Page 2 October 30, 2013

Similar documents
July 28, Elizabeth M. Murphy Secretary Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549

October 30, Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

March 27, Washington, DC Washington, DC 20515

Comments on Volcker Rule Proposed Regulations

Subject: Interagency Proposed Rule regarding Credit Risk Retention. 12 CFR Part 43 [Docket NO. OCC ] RIN 1557-AD40

Testimony of. Michael Middleton. American Bankers Association. United States Senate

February 5, Dear Secretary Geithner:

October 30, Honorable Martin J. Gruenberg Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Washington, DC Re: RIN 3064-AD74

Credit Risk Retention

Summary As households and taxpayers, Americans have a large stake in the future of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Homeowners and potential homeowners ind

Testimony of. Jeff Plagge. American Bankers Association. Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. United States Senate

November 15, Alfred M. Pollard General Counsel Federal Housing Finance Agency th St., SW, 8 th Floor Washington, D.C.

Credit Risk Retention: Dodd- Frank Final Rule February 26, 2015 Presented By: Kenneth E. Kohler Jerry R. Marlatt

Removal of References to Credit Ratings in Certain Regulations Governing the Federal Home Loan Banks

August 1, 2011 BY ELECTRONIC MAIL

A Guide to the Re-Proposed Credit Risk Retention Rules for Securitizations

13 February 2012 USA.

March 29, Proposed Guidance-Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Products 70 FR (December 29, 2005)

November 14, The Honorable Melvin L. Watt Director Federal Housing Finance Agency th St SW Washington, DC 20219

Basel III s implications for commercial real estate

Council of Community Bankers Associations

October 17, By Electronic Submission

Defining Issues. Regulators Finalize Risk- Retention Rule for ABS. November 2014, No Key Facts. Key Impacts

Comptroller of the Currency. Re: Market and Consumer Impact of the Treatment of Mortgage Servicing assets under Basel III

Joe Gendron, Director of Government Relations 5555 Bankers Avenue, Baton Rouge, LA (225) ,

Re: OMB Control No ; FFIEC 031, 041 and 051

Structured Finance Alert

CMBS 2.0 Monday, August 15th

October 9, Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Strategic Initiatives th St, S.W. Washington, D.C To Whom it May Concern:

August 5, Department of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Ave, NW Washington, D.C Docket: TREAS-DO To Whom It May Concern:

Statement of. Edward J. DeMarco Acting Director Federal Housing Finance Agency

Brenda Hughes. American Bankers Association. Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs United States Senate

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 250 E Street, SW Mail Stop 2-3 Washington, DC

Re: Request for Information on Small-Dollar Lending (Docket No. FDIC ; RIN ZA04)

September 14, Dear Mr. Kirkpatrick:

RE: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's Proposed Underserved Markets Plans

October 13, Dear Mr. Ryan,

June 10, The Honorable Sheila C. Bair Chairman Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation th Street, NW Washington, DC 20429

By William P. Cejudo, Charles A. Sweet, James A. Gouwar and John Arnholz. Volume 10 Issue JOURNAL OF TAXATION OF FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 29

Final Credit Risk Retention Rule. Last Updated: December 2014

Differences Across Originators in CMBS Loan Underwriting

Volcker Rule Materials Proprietary Trading. February 13, Comment Letter. SIFMA AMG Proposed Rule. # v1

Hearing on The Housing Decline: The Extent of the Problem and Potential Remedies December 13, 2007

Overview of Proposed Dodd-Frank Risk Retention Regulation

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank for International Settlements CH 4002, Basel Switzerland Basel

Request for Input Enterprise Guarantee Fees

A Closer Look: Credit-risk Transfer to Private Investors

April 1, Mr. Robert de V. Frierson Secretary Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 20 th Street and Constitution Avenue Washington, DC 20551

Federal National Mortgage Association

Re: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio

CONSUMER CREDIT INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION

MetLife. March 15, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Bank for International Settlements Centralbahnplatz 2 CH Basel Switzerland

Changes in Certain Multifamily Housing and Health Care Facility Mortgage Insurance Premiums for Fiscal Year 2013 Notice Docket No.

March 9, The Honorable Mel Watt Director Federal Housing Finance Agency 400 7th Street, SW Washington, DC Dear Director Watt,

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in Conservatorship

December 21, Dear Chairman McWilliams, Comptroller Otting, Vice Chairman Quarles, Chairman McWatters, and Chairman Tonsager:

Re: Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring

Re: Residential Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosure Process and Protections

which was indicated to be roughly 1.5+ standard deviations from the national average. 3 Id.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS

March 21, Robert dev. Frierson, Secretary Board of Governors Federal Reserve System 20 th Street and Constitution Washington, DC 20551

By electronic submission. October 26, 2012

RMBS Commentary: RMBS Landscape

TESTIMONY OF MR. JERRY REED CHIEF LENDING OFFICER ALASKA USA FEDERAL CREDIT UNION ON BEHALF OF THE CREDIT UNION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

January 10, Secretary

February 13, 2012 DELIVERED VIA

Small Multifamily Building Risk Share Initiative Request for Comment [Docket No FR 5728 N 01]

Testimony of. Brenda Hughes. American Bankers Association. Subcommittee on Housing and Insurance. Committee on Financial Services

Michael L. Gullette Senior Vice President Tax and Accounting July 13, 2018

March 21, RE: RIN 2590 AA98: Validation and Approval of Credit Score Models by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

TOWARD A NEW HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM

On January 7, 2005, the Securities and

March 29, Federal Housing Finance Agency Office of Housing and Regulatory Policy th St., SW, 9 th Floor Washington, D.C.

November 12, 2013 By

Overview of Mortgage Lending

Federal Housing Finance Agency Perspectives on Housing Finance Reform. An Ongoing Conservatorship is Not Sustainable and Needs to End

Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Treatment of U.S. Municipal Securities as High-Quality Liquid Assets

by Lisa Filomia-Aktas, EY

SIFMA Comments on December 4, 2017 Update on the Single Security

A description of each Association is provided in Appendix A of this letter.

Basel Pillar 3 Disclosures

RE: RIN 2590 AA53, Federal Housing Finance Agency Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking concerning mortgage assets affected by PACE programs

This chapter was originally published in:

U.S. CREDIT RISK RETENTION RULES:

ASA & NAIFA Comments On The Re-Proposed Risk-Retention Rule

Re: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Request for Comments Members of Federal Home Loan Banks (RIN 2590-AA39)

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking with request for comment. SUMMARY: The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) is proposing amendments

Alfred M. Pollard General Counsel Attention: Comments/RIN 2590-AA42 Federal Housing Finance Agency. Washington, DC RIN 2590 AA42

Fannie Mae Reports Third-Quarter 2011 Results

Jack E. Hopkins President and CEO of CorTrust Bank Sioux Falls, SD

May 19, Re: Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards, and Monitoring Daily Calculation Requirement. Ladies and Gentlemen:

The Perils of Privatizing the U.S. Mortgage Finance System. David Min March

***EMBARGOED UNTIL 9:30 a.m ***

Capital Requirements

WikiLeaks Document Release

Re: Regulatory Capital Treatment for High Volatility Commercial Real Estate (HVCRE) Exposures

January 18, Reduced Reporting for Covered Depository Institutions. Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

GSE REFORM PRINCIPLES AND GUARDRAILS

Risk Retention Rule Premium Capture, Commingling, and Servicing Robert Barnett June, 2011

Transcription:

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Robert dev. Frierson, Secretary 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20551 E-mail: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 550 17th Street, NW Washington, DC 20429 Attn: Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, Comments E-mail: Comments@FDIC.gov Federal Housing Finance Agency 1700 G Street, NW, Fourth Floor Washington, DC 20552 Attn: Alfred M. Pollard, General Counsel Email: RegComments@fhfa.gov Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 7th Street, SW, Room 10276 Washington, DC 20410-0500 Attn: Regulations Division, Office of General Counsel Office of the Comptroller of the Currency Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, 400 7th Street, SW, Suite 3E-218, Mail Stop 9W-11 Washington, DC 20219 E-mail: regs.comments@occ.treas.gov Securities and Exchange Commission 100 F Street, NE Washington, DC 20549-1090 Attn: Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary E-mail: rule-comments@sec.gov Re: Proposed Rule (Release Nos. 34-70277), Credit Risk Retention - Federal Reserve Docket No. R- 1411; FDIC RIN 3064-AD74; OCC Docket Number OCC-2013-0010; SEC File Number S7-14-11; FHFA RIN 2590-AA43 Ladies and Gentlemen: The Real Estate Roundtable is pleased to submit this letter in response to the joint-agency (Agencies) request for comments regarding the re-proposed rules to implement the credit risk retention requirements of Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Re-proposed rules) in accordance with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd- Frank Act). The Real Estate Roundtable represents the principal owners, investors and managers of the U.S. income producing commercial and multifamily real estate sector. As such, we recognize the goal of the Agencies is to provide greater integrity and discipline in domestic and international capital markets. The Real Estate Roundtable and its members lead an industry that generates more than 20 percent of America s gross national product, employs more than 9 million people and produces nearly two-thirds of the taxes raised by local governments for essential public services. Our members are senior real estate industry executives from the nation s leading income-producing real property owners, managers and investors, the elected heads of America s leading real estate trade organizations, as well as the key executives of the major financial services companies involved in financing, securitizing or investing in income-producing properties. Commercial real estate markets continue to recover from the most severe economic downturn since the Great Depression. Credit to the sector virtually shut down in 2008 and only began to return in a limited capacity in 2010. As one of the largest sources of credit for commercial and multifamily real estate in the United States, the commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) market is an important element of the over $3 trillion commercial real estate debt market, currently comprising roughly 26 percent of the overall market. It is essential to have a healthy and disciplined new-issuance CMBS market.

Page 2 The Real Estate Roundtable supports efforts to promote economically responsible commercial real estate lending that reflects sound underwriting and risk management practices, and rational pricing of economic risk. We continue to urge policymakers to take action that encourages stable valuations, enhanced transparency and sensible underwriting, and support efforts to establish appropriate systemic safeguards all key factors for a reliable credit system. Within this context, we appreciate the Agencies efforts to ensure that the commercial real estate lending market function with an appropriate level of integrity and discipline. Although risk retention may be intended to safeguard bondholders, it also introduces the potential to raise costs for borrowers or to limit the amount of credit and liquidity that are available, particularly to borrowers in secondary and tertiary markets. We commend the Agencies for making revisions to the originally proposed regulations, as issued on April 29, 2011. Despite a number of constructive revisions, we remain concerned about the serious and, presumably, unintended economic consequences that the re-proposed rules could have on a reliable new issuance market for commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) and overall commercial and multifamily real estate credit capacity. For this asset class, we have the following concerns: Appropriate Alignment of Interests. A key assumption underlying the originally proposed rules is that by requiring a CMBS sponsor to retain an economic interest in its securitized assets, the sponsor s interest will be more closely aligned with the interests of CMBS investors. However, we remain concerned that neither the originally proposed rules nor the re-proposed rules acknowledge or account for existing incentive alignment mechanisms 1 and forms of risk retention such as the existing B-piece investor retention and special servicing structure for CMBS which serve to appropriately align incentives and create skin in the game. Cost Benefit Analysis. The originally proposed rules failed to acknowledge and build on these forms of risk retention. In the Federal Reserve s Report to the Congress on Risk Retention 2, the Board recommended that the Agencies responsible for implementing credit risk retention take into account a number of factors in order to help ensure that the regulations promote the purposes of the Act without unnecessarily reducing the supply of credit. 3 This report notes that overcollateralization, subordination, third-party credit enhancement, representations and warranties and conditional cash flows all serve a similar purpose. 4 While an improvement over the original proposal, the re-proposed rules still do not appear to fully address these factors. Additional concerns have been raised by the Financial Stability Oversight Council in a Dodd- Frank mandated report 5 regarding the potentially negative macroeconomic effects that the proposed risk retention rules could trigger which warns that if regulators set risk retention requirements at an inappropriate level, or design them in an inappropriate manner, the costs in terms of lost long-term output could outweigh the benefits of the regulations. 6 Given the fragile state of the U.S. economy and the important role of CMBS in commercial real estate finance markets, this broader economic view is of vital concern to commercial real estate particularly for smaller market participants. 7 The Senate Banking Committee also urged the Agencies to fully understand the economic impact these credit risk retention rules could have on the overall economy by conducting a rigorous costbenefit and economic impact study prior to implementation given the potential harm to our already 1 Federal Reserve Report, 3-4. 2 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to the Congress on Risk Retention (October 2010). 3 Federal Reserve Report, 3-4. 4 Federal Reserve Report, 41-43. 5 Financial Stability Oversight Council, Macroeconomic Effects of Risk Retention Requirements (January 2011). 6 FSOC Report, 30 7 Federal Reserve Report, 3-4.

Page 3 weak economy and the public from ill-conceived rules. 8 Such an analysis should specifically address how the proposed CMBS risk retention requirements could affect overall credit capacity for commercial real estate and how a potential reduction in liquidity will affect borrowers, the credit markets and the overall economy. We are, therefore, disappointed that the Agencies did not accept the suggestion made in our August 1, 2011 letter recommending that a comprehensive cost benefit analysis be conducted of how the proposed rules will affect commercial real estate and the overall national economy before the rules are finalized. As such, we concur with the dissenting view of SEC Commissioner Michael S. Piwowar regarding the re-proposed risk retention rules. Commissioner Piwowar stated that, although improvements were made to the original proposal in response to public comments, he did not support the re-proposal because it does not contain necessary economic analysis, nor does it adequately consider alternatives to credit risk retention requirements. We continue to urge that the Agencies make every effort to understand the economic impact these re-proposed credit risk retention rules could have on the overall economy by conducting a rigorous cost-benefit and economic impact study prior to implementation given the potential harm to our already weak economy and the public from ill-conceived rules. Retention Structures. We commend the Agencies for eliminating the controversial premium capture cash-reserve account (PCCRA) provision in the revised proposal. We also commend you on devising a new methodology for permitting greater flexibility in the structure a sponsor utilizes to meet the retention requirement. Under the re-proposed rule, a sponsor may retain any combination of horizontal (eligible horizontal interest) and/or vertical economic interest (eligible vertical interest) in a CMBS securitization transaction, provided that those interests generally equal at least 5 percent of the fair value of the securitization transaction in the aggregate. Under this newly proposed calculus, however, the retention piece would usually be larger than if it were calculated based on the par value. This re-proposed structure permits greater flexibility in meeting the retention requirements but will still result in higher retention levels than the current structure. We have concerns that basing the retention calculation on fair value measurements, instead of the par value of securities, as originally proposed, will lead to dramatically higher retention levels than the current structure, requiring additional investor capital. Such an increase will unduly result in higher borrowing costs and may fuel a preference for higher yielding, more risky loans. Term. The original proposal called for only one party to retain a 5 percent risk piece of every transaction and retain it for the life of the transaction. Under the re-proposal, the parties that retain a transaction's risk piece would be able to trade out of that position after five years. While the re-proposal is more flexible than the original proposal, this still places onerous term restrictions on investors. There are also restrictions on the sponsor and/or B-piece buyer hedging their positions during the risk retention period. Such a structure creates a disincentive for investors and could drive up borrowing costs. Indeed, how can an insured depository institution participate in this market and balance safety and soundness concerns? Despite improvements to the original proposal, we remain concerned that the five year term creates disincentives for investors that could undermine market liquidity. Qualified Commercial Real Estate (QCRE) Mortgages Should Follow More Realistic Guidelines. We had hoped that a more realistic set of criteria could be developed for qualification to exempt certain CMBS from the risk retention construct. While modest improvements have been made, the reproposed parameters stipulate uncharacteristically low leverage and high debt service coverage levels for commercial and multifamily real estate loans. We agree with notion of reducing or eliminating the risk retention piece for CMBS loans that are conservatively underwritten. The inclusion of such qualifying loans in a CMBS transaction would reduce the overall risk-retention requirement, but very 8 Letter dated February 15, 2011 to The Honorable Timothy Geithner, Secretary, The Department of Treasury, et al., and letter dated May 4, 2011 to Elizabeth A. Coleman, Inspector General, Federal Reserve Board, et al.

Page 4 few, if any, current loans would qualify. It would be entirely more feasible to have more realistic parameters under which a commercial or multifamily real estate loan would qualify for this designation. For example, insurance company and commercial bank lenders have the lowest incidence of delinquency 9 for commercial and multifamily loans. Since loans originated by balance sheet lenders such as insurance companies and commercial banks outperform loans from other sources, we recommend following the guidelines utilized by such lenders. As such, we suggest utilizing a capitalization rate, loan-to-value ratio, debt service coverage ratio and amortization schedule for commercial and multifamily real estate loans more typical of these balance sheet lenders. By following more realistic industry standards in the qualification parameters, the Agencies would have a better chance of seeing higher quality assets in QCRE commercial mortgage securitizations. With efforts underway to reform the nation s Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), the importance of having a viable CMBS market is more important than ever -- given the fact that a significant percentage of the multifamily market is financed through either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Should reform efforts take the GSEs out of the multifamily finance market or further reduce their multifamily issuance capacity, having a reasonable qualification for multifamily mortgages is vital to maintain credit flows to the multifamily sector. Therefore, it is vitally important for the Agencies to create realistic parameters under which a CMBS loan may qualify for appropriate reduction or elimination of the risk retention piece for CMBS. Single-Borrower/Single-Credit (SBSC) Transactions Should be Exempt from Risk Retention. One important asset class of CMBS that currently does not require a risk retention piece is the single-borrower/single-credit (SBSC) transaction. SBSC CMBS transactions represent an important source of credit for the commercial and multifamily real estate sector and are a subset of the broader CMBS market. Compared to conduit transactions that average 100 or more loans per pool, SBSC transactions are less complex and contain only one loan (or a handful of cross-collateralized loans that essentially function as one loan). The SBSC market has the highest credit quality characteristics of any securitization asset class, with losses of roughly 20 basis points over time versus an average of nearly 4 percent for conduit transactions and over 6 percent for private label residential securitizations. Moreover, the SBSC asset class serves as an important source of credit for large-scale commercial real estate properties where securitization is the only option. In this sense, they often involve only one loan (or a pool of cross-collateralized loans that essentially function as one loan) and are more similar to corporate debt than to other CMBS. The re-proposed rule requires that all sponsors of securitizations retain a 5 percent retained interest. The rule counts B-piece buyers holdings against the requirements for conduit transactions. However, because SBSC transactions are transparent and extremely credit-worthy, investors have not demanded a subordination to support their positions as with conduit transactions. As such, all bonds issued out of an SBSC trust are investment grade, and there are no B-piece buyers to absorb what will be very costly requirements for the sponsors to absorb. We are very concerned about the implications of applying a one-size-fits-all rule to this asset class. Sponsors estimate that the change will add at least 20 to 30 basis points to borrower costs and increase warehouse risk. This potential increase in borrowing costs could have the unintended consequence of reducing the credit quality of the underlying loans thereby undermining the overall goal of risk retention. In addition to raising borrowing costs, the market would potentially become less liquid which could result in reduced credit capacity for the overall commercial real estate market. 9 Differences Across Originators in CMBS Loan Underwriting, Lamont K. Black, Chenghuan, Sean Chu, Andrew Cohen, and Joseph B. Nichols, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Divisions of Research & Statistics and Monetary Affairs Federal Reserve Board, Washington, D.C. 2011-05

Page 5 We, therefore, recommend that the re-proposal be revised to permit a complete exemption from risk retention for traditional SBSC CMBS transactions for commercial and multifamily properties. It is vitally important to preserve this financing vehicle for large-scale transactions too large for traditional portfolio lenders. REITs. We commend the Agencies for removing language that would have excluded loans against properties owned by REITs from being able to be exempt from the risk-retention rules. The reproposal said "the agencies did not intend to exclude otherwise valid CRE loans from the definition solely because the borrower was organized as a REIT structure." We also commend the agencies for seeking to avoid unsecured REIT loans from being classified as commercial real estate loans. Monitoring Impact of Proposed Rules It is vital that the Agencies appropriately monitor the application and administration of the reproposed rules to ensure that such application and administration is balanced, consistent and otherwise conforms to the Agencies intentions. As one element of such monitoring, the Roundtable respectfully suggests that the Agencies sponsor periodic industry forums. These forums would permit institutions, their customers, and other interested parties to provide feedback to the Agencies on the implementation of the re-proposed rules in the field. Such forums, held on a semiannual basis, could serve as an early warning system to alert the Agencies regarding potential issues with respect to the administration and implementation of the re-proposed rules. This feedback would allow the Agencies to appropriately address any possible concerns regarding the impact the re-proposed rule is having on the new-issue CMBS market and the overall stability of the real estate lending market. Conclusion We appreciate what the Agencies are trying to achieve and commend them on making progress toward a more workable re-proposal. However, we remain concerned about the impact the re-proposed rules will have on the new issue CMBS market, SBSC transactions, commercial real estate credit flows and the overall economy. Given the vast credit challenges facing commercial real estate, the fragile nature of the economy and the continued volatility in credit and capital markets, it is important to appropriately craft the re-proposed rules to ensure a properly functioning and reliable CMBS market. Accordingly, we respectfully request that the Agencies consider making a number of further refinements to the re-proposed rules and reduce the potential for an unintended negative impact on the CMBS market and the overall economy. Again, we appreciate this opportunity to comment, and we look forward to working constructively with the Agencies on this important matter. We trust the Agencies may find our few comments useful. Should you have questions or require additional information, please contact Clifton E. Rodgers, Jr., by telephone at (202) 639-8400 or by email at crodgers@rer.org. Thank you for this opportunity to comment on this important issue. Sincerely, Jeffrey D. DeBoer President and CEO