Contingency Reserve Cost Allocation. Draft Final Proposal

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Contingency Reserve Cost Allocation Draft Final Proposal May 27, 2014

Contingency Reserve Cost Allocation Draft Final Proposal Table of Contents 1 Introduction... 3 2 Changes to Straw Proposal... 3 3 Plan for Stakeholder Engagement... 3 4 Proposed Change to Cost Allocation... 4 5 Next Steps... 5 CAISO/M&ID/D. Tretheway Page 2 May 27, 2014

1 Introduction On November 13, 2013, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved regional reliability standard BAL-002-WECC-2 (Contingency Reserve), which was submitted by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC). The regional reliability standard applies to balancing authorities and reserve sharing groups in the WECC region and specifies the quantity and types of contingency reserves required to ensure reliability under normal and abnormal conditions. FERC s order approving regional reliability standard BAL-002-WECC-2 (Order 789) became effective on January 28, 2014. The procurement requirements in regional reliability standard BAL-002- WECC-2 will become effective on October 1, 2014. The ISO currently aligns contingency reserve obligations for a Scheduling Coordinator (SC) with the requirements calculation outlined in the existing WECC standard BAL-STD-002 - Operating Reserves. Given the changes in the requirement calculation outlined in the new standard, the ISO proposes to align the calculation of contingency reserve obligations with the new requirements calculation. This will modify the ISO s cost allocation of contingency reserves. However, the ISO proposes to maintain the existing design principles of the current cost allocation which allocates contingency reserves costs based upon an SC s measured demand with adjustments for self-provision and inter-sc trades. The ISO is not proposing any changes to the payment rescission or the substitution rules for ancillary services. The ISO plans to implement the revised cost allocation in the Fall software release on October 1, 2014. 2 Changes to Straw Proposal Modified calculation of a Scheduling Coordinator s (SC s) initial obligation to 6% of Load + 3% of Exports - 3% of Imports Clarified that an SC s obligation cannot be lower than zero as the result of excess selfprovision and modified the provisons so that SCs will receive credits, beyond their contingency reserve obiligation, for reserves associated with imports. Posted a illustrative spreadsheet of the contingency reserve obligation calculation Provided additional clarification on the treatment of dynamic transfers Discussed treatment of contingency reserves associated with EIM transfers 3 Plan for Stakeholder Engagement Item Post Draft Final Proposal May 28, 2014 Stakeholder Meeting June 3, 2014 Stakeholder Comments Due June 11, 2013 Board of Governors Decision July 17-18, 2014 Date CAISO/M&ID/D. Tretheway Page 3 May 27, 2014

4 Proposed Change to Cost Allocation The current cost allocation of spinning and non-spinning reserves considers the Resource and Demand Balancing standard reserve requirements calculation in determining an SC s obligation. The following compares the minimum contingency reserve calculation as between the existing and new standards. The contingency reserve requirement is based on the greater of: Per current standard (BAL-STD-002): (a) The loss of generating capacity due to forced outages of generation or transmission equipment that would result from the most severe single contingency; or (b) The sum of five percent of the load responsibility served by hydro generation and seven percent of the load responsibility served by thermal generation. Per proposed standard (BAL-002-WECC-2): (a) The amount of Contingency Reserve equal to the loss of the most severe single contingency; (b) The amount of Contingency Reserve equal to the sum of three percent of hourly integrated Load (generation minus station service minus net actual interchange) plus three percent of hourly integrated generation (generation minus station service). Under the current standard, an SC s hourly obligation is based upon criteria (b). An SC s reserve obligation is 7% of (metered load + firm exports firm imports) + 100% of non-firm imports minus 2% of (hydro generation + unit contingent imports from hydro generation unit contingent exports from hydro generation). The new standard simplifies the calculation of the SC s obligation using criteria (b). The current design principle is to allocate the costs to measured demand (metered demand and exports) and not generation. The ISO proposes to calculate an SC s initial obligation based upon 6% of metered load + 3% of exports - 3% of imports. The initial obligation can be less than zero, which can result in a payment to the SC. The new standard does not require distinctions for the fuel source of generation serving the load or distinctions for the energy type indicated in e-tags corresponding to imports into the CAISO (e.g. firm, non-firm, unit contingent ). If the actual contingency reserves procured pursuant to criteria (a), the ISO currently allocates the higher obligation on a pro-rata basis using the calculations based upon criteria (b). The ISO is not proposing a change to this market design element under the new standard. The ISO has posted an illustrative spreadsheet calculating an SC s reserve obligation with this draft final proposal. Under the new standard, the treatment of dynamic transfers for which BA carries the reserve obligation can differ. Pseudo-tie resources are always considered within reserve obligation of the receiving BA. For dynamic schedules, the default is that the source BA is responsible for contingency reserves. However, the reserve obligation can be transferred contractually. Currently in the ISO tariff for dynamic schedules, the ISO agrees to be responsible for the contingency reserves. As a result, all existing dynamic schedule imports require the ISO to carry the reserves. Therefore, all dynamic transfers will be excluded when calculating an SC s initial obligation. If in the future, an importing dynamic schedule does not transfer the reserve obligation to the ISO, the ISO will have to add a flag to the Master File so that this dynamic schedule can be included in an SC s initial obligation. SCs can submit inter-sc trades for ancillary services obligations, but an SC cannot trade more than its initial obligation. This functionality is unchanged. CAISO/M&ID/D. Tretheway Page 4 May 27, 2014

The reserve obligation for an SC can be reduced through self-provision. The ISO is not proposing to change the rules that allow the self-provision of ancillary services; however, the ISO proposes that an SC cannot obtain a payment through the cost allocation for excess selfprovision. If an SC self-provides more than its reserve obligation, after considering inter-sc trades, the excess self-provision wil be allocated to positive initial obligations through the ancillary services neutrality accounts. For example, assume an SC had an initial obligation of 30 MW and self-provision of 40 MW, the reserve obligation would be zero. If the SC had an initial obligation of 30 MW, an inter-sc trade of 15 MW, and self-provision of 40 MW, the reserve obligation would be 5 MW. If payment to SCs providing ancillary services does not equal the cost allocation to SCs reserve obligation neutrality will result. The ISO is not proposing any change to the allocation of the combined upward ancillary services neutrality adjustment or the individual spinning/nonspinning neutrality adjustments, which are allocated based upon the SC s pro-rata share of positive initial reserve obligations. The ISO does not propose to change the rules for substituting higher quality reserves for lower quality reserves when it is economic to do so. However, the ISO believes that the tariff requires additional clarity on how self-provision interacts with ancillary services substitution. The ISO calculates a rate for each ancillary service that reflects both bid-in costs but also any additional ancillary services capacity that SCs self-provide beyond the ISO s requirements. The rate for each ancillary service reflects an average of all substituted ancillary services in order to reflect the procurement of higher quality ancillary services that is performed optimally in day-ahead and real-time market. By reflecting the value of high quality substituted ancillary services in the ancillary services rate, the ISO can help eliminate neutrality differences due to ancillary service substitution. This outcome achieves an equitable cost allocation to SCs that self-provide more capacity than their ancillary service obligation of a higher quality reserve, since their obligation for each ancillary service cannot be less than zero. The excess self-provision of a higher quality reserve is reflected in the ancillary services product rate of the lower quality reserve to the benefit of all SCs. The ISO proposes to clarify the tariff to state that self-provided ancillary services capacity can satisfy a lower quality ancillary service requirement as part of the market optimization. EIM transfers will be tagged as dynamic schedules between the ISO and the EIM Entity. Unlike other existing dynamic schedules, the ISO has not assumed the reserve obligation. Therefore, the EIM Entity SC will be charged and paid for contingency reserve obligations that result from the EIM transfer. If there is an EIM transfer into the ISO, the EIM Entity SC will receive a payment equal to the 3% of the hourly MW transfer into the ISO multiplied by the ancillary service product rate. If there is an EIM transfer out of the ISO, the EIM Entity SC will be charged for 3% of the hourly MW transfer out of the ISO. Since the EIM Entity SC is not allocated Regulation costs, the EIM transfers will be excluded from the upward anciallary services neutrality charge. 5 Next Steps The ISO plans to discuss this draft final proposal with stakeholders during a conference call to be held on June 3. The ISO requests comments from stakeholders on the proposed market design described in this draft final proposal. Stakeholders should submit written comments by June 11 to CRCA@caiso.com. CAISO/M&ID/D. Tretheway Page 5 May 27, 2014