Discussion of The Role of Expectations in Inflation Dynamics

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Discussion of The Role of Expectations in Inflation Dynamics James H. Stock Department of Economics, Harvard University and the NBER 1. Introduction Rational expectations are at the heart of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models maintained by central banks. A key equation which governs the evolution of prices in those models is the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC), in which today s rate of inflation is linked to expected future inflation. Expected future inflation is in turn modeled using rational expectations, which operationally means that forecast errors are unforecastable given current information; this assumption generates the orthogonality condition used to estimate the NKPC parameters by GMM. Early skeptics of rational expectations, notably Friedman (1979), argued that the information acquisition and processing requirements of rational expectations exceed the capacities of real-world economic actors. Indeed, as Fuhrer points out in his paper (2011) and as I discuss in more detail below, there is ample evidence that even professional forecasts, such as the median inflation forecast from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), differ from modelbased rational expectations forecasts; moreover, SPF forecasts are not rational in the sense that SPF forecast errors are predictable. This raises the question long overdue in light of Friedman s (1979) early critique tackled in Fuhrer s paper: what really matters for price setting, rational or other expectations? Fuhrer s striking finding is that once the SPF forecast of one-year CPI inflation is included in the NKPC, the coefficient on the rational expectation of future inflation is small and statistically insignificantly different from zero. In short, survey expectations are not rational, and survey expectations are what matter for price setting. 167

168 International Journal of Central Banking January 2012 The logical consequence of this finding is that it is important to study how the expectations of real people not a model s rational agents are actually formed, and in the second part of the paper Fuhrer takes some steps in this direction. These comments focus primarily on the key empirical evidence on which expectations enter the NKPC. I report some econometric evidence that is consistent with Fuhrer s; however, there is substantial difficulty distinguishing between these two expectations measures because of weak identification. I then take a look at SPF forecast errors, which suggest that SPF forecasters act as though there is a less of a Phillips-curve gap coefficient than there actually is. These findings underscore the importance of finally pursuing Friedman s (1979) rich set of questions about alternative models of expectations formation and their role in inflation dynamics. 2. Rational vs. Survey Expectations in the NKPC I now turn to variations on Fuhrer s NKPC estimates, with an eye on robustness and strength of identification. Fuhrer estimates the NKPC using core CPI inflation, the SPF one-year-ahead CPI inflation forecast, two measures of trend inflation (the Cogley-Sbordone trend and SPF ten-year expectations), and two measures of the output gap (the Galí-Gertler marginal cost series and the CBO unemployment gap). Here, I examine several variations of these regressions, with the aim of assessing the robustness of Fuhrer s main finding that the coefficient on rationally expected π t+1 is small and statistically insignificant. My regressions differ from Fuhrer s in five main ways. First, I use a modified specification in which lagged inflation is replaced by a univariate estimate of trend inflation, constructed using the unobserved components/stochastic volatility model in Stock and Watson (2007). Second, because there is considerable ambiguity about how to measure the output gap, I additionally consider two other measures: the Stock-Watson (2010) so-called recession gap, which is the deviation of the current unemployment rate from its twelve-quarter minimum, and an unemployment gap based on the short-term (less than twenty-seven weeks) unemployment rate examined in Stock (2011). Third, because I do not use the ten-year SPF forecast, my regressions start earlier and cover 1982:Q1 2010:Q4. Fourth, because the SPF forecast is for total CPI,

Vol. 8 No. S1 Discussion: Stock 169 I also consider total CPI instead of core CPI. Fifth, I use GMM estimation instead of the Fuhrer-Olivei (2004) maximum-likelihood (ML) estimator. The results are reported in table 1. The results are generally supportive of those in Fuhrer s table 2 using the Fuhrer-Olivei (2004) estimator, with considerable weight being placed on the SPF forecast and, in almost all cases, the coefficient on π t+1 being statistically insignificantly different from zero. There are, however, several indications that the GMM specifications which include π t+1 suffer from weak identification. In particular, the first-stage F -statistic for π t+1 is extremely small, in all cases less than 3, and the GMM estimates using core inflation are all close to the OLS estimates. 1 If identification is weak, the GMM point estimates and confidence intervals are not reliable. One method that is reliable under weak identification is constructing confidence intervals as GMM Anderson-Rubin sets (S-sets in the terminology of Stock and Wright 2000). When this is done for the leading case, model 2 in table 1, the 90 percent confidence set includes all economically plausible parts of the parameter space ({0 α 1, 0.50 λ 0.5} in the notation of table 1). As Fuhrer suggests, this weak identification is a plausible reason for the differences between his (and my) findings and those of Nunes (2010, table 2). Fuhrer s solution to the weak identification problem is to use the Fuhrer-Olivei (2004) estimator. The motivation for this estimator (imposing the model restrictions to improve precision) is sensible, but as far as I know no formal analysis has been done of this estimator under weak identification. My main conclusion from this analysis is that the amount of information available to pin down the coefficient on π t+1 in these regressions is quite limited and that the GMM and ML point estimates and confidence sets (other than the S-set) should be viewed with some skepticism, and this question of which expectations matter is in need of additional analysis that is robust to weak instruments. It is interesting nevertheless to see what happens if one takes the GMM estimates at face value. Regressions 5 7 in table 1 therefore impose the restriction that the only expectation term appearing in 1 When there are many irrelevant instruments in the linear model with homoskedastic serially uncorrelated errors, the GMM estimator concentrates around the OLS estimator.

170 International Journal of Central Banking January 2012 Table 1. Estimates of New Keynesian Phillips Curves, 1982:Q1 2010:Q4 πt =(1 α β)π t 1 trend + απt+1 + βπ SPF,1yr t + λũt + vt Inflation Gap Estimation Measure Series Method π t 1 trend πt+1 π SPF,1yr t NKPC Coefficients First-Stage F s Ũt πt+1 Ũt 1 Core CBO OLS.217.237.546.095 (.154) (.089) (.194) (.037) 2 Core CBO GMM.303.139.557.112 2.39 137.9 (.109) (.199) (.171) (.031) 3 Core Recession GMM.363.026.611.111 2.39 530.0 (.130) (.238) (.207) (.035) 4 Core < 27 week GMM.298.340.632.188 2.39 278.5 (.094) (.166) (.138) (.054) 5 Core CBO GMM.342.658.120 137.9 (.091) (.091) (.031) 6 Core Recession GMM.333.667.119 530.0 (.089) (.089) (.031) (continued)

Vol. 8 No. S1 Discussion: Stock 171 Table 1. (Continued) Inflation Gap Estimation Measure Series Method π t 1 trend πt+1 π SPF,1yr t NKPC Coefficients First-Stage F s Ũt πt+1 Ũt 7 Core < 27 week GMM.400.600.213 278.5 (.095) (.095) (.060) 8 Headline CBO OLS.069.128.941.281 (.236) (.082) (.268) (.031) 9 Headline CBO GMM.148.450.402.152 1.65 138.5 (.122) (.110) (.150) (.059) Notes: πt is measured either by core or headline CPI one-quarter inflation as indicated in the first column. π trend t 1 is the inflation trend component estimated using the Stock-Watson (2007) unobserved components stochastic volatility (UC-SV) model, π SPF,1yr t is the one-year-ahead SPF median forecast of CPI inflation, and Ũt denotes the unemployment gap listed in the second column. GMM estimates use as instruments two lags each of the first difference of the inflation measure used in the specification, the SPF one-year forecast, the recession gap, and the short-term (less than twenty-seven weeks) unemployment gap, where inflation and SPF forecasts are deviated from the UC-SV trend. Standard errors (in parentheses) and GMM estimates are Newey-West with eight lags. The final column reports the first-stage F statistic, testing the exclusion restriction on the instruments in the regression of the column endogenous variable on the instruments and π SPF,1yr t. The CBO gap is the total unemployment rate minus the CBO NAIRU; the recession gap is the total unemployment rate minus its rolling twelve-quarter minimum (Ut min(ut,...,ut 11)); and the < 27 week unemployment gap is the ratio of less than twenty-seven weeks unemployment to the labor force, deviated from a seventy-three-quarter centered moving average (for the moving average, endpoints are padded using univariate forecasts). denotes significance at the 5 percent level.

172 International Journal of Central Banking January 2012 the NKPC is the SPF forecast, as in Roberts (1997). The resulting GMM estimates (which are strongly identified) are remarkably consistent across specifications of the gap and show coefficients on the SPF forecast around 0.65, coefficients on lagged trend inflation of 0.35, and negative gap coefficients; all estimates are precisely estimated and statistically significant. These specifications underscore the importance of better understanding how SPF forecasts are made. 3. Empirical Characterization of SPF Forecast Errors The forecastability of SPF forecast errors is documented by Adam and Padula (2011) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2010) and by multiple references therein. At least for the SPF one-year CPI inflation forecast, there is a rather striking procyclical pattern underlying the violation of forecast rationality. Figure 1 plots the SPF forecast error (realized inflation minus forecast) and the short-term unemployment gap, with the timing aligned so that a contemporaneous correlation represents a predictive relation that violates forecast rationality. Evidently there is a strong negative cyclical predictive relation: positive unemployment gaps are associated with negative forecast errors, that is, with SPF forecasts of inflation that are too high. 2 It appears that SPF forecasters understate the Phillips relation, so that inflation is overpredicted in recessions and underpredicted in expansions. This is a similar pattern to that found by Zarnowitz and Braun (1993) when they examined earlier data on SPF GNP inflation forecasts and concluded that the forecasters underpredicted increases in inflation and missed disinflationary episodes. What figure 1 shows is that this is not a simple consequence of optimal forecasts having lower variance than the variable being forecast; instead it appears to be linked to a systematic understatement by the forecasters of the Phillips relation. Although many explanations for the predictability of SPF forecasts have been proposed, there is no consensus on forecast formation, and Fuhrer s new work on the survey expectations operator is a welcome attempt to provide some structure to forecasts but at 2 The contemporaneous correlation between the SPF forecast error and shortterm unemployment gap is 0.36, and the regression coefficient on the gap is significant at the 1 percent level using Newey-West standard errors.

Vol. 8 No. S1 Discussion: Stock 173 Figure 1. The SPF One-Year Headline CPI Forecast Error (Solid Line) and the Short-Term Unemployment Gap Notes: The series are aligned so that at a given date the forecast error is the error that will transpire over the next four quarters and the gap is the value of the gap at that date. The forecast error is the actual four-quarter rate of headline CPI inflation over the coming four quarters minus the current SPF forecast of one-year headline CPI inflation. the same time to weaken the rational expectations assumption. Work along these lines, in which we attempt to understand how real people make forecasts as called for by Friedman (1979), is long overdue. References Adam, K., and M. Padula. 2011. Inflation Dynamics and Subjective Expectations in the United States. Economic Inquiry 49 (1): 13 25. Coibion, O., and Y. Gorodnichenko. 2010. Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts. Manuscript, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.

174 International Journal of Central Banking January 2012 Friedman, B. M. 1979. Optimal Expectations and the Extreme Information Assumptions of Rational Expectations Macromodels. Journal of Monetary Economics 5 (1): 23 41. Fuhrer, J. 2011. The Role of Expectations in Inflation Dynamics. Manuscript, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. Fuhrer, J., and G. Olivei. 2004. Estimating Forward-Looking Euler Equations with GMM and Maximum Likelihood Estimators: An Optimal Instruments Approach. In Models and Monetary Policy: Research in the Tradition of Dale Henderson, Richard Porter, and Peter Tinsley, ed. J. Faust, A. Orphanides, and D. Reifschneider. Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Nunes, R. 2010. Inflation Dynamics: The Role of Expectations. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 42 (6): 1161 72. Roberts, J. 1997. Is Inflation Sticky? Journal of Monetary Economics 39 (2): 173 96. Stock, J. H. 2011. Discussion of Ball and Mazumder. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 42 (1). Stock, J. H., and M. W. Watson. 2007. Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast? Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 39 (s1): 3 34.. 2010. Modeling Inflation after the Crisis. In Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead. Proceedings of the Economic Policy Symposium organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 26 28. Stock, J. H., and J. Wright. 2000. GMM with Weak Identification. Econometrica 68 (5): 1055 96. Zarnowitz, V., and P. Braun. 1993. Twenty-Two Years of the NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic Outlook Surveys: Aspects and Comparisons of Forecasting Performance. In Business Cycles, Indicators, and Forecasting (NBER Studies in Business Cycles, Vol. 28), ed. J. H. Stock and M. W. Watson, 11 84. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.