Online Appendix Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending

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Online Appendix Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from day Lending Will Dobbie Harvard University Paige Marta Skiba Vanderbilt University March 2013

Online Appendix Table 1 Difference-in-Difference Estimates of the Effect of Loan Amount on Default (1) (2) Loan Amount 0.036 0.035 (0.021) (0.022) Age 0.452 (0.033) Black 1.120 (1.834) Male 0.800 (1.551) Credit Score 0.040 (0.004) Checkings 0.000 (0.002) Home Owner 1.042 (1.617) Direct Deposit 0.322 (1.421) Garnishment 8.535 (5.932) Observations 10,279 10,279 Notes: This table reports difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of loan amount on default. The sample consists of first-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1100 every two weeks. We instrument for loan size using a linear trend in income interacted with an indicator variable for living in Tennessee and being eligible for a $200 loan. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. The dependent variable is an indicator for bouncing a check on the first loan. Coefficients and robust standard errors are multiplied by 100. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. 1

Online Appendix Table 2 OLS Estimates of Borrower Characteristics on Loan Choice RD Sample RK Sample (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 0.074 0.076 0.020 0.006 0.006 0.016 (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Age 0.152 0.156 0.026 0.031 (0.038) (0.038) (0.011) (0.011) Black 8.281 8.558 0.838 0.718 (2.968) (2.985) (0.472) (0.467) Male 0.894 1.238 1.187 1.882 (2.739) (2.707) (0.491) (0.487) Credit Score 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.002 (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) Checkings 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) Home Owner 1.011 0.885 4.191 4.371 (2.915) (2.914) (0.549) (0.545) Direct Deposit 0.167 1.047 2.260 0.748 (2.183) (2.165) (0.383) (0.381) Garnishment 0.594 0.958 0.258 0.641 (7.422) (7.368) (1.531) (1.516) Loan Eligibility 0.202 0.094 (0.021) (0.002) R 2 0.242 0.246 0.254 0.166 0.168 0.182 Observations 9,473 9,473 9,473 130,025 130,025 130,025 Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of the cross-sectional correlation between borrower characteristics and loan choice. The regression discontinuity (RD) sample consists of first-time paydayloan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1100 every two weeks. The regression kink (RK) sample consists of first-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1000 of a kink point. The dependent variable is an indicator for choosing the largest loan the borrower is eligible for. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Coefficients and robust standard errors are multiplied by 100. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. 2

Online Appendix Table 3 Regression Discontinuity Tests of Quasi-Random Assignment Polynomial Spline Linear Characteristics (1) (2) (3) Age 0.204 0.260 0.021 (0.295) (0.289) (0.528) 9443 9443 9443 Black 0.012 0.007 0.021 (0.025) (0.027) (0.043) 1316 1316 1316 Male 0.005 0.009 0.038 (0.027) (0.028) (0.044) 1316 1316 1316 Credit Score 2.537 4.855 18.322 (7.281) (7.357) (13.882) 2165 2165 2165 Checkings 4.954 6.268 17.160 (16.305) (16.800) (32.300) 2274 2274 2274 Home Owner 0.007 0.004 0.042 (0.027) (0.028) (0.047) 1160 1160 1160 Direct Deposit 0.000 0.004 0.006 (0.018) (0.018) (0.032) 2350 2350 2350 Garnishment 0.009 0.009 0.006 (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) 1160 1160 1160 Density Test Nbr. of Borrowers 2.208 2.309 28.313 (1.929) (1.857) (24.044) 100 100 10 Notes: This table reports tests of quasi-random assignment in our regression discontinuity design. The sample consists of first-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1100 every two weeks. Column 1 controls for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Column 2 controls for a linear spline in net pay. Column 3 stacks data from each cutoff and controls for net pay using a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. Loan eligibility is the maximum loan size an individual is eligible for. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay. Number of borrowers is defined using $10 bins in pay. See text for additional details. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. 3

Appenidx Table 4 Regression Kink Tests of Quasi-Random Assignment $300 $500 Cutoff Cutoff Characteristics (1) (2) Age 0.209 0.142 (0.112) (0.036) 33,164 96,631 Black 0.013 (0.003) 40,878 Male 0.006 (0.003) 40,878 Credit Score 1.229 (0.738) 91,261 Checkings 0.540 (2.421) 89,844 Home Owner 0.008 (0.003) 34,133 Direct Deposit 0.025 (0.002) 91,790 Garnishment 0.002 (0.001) 34,133 Density Test Nbr. of Borrowers 4.754 1.546 (5.528) (4.490) 61 77 Notes: This table reports tests of quasi-random assignment in our regression kink design. The sample consists of first-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning more than $100 and within $1000 of a kink point. Loan cutoff is an indicator for eligibility for the largest loan available in a state. All regressions using baseline characteristics control pay and month-, year-, and state-ofloan effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay. Number of borrowers is defined using $10 bins in pay. Regressions using the number of borrowers control for a seventh-order polynomial in pay interacted with the loan cutoff. See text for additional details. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. 4

Online Appendix Table 5 Regression Discontinuity Falsification Test of the First Stage Polynomial Linear Spline Local Linear (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Loan Cutoff 2.750 2.755 2.864 2.860 1.657 1.790 (2.074) (2.063) (2.074) (2.064) (1.042) (1.167) Age 0.149 0.149 0.142 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) Black 1.233 1.234 1.166 (1.021) (1.021) (0.994) Male 1.893 1.890 2.028 (1.116) (1.116) (1.116) Credit Score 0.005 0.005 0.006 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) Checkings 0.006 0.006 0.006 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Home Owner 9.371 9.362 9.408 (1.264) (1.263) (1.261) Direct Deposit 0.710 0.719 0.375 (0.823) (0.823) (0.751) Garnishment 2.675 2.662 2.651 (3.371) (3.370) (3.368) Observations 101,026 101,026 101,026 101,026 101,026 101,026 Notes: This table reports regression discontinuity first-stage estimates in a sample of states where no effect is expected. The sample consists of first-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1100 every two weeks. Columns 1-2 control for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Columns 3-4 control for a linear spline in net pay. Columns 5-6 stack data from each cutoff and control for net pay using a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. The dependent variable is the dollar amount of the borrower s first loan. Loan eligibility is the maximum loan size an individual is eligible for. All regressions control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Columns 5 and 6 also control for cutoff fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. 5

Online Appendix Table 6 Regression Discontinuity Falsification Test of the Main Results Polynomial Linear Spline Local Linear (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Loan Amount 0.127 0.110 0.121 0.091 0.014 0.021 (0.158) (0.131) (0.128) (0.126) (0.025) (0.023) Age 0.307 0.304 0.301 (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) Black 2.966 2.990 3.111 (0.344) (0.338) (0.291) Male 2.401 2.361 2.121 (0.416) (0.406) (0.381) Credit Score 0.019 0.019 0.016 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Checkings 0.002 0.001 0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Home Owner 2.321 2.143 1.728 (1.288) (1.240) (0.503) Direct Deposit 1.920 1.907 1.433 (0.305) (0.302) (0.423) Garnishment 0.878 0.839 0.939 (1.288) (1.275) (1.258) Observations 101,026 101,026 101,026 101,026 101,026 101,026 Notes: This table reports regression discontinuity estimates of loan amount on default in a sample of states where no effect is expected. The sample consists of first-time payday-loan borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly earning between $100 and $1100 every two weeks. Columns 1-2 control for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Columns 3-4 control for a linear spline in net pay. Columns 5-6 stack data from each cutoff and control for net pay using a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. The dependent variable is an indicator for bouncing a check on the first loan. All regressions instrument for loan amount using loan eligibility and control for month-, year-, and state-of-loan effects. Columns 5 and 6 also control for cutoff fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by pay. Coefficients and standard errors are multiplied by 100. *** = significant at 1 percent level, ** = significant at 5 percent level, * = significant at 10 percent level. 6

Online Appendix Figure 1A Regression Discontinuity Tests of Quasi-Random Assignment Baseline Characteristics Age Age 25 30 35 40 Age 25 30 35 40 Residualized Age -2-1 0 1 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear Fraction Black Black.4.6.8 1 Black.4.6.8 1 Residualized Black -.05 0.05 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear Fraction Male Male 0.2.4.6.8 Male 0.2.4.6.8 Residualized Male -.3 -.2 -.1 0.1 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear Credit Score Credit Score 400 450 500 550 600 Credit Score 400 450 500 550 600 Residualized Credit Score 0 50 100 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear 7

Checking Balance Checkings 0 Checkings 0 Residualized Checkings -200-100 0 100 200 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear Home Ownership Home Owner 0.2.4.6.8 Home Owner 0.2.4.6.8 Residualized Home Owner -.05 0.05.1.15 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear Direct Deposit Direct Deposit.1.2.3.4.5.6 Direct Deposit.1.2.3.4.5.6 Residualized Direct Deposit -.06 -.04 -.02 0.02.04 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear Garnishment Garnishment Flag 0.1.2.3 Garnishment Flag 0.1.2.3 Residualized Garnishment Flag -.02 0.02.04 A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline C. Local Linear 8

Notes: These figures plot baseline characteristics and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regression discontinuity sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1100. The smoothed line in the first column of figures controls for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. The second column controls for a linear spline in net pay. The third column stacks data from each cutoff and controls for net pay using a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text for additional details. 9

Online Appendix Figure 1B Regression Discontinuity Tests of Quasi-Random Assignment Number of Observations A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline Number of Borrowers 0 20 40 60 80 Number of Borrowers 0 20 40 60 80 C. Local Linear Number of Borrowers 260 280 300 320 340 Notes: These figures plot the number of borrowers and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regression discontinuity sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $50 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1100. The smoothed line in the first figure controls for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. The second figure controls for a linear spline in net pay. The third figure stacks data from each cutoff and controls for net pay using a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text for additional details. 10

Online Appendix Figure 2A Regression Kink Results Test of Quasi-Random Assignment Fraction Black Fraction Male Black.3.4.5.6.7 Male.2.4.6.8 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap Credit Score 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap Checking Balance Credit Score 400 450 500 550 Checkings 100 200 300 400 500 600 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap Home Ownership 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap Direct Deposit Home Owner.05.1.15.2 Direct Deposit.2.3.4.5.6 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap 11

Garnishment Age Garnishment Flag 0.005.01.015.02 Age 30 35 40 45 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $500 Cap 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $300 Cap $500 Cap Notes: These figures plots average baseline characteristics and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regression kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly and earning more than $100 and within $1000 of a kink point. The smoothed line controls for pay interacted with being eligible for the maximum loan size in a state. Age is the only baseline characteristic available for states with a $300 cap. See text for additional details. 12

Online Appendix Figure 2B Regression Kink Results Test of Quasi-Random Assignment Number of Borrowers 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 $300 Cap $500 Cap Notes: This figure plots the number of borrowers and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in our regression kink sample. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly and earning more than $100 and within $1000 of a kink point. The smoothed line controls for a seventh-order polynomial in pay interacted with being eligible for the maximum loan size in a state. See text for additional details. 13

Online Appendix Figure 3 Regression Discontinuity Falsification Test of First Stage A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline Loan Amount 50 100 150 200 250 300 Loan Amount 50 100 150 200 250 300 C. Local Lineaer Residualized Loan Amount -2-1 0 1 2 Relative to Loan Eligibility Notes: These figures plot average loan size and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in a sample of states where no effect is expected. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1100. The smoothed line in Figure A controls for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Figure B controls for a linear spline in net pay. Figure C stacks data from each cutoff and controls for net pay using a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text for additional details. 14

Online Appendix Figure 4 Regression Discontinuity Falsification Test of Main Results A. Polynomial B. Linear Spline Fraction Default.1.15.2.25 Fraction Default.1.15.2.25 C. Local Linear Residualized Fraction Default -.04 -.02 0.02.04 Relative to Loan Eligibility Notes: These figures plot average default and biweekly pay for first-time payday borrowers in a sample of states where no effect is expected. The sample consists of borrowers living in states offering payday loans in $1 or $10 increments who are paid biweekly or semimonthly between $100 and $1100. The smoothed line in Figure A controls for a seventh-order polynomial in net pay. Figure B controls for a linear spline in net pay. Figure C stacks data from each cutoff and controls for net pay using a linear regression and a linear regression interacted with the loan cutoff. See text for additional details. 15