Pricing indexed agricultural insurance: Lessons from India

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Pricing indexed agricultural insurance: Lessons from India Daniel J. Clarke, University of Oxford November 2011 Joint work with Olivier Mahul and Niraj Verma, World Bank Part of a program of work with the Government of India and AICI

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Number of farmers covered (million) Background: the world s largest insurance program National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) Decades of experience Insures close to 25m farmers annually Compulsory for farmers who borrow from financial institutions (and voluntary for others) How NAIS works: Year Farmers pay capped premiums to the public insurer AICI Historical claim payments = 3.5 historical premiums Area yield based approach Yields measured in given area (subdistrict) through crop cutting experiments Ex-post financing for claims processing Central and state governments allocate additional funds after each harvest and transfer to AICI to pay claims 20 15 10-5 Total Borrowing / compulsory

yet significant issues remain 1. Long delays in farmer claim payments Often > 1 year Partly due to ex-post public financing 2. Open-ended fiscal exposure for government 3. Inequitable: Low risk farmers pay the same premium as high risk farmers Level of cover is based on 3 or 5 years of data, and is therefore excessively volatile 4. Challenges in yield assessment

Cluster of innovations since 2005 Government of India Ministries of Agriculture and Finance State governments The Agricultural Insurance Company of India (AICI) Private sector insurers and reinsurers World Bank providing Technical Assistance since 2005

Government of India is piloting two potential successors to NAIS National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (NAIS) Weather Based Crop Insurance Scheme (WBCIS) Scheme maturity Established Potential successor Modified National Agricultural Insurance Scheme (mnais) Year started 1999 2007 2010 Index Area yield Weather Area yield+ Farmers covered per year >22m >6m 340,000 (Winter season 2010 only) Government financing Ex-post Upfront premium subsidy Open to private sector No Yes Average claims farmer premiums 3.5 (2000-2008) 1.4 (2007-2010) (expected to be similar to WBCIS)

Actuarially sound design and ratemaking is central to move to market-based program Allows government to move from ex-post financing to upfront premium subsidy Use market-based instruments to achieve social objectives Private sector insurers can compete with the public sector insurer Faster claim settlement benefits farmers Improved budget management benefits government Increases equity The actuarial value of all products for one crop within one state can be set to be constant Price discovery has far-reaching policy implications Subsidies to different farmer groups are explicit

Actuarially sound design and ratemaking: An introduction to two technical issues Many issues to consider when pricing indexed agricultural products, including: 1. Porfolio-based approaches to pricing (as opposed to standalone approaches) 2. Trends

1. Porfolio-based approaches to pricing Historical yields vary significantly from subdistrict to subdistrict Statistical question: how much of this variation is statistically significant Actuarial question: how much of this variation should be reflected in prices? Historical claim payment rates at 90 % coverage level, Rice crop, Andhra Pradesh

Credibility Theory A simple example Consider yield histories for two adjacent subdistricts: Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Yield for subdistrict 1 Yield for subdistrict 2 600 600 400 600 600 600 600 400 600 600 600 600 400 600 100 600 600 400 600 600 Suppose that you want to offer full marginal insurance for yields below a trigger of 500 kg/ha. The expected area to be insured is the same for both products Question: What should the (unloaded) premium rates be?

Naive pricing approach 1: Calculate premium rate for each product separately The historical claim payment rates that would have been payable are: Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Claim rate for subdistrict 1 Claim rate for subdistrict 2 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0% 0% 20% 0% 80% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% Average historical claim payment rates are 4% and 12%. Disadvantage of this approach: The calculated premium rates could be significantly different even if the difference in yield histories is not significantly different.

Naive pricing approach 2: Calculate one premium rate for the two products Average historical claim payment rate for the two products combined is 8%. Disadvantage of this approach: The calculated premium rates would be the same even if the difference in yield histories was significantly different.

Approach to pricing based on Credibility Theory Basic idea Rate 1 = 4% Z +8% (1 Z) 4% 8% Rate 2 = 12% Z +8% (1 Z) 12% Premium rate Blue rates are those calculated for each product separately Green rate is calculated for both products together Red rates are consistent with Credibility Theory Z is between 0 ( no credibility ) and 1 ( full credibility ) Degree of smoothing determined by Empirical Bayes Credibility Factor Z (Bühlmann 1967)

Yield (kg/ha) Yield (kg/ha) 2. Trends 150 150 100 100 50 50 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year number 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Year number These two yield histories have the same mean and standard deviation but should they be treated the same?

Allowance for trends can make a big difference to rates For example Use of improved seeds (Bt cotton) led to dramatic increase in average cotton yields across India Ratemaking without allowance for this technological trend led to high premium rates and low demand Trend in yields mistaken for uncertainty Application of detrending methodology provided sound justification for rate reductions of: Gujarat Maharashtra Madhya Pradesh Percentage reduction 47% 78% 54%

Conclusions Competition in agricultural insurance can benefit government and farmers An actuarially sound design and ratemaking methodology is critical Increases farmer equity Upfront premium subsidies enables private sector competition (insurers and reinsurers) Improved budget management benefits government Price discovery has far-reaching policy implications and should draw on body of actuarial know-how

References and further reading Three papers by O. Mahul, N. Verma and D.J. Clarke: 1. Improving famers' access to agricultural insurance in India 2. Weather Based Crop Insurance in India 3. Index Based Crop Insurance Product Design and Ratemaking: The case of the modified NAIS in India Educational resource for technical microinsurance practitioners Being developed on a volunteer basis by qualified actuaries Will cover life, health and agricultural insurance For more information see http://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/actuarialtoolkit