Purpose and scope of the Belgian report

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Anti-avoidance measures of general nature and scope - GAAR and other rules 12 September 2017 Wim Panis Partner Stibbe Purpose and scope of the Belgian report 1. Understanding domestic GAAR - specific to direct taxes 2. No analysis of BEPS action plan or EU measures (separate report) 3. Purpose = comparison 4. No re-visiting of the premise Oslo Congress 2002: Form and substance in tax law tax avoidance challenged by GAAR Rome Congress 2010: Tax treaties and tax avoidance: application of anti-avoidance provisions 2 1

TOC 1. GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE RULES OR DOCTRINES 2. CASE LAW ON STATUTORY OR COURT-DEVELOPED GAARS 3. GAAR AND TAXPAYER S SAFEGUARDS 3 1. General Anti-Avoidance Rules or Doctrines 2

1.1 General overview Domestic GAAR GAARs in Belgian DTT & MLI ATAD Domestic SAARs 5 1.1.1 Domestic GAAR Program Law of 29 March 2012 EUCJ: Halifax, Cadbury Schweppes, New article 344, 1 BITC replacing GAAR of 1993 6 3

1.1.1 Domestic GAAR Not enforceable towards the [tax] administration is the legal act, or the series of legal acts leading to the same transaction, when the administration demonstrates, by presumptions or by other means of proof [accepted in the tax code] and on the basis of objective circumstances, that tax abuse occurs. Tax abuse occurs when the taxpayer, by means of performing a legal act or a series of legal acts, realizes one of the following transactions: 1. a transaction whereby the taxpayer places himself contrary to the purpose of a provision of the [BITC], or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, outside the scope of such provision; or 2. a transaction whereby a tax advantage offered by the present Code, or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, is claimed while obtaining this advantage would be contrary to the purpose of this provision, and where the essential goal is the obtaining of this advantage. The taxpayer must prove that the choice for his legal act or series of legal acts is justified by other reasons than the avoidance of income taxes. If the taxpayer does not provide proof to the contrary, then the taxable base and the calculation of the tax will be restored in such a way that the transaction will be subject to taxation in accordance with the purpose of the law as if the tax abuse had not taken place 7 1.1.2 Treaty GAAR & MLI No tradition of GAARs in DTT (rare exceptions) Traditional view: DTT cannot prevent application of domestic anti-avoidance provision Reluctancy to combat abuse via interpretation of DTT provisions 8 4

1.1.2 Treaty GAAR & MLI June 2007 Belgian Model Tax Convention June 2010 : Notwithstanding the other provisions of the Convention, the benefits of the Convention shall not apply if income is paid or derived in connection with an artificial arrangement. Negotiated in most recent treaties (MoF 24/1/2017: Macedonia, Moldova, Oman, Qatar, Poland, Taiwan, Uruguay) MLI: 7 June 2017 9 1.1.2 Treaty GAAR & MLI PPT: Notwithstanding any provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement, a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted in respect of an item of income or capital if it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit, unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement. Low watermark vs. simplified LOB and LOB Potential impact 100 treaties, but not with NL and Germany Signed (67) Awaiting ratification 10 5

1.1.3 ATAD Art. 6 to be transposed by 31/12/2018: 1.For the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, a Member State shall ignore an arrangement or a series of arrangements which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the applicable tax law, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances. An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part. 2.For the purposes of paragraph 1, an arrangement or a series thereof shall be regarded as non-genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality. 3.Where arrangements or a series thereof are ignored in accordance with paragraph 1, the tax liability shall be calculated in accordance with national law. 11 1.1.4 Domestic SAARs Typical SAARs: specific avoidance specific remedy Transfer pricing CFC-like (Cayman tax and 344, 2BITC) Disallowance of expenses Thin capitalization SAARs working as GAARs for specific provisions Parent-subsidiary Directive; Merger directive; 12 6

1.2 The tax avoidance scheme, arrangement or transaction Domestic GAAR MLI ATAD 13 1.2.1 The tax avoidance scheme, arrangement or transaction Target = tax abuse Tax abuse = Transaction Objective element Subjective element the taxpayer realizes a transaction by performing a legal act or a series of legal acts 14 7

1.2.1 The tax avoidance scheme, arrangement or transaction Legal act = realized willingly with a view to generate legal csq (agreement, creation of company, ) fact or situation that may or may not have legal csq (person s birth/decease, delocalization of activities >< transfer of seat, ) 15 1.2.1 The tax avoidance scheme, arrangement or transaction series of legal acts that lead to the same transaction No time limit (>1 fiscal year) Single intent unifying all the constitutive legal acts From the beginning Indivisible (no other meaning than pursuit of tax advantage) Realized by the taxpayer 16 8

1.2.2 The tax avoidance scheme in PPT & ATAD PPT : any arrangement or transaction [ ] that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit ATAD : an arrangement or a series of arrangements whereby an arrangement may comprise more than one step or part who realizes the arrangement? (BE GAAR: the taxpayer) 17 1.3 The tax benefit, gain or advantage Domestic GAAR MLI ATAD 18 9

1.3.1 The tax advantage in 344, 1 BITC Objective element Advantage = Taxpayer avoids taxation by placing himself outside the scope of provision of BITC or decree Taxpayer obtains tax exemption/reduction by applying provision of BITC or decree Contrary to purpose of the provision 19 1.3.1 The tax advantage in 344, 1 BITC BITC or decree >< stock option plans, VAT, registration tax, DTT Codification of Fraus legis (?) Similar wording in preparatory works (taxpayer has come so close to a situation that is taxable, that in light of the object and purpose of the concerned tax provision, his/her situation should also be taxable) >< wildcard to replace the actual set of facts and to determine scope of tax provisions? 20 10

1.3.1 The tax advantage in 344, 1 BITC Constitutional Court (30/10/13) Means of proof to factually establish taxable amount Does not affect the legally established taxable amount or tax rate Sufficient safeguards for principle of legality: Contrary to versus strange to the purpose of the provision Purpose of provisions should be sufficiently clear (interpretatio cessat in claris / in dubio contra fiscum) and sufficiently precise (>< MoF: collecting public funds) 21 1.3.2 The tax advantage in PPT & ATAD PPT a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement [ ] unless it is established that granting that benefit in these circumstances would be in accordance with the object and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Covered Tax Agreement ATAD: For the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability [ ] a tax advantage that defeats the object or purpose of the applicable tax law 22 11

1.4 Taxpayer s purpose or intent Domestic GAAR GAARs in Belgian DTT & MLI ATAD 23 1.4.1 Taxpayer s purpose or intent in 344, 1 BITC Subjective element poorly drafted: 1. a transaction whereby the taxpayer places himself contrary to the purpose of a provision of the [BITC], or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, outside the scope of such provision; or 2. a transaction whereby a tax advantage offered by the present Code, or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, is claimed while obtaining this advantage would be contrary to the purpose of this provision, and where the essential goal is the obtaining of this advantage. Applies to both types of advantage 24 12

1.4.1 Taxpayer s purpose or intent in 344, 1 BITC Essential of exclusive purpose test? Tax abuse occurs when the taxpayer, by means of performing the legal act or the series of legal acts, realizes one of the following transactions: 1. a transaction whereby the taxpayer places himself contrary to the purpose of a provision of the [BITC], or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, outside the scope of such provision; or 2. a transaction whereby a tax advantage offered by the present Code, or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, is claimed while obtaining this advantage would be contrary to the purpose of this provision, and where the essential goal is the obtaining of this advantage. Definition of tax abuse scope of GAAR Scope of GAAR = tax abuse + no counter-proof 25 1.4.1 Taxpayer s purpose or intent in 344, 1 BITC Exclusive purpose test >< essential purpose: weighing of motives Except insignificant motives non-tax motives are so general that they are not specific to the transaction concerned non-tax motives are specific to the transaction but they are of such low importance that no reasonable person would enter into the transaction for this non-fiscal motive See also wholly artificial arrangements 26 13

1.4.1 Taxpayer s purpose or intent in 344, 1 BITC Burden of proof for tax administration Includes subjective element, but not exclusivity By presumptions or by other means of proof And objective circumstances tautology Poiares Maduro in Halifax: [the subjective element] is subjective only in so far as it aims at ascertaining the purpose of the activities in question. That purpose which must not be confused with the subjective intention of the participants in those activities is to be objectively determined [ ] circumstances that would be relevant to any other party in the same situation regardless of specific motives of an individual taxpayer No soul searching E.g.: artificial arrangement, letterbox subsidiary, links between operators, 27 1.4.2 Taxpayer s purpose or intent in PPT & ATAD PPT reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was one of the principal purposes base erosion ATAD put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining [advantage] which are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances Non-genuine = not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic reality - Corporate tax commercial/economic - wholly artificial arrangement / ECJ - base erosion vs abuse?! 28 14

1.5 Consequences of the GAAR application Domestic GAAR GAARs in Belgian DTT & MLI ATAD 29 1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 Not enforceable towards the [tax] administration is the legal act, or the series of legal acts leading to the same transaction, when the administration demonstrates, by presumptions or by other means of proof [accepted in the tax code] and on the basis of objective circumstances, that tax abuse occurs. Tax abuse occurs when the taxpayer, by means of performing the legal act or the series of legal acts, realizes one of the following transactions: [ ] a transaction whereby the taxpayer places himself contrary to the purpose of a provision of the [BITC], or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, outside the scope of such provision; or a transaction whereby a tax advantage offered by the present Code, or the decrees adopted in execution thereof, is claimed while obtaining this advantage would be contrary to the purpose of this provision, and where the essential goal is the obtaining of this advantage. If the taxpayer does not provide proof to the contrary, then the taxable base and the calculation of the tax will be restored in such a way that the transaction will be subject to taxation in accordance with the purpose of the law as if the tax abuse had not taken place. 30 15

1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 Condition unenforceability condition restoration? How to restore? Redefine/recharacterize the legal acts (incl. potential elimination of acts) Respect the transaction the facts are the facts (De Broe and Bossuyt) Constitutional Court (30/10/13): only a means of proof (vs hybrid character) Recharacterization has no absolute character: no impact on legal situation, VAT, other taxes 31 1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 Recharacterization for all parties involved or not? Circ. 3/2012: case by case Additional taxation only for the taxpayer who realized the tax abuse For other taxpayers proportional application is necessary corresponding adjustment: levy taxes in accordance with the object and purpose of the circumvented tax provision double taxation, arbitrariness, 32 16

1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 Penalties and other consequences Circular letter 3/2012: tax abuse infringement of a provision of the BITC The original 3y assessment period must be respected (extension for fraud is not available) No penal consequences A reassessment will follow. As with any reassessment a tax increase may be imposed (= critized). 33 1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 Impact on DTT application BE: monistic dominance of international law Different possibilities: DTT expressly allows application of domestic GAAR GAAR can be applied even if outcome is inconsistent with normal application of the DTT DTT silent on domestic GAAR: OECD MC Commentary 2003 / BE admin. commentary >< pacta sunt servanda? 34 17

1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 (DTT silent on domestic GAAR:) DTT: BE has power to tax (before and after recharacterization): increased taxation due to GAAR is permissible BE does not have the power to tax under DTT, but claims it after recharacterization under GAAR: Recharacterization >< autonomous definition in DTT infringement of DTT No autonomous definition (art. 3(2) OECD MC), may be permitted (subject to contextual analysis) 35 1.5.1 Consequences of the application of 344, 1 Impact on EU freedoms EUCJ case law was inspiration for art. 344, 1 BITC Cadbury Schweppes: restriction on freedom arising from domestic antiavoidance rule [CFC] may be justified on the ground of prevention of wholly artificial arrangements if proportionate in relation to that objective check case-by-case 36 18

1.5.2 Consequences of application PPT and ATAD PPT a benefit under the Covered Tax Agreement shall not be granted ATAD For the purposes of calculating the corporate tax liability, a Member State shall ignore and [ignored ] tax liability shall be calculated in accordance with national law 37 1.6.1 Conflicts between domestic and treaty GAAR No direct conflict: art. 344, 1 BITC abuse of DTT provisions Effect of 344, 1 BITC may interfere with DTT (see possibilities in 1.5.1) and DTT GAAR: DTT GAAR takes precedence = what contracting states wanted MLI (PPT) expected to reduce impact of (or potential conflicts with) BE GAAR (directly or indirectly via impact on contextual analysis) 38 19

1.6.2 Conflicts between domestic GAAR and SAAR BE GAAR = ultimum remedium (Circ. 3/2012) after methods of interpretation, technical provisions, SAARs and Sham SAARs prevail over GAARs: more detailed quantitative (e.g. debt/eq ratio) or temporal criteria (e.g. 1 year holding period) = purpose of SAAR-provision E.g. 1y + 1d holding period: GAAR cannot apply objective element GAARs can complement SAARs (when targeted situation is circumvented and SAAR is in applicable) 39 2. CASE LAW ON STATUTORY OR COURT- DEVELOPED GAARS 20

3. GAAR AND TAXPAYER S SAFEGUARDS 3. GAAR AND TAXPAYER S SAFEGUARDS - Constitutional safeguard (principle of legality and security) see above - GAAR (aligns taxation with spirit of the law) substance over form (= taxation in accordance with economic substance as opposed to legal form) >< principle of legality - EU freedoms see above 42 21

3. GAAR AND TAXPAYER S SAFEGUARDS - Allocation of burden of proof between taxpayers and tax administration? - Proof of objective and subjective element by tax administration (see slides on subjective element) - Counterproof by taxpayer exclusive purpose test - Motives for the legal act(s) - Other non-insignificant motives prevail - Not only economic/financial motives but also subjective/personal/ - Avoidance of taxes outside BITC (VAT, Registration tax, )? 43 3. GAAR AND TAXPAYER S SAFEGUARDS - If a GAAR is applied, is there the right to a corresponding adjustment? See 1.5.1 - Is there a formal procedure to be observed (due process) when a GAAR is applied? No - Possibility of an advance tax ruling - Art. 344, 1 BITC = procedural/evidentiary rule incompetent - Ruling on the non-tax motives (subjective element) - MoF: This supposes a prior analysis of the objective element by the ruling commission full competence in practice - Regionalized matters with regional tax administration (FL property tax, ) 44 22

Thank you! Stibbe.com 45 Contact Wim Panis T +32 2 533 56 63 M +32 495 89 89 18 wim.panis@stibbe.com 23