Tobias Adrian Federal Reserve Bank of New York Hyun Song Shin Princeton University Presentation at the 6th BIS Annual Conference Financial System and Macroeconomic Resilience Brunnen, June 18-19, 2007 The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
Marking to Market and Changes in Net Worth Consider world where balance sheets are continuously marked to market. Price changes show up immediately as changes in net worth What are the reactions to changes in net worth? What are the aggregate consequences to such reactions? 1
Three Objectives of This Paper Document evidence on the behavior of financial intermediaries Leverage is strongly pro-cyclical Margin of adjustment is in collateralized borrowing/lending (repos and reverse repos) Show that such behavior has aggregate consequences for risk appetite Balance sheet changes forecast shifts in risk appetite (VIX index) Shed light on liquidity as change in aggregate balance sheets 2
Shedding Light on Liquidity Asset price booms often linked to liquidity in financial system Suggestive metaphors, such as Awash with liquidity, The Economist, February 3 rd 2005. Liquidity sloshing around, Reuters, July 26 th 2006. We propose a definition of liquidity in this context in terms of balance sheets of financial intermediaries. 3
Basic Balance Sheet Arithmetic: Passive Investor Household balance sheet Assets Liabilities House, 100 Equity, 10 Mortgage, 90 Leverage = Assets Equity =10 Assume that the market value of debt is constant at 90. L = A A 90 4
Leverage is inversely related to total assets: 13 12 L 11 10 9 8 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 A 5
Balance Sheet Size and Leverage: Households 8 Total Asset Growth (Percent Quarterly) 6 4 2 0-2 -4-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 Leverage Growth (Percent Quarterly) U.S. Flow of Funds (1963-2006) 6
Non-Financial, Non-Farm Corporations 6 Total Assets Growth (Percent Quarterly) 5 4 3 2 1 0-1 -2-2.5-2 -1.5-1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 Leverage Growth (Percent Quarterly) U.S. Flow of Funds, 1963-2006 7
Financial Institutions Financial institutions actively manage balance sheets so as to meet value at risk or economic capital targets to meet performance measures such as return on equity (ROE). to hit desired credit ratings meet regulatory requirements What are the consequences? 8
Commercial Banks 6 Total Asset Growth (Percent Quarterly) 5 4 3 2 1 0-1 -2-50 -40-30 -20-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 Leverage Growth (Percent Quarterly) U.S. Flow of Funds (1963-2006) 9
Security Dealers and Brokers 40 Total Asset Growth (Percent Quarterly) 30 20 10 0-10 -20-30 -50-40 -30-20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 Leverage Growth (Percent Quarterly) U.S. Flow of Funds (1963-2006) 10
Targeting Constant Leverage Initial balance sheet Assets Liabilities Securities, 100 Equity, 10 Debt, 90 Assume price of debt approximately constant. increases by 1% to 101. Suppose the security price Assets Liabilities Securities, 101 Equity, 11 Debt, 90 11
Leverage falls to 101 11 =9.18 If bank targets constant leverage, it must take on additional debt of D to purchase D worth of securities on the asset side so that assets equity = 101 + D 11 =10 The solution is D =9. In other words, the bank takes on additional debt worth 9, and with this money purchases securities worth 9. The demand curve is upward-sloping. 12
The new balance sheet looks like this. Assets Liabilities Securities, 110 Equity, 11 Debt, 99 The leverage is now back up to 10. The mechanism works in reverse, too. security price so that Suppose there is shock to the Assets Liabilities Securities, 109 Equity, 10 Debt, 99 Leverage is too high (109/10 = 10.9). 13
Sell securities worth 9, paydown debt of 9. Assets Liabilities Securities, 100 Equity, 10 Debt, 90 Back to leverage of 10. Supply curve is downward-sloping. What is the aggregate impact of perverse demand and supply curves? 14
Aggregate Impact Target leverage Target leverage Stronger balance sheets Increase B/S size Weaker balance sheets Reduce B/S size Asset price boom Asset price decline If leverage is procyclical, then amplifying effect is that much larger. 15
Why investment banks? Wall Street Investment Banks Their balance sheet is very close to the ideal of being continuously marked to market. Stylized balance sheet of an investment bank: Assets Trading assets Reverse repos Other assets Liabilities Short positions Repos Long term debt Shareholder equity They are a significant part of financial system, both in quantities and impact through prices 16
30% Total Financial Assets of Financial Intermediaries as % of Commercial Bank Total Assets 30% Total Financial Assets (% of CB Assets) 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% Security Brokers and Dealers Hedge Funds 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% Total Financial Assets (% of CB Assets) 0% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 0% Source: Total financial assets of Security Brokers and Dealers are from table L.129 of the Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Total financial assets of Bank Holding Companies are from table L.112 of the Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Total Assets Under Management of Hedge Funds are from HFR. 17
Sample Bank Bear Stearns Goldman Sachs Lehman Brothers Holdings Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley Sample 1997 Q1 2006 Q4 1999 Q2 2006 Q4 1993 Q2 2006 Q4 1991 Q1 2006 Q4 1997 Q2 2006 Q4 These banks are pure play stand alone investment banks, not part of larger commercial banking group. Panel regressions use these five banks. 18
Bear Sterns Total Assets and Leverage Citigroup Goldman Sachs Total Assets (log change) -.1 0.1.2 1998-2 1998-4 1998-3 1998-1 Total Assets (log change) -.3 -.2 -.1 0.1 1998-3 1998-4 1998-2 Total Assets (log change) -.05 0.05.1 Leverage (log change) Leverage (log change) -.2 -.1 0.1 Leverage (log change) Lehman Brothers Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley Total Assets (log change) 1998-4 1998-2 1998-3 1998-1 Total Assets (log change) 1998-4 1998-2 1998-3 1998-1 Total Assets (log change) 1998-4 1998-3 1998-1 1998-2 Leverage (log change) Leverage (log change) Leverage (log change) 19
Tot. Coll. Borrowing (log change) -.2 0.2.4 Tot. Coll. Borrowing (log change) Liquidity and Financial Cycles 1998-4 1998-2 Bear Sterns 1998-3 -.1 0.1.2 Total Assets (log change) 1998-1 Tot. Coll. Borrowing (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4 1998-3 Citigroup 1998-4 1998-2 -.3 -.2 -.1 0.1 Total Assets (log change) -.05 0.05.1 Total Assets (log change) Tot. Coll. Borrowing (log change).3 Goldman Sachs Lehman Brothers 1998-4 1998-2 1998-3 1998-1 Total Assets (log change) Tot. Coll. Borrowing (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Merrill Lynch 1998-4 1998-2 1998-3 Total Assets (log change) 1998-1 Tot. Coll. Borrowing (log change) -.3 Total Repos and Total Assets Morgan Stanley 1998-4 1998-3 1998-1 1998-2 Total Assets (log change) 20
Reverse Repos (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Reverse Repos (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Liquidity and Financial Cycles Bear Sterns 1998-2 1998-4 1998-3 1998-1 Repos (l og change) Reverse Repos (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4.6 1998-3 1998-4 Citigroup 1998-2 -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Repos (log change) Repos (log change) Reverse Repos (log change) Credit Suisse Goldman Sachs -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Repos (l og change) Reverse Repos (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Lehman Brothers 1998-4 1998-2 1998-1 1998-3 Repos (log change) Reverse Repos (log change) -.4 -.2 0.2.4 Total Repos and Reverse Repos Morgan Stanley 1998-4 1998-2 1998-3 1998-1 -.3 Repos (log change) 21
Total Assets Growth and Collateralized Financing Growth Asset weighted -.3 1992-1 1994-1 1996-1 1998-1 2000-1 2002-1 2004-1 2006-1 date Total Coll. Financing (log change) Total Assets (log change) 22
Value at Risk Economic capital K meets total value at risk K = V A A is total assets V is value at risk per dollar of assets. Leverage L satisfies L = A K = 1 V Procyclical leverage arise from counter-cyclical nature of value at risk. Measured risk is low during booms and high during busts. 23
Trading VaR and Total Assets log levels log changes Log Trading VaR 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 Trading VaR (log change) -.5 0.5 12 12.5 13 13.5 14 Log Assets -.1 0.1 Total Assets (log change) Bear Sterns Lehman Brothers Morgan Stanley Goldman Sachs Merrill Lynch Bear Sterns Lehman Brothers Morgan Stanley Goldman Sachs Merrill Lynch 24
Aggregate Impact on Risk Appetite Weekly data on primary dealers with the Federal Reserve, published every Thursday VIX index: options weighted average of implied volatilities of S&P 500 index Volatility risk premium: VIX index realized volatility of S&P Averages over the week (Thursday - Wednesday) 25
Forecasting Risk Appetite Table 5: Forecasting Volatility Risk Premium Volatility Risk Premium (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) Volatility Risk Premium (lag) coef 0.704 0.703 0.700 p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** Repos (lagged growth rate) coef -0.146-0.196 p-value 0.009*** 0.000*** Reverse Repos (lagged growth rate) coef -0.091-0.130 p-value 0.047** 0.000*** Net Repos (lagged growth rate) coef -0.061-0.068 p-value 0.035** 0.001*** Constant coef 4.788 1.428 4.778 1.422 4.782 1.437 p-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** Observations 862 862 862 862 862 862 R-squared 0.8% 50.0% 0.5% 49.5% 0.5% 49.2% 26
Completing the Circle Target leverage Target leverage Stronger balance sheets Increase B/S size Weaker balance sheets Reduce B/S size Asset price boom Asset price decline 27
Aggregate Liquidity Liquidity is the rate of growth of aggregate balance sheets. Strong balance sheets surplus marked-to-market capital surplus capacity in banking system For surplus capacity to be utilized, intermediaries expand their balance sheets. Ontheliabilitiesside,takeonmoreshort-termdebt. On the asset side, search for potential borrowers How hard do financial intermediaries search for borrowers? Sub-primemortgagemarket Debt financing of private equity 28
Liquidity and Money Stock? What is the link between liquidity and the money stock? Broad money is liability of deposit-taking banks. In financial systems dominated by deposit-taking banks, money stock tracks aggregate balance sheets. 19th and early 20th centuries, developing countries today but poor indicator of aggregate liquidity for market-oriented financial system Focus on the right analogies for classical notion of money. Forget money as means of exchange Reposaretherightfulsuccessorsof money 29