Choice under risk and uncertainty

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Transcription:

Choice under risk and uncertainty

Introduction Up until now, we have thought of the objects that our decision makers are choosing as being physical items However, we can also think of cases where the outcomes of the choices we make are uncertain - we don t know exactly what will happen when we do a particular choice. For example: You are deciding whether or not to invest in a business You are deciding whether or not to go skiing next month You are deciding whether or not to buy a house that straddles the San Andreas fault line

Risk and Uncertainty In each case the outcomes are uncertain. Here we are going to think about how to model a decision maker who is making such choices. Economists tend to differentiate between two different types of ways in which we may not know for certain what will happen in the future: risk and uncertainty (sometimes called ambiguity). Risk: the probabilities of different outcomes are known, Uncertainty: the probabilities of different outcomes are unknown Now we consider models of choice under risk,

An example of choice under risk For an amount of money x, you can flip a coin. If you get heads, you get 10. If you get tails, you get 0. Assume there is a 50% chance of heads and a 50% chance of tails. For what price x would you choose to play the game? i.e. you have a choice between the following two options. 1. Not play the game and get nothing 2. Play the game, and get -x for sure, plus a 50% chance of getting $10.

Figure out the expected value (or average pay-out) of playing the game, and see if it is bigger than 0. If it is, then play the game, if not, then don t. With a 50% chance you will get 10- x, With a 50% chance you will get -x. Thus, the average payoff is: 0.5(10 - x) + 0.5(- x) = 5 - x Thus the value of the game is 5 - x. you should play the game if the cost of playing is less than 5.

Lotteries (or prospects) Decision making under risk can be considered as a process of choosing between different lotteries. A lottery (or prospect) consists of a number of possible outcomes with their associated probability It can be described as: q = x 1, p 1 ; x 2, p 2 ; x n, p n where x i represents the i th outcome and p i is its associated probability, p i 0,1 i and i p i = 1.

In the example the choice is between: r = 10 x, 0.5; x, 0.5 s = 0, 1 in this last case we omit probability and we can write s = 0. When an outcomes is for sure (i.e. its probability is 1) we write only the outcome. s = x means that the outcome x is for sure Sometime we can omit the zero outcomes, so the lottery r = 10, 0.5; 5, 0.3; 0, 0.2 can be written as r = 10, 0.5; 5, 0.3

Compound lotteries Lotteries can be combined From the previous example: suppose you have the following lottery of lotteries: c = r, 1 ; s, 1 2 2 where r = 10 x, 0.5; x, 0.5 and s = 0, 1. Then, the resulting lottery is: c = 10 x, 1 4 ; x, 1 4 ; 0, 1 2

More in general Consider the two following lotteries r = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n and s = y 1, q 1 ; y n, q n, then c = r, a; s, 1 a = x 1, ap 1 ; x n, ap n ; y 1, 1 a q 1 ; y n, 1 a q n

Choice under risk: the axioms of von Neumann and Morgenstern (vnm) These axioms are related to the axioms on preferences and impose rationality to the individual s behaviour when individuals face choices among lotteries. satisfies: a. Completeness For all lotteries q and r we have that q r or r q (or both) b. Transitivity For any three lotteries q, r, s if q r and r s, then q s

c. Continuity For any three lotteries q, r, s where q r and r s, there exists some probability p such that there is indifference between the middle ranked prospect r and the prospect q, p; s, 1 p, i.e. q, p; s, 1 p r Equivalently there exist a, b 0, 1 such that: q, a; s, 1 a r q, b; s, 1 b

d. Independence Any state of the world that results in the same outcome regardless of one s choice can be ignored or cancelled For any three lotteries q, r, s and any p 0, 1 if q r then q, p; s, 1 p r, p; s, 1 p

Example If q = 3000, r = 4000, 0.8 and q r then q = 3000, 0.25, r = 4000, 0.2 and q r Note that: prospect q is the compound lottery q = q, 0.25; 0, 0.75 and prospects r is the compound lottery r = r, 0.25; 0, 0.75

Directly related to independence is the axiom of betweenness. If q r then for any a 0,1 : q q, a; r, 1 a r q, a; r, 1 a

e. Monotonicity a gamble which assigns a higher probability to a preferred outcome will be preferred to one which assigns a lower probability to a preferred outcome (as long as the other outcomes in the gambles remain unchanged) Concept od stochastically dominance.

Stochastic dominance Consider the following two lotteries: q = 10, 0.01; 15, 0.02; 30, 0.01; 45, 0.06 r = 15, 0.03; 45, 0.07 r dominates q, it is clear rewriting r as: r = 10, 0.00; 15, 0.03; 30, 0.00; 45, 0.07

Consider two prospects q and r Let x 1, x 2, x n the outcomes in q and r, ordered from the worst to the best. Let be: p qi the probability of outcome i in prospect q p ri the probability of outcome i in prospect r We say that prospect q stochastically dominates prospect r if: x i=1 x p qi i=1 p ri x 1,, n with strict inequality for at least one x

Expected Value The expected value of prospectr = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n is Example E r = i p i x i r = 1000, 0.25; 500, 0.75 and u x i = x i E r = 0.25 1000+ 0.75 500

St. Petersburg paradox A fair coin is tossed repeatedly until a tail appears, ending the game. The pot starts at 2 dollars and is doubled every time a head appears. Prize is whatever is in the pot after the game ends: 2 dollars if a tail appears on the first toss, 4 dollars if a head appears on the first toss and a tail on the second, 8 dollars if a head appears on the first two tosses and a tail on the third, 16 dollars if a head appears on the first three tosses and a tail on the fourth, etc. 2 k dollars if the coin is tossed k times until the first tail appears.

The expected value is : 2 1 2 + 4 1 4 + 8 1 8 +.. = = i=1 2 i 1 2 i = = 1 + 1 + 1 +.. = The experimental evidence is that people are willing to pay only limited amount of money to play this lottery Solution: the value that people attach to the first dollar of their wealth is larger tat the value they attach to the i th dollar they earn. A decreasing marginal value can explain this paradox

Expected Utility and Expected Value The expected utility of a prospect r = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n is given by: U r = i p i u x i Example r = 1000, 0.25; 500, 0.75 and u x i = x i U r = 0.25 1000+ 0.75 500 St.Petersburg paradox when u x i = x i 2 i 2 1 i 2 i = 1 = 1 2 2 1 = 2.41 i=1 i=1

Representation theorem Let be X the set of all possible lotteries. A binary relation satisfies vnm axioms if and only if there exists a function u: X R such that: q r if and only if u q u r

1) Asset integration Further assumptions a prospect is acceptable if and only if the utility resulting from integrating the prospect with one s assets exceeds the utility of those assets alone. Lottery r = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n position w if U x 1 + w, p 1 ; x n + w, p n is acceptable at asset U w

2. Risk aversion a person is said to be risk averse if he prefers the certain prospect x to any risky prospect with expected value equal to x. Risk aversion is caused by the concavity in the utility function More in general we can talk of Risk Attitudes

A decision maker is risk neutral if he is indifferent between receiving a lottery s expected value and playing the lottery. Consider r = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n u Risk Attitudes i p i x i = i then: p i u x i A decision maker is risk neutral if its utility function is linear, i.e. u x = a + b x

A decision maker is risk averse if he prefers receiving the lottery s expected value instead of playing the lottery. Consider r = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n u i p i x i > i then: p i u x i A decision maker is risk averse if its utility function is strictly concave, i.e. u" x < 0

A decision maker is risk seeking if he prefers playing the lottery instead of receiving its expected value. Consider r = x 1, p 1 ; x n, p n u i p i x i < i then: p i u x i A decision maker is risk seeking if its utility function is strictly convex, i.e. u" x > 0

r = 100, 0.5 0 0 50 100

All these results are proved by Jensen s Inequality Let x be a random variable where E(x) is its expected value and f x is a concave function then: f E x E f x f x is a convex function then: f E x E f x

Measures of risk aversion For of a lottery q, the risk premium R q is defined as R q = E q CE q where CE q is the certainty equivalent wealth defined as U CE q = U q Interpretation: the risk premium R q is the amount of money that an agent is willing to pay to avoid a lottery.

Example. Person A has to play the following lottery q = 100, 0.5; 64, 0.5. Assume that his utility function is u x = x Compute the risk premium. U CE q = U q CE q = 0.5 100 + 0.5 64 CE q = 81 R q = E q CE q = 100 0.5 + 64 0.5 81 = 1 Person B utility function is u x = x. He proposes to person A to buy the lottery. Which is the minimum price that person A will accept? Answer: 81 Is convenient for person B? Answer: yes

Person A has to play the following lottery q = 100, 0.5; 64, 0.5. Assume that his utility function is u x = x We have computed that R q = 1 Selling the lottery at p=81 is equivalent to hold the lottery and pay 19 when lottery s outcome is 100 and to receive 17 when lottery s outcome is 64. In expected terms Person A pays 1 ( 19 0.5 + 17 0.5 = 1)

r = 100, 0.5 R r = 50 CE r 0 CE r E r = 50 0 100

1. Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion: u" c A c = u c 2. Arrow-Pratt-De Finetti measure of relative riskaversion or coefficient of relative risk aversion c u" c R c = u c

Type of Risk-Aversion Example of utility functions Increasing absolute riskaversion u w = w c w2 Constant absolute riskaversion u w = e c w Decreasing absolute riskaversion u w = ln w

Type of Risk-Aversion Example of utility functions Increasing relative riskaversion w cw 2 Constant relative riskaversion ln(w) Decreasing relative riskaversion 1 e 2 w 2

The Machina triangle two-dimensional representation 3 possible outcomes, x 1, x 2, and x 3, and x 3 x 2 x 1. they occur with probabilities p 1, p 2, and p 3 respectively, where i p i = 1 since p 2 = 1 - p 1 - p 3, we can represent these lotteries by points in a unit triangle in the (p 1, p 3 ) plane, known as the Machina triangle Example r = x 1, p 1, x 2, p 2 ; x 3, p 3, U r = p 1 u x 1 + p 2 u x 2 + p 3 u x 3 U r = p 1 u x 1 + 1 p 1 p 3 u x 2 + p 3 u x 3

Example r = x 1, p 1, x 2, p 2 ; x 3, p 3, U r = p 1 u x 1 + p 2 u x 2 + p 3 u x 3 Replace p 2 = 1 p 1 p 3 U r = p 1 u x 1 + 1 p 1 p 3 u x 2 + p 3 u x 3 Hold the utility constant at a level U and solve by p 3 p 3 = U u x 2 u x 3 u x 2 + u x 2 u x 1 u x 3 u x 2 p 1 Slope is positive, intercept could be either positive or negative

Representing risk attitudes using indifference curves p 3 The blue lines in both panels are iso-expected value lines p 1

Risk averse p 3 The blue lines are iso-expected value lines Black lines are indifference curves p 1

Risk seeking p 3 The blue lines are iso-expected value lines Black lines are indifference curves p 1