.6-0.8 - Rate of Return to Capital Cutting Government Consumption Raising Full Retirement Age to 69 %Ch from 2015 Economy %Ch from Balanced Growth Path Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita %Ch % of from Balanced Balanced Growth Growth GDP Path h from 2015 Economy 7.0 6.0 5.0 0.8-4.0 0.6-6.0-8.0 0.4-1 0.2-1 -14.0-0.2-0.4 2-15.0 - -1.5 1-2.5 5.0-3.0-3.5-5.0 7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 Labor Supply Per Capita Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Private Consumption Per Capita SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Average Wage Rate Making All OASI Benefits Taxable 50 / 54

Ch %Ch in %Pts from from Balanced 2015 Economy Growth Pa 0.2 - -0.2-3.0-0.4-1.5 4.0-4.0 Taxing -5.0-0.6 All Benefits vs Raising 3.0 FRA (3) -6.0-0.8-7.0 - -8.0-1.2 % -1.4 changes from the 2015 benchmark - economy Ch as % Ch of in Bal. %Pts Gr. from GDP 2015 Per Capita Economy Ch as Ch % as of % Bal. of Bal. Gr. GDP Gr. GDP Per Per Capita Capita Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita 0.2 3.0-0.2 2.5-0.4-0.6-0.8 1.5 - -1.2-1.4 3.0 2.5 - - 1.5-1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0 - - -1.5-2.5-3.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Rate of Return to Capital SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 SS (OASI) Benefits Per Capita Gov't Consumption Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Gov't Consumption Per Capita Cutting Government Consumption Raising Full Retirement Age to 69 %Ch %Ch from from Balanced 2015 Economy Growth Pa Ch as % of Bal. %Ch Gr. from GDP 2015 Per Economy Capita Ch % as of % Balanced of Bal. Gr. Growth GDP Per GDP Capita f Balanced Growth GDP 7.0-6.0-5.0-2.5-3.0-3.5 7.0 6.0 5.0 0.8 4.0 0.6 3.0 0.4 0.2 - -0.2-0.4 2 0.8 15.0 0.6 0.4 1 0.2 5.0-0.2-0.4-5.0 2 15.0 1 5.0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Average Wage Rate Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 Payroll Tax Revenue Per Capita SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP Making All OASI Benefits Taxable 51 / 54

Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Cap 2.5 1.5 0.2 Taxing All Benefits vs Raising FRA (4) % changes from the 2015 benchmark economy Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Cap 0.8 0.6 0.4-0.2-0.4 Ch as % of Bal. Gr. GDP Per Capita - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0 Gov't Consumption Per Capita Cutting Government Consumption Raising Full Retirement Age to 69 % of Balanced Growth GDP 2 15.0 1 5.0-5.0 SS (OASI) Trust Fund / GDP 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 Making All OASI Benefits Taxable 52 / 54

Taxing All Benefits vs Raising FRA (5) % changes from the 2015 benchmark economy % Ch in Consumption Equivalence - - -1.5-2.5-3.0-3.5-4.0 100 80 Consumption Equivalcence 60 40 20 0-20 -40-60 -80 Age in 2016-100 -120-140 Wealth Transf. as % of GDP Per Capita 10 0-10 -20-30 -40-50 -60-70 100 Compensating Variations (-1) 80 60 40 20 0-20 -40-60 -80-100 -120-140 Age in 2016 Making All OASI Benefits Taxable Raising Full Retirement Age to 69 53 / 54

Concluding Remarks The years of OASI Trust Funds depletion and % changes in the long-run GDP per capita are as follows: Trustees OLG model Rep. 2016 economy year year GDP Do nothing (baseline) 2035 2035-6.9% Increase payroll tax by 2.25pp 2090 2058-7.5% Decrease benefits by 15.8% 2090 2060-4.7% Remove max taxable earnings 1-2054 -9.2% Remove max taxable earnings 2-2057 -8.5% Make all benefits taxable - 2048-5.3% Raise FRA from 67 to 69-2047 -5.5% 54 / 54