TRADE COLLAPSE DURING THE 2009 CRISIS: HOW DID EUROPEAN COMPANIES FARE? LESSONS FROM

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TRADE COLLAPSE DURING THE 2009 CRISIS: HOW DID EUROPEAN COMPANIES FARE? LESSONS FROM SEVEN COUNTRIES Gábor Békés, Miklós Koren, Balázs Muraközy & László Halpern (Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ) 10 September 2011 / ETSG Copenhagen G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 1

Great recession, trade collapse and research agendas 2009: massive shock to European economies Trade collapsed, falling by 30% in early 2009 Policy related questions: Did all firms in Europe suffer? What are key differences? EFIGE project Policy Report forthcoming by CEPR & Bruegel in October G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 2

Synchronized export change in EU countries G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 3

This paper - Motivated by policy There is a large shock Policy makers believe it is temporary Thus, want to protect existing producers etc How did the crisis affect firms? Maybe useful for next crisis G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 4

Related theory/evidence on crisis 1. Trade decline strongly correlated across developed countries 2. Demand decline led to systematic decline in trade 3. In exports, the extensive margin is small 4. Composition - durables, intermediate goods sectors more volatile 5. Value chains - vertical linkages exacerbate shocks 6. Value chains - outsourcing helps reduce volatility of HQ 7. Imports decline through volatile inventory cycle 8. The effect of trade credit is uncertain 9. Labour flexibility useful but may increase short term impact 10. Significant fiscal stimulus to attenuate the crisis effect G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 5

Data Introduce variables Methodology Results Policy G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 6

Data EFIGE Dataset: 15,000 firms surveyed across 7 countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, UK) Manufacturing firms only Survey in 2010 targeting year 2008 /2009 The questionnaire is mainly focused on 2008, Crisis indicator variables were asked directly, such as how did sales or export change in 2009 compared with 2008. Representative survey plus weights (industry, size, regional location) 7

Data measuring the impact of crisis Some questions in survey targeted specifically at the crisis The key outcome variables that firms reported are 1. reduction (if any) in sales between 2008 and 2009, 2. the percentage change in exports 3. the percentage change in employment. Sales: multiple outcome variable: Change 2009/08: 0 if sales rose or were unchanged, 1 for small (0-10%) decline, 2 for moderate (10-30%) decline 3 for large decline (>30%). G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 8

What affected firm performace? - Topics 1) Synchronized shock -- Synchronized response?. 2) The role of trade 3) Labor composition 4) Internationalization (ownership, outsourcing) 5) Finance 6) Fiscal policy G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 9

What affected firm performace? - Topics 1) Synchronized shock -- Synchronized response?. 2) The role of trade 3) Labor composition 4) Internationalization (ownership, outsourcing) 5) Finance 6) Fiscal policy G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 10

Methodology: Regressions (1) D _ sales = α + βx i + γcd i + ε i (2) D _ exp orts = α + β X i + γ CD i + ε i (3) D _ employment = α + βx + γcd + φd _ sales + ε Xi is a vector of different firm-level variables For employment, we control for sales decline, S (2), (3) OLS (1) Interval regression CDi is a set of country, 2-digit industry and size dummies Weighted regressions (to control for survey bias) i i i i G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 11

Methodology: Interval regression Sales: multiple outcome variable: Change 2009/08: 0 if sales rose or were unchanged, 1 for small (0-10%) decline, 2 for moderate (10-30%) decline 3 for large decline (>30%). Interval regression ordered probit with cut points fixed and with coefficients and variance estimated by maximum likelihood Results - percentage change. +%: increase in sales Results robust to using OLS with mid-points instead G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 12

Variables measuring the impact of crisis (Xi) Firm response = f(firm properties) Internationalisation exporter, importer of intermediate goods Does outsourcing, did FDI Organisation of the firm Ownership (home, foreign), place in a group Labor Skill composition Finance Reliance on external financing Use trade credit G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 13

RESULTS G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 14

#1. Heterogeneity in sales response Global financial shock affected all European countries at a similar fashion Yet firm reaction was diverse Sales, exports Change in sales Frequency (%) Larger decline than 30 % 18.1 Between 30-10 % decline 34.4 Smaller decline than 10% 19.1 No change or growth. 28.4 G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 15

#1 Frequency of export volume change of 2009 vs 2008 national diversity in reaction G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 16

#1 Frequency of export volume change of 2009 vs 2008 industry differences matter some G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 17

#1 Frequency of export volume change of 2009 vs 2008 size does not matter much G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 18

#1. Heterogeneity in export response G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 19

#1 Heterogeneity in export response: 2% exit G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 20

# 1: There is heterogeneity in sales change Fact 1a: Regarding declining sales and exports, some diversity Countries: highest decline in Hungary and Spain, lowest in Austria and Germany) Industries (food sector stable, metal production declining the most). Firm size did not matter, small and large firms performed similarly. Fact 1b: Firm level heterogeneity is overwhelmingly Over 13% and 18% of firms were able to sustain or even increase their sales even in the worst hit industries (metal products) and countries (Spain), respectively. Differences within sector, country, size G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 21

#2 Internationalization and sales change in crisis Internationalisation exporter, importer of intermediate goods Importer of services did FDI Look at overall sales and exporters only G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 22

#2 Internationalization and sales change in crisis Dep. Var. Sales decline All firms All firms Exporters Exporter dummy -2.173*** -2.219*** (0.381) (0.383) Importer dummy 0.776** 0.733* 0.846* (0.377) (0.38) (0.433) Import services dummy 0.195 0.184 (0.633) (0.672) FDI dummy 1.494* 2.069** (0.885) (0.916) Observations 14412 14412 9622 Control variables -Sector -Region -Firm size category McKelveyZavoina_R2 0.0798 0.0799 0.07 G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 23

#2: Trade contributes to the transmission of the crisis Fact 3: Exporters contracted more than non-exporters, while importers suffered less of a decline. small effects on the extensive margin exporters decline significantly more than non-exporters (2.5 percent) intermediate importers fare somewhat better than non-importers (0.8pp) Country differences reflect domestic macro G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 24

#3: Firms laying off unskilled workers more Firms employing skilled workers laid off less employees compared to other firms faced with a similar fall in demand. (White collar and skilled blue collar) vs unskilled G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 25

#4 Value chain Supply chain/value chain/linkages Produced-to-order goods share Outsources some production Share of output used as intermediate of other domestic sectors Effect of input-output linkages linkage measured at the country/industry level (we control for both country and industry FE), estimates = variation across countries within the same industry. Firms in countries and industries with a larger share of output going to other producers suffer a larger sales decline. G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 26

#4 Value chain Supply chain/value chain/linkages Produced-to-order goods share (-) Outsources some production (+) Share of output used as intermediate of other domestic sectors (-) Effect of input-output linkages linkage measured at the country/industry level (we control for both country and industry FE), estimates = variation across countries within the same industry. Firms in countries and industries with a larger share of output going to other producers suffer a larger sales decline. G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 27

#4 Value chain 2 Control - firms in different parts of the governance network. controlling firms firms: have affiliates or are the head of a network. controlled by others : firms that are subordinate members of a network, or have been acquired by another firm Effects employment reaction more than sales G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 28

#4 Value chain 2 Control - firms in different parts of the governance network. controlling firms firms: have affiliates or are the head of a network. (+) controlled by others : firms that are subordinate members of a network, or have been acquired by another firm (-) Effects employment reaction more than sales G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 29

# 4: The value/supply chain may provide insurance against demand shocks. If you are the buyer. Firms did worse: producing a large fraction of their output to order selling a large fraction to other firms Firms did better Did FDI before Do outsourcing Control other companies. Impact is largest when firm in country/industry faced with large shock G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 30

# 5: Financially constrained firms contract more Firms relying on external finance and experiencing financial constraints to growth (before the crisis) experienced a greater sales decline. The use of trade credit itself did not prove to be a significant factor. G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 31

# 6: Counter-cyclical fiscal policy may help mitigate the effects of the crisis on firms Counter-cyclical fiscal policy may help mitigate the effects of the crisis on firms while home brewed crisis (such as in Spain and Hungary) will substantially reduce sales. G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 32

#6 Traders lost more in sales revenue with country differences: domestic policy matters BACK G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 33

Insight for policy 1:Export not enough Industry difference is small (exc food) and size does not matter Import, outsource actually helps in bad times Fiscal policy can make big difference in bad times - room needed G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 34

Insight for policy 2: Dominant firms Dominant firms, centrally placed in the technology, trade and ownership network, fared better. Firms producing final goods relying on skilled workers. Not making specific products ordered by large customers Relying on a network of suppliers (importing /outsourcing) Controlling other companies at home or abroad In crises, policy should focus on helping stabilize firms that are in weaker position, owned by foreign / larger firms making less skill-intensive products Being a supplier, making specific products to large customers G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 35

Thanks for the attention! BEKES@IEHAS.HU WWW.EFIGE.ORG G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 36

Key findings 1) Despite a synchronized, large macro-economic shock, the firm response was rather diverse. There is a large heterogeneity but firm size made no difference. 2) Firms reduced employment less than their sales had dropped, and firms with relatively more skilled workers preserved more jobs. 3) Exporters contracted more than non-exporters, while importers suffered less of a decline. 4) Outsourcing firms and firms that control other companies fared somewhat better, while firms relying on specific demand of others lost more. 5) Firms relying on external finance and experiencing financial constraints experienced a greater sales decline. Firms with more pre-crisis tangible assets (e.g. properties) or relying on local bank finance were particularly constrained. 6) Expansionary fiscal policy both mitigated the effects of the crisis through supporting general domestic demand and maintaining orders of public bodies for supplying firms. G. Békés (23/06/2011): Crisis and EU firms 37