Mortgage Modeling: Topics in Robustness. Robert Reeves September 2012 Bank of America

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Mortgage Modeling: Topics in Robustness Robert Reeves September 2012 Bank of America

Evaluating Model Robustness Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful. - George Box Assessing model robustness: Requires consideration of how wrong the models could be. Should focus on the underlying economic foundations of the model and whether the structure and results make sense. Will not be primarily driven by complex quantitative or statistical methods. 2

Robustness Begins with Model Design. Model structure must be completely transparent. Models must be grounded in economics, not data mining. Models should be parsimonious, so as not to replace one problem (forecasting losses) with another (forecasting a multitude of macro variables required by the model) or create excessive segmentation (where model treatments across segments may be counterintuitive.) Models should be as simple as possible. Complex Markov transition approaches are not needed: straightforward PD models will suffice. Models must treat competing risks in a consistent framework. Models should be intuitive in form, variables included, sign and magnitude of coefficients, shape of splines, and nature of interactions. 3

Topic 1: Robustness To a Stress Scenario Start with an assessment of performance in-sample: Drill down into segments that are reflective of current portfolio mix. Compare the historical macro trajectory to the stress trajectory. Geographic variation may offer key insights. From year end 2006 to 2010: California saw home prices down 44% & unemployment reach 12.2 %. Ohio saw home prices down 13% and unemployment reach 9.2% Virginia saw home prices down 22 % & unemployment reach 6.5 %. In-sample for some states may inform the future stress result for others. Consider economic and institutional changes that have occurred over time and may not be captured in the model. 4

Reassess the Model Specification Consider which model treatments are most at risk of breaking down in a stress event. Assess whether any of these should be altered: Do any model response functions plateau in the extremes? Are there burnout or momentum treatments that may prove unstable? Are interactions between variables sensible and complete? Are there implicit recovery assumptions (e.g. normalization of credit availability) that should be adjusted? At a minimum, this will inform sensitivity testing around key model risks. 5

Assess the Forecast under the Stress Scenario Are the results intuitive versus historical experience? Are the underlying components reasonable? Do prepayments have a reasonable trajectory? Do delinquencies or defaults make sense? Are forecast severities sensible? Do results reasonably reflect evolution of portfolio quality? Rerun the stress scenario using a pre-crisis portfolio snapshot. Consider whether the relative magnitude of losses between pre-crisis and current books make sense. Perform some sensitivity tests. Perturb the macro trajectory. Shock the model components of greatest concern. However, do not overdo it, or credibility will suffer. 6

Topic 2: Robustness In the Presence of Imperfect Data In particular: 1. Relationships between First and Second Liens and implications for modeling 2. Addressing the existence of a performing Second Lien with a delinquent underlying First Lien 7

Modeling in the Presence of Multiple Liens The dominant variable in mortgage loss models: Updated Combined LTV. Data available around borrower finances are always imperfect: Overall lien position is not always visible. Property values are estimates. Borrower balance sheet, income, employment status are not visible or available for use. Uncertainty increases with the age of a loan. Updated FICO will only mitigate these issues to some extent. 8

Modeling in the Presence of Multiple Liens The simple (perhaps unsatisfying) solution: 1. Use the best estimates available. 2. Understand that the model coefficients will include implicit adjustments given the missing data. In building the data set: If complete data are available on total lien position, use it. If data are missing, as with a second lien where another lender services the first, use the data as known at origination and apply estimated regular amortization for the first. Update the CLTV with monthly HPI at low geographic level. 9

Modeling in the Presence of Multiple Liens Imperfect data will create an imperfect model. (But we knew that anyway.) At a portfolio level, however, an acceptable overall model fit can be achieved. Were it possible to segment the model by the unobservable features, we would expect to see biases. Model would be biased low for first liens with an unobserved second. Model would be biased high for loans where home value is undervalued in the data. Model would be biased low for loans where borrower income or employment status have deteriorated over time. Model performance degradation over time is driven in part by changes in the underlying mix of loans with varying degrees of missing data. 10

Modeling in the Presence of Multiple Liens A related example: Performing Seconds with Delinquent Firsts. A early version of second lien loss models omitted information around the delinquency status of the underlying first. The overall performance of the model was unbiased. When model performance was examined for those seconds with a delinquent first, the model indeed was biased low. However, the model compensated with a slight high bias on the much larger remainder of the portfolio. Thus, adding a treatment to the model to incorporate the status of the first did not materially impact the loss forecast at a portfolio level. 11

Topic 3: Robustness When Event Data Are Thin. Large volumes of industry HELOC balances will face payment shocks in 2014-2018, as the typical 10 year interest-only period expires. Empirical data for modeling of this event are scarce and were often of higher-quality vintages. However: Some data, while limited, exist for modeling purposes. First lien pay shock treatments, for Hybrid IO ARM s and 2/28 Subprime, are informative as well. Simple data-driven model treatments are therefore possible. Model robustness is an obvious concern, so performance is carefully monitored. 12

HELOC Risk: Payment Shock or Aftershock? Reasons for guarded optimism: Largest volumes remain a few years away from the payment event, allowing additional time for recovery. Projected average payment changes, in absolute dollar terms, are not terribly large especially compared to previous payments made by the borrowers when rates were higher. Much of the story will have played out before the event occurs: Attrition of risky loans in the past and prior to the reset. Prepayment of loans for another few years. Forecast UPB reaching reset is likely well below current UPB. Forecast high CLTV balances reaching reset is an even better measure. Performing borrowers taking out HELOCs in 2004-2008 have already shown resiliency through the crisis; this signal will be even stronger for those that reach the reset date. 13

HELOC Payment Risk: No Place for Point Estimates. Nevertheless, given the paucity of data, attempt to quantify the model risk: Estimate a baseline model with a payment shock feature. Create some intuitive model shocks relative to the baseline: Dampen the prepayment model, exposing more balances to the reset. Eliminate dampeners such as credit burnout in the model, if any. Amplify the payment shock component. Run the forecast for base case and stressed macro scenarios using the models with and without the model shocks. Rerun with the payment shock turned off completely, allowing an incremental view of payment shock impact. Monitor ongoing model performance on resetting loans with care. 14