The Effect of the Disability Insurance Application Decision on the Employment of Denied Applicants

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The Effect of the Disability Insurance Application Decision on the Employment of Denied Applicants Mashfiqur R. Khan Tulane University January 2018 Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 1 of 25

Introduction The SSDI is a social insurance program for: Eligible workers Who are disabled, and Unable to engage in SGA In expectation of getting on to the SSDI rolls, most applicants do not work while they are in the process of determination Work discouragement aspect of SSDI application process adversely affects the applicant post-application labor supply Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 2 of 25

Motivation of the Paper Existing literature primarily focuses on the benefit receipt effect of SSDI using denied applicants as counterfactual of receipients The effect of application process on denied applicants is unaccounted for in those analyses In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of SSDI application on the post-application employment of denied applicants Facts: More people than ever are applying and denied for SSDI Denied applicants make up two-thirds of applicants - a total of 1.8 million individuals in 2013 alone Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 3 of 25

Contributions of the Paper First paper to analyze the causal effect of SSDI on employment of denied applicants using the non-applicants as a control group The post-application employment of denied applicants at ages 50-58 is as much as 49 percentage points lower in the short-run Using a IV approach I find SSDI causes a 36 percentage points reduction in employment of denied applicants in the short-run The findings of this paper suggest that the existing literature is not fully capturing the spillover effect of SSDI on applicants LitRev Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 4 of 25

Data The data used in this paper comes from: The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) SSA s administrative geographic identification of the HRS respondents SSDI allowance rate at the state Disability Determination Services (DDS) level provided by SSA The HRS is a nationally representative longitudinal household survey of older Americans 11 waves of HRS data from 1992 to 2012 are used in this paper Geographic identifier allows matching individuals to the allowance rate of the state of application Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 5 of 25

The Comparison Group Potential comparison group: all non-applicants who have worked enough to pass the technical denial Role of hassle cost and stigma cost associated with the SSDI application in finding the appropriate comparison group Comparison group in this paper: individuals observed to be non-applicants between age 50 to 58 (inclusive), who later filed SSDI application on or after age 60 Thus, the sample of analysis is comprised of individuals who are eventual SSDI applicants LSAgeYear Demography OtherChar SelfHealth MedCondition Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 6 of 25

Identification Strategy Estimate a causal model of labor supply using SSDI denied applicants and eligible non-applicants of age 52 to 61 like: y i = X i β + γdi i s i + ɛ i y i is the employment status of individual i 2-3 years after a reference age (for denied the reference is the application age) X i includes observable characteristics at the reference age and changes in time-varying attributes DI i = 1 if individual i applied SSDI first time at the reference age and never received benefits s i represents unobserved factors which is uncorrelated with any remaining idiosyncratic error term ɛ i Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 7 of 25

Identification Strategy cont... If E[s i DI i ] 0, then OLS gives a biased estimate of γ If γ < 0 and if s i is positively correlated with the SSDI application, then the OLS provides an upper bound of γ For consistent I use 2SLS where the first stage is: DI i = λx i + δz i + η i Z i includes I i (65 > F RA i < 66) and I i (F RA i 66) with I i (F RA i = 65) is the omitted category Z i also includes indicator for relatively more generous state in terms of level of stringency in awarding SSDI benefits Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 8 of 25

IV: Variations in the FRA The Social Security Amendments of 1983 and Calculation of the OASI and SSDI benefits The actuarial reduction factor associated with OASI makes SSDI relatively more generous for workers with higher FRA Duggan et al. (2007), Li and Maestas (2008), and Coe et al. (2010) provide evidence of the existance of the first stage Assumption: Differences in employment of the different cohorts associated with different FRAs are only due to their heterogeneous incentives to apply for SSDI for ages 52-60 Figure 1 Figure2 IVAllowRate Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 9 of 25

First Stage of the 2SLS Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 10 of 25

Main Findings avgemp Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 11 of 25

Sensitivity of the Main Findings Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 12 of 25

Conclusions SSDI application causes a reduction in employment of denied applicants by 36 percentage points in the short-run Unobserved factors like severity of health conditions or low labor market opportunities of the denied applicants account for another 13 percentage points reduction in the employment The findings call for shorter SSDI determination time and reduce the work discouragement while applying Also indicates the importance of resources needed for smoothing the transition of denied applicants back to work Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 13 of 25

. Thank You Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 14 of 25

. Appendix Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 15 of 25

Literature Review Bound (1989) is the seminal paper in estimating the benefit receipt effect Chen and van der Klaauw (2008), Maestas et al. (2013), French and Song (2014) among others to provide the estimate of causal effect of benefit receipt von Wachter et al. (2011) find 30 percentage points reduction in employment for denied applicants in the short-run using matching in observables Autor et al. (2015) find the effect of waiting time is 6 percentage points reduction in employment of denied applicants in the long-run back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 16 of 25

Average Employment in Sample back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 17 of 25

Characteristics of Sample Back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 18 of 25

Characteristics of Sample cont... back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 19 of 25

Characteristics of Sample cont... Back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 20 of 25

Characteristics of Sample cont... back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 21 of 25

Exclusion Restriction of the FRA Change back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 22 of 25

Variation in the SSDI Allowance Rate back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 23 of 25

IV: Indicator for More Generous State Steps in defining the more generous state indicator: Calculate allowance rate for age groups 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60-64 for each state from 1992 to 2013 For each age group in a given state I compare the allowance rate for a given year to the allowance rate of that age group in the same state in next year Define a state to be more generous in a given year only if the allowance rate of all four age groups in the following year is strictly higher simultaneously Assumption: People do not choose their state of residence on the basis of allowance rate of the DDS office of that state back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 24 of 25

Average Employment of Different Groups back Mashfiqur R. Khan Effect of SSDI on Employment of Denied 25 of 25